

ALGERIA Vol.I

ALGERIA Vol.I

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	Intelligence Memorandum	Jan 69	B
4	memo	Haig to HAK	2/5/69	B
7A	report	Biography	n.d.	B
13	report	Intelligence Information Cable	9/14/73	B
16	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	7/17/74	B
16A	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	6/11/74	B
19	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	5/22/74	B
25	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	2/14/74	B
29	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	1/14/74	B
44	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	6/27/73	B
45	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	7/31/73	B
46	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	6/14/73	B
47	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	4/25/73	B
49	telegram	USINT Algiers to Sec State	4/11/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

735

FOLDER TITLE

(1)

[1]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
50	telegram	USINT Algiers to SecState	3/30/73	B
51	telegram	USINT Algiers to SecState	3/30/73	B
54	telegram	USINT Algiers to SecState	3/19/73	B
81	telegram	USINT Algiers to SecState	9/9/70	B
100	telegram	Amemb Algiers to SecState	3/14/69	B
105	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	10/12/73	B
106	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	6/29/73	B
110	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers, et. al.	6/21/72	B
116	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	11/3/71	B
126	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers, et. al.	10/16/70	B
205	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	4/30/74	B
212	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	2/12/74	B
218	telegram	SecState to USINT Algiers	10/26/73	B
227	telegram	SecState to Amemb Algiers, et. al.	2/11/70	B
230	telegram	Amemb Tunis to SecState	2/14/69	B
231	cable	DIRNSA to White House	8/28/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

*Intelligence
Note* - 145

MAR 20 10 39 AM '69
March 19, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: New Directions in the Maghreb

Diplomatic activity in the Maghreb has quickened since the successful visit in January of Algerian President Houari Boumediene to Morocco. "Non-alignment" is again the watchword in Morocco and Algeria--although not yet in Tunisia or Libya. While this new climate may place some limits on Soviet influence, it can also have significant drawbacks for the US. But the enhanced stability it provides an area important to US interests may be worth the risks.

New Mood in the Maghreb. The Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement has been the major agent of change.¹ Apparently determined to live up to the friendship treaty they signed in January, Morocco and Algeria have now signed a financial accord. Both have been seeking to promote a Maghreb summit to bring Tunisia and Libya into line. The advent of a new administration in Washington, the Nixon-de Gaulle talks, and the suggestion of Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella that the Mediterranean be cleared of both the US and Soviet fleets have contributed to an atmosphere of international ferment that has affected the mood in the Maghreb.

Morocco Searching for New Partners. Since France suspended a good part of its aid following the Ben Barka affair in late 1965, Morocco has been seeking more diplomatic latitude. The June 1967 war in the Middle East--and

¹See Intelligence Note 42, "Boumediene's Visit to Morocco: A New Era in Moroccan-Algerian Relations," January 24, 1969 (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM).

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protracted US delays in honoring a commitment in 1967 to supply \$14 million in arms--induced Morocco to seek a more neutralist coloration in its diplomacy. One result has been a gradual warming in Morocco's relations with the USSR, reflected in increased trade and economic assistance. The Moroccans are now looking forward to a visit by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny in April in the hope of obtaining more economic assistance for their new five-year plan. Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki has also expressed interest in a "Mediterranean pact" that he apparently sees as growing out of the Castiella proposal. At the same time, the Moroccans have been probing for an invitation for King Hassan to visit Washington.

Algeria Seeking Alternatives. Algeria is also trying to avoid too great a dependence on either of its major aid donors--France or the USSR. Stung by Western criticism of increasing Algerian dependence on the USSR, Boumediene has moved to demonstrate his independence by bettering relations with his conservative neighbors. To draw a rein on the Soviets, the Algerians have sought more French military assistance and have agreed to a visit by French Foreign Minister Debre in May. They, as well as the Moroccans, are now preparing to receive Podgorny and probably hope this will help keep the French on their toes. To keep both countries in line they have hinted at an improvement in relations with the US and have recently received a private delegation of Americans interested in increased trade.

Tunisia and Libya More Cautious. Tunisia and Libya have been less quick to respond to these new currents. Tunisia fears, moreover, that Algeria

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and Morocco may be trying to impose a new pattern on the Maghreb. In January the Tunisians obtained some promising results in talks with the Algerians on economic cooperation. Later, however, the Algerians attempted to force through a quick border settlement, with the predictable result that the Tunisians dug in their heels. Both Tunisia and Libya have been seeking nonetheless to broaden their diplomatic options. Tunisia has been moving ahead on its rapprochement with France.¹ Libya, having recently signed a friendship treaty with Algeria, is scheduling visits for the spring by Crown Prince Hassan al-Rida to its Maghreb neighbors and to France.

Implications for the US. The move towards "non-alignment" resulting from the Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement may have more immediate drawbacks for the US than for the USSR. Although Morocco apparently interprets the new relationship as calling for more Soviet and neutralist influence in its foreign policy, Algeria has not shown a corresponding interest in moving closer to the US or other Western countries. Boumediene has recently branded the US Sixth Fleet--but not the Soviet Fleet--as "dangerous" to its independence. Even so, Algeria's decision to improve relations with its neighbors probably constitutes a significant commitment to stabilizing an area long torn by rivalries and suspicions and in which the US retains important interests.

¹See Intelligence Note 91, "Franco-Tunisian Rapprochement: Interests Converging," February 14, 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM).

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MAR 14 8 59 AM '69

*Intelligence
Note* - 175

March 13, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *by A.C.D.*
Subject: GUINEA: Sekou Toure's Formula for Staying in Power

"The causes of imperialist victories in certain African countries which have adhered to socialism are rooted less in the insufficiencies of national democracy than in the treason or ideological and moral weakness of some of their cadres."

Sekou Toure, January 1, 1969

Still feeling the shock waves from the coup last November that toppled Modibo Keita in Mali, President Sekou Toure of Guinea is acting on the assumption that a similar fate may be in preparation for him. He has reason to be concerned. Some Guinean leftists seem to be attracted by the communist argument that Toure's regime, classified like Keita's as a "national democracy," is fraught with contradictions and not viable. Some army officers as well have reason to be disenchanted with Toure and might like to see him overthrown. His rejection of criticism of national democracy and his renewed efforts to tighten control over the army reflect his uneasiness.

The Army... Toure first reacted to the Mali coup by tightening party controls over the army, apparently calculating that the risk of inaction was greater than the risk of provoking the military into action against him. He was probably right. As it was, two lieutenants and a warrant officer were implicated in February by an officer loyal to Toure

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in a plot to assassinate him. Later, another loyal officer, a pilot, thwarted the efforts of the accused plotters to escape to Mali in a hijacked plane. The government's public acknowledgement of the episode stressed the role of the "heroes" who defended the regime. Toure was unwilling to press his luck with the army very far, however, and took the precaution of placing the plotters in the custody of the Republican Guard, an autonomous military unit that is responsible directly to him. The men are to be tried before a Revolutionary Tribunal.

...And the Left. The overthrow of President Modibo Keita's "national democratic" regime by the military has predictably had a demoralizing effect on Guinea's leftists. Toure appeared to be responding to them as much as to foreign communists when he said in a speech on New Year's Day that Marxist-Leninist parties were wrong when they concluded that "national democratic" regimes were not viable. Possibly he was aware of reports that the "errors" of his regime and the "contradictions" within the army, the militia, the party, and the administration were being discussed in Cuba by Cuban officials and a mission from Algeria. Toure may well have been concerned about the impact of foreign influence on his militants when he dismissed 150 foreign teachers and closed down a faculty in Guinea's highest educational institution in early March. The majority of Guinea's foreign faculty come from communist states.

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Strong Medicine. Toure has invoked the spectre of external (i.e., French) mischief-makers and has pleaded with communist ambassadors to increase their aid in order to help save the Guinean revolution. He may even be contemplating a showcase trial. Radio Conakry announced on March 11 that an unspecified number of plotters had been arrested and would be tried for conspiring to assassinate Guinea's leaders.

The Toure Touch. Toure still apparently has something going for him that has been present throughout Guinea's history: no group is so alienated that it contains no one loyal to him. Any Guinean casting about for collaborators in an anti-Toure plot must move extremely carefully. Moreover, Toure clearly hopes that those who think the time is ripe for change will get the message from the recent arrests. It is a lesson he last tried to drive home in a treason case in 1965. Then, as now, the culprits were linked to French "imperialism." Nor is he forgiving of the putative foreign "interventionist." French-Guinean relations were broken in 1965 and have remained so ever since.

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16587

SECRET Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

October 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: President Boumediene's Reorientation of
Algerian Foreign Policy: Implications
for the United States.

Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of
a memorandum dated October 24 concerning Algerian
foreign policy.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. for
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET Enclosure

4021



SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S
16483

OCT 24 1969

SUBJECT: Boumediene's Reorientation of Algerian Foreign
Policy: Implications for the United States -

Algerian President Houari Boumediene made an important foreign policy address on October 21 at a conference of Algerian chiefs of mission. His diplomats were told that, with one exception, they would all soon be transferred to inaugurate a new foreign policy asserting the priority of internal over external affairs. Algeria would shun the example of those "progressive" regimes that had played a "vanguard" role on the international scene only to collapse for internal reasons.

Algeria's foreign policy priorities would henceforth be in this order: "material, political, and ideological". The main emphasis would be on setting Algeria's economic and financial house in order, and the performance of ambassadors' would be rated accordingly.

Boumediene said that Algerian foreign policy would also be based on a number of key principles: (1) independence of all foreign powers, whatever their position; (2) stability, peace and non-interference in the Maghreb; (3) mutual "co-operation" rather than "alms"; (4) an abhorrence of blocs, military bases, and special preserves; (5) in the Middle East an "escalation of armed struggle" by the Palestinians themselves - which he stated somewhat defensively was not an "extremist" position but simply an extension of Algeria's own independence creed; and (6) continued support to Vietman and the African liberation movements.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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What stands out in this speech is the emphasis on Boumediene's personal philosophy of concentration on internal goals. The theme had figured in earlier Boumediene speeches but had never been fully woven into Algerian foreign policy. Until the past year Boumediene's attention had been preoccupied with internal problems. With these now in hand, he is free to turn more to foreign affairs and to lean more in that field on his own ideas.

This is an attractive refrain, since the assertion of economic interests can be used to justify a bettering of relations with the U.S. In any event, the downgrading of political and ideological concerns may signal the emergence of a more pragmatic, technocratically-oriented Algeria.

Nowhere in the October 21 speech was the U.S. attacked. The old self-image of a beleaguered socialist Algeria "surrounded" by hostile pro-Western states appears to have disappeared. Even the sharper passages in the speech relating to the Middle East seemed designed mainly to demonstrate that Algeria had not renounced its revolutionary heritage.

But it was probably too much to expect that Algeria would completely foresake its old ways. On October 22, Boumediene - perhaps reacting to criticisms of his previous mildness - corrected the record on the U.S. with respect both to Vietnam and the Middle East. He explained that Algeria's criticism of the U.S. had nothing to do with purely national interests but was directed to the international role of the U.S., which he described as "hostile" to just causes. In private, the Algerians now tend to tone down this kind of language, but not yet, it appears, for general consumption.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


June 2, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Algerian-Moroccan Rapprochement
Further Consolidated

Enclosed is a copy of an information
memorandum prepared for the Secretary of
State by the Bureau of African Affairs.

for 
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

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CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

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CONFIDENTIAL

June 2, 1970

SUBJECT: Algerian-Moroccan Rapprochement Further
Consolidated - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Algerian President Boumediene and Morocco's King Hassan met May 27 and moved closer toward a resolution of remaining bilateral problems, including the territorial dispute that led to the 1963 "border war" between them. The two Chiefs-of-State agreed to set up a joint commission to demarcate the border and a joint company to exploit the rich iron ore deposits located in the disputed Tindouf area. In what may be an Algerian payment for Moroccan concessions on the border claim, the two sides agreed to coordinate their action to "liberate" the Spanish Sahara, claimed by Morocco.

Hassan and Boumediene have, despite the major differences in their political orientation, passed another landmark in the gradual evolution toward regional cooperation in the Maghreb. The agreement on frontiers strongly suggests Boumediene has won a major concession from Hassan in exchange for promises of future cooperation. The close association with "revolutionary" Algeria is, however, useful to Hassan against his domestic enemies on the left. It also strengthens Hassan's posture in dealing with the growing pressures throughout the Arab world for greater commitments to the struggle against Israel.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S - 7102257

February 16, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Background Data on Algeria
for Mr. McCracken

orig. sent 2/17/71
Please transmit to Paul W. McCracken, Chairman,
Council of Economic Advisers, the enclosed background
information on Algeria. Mr. McCracken is meeting with
the Head of the Algerian Interests Section on Wednesday,
February 17, at 3:00 p.m.

Paul W. Borg
for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure: Background Information on Algeria

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

February 16, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Background Information for Call by Head
of Algerian Interests Section, Abdelkader
Bousselham, on Paul W. McCracken, Chairman,
Council of Economic Advisers

Status of Relations with US

Algeria broke relations in June 1967. There has been a significant improvement in economic relations during the past two years. The assignment to Washington of a senior official, Abdelkader Bousselham, (bio data enclosed), in December 1970 was one of the first significant signs of forward political movement.

When a resumption of diplomatic relations takes place, it will stem chiefly from the Algerian desire for US technology and capital and interest in the American market for its huge reserves of natural gas (third largest in the world). We do not attach political conditions to the approval of commercial transactions between us. However, we have cautioned the Algerians that there are "outer limits" on what we can do in the absence of diplomatic relations (e.g., Eximbank financing of major projects).

Expropriation Disputes and Outlook for Bilateral Economic Relations

In 1967 Algeria nationalized or placed under state control the assets of eight American petroleum or petroleum service companies. Two of the eight, Getty and Dresser Industries, negotiated new joint venture arrangements (Algeria requires 51% ownership). Three, Atlantic-Richfield/Sinclair, Phillips, and Mobil, signed compensation agreements within the past eight months. Esso and Newmont Mining still have expropriation claims, totaling about \$20 million.

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The eighth company, El Paso Natural Gas, has signed two agreements with SONATRACH (Algerian state oil company) to purchase liquefied natural gas for importation to the US East Coast. The first agreement, signed in October 1969, is for the LNG equivalent of one billion feet³ per day for 25 years. This project will require an investment of \$1 billion, 2/3 of it by SONATRACH. El Paso will invest the other 1/3, not directly in Algeria but for facilities in the US and the LNG tankers. This gas has already been contracted for and applications have been submitted to the Federal Power Commission for import authorizations. Formal hearings will probably begin in March or April. If the project is implemented, it would earn Algeria \$120-\$150 million in foreign exchange each year.

In January 1971, El Paso and SONATRACH signed an agreement for the sale of an additional 500 million feet³ per day for 25 years. El Paso does not intend to apply to the FPC for authorization to import this amount until the FPC has approved at least one of the applications already submitted.

SONATRACH has submitted to Eximbank a request for a loan of \$285 million (10% down, 45% direct credit, 45% guarantees) for the construction of the liquefaction plant connected with the El Paso project. Eximbank President Henry Kearns is visiting Algeria February 15 and 16 and is scheduled to be received by President Boumediene and seven ministers, an accurate indication of the importance Algeria attaches to gaining access to the American money market.

US investment in Algeria since independence has been limited to the establishment of eight small joint ventures, mostly in the petroleum service industries, under which American companies provide equipment and technical personnel.

There is enclosed a summary fact sheet and economic summary.

Enclosures: 1. Bio on Bousselham
2. Summary of Fact Sheet
3. Economic Summary

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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ALGERIA

Summary of Fact Sheet

I. Treaties and Agreements

A. Algeria has no treaty or other security agreements with the United States.

B. Although Algeria follows an independent foreign policy it has close ties with France and the USSR.

II. Security

A. Algeria's military establishment numbers 67,500 men and has an annual budget of \$100 million.

B. The United States has never offered Algeria any military assistance.

C. The Soviet Union is the principal supplier of military aid to Algeria. The latest deliveries of major items took place in the fall of 1970. At least 1,200 Soviet military advisers and technicians are active in virtually every major military sector. France has undertaken measures to reassert its influence and to counterbalance the Soviet presence, particularly in the Air Force.

III. Economic

A. Basic Facts: Algeria has a population of 13.4 million, a 1969 GNP valued at \$3.5 billion and per capita income estimated at \$262. GNP growth rate is about 8%.

B. <u>Trade (\$ million)</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Exports to:		
United States	\$5.3	\$2.3
France	454.	NA
Germany	103.	173.4
Italy	44.	33.6
United Kingdom	39.	52.8
Total Exports	\$830.	\$916.

B. Trade (\$ million) (cont'd) 1968 1969

Imports from:

United States	\$52.8	\$63.8
France	450.	436.3
Italy	46.4	76.8
Germany	44.	92.0
Communist Bloc	23.	N.A.

Total Imports	812.	988.
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COMMENT: Principal imports from the United States include wheat, transportation equipment, and agricultural and drilling machinery. The small Algerian exports to the United States consist mainly of petroleum products.

C. Assistance

1. U.S. economic assistance to Algeria from independence through the severance of diplomatic relations in 1967 totaled \$185.3 million, almost all foodstuffs.

During FY-70, an additional \$3.1 million worth of PL-480 Title II commodities were shipped to Algeria. This program ended in June 1970.

2. Algeria has received over \$1 billion in economic assistance from non-U.S. sources. More than half from France and approximately 20 percent from the Soviet Union.

D. Investment

The assets of most American firms operating in Algeria prior to 1962 have been expropriated by the GOA. Of the seven major firms involved, two have renegotiated new agreements and three have been compensated. Direct U.S. investment since independence has been minimal, but many U.S. petroleum service firms are operating under joint ventures.

The total value of non-U.S. private investment in Algeria at the end of 1969 was estimated at \$53 million.

E. Debt

Total Algerian governmental debt is \$436 million of which \$9.5 million is owed to the United States.

IV. Cultural and Scientific

A. U.S. information and cultural activities are severely limited. CU finances two university professors and helped finance 18 IVS English language teachers during FY-71.

B. USIS has two American employees; FY-70 obligations of \$101,000.

C. During the 1969-70 academic year, 45 Algerian students attended American universities compared with 990 in France and 365 in Communist countries.

V. UN Relations

Algeria and the United States are in opposition on many major issues before the UN. The two countries maintain different views on Chinese representation, on an embargo against southern Africa and Rhodesia, and on political highjacking of aircraft. Algeria appears to be both vocal and influential among the non-aligned nations of the UN.

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J. J. J.

Appendix "B"

Country Summary

ALGERIA

Economy - 60% of 13 million population are engaged in agriculture, but contribute only 13% to GDP. Crude oil and natural gas is the most dynamic sector and principal foreign exchange earner: 19% of GDP, 23% of the government's current budget receipts and 67% of export earnings.

Growth Trends - In 1969 GDP increased by 7% to about \$3.5 billion (per capita GDP \$260). The \$5.5 billion four-year plan 1970-1973 aims at 9% annual growth. Since Algeria has large unexploited mineral resources and inherited a profitable agriculture and efficient infrastructure, development goals are rapid expansion of oil export facilities and creation of basic industries, such as iron and steel, petrochemical and phosphate plants, and several secondary industries.

Balance of Payments - Algeria traditionally achieved a trade surplus (exports of \$869 million vs. imports of \$766 million in 1968) and an over-all surplus of around \$100 million through 1968. Spurred by a large rise in imports (\$952 million in 1969) related to the development effort, a small trade deficit of \$51 million in 1969 was incurred and the year ended with an over-all deficit of \$79 million. In 1970 the trade and over-all deficits are expected to reach \$65 million (\$952 million of exports vs. \$1,015 million of imports) and \$100 million respectively.

To support the development effort, the Algerian government expects to borrow during the 1970-73 period a total of some \$2 billion from external sources, of which \$500 million would be in the form of supplier credits. Even with borrowing on this scale, some deficits are expected to result from the development program, but not quite of the size experienced in 1970.

Even with a rise in oil receipts, Algeria may encounter balance of payments difficulties in the next two years, but by 1973 earnings should increase considerably as new oil and gas projects now under construction will add approximately \$100 million to export proceeds for a total then of some \$1,400 million. If imports do not increase faster than 5 to 6% annually, they will reach \$1,150 million which may mean a trade surplus of some \$250 million.

External Debt - \$1.6 billion (end of 1970), up from \$550 million at the end of 1968. Total debt service in 1970 should take approximately 8-10% of the \$952 million export earnings in 1970. As Algeria plans to add another \$1 billion in debt over the next two years, the debt burden will increase to around 20% by 1972; but is expected to fall by 1973 to about 15% because of the jump in export proceeds.

Reserves - \$317 million in October of 1970 (4 months import cover), down from \$352 million in February and \$478 million at the end of 1968. It was anticipated that reserves would be allowed to drop somewhat, but the unexpectedly rapid fall in the level of reserves in 1970 necessitated restrictions on foreign exchange outlays aiming at stabilizing reserves at not less than \$250 million. Undoubtedly, reserves will remain under pressure at least until 1973.

Creditworthiness - Algeria is likely to encounter balance of payments difficulties for the next two years and pressures on its already low level of reserves. But as the exchange restrictions become fully effective and the oil payment scheme now under negotiation is likely to turn into higher revenues, Algeria should be in a position to meet its external obligations without undue strain. Indications are good that by 1973 Algeria's situation will be considerably more comfortable. Its longer range outlook is favorable.

December 22, 1970

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL P. FILE

NUMBER MO DA HR

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DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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_____ SENSITIVE
_____ PARIS MTG
_____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 02/16/71

SUBJECT: Background data on Algeria for
Mr. Mc Cracker

ENCLOSURES: 5/5 (7102257) () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME:

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY FOR:
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<u>X</u>	
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC		<u>X</u>	
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
RECOMMENDATIONS ()
JOINT MEMO ()
APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
CONCURRENCE ()
DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

Log in Log out

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED

MICROFILM DATA
DO RT
INIT RT
DATE 22 FEB 71
ORIG. NSC
TO J. PAF X
WHC
SUBF

DISPOSITION

Send to Mr Cracker
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

NOTIFY: _____

COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL
PAF X _____ HAK APP'L
WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
SUBF no _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/11
ACTION
29164

SECRET

June 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *7/16*

SUBJECT: Liquid Natural Gas Project in Algeria

I gather that, in response to the attached memorandum, you have asked Mr. Flanigan to hold up for an unspecified period notifying the Federal Power Commission that there is no foreign policy objection to an arrangement between Algeria and the El Paso Natural Gas Company for the import of liquified natural gas from Algeria to the US.

I also understand that Mr. Flanigan may have interpreted something that the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission said as indicating that the Commission does not intend to take a position on this issue until next year and that therefore no statement of foreign policy position from the State Department is necessary.

I may not be aware of all of the elements in this situation, but I want to be sure that you understand the ones that I am aware of. The main point is that the Federal Power Commission initially agreed to move its hearings up so that a ruling could be made one way or another before September. The reason for the September target is that the financial structure of this project is built around bids based on prices that will have to be changed if the project is not underway by mid-September. El Paso has scheduled tankers to be built, and the Algerians are building the liquifaction plant. Estimates on both projects assume prices that would exist if the project begins prior to September 15. In short, those involved in the project say that it will come apart if the present schedule breaks down.

As I understand the decision-making process, it was decided in mid-April to tell President Pompidou that we would hold up for six or seven weeks and then that we would have to move ahead after that. That message was conveyed. The question then is whether there is some new political element in the situation that warrants holding this up further. In the interim between the mid-April message to Pompidou and now the formal government-to-government negotiations between France and

SECRET

*Greenant of
Watson meeting
with Pres. + Connally
meeting
with Pos.
solve problem
up with loans
+ countries
with
appropriation
problems*

SECRET

- 2 -

Algeria broke down. There is some prospect, I understand privately, that the companies may still harbor a hope of working out an arrangement with the Algerian government, and the government of France is attempting to keep the pressure on the Algerian government by trying to block its exports of oil to other European countries. Are we now involved in part of that process? Or in asking Mr. Flanigan to hold up did you have something more general in mind?

Go ahead _____

Hold further because _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
29164

@

SECRET

June 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Next Step on Loan for Algeria

You will recall that in early April President Pompidou asked us to hold off for the time being our Export-Import Bank loan in support of El Paso's arrangement with the Algerian government to import Algerian liquid natural gas into the US. You authorized a response saying that our procedures would prevent any movement for six or seven weeks but that we would have to move ahead after that.

That period has expired. The Ex-Im loan has been approved by the NAC. Ex-Im will make no public announcement but is prepared to give a preliminary commitment this week. Our embassy in Paris has been authorized to explain to the French the current status of the loan.

The next step internally is for State to send a letter on the foreign policy aspects to the Federal Power Commission which is holding hearings now. The Department's position is that the expansion of economic relations with Algeria is desirable and that neither the expropriation disputes nor absence of diplomatic relations preclude commercial transactions such as this. The State memo explains the legalities of purchase by a US company of liquified natural gas from Algeria while negotiations between France and Algeria remain stalled.

The main reason for bringing this to your attention is the attached note from Peter Flanigan. He says you requested him "to delay any action by the FPC for two months." (He does not say, but I assume that dates from Pompidou's approach in early April.) He asks you to let him know by tonight--Monday evening, June 7--whether you have any reason for further delay. If he does not hear from you, he will let the letter go to FPC.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

RECOMMENDATION: That, unless you know of some new reason for delaying the El Paso loan a little longer, General Haig tell Mr. Flanigan it is OK now to go ahead. [He says he will do so anyway if he does not hear June 7.]

Approve _____ Other _____

*Hold up -
Flanigan notified
by Haig 8 June*

SECRET

29164

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1971

URGENT

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN

Attached is a copy of a draft letter from the Department of State to Chairman Nassikas (DOD has proposed sending a similar letter). Also attached is an internal memorandum of the State Department supporting the letter.

Contrary to State's recommendation, you have requested me to delay any action by the Federal Power Commission for two months. I have been unable to reach Nassikas, but will do so on Tuesday, June 8. Would you please review the attached letter and memorandum and confirm to my office by Monday night that you continue to wish action deferred. If no such confirmation is forth-coming, I will assume that you've changed your mind and are prepared to see the Administration move forward along the lines set forth in those documents.

(dictated but not read)

URGENT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Honorable John N. Nassikas
Chairman, Federal Power Commission
Washington, D. C. 20426

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letters dated October 8, 1970 in which you requested the views of the Department of State on the applications filed by El Paso Eastern Company in Docket No. CP71-66 and by El Paso Atlantic Company in Docket No. CP71-67, both subsidiaries of El Paso Natural Gas Company, and on the application filed by Columbia LNG Corporation in Docket No. CP71-68. These applications requested authorization to import a total liquefied natural gas equivalent of about 365 million Mcf per year of natural gas in vaporous state from Algeria for an initial period of 25 years pursuant to Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. This letter also acknowledges your letter of March 19, 1971 in which you stated that the applications by the two El Paso subsidiaries had been withdrawn on November 25, 1970 and had been replaced by applications filed by Southern Energy Company in Docket No. CP71-151 and by Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in Docket No. CP71-153 to import from Algeria the volumes of liquefied natural gas originally requested by the two El Paso subsidiaries.

The Department of State has carefully reviewed the foreign policy aspects of the proposed importation from Algeria. The Department places major importance on the expansion of economic relations with developing countries, including Algeria. The Department further believes that the existence of expropriation disputes involving US or foreign interests should not preclude the approval of commercial transactions. It also believes that the absence of diplomatic relations with a particular country should not preclude the approval of commercial transactions.

The Department is, of course, aware of the recent nationalization by Algeria of the share in the Algerian natural gas industry held by French companies and that the natural gas which would be imported into the United States under the subject applications would originate from fields in which French companies had certain interests. These actions have given rise to claims against Algeria by the French companies concerned.

The Department has noted that the Algerian nationalization of the French equity in these concessions and of other hydrocarbon concessions held by French companies followed a period of negotiations between Algeria and France centering around a revision of the 1965 agreement between the two governments. The 1965 agreement was itself a revision of parts of the Evian Agreements which accorded Algeria its independence in 1962. Both of these agreements encompassed a number of matters between these two countries in addition to hydrocarbons.

The problem of nationalizations of French-owned hydrocarbon concessions in Algeria is, therefore, only one part of a complex bilateral relationship. The Department has noted the acceptance by the Algerian Government of the principle of compensation for the nationalized assets and the Algerian Government has fixed a specific amount of compensation. Although the terms of the Algerian offer may not have been acceptable to the French companies, talks have been taking place between the two parties since the offer was made. In addition, liquefied natural gas imports from Algeria to France have continued and French companies have continued to invest in the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant in Algeria.

There presently exists some unresolved claims against Algeria by US interests. [However, the Department of State has noted the negotiated settlement of several significant expropriation claims by US private interests in Algeria during the past year.]

→ However, most of the major expropriation claims by US private interests in Algeria have been settled by agreement during the past year

- 3 -

There can, of course, be no absolute guarantee that there will be no interruption of supply during any long term contract for the sale of gas. However, the Department believes the security of supply in this case is enhanced by certain factors. Through SONATRACH, the Algerian national oil company which is selling the gas, the Algerian Government will own all the gas facilities in Algeria for this project and will have a major financial stake in continued gas sales. This project is a central part of Algeria's economic development effort and will be an important source of its foreign exchange earnings. Furthermore, different components of this project are highly interrelated and large-scale exports cannot easily be shifted from one market to another. In the present case, we have noted that most of the ships to transport the LNG are to be owned by a subsidiary of the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the buyer of the gas from SONATRACH.

Algeria, of course, is not the only potential source of natural gas imports by the United States. Insofar as the US supply picture requires imports of natural gas, the Department believes our security will be enhanced by maximum diversification of sources of supply.

On the basis of its review, the Department of State perceives no objection on foreign policy grounds to the proposed importation. It assumes that this response will be made a part of the public record in these proceedings.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Trezise
Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs

We are of course not in a position to comment on the strictly US domestic aspects of these applications.

^e ^{wle} ^{Al e}
E/ORF/FSE:WClark-L/E:WCLiebllich-AF/N:ALLOWrie:pw
6/4/71 x22622

Clearances: E/ORF/FSE - Mr. Akins
E/ORF - Mr. Katz
EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy^{eTe}
AF/N - Mr. Odell^{oe}
L - Mr. Salans^{es e}
AF - Mr. Smith



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S *DL*

E/ORE 5/21
FSE
Algeria
- El Paso

SECRET

To: The Secretary

MAY 26 1971

From: AF - Mr. Newsom
E - Mr. Trezise *PT*

Recommended Position on
Algerian-El Paso LNG Project

There are two interrelated decisions which require your early approval for the El Paso-SONATRACH LNG project to go forward:

-- The Department's response to the FPC prior to the end of the formal hearings sometime in early June. If we do not reply before the completion of the hearings they might have to be reopened to consider our response.

-- The Department's position within the National Advisory Council on Eximbank financing for the project. The NAC plans to vote on June 3.

Advantages to the U.S. of Support of the Project

1. We need the gas. U.S. gas reserves are declining and LNG imports will be required to help fill future needs.

2. The project would create a long-term community of interests between the U.S. and Algeria and could result in an early resumption of diplomatic relations. The example of a radical Arab and non-aligned state entering into a partnership with the U.S. should have beneficial regional repercussions for us.

3. It would reduce Soviet influence in Algeria by assuring Algeria additional foreign exchange earnings of well over \$100 million per year.

4. It would strengthen those elements within the Algerian regime who favor rapprochement with the U.S. and advocated the resolution of the eight expropriation

SECRET

SECRET

2

disputes involving U.S. oil companies. These disputes are now settled.

5. It would assure U.S. exports a major place in the expanding Algerian market. Eximbank President Kearns estimates that the export of U.S. goods could reach well over \$1 billion in the next three years.

Security of Supply

Although these imports will represent only about 1.5% of our total annual gas consumption, they would account for a larger percentage of consumption in specific areas of the U.S. East Coast. The question of security of supply thus arises since any cut off could cause problems in these consumption areas, although problems can be reduced or eliminated by measures such as storage facilities and interconnecting pipelines.

There can be no absolute guarantee that Algeria will not disrupt gas exports to the U.S. over the twenty-five year period of the contract. However, we believe the risks are minimal since the Algerian Government will own all the gas facilities in Algeria and have a major financial stake in continued gas sales. Also, this project will consume less than 10% of Algeria's proved gas reserves, thus giving Algeria an incentive to carry out its contract to promote additional future sales. In addition, LNG exporters cannot easily shift large quantities of gas from one market to another, particularly in this case in which most of the tankers are owned by the purchaser (El Paso).

In the final analysis we believe gas supplies are best secured by expanding the base of U.S. proved reserves and diversifying our sources of supplies from overseas. This project should have the effect of doing both, by stimulating higher prices and greater exploration domestically, and by encouraging other LNG projects now waiting in the wings from other sources such as Nigeria and Venezuela.

Disadvantages of Support

1. It might adversely affect our relations with France. We have, however, already informed the French

SECRET

SECRET

3

we expect to approve. Subsequently, they have emphasized they are making no demarches to us.

2. It would be criticized by some elements of the American business community as a precedent that might encourage nationalizations without compensation of U. S. interests in other LDCs. The Algerian case is, however, distinguishable from other nationalizations. The El Paso contract with SONATRACH was made 18 months before the nationalization action. The Algerians already had title to 25 per cent of the gas reserves, which would cover El Paso purchase requirements for the life of the contract, and they had the right to purchase all gas at the well head and market it wherever they wished.

3. French companies have threatened legal action to prevent the importation of Algerian gas. The prospects for success are, in the Legal Adviser's opinion, slight (Mr. Stevenson's memo to you of April 28, 1971). It should be noted in this connection that the state-owned Gaz de France is continuing to purchase gas from the nationalized field and French companies are proceeding with the construction of an LNG plant which will also utilize Algerian gas from the same field.

Advantages of Disapproval

1. Disapproval would win us appreciation from the French, particularly President Pompidou.

2. Our disapproval might discourage similar LDC nationalization of U. S. interests. We could cite our action in this case in any future effort to obtain international support against threats of or possible nationalization of U. S. interests.

Consequences of Disapproval

1. Our disapproval would be read by Algeria and the Arabs as a decision to take France's side against Algeria. Our bilateral relations would be set back for years. Only those opposed to closer Algerian ties with the U.S. would benefit.

SECRET

SECRET

4

2. We would lose the commercial advantage of trading with Algeria.

3. We do not believe it would significantly reduce the likelihood of nationalizations elsewhere against U.S. interests since international cooperation to be effective in this area would have to be nearly unanimous. It has been lacking principally because each investor country acts on the basis of its own national interests.

Recommendation

That the Department send on or about June 7 (six and one-half weeks after the President's message to President Pompidou) a favorable response to the FPC and inform the National Advisory Council on June 3 that it has no objection to Eximbank approval on June 7 of a preliminary commitment of the \$285 million loan and credit guarantees to Algeria.

Approve *WPR* 81 157

Disapprove _____

SECRET

Drafted: AF/N:ALLowrie; E/ORF/FSE:WClark:chg
x22622; 5/25/71

Concurrence:

E/ORF - Mr. Katz
EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy
L - Mr. Rhinelanders
E/IFD - Mr. Weintraub
AF/N - Mr. Odell
AF - Mr. Smith

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
060506	0710	29164	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER ☒ _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
Flanigan, P S ☒ _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Policy on Import of LNG from Algeria*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO <i>HAK</i> TO <i>FLANIGAN</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EUROPE/CANADA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ANY ACTION NECESSARY	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>0607</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
6/17/71	Saunders	NSC/S	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Segn Memo to Flanigan (0607)</i>	
6/8		Saunders	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Handled by phone per Haig</i>	
6/15/71	Saunders	HAK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Decision (0617)</i>	
JUN 21 1971	<i>HAK</i> Saunders	S	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Further action</i>	
8/2/71	Saunders	Secretariat		No further action. Close out (but send cy plus ticket cy to Hormats). This taken care of by State letter of July 14 (fr Asst. Sec. Trezise, Econ Affairs) to FPC	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH *29582* NOTIFY _____ saying no foreign policy objections to *El Paso* applicatio
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____ for import LNG from *Algeria*. Matter now with FPC
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____ (Related to 29582)
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, ☒ HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

DO ☒ INIT _____
 DATE _____
 ORIG) NSC _____
 TO) PAF ☒
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: PETER FLANIGAN

The comment in today's news summary regarding Departments of Defense and State clearance of importation of gas does not refer to the El Paso application for importing gas from Algeria. This refers to an earlier application for the importation of gas from Algeria on which State and Defense acted with a "no objection" letter two months ago.

With regard to the El Paso case, as requested by you, we have held up State and Defense approval for two months. Unless I hear differently from you, I will release the Defense and State letter to the FPC on August 1. I have previously sent you copies of their draft letter plus the rationale behind it.

As I informed General Haig, State believes that Secretary Rogers will appeal this "hold" directly to the President.

29582
Algeria

8/15

PAKISTAN-AID

A State Dept. spokesman said the US does not intend to point the finger in the direction of anyone in counselling restraint by both India and Pakistan in the handling of the civil strife in East Pakistan. (AP)

* * * *

PETROLEUM

US and Soviet oil experts reported success in the use of underground nuclear explosions to boost the output of oil fields and natural gas reservoirs. In their latest accounts both the Soviet and US oilmen reported no dangerous radioactive contamination. (AP)

* *

A FPC examiner recommended a US company be approved for the first long-term, large-volume importation of liquefied natural gas. He said he got advice from the Dept. of Defense and State before he recommended approval of the importation. He said State told him it puts "major importance on the expansion of economic relations with developing countries." It does not think "these disputes and the absence of diplomatic relations should preclude the approval of this commercial transaction." The examiner's ruling is important because of the search for new fuel sources. (UPI)

* * * *

NARCOTICS

A deeply concerned RN put the finishing touches on a new multi-million dollar program to cope with the trafficking in illicit drugs after conferring with cabinet advisors and Ambassadors to six countries. (UPI)

* *

An US narcotics expert told the international council on alcohol and addiction that narcotics addicts are becoming increasingly skilled at cheating to remain in rehabilitation programs. Dr. G.G. De Angelis suggested that physicians treating addicts be extremely cautious about the results of diagnostic tests. He said, "False negatives" or "false positives" could damage a treatment program. (UPI)

* * * *

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
6/15	6/15	29164	

PRES _____
KISSINGER ☒
HAIG _____FROM: ELIOT _____
ROGERS, W _____
LAIRD, M _____LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
C ☒ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT:

Expected Release of DOD/STATE LTR to FPC on importation
of Liquefied Natural Gas

REFERENCE:

S/S _____

OTHER _____

NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS:

PRES _____

HAK _____

TALKER _____

MEMCON _____

DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC	X		
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)
MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
JOINT MEMO *let* _____ (_____)
REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ (_____)
CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
DUE DATE: *6/23*

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
	Saunders	Secretariat	<i>9</i>	<i>There was much telephone talk between HAK + Flanigan.</i> OBE'd. [Related to 29164] FPC subsequently <i>which HAK approved,</i> informed via July 14 letter from Assistant Secretary Trezise (Economic Affairs) that State posed no foreign policy objections re El Paso application for import of LNG from Algeria. Send copy plus ticket to Hormats. <i>o/p per</i> <i>by 29164</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH *29164* NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO ☒ *ETM*
INIT *ETM*
AUG 16 1971
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) PAF ☒
WHC _____
SUBF _____

30110

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: FPC Request for State Department
Views on Natural Gas Imports from
Algeria

The President has approved your recommendation of
June 25, 1971 and authorizes you to respond favorably
to the Federal Power Commission's request for views
on applications to import gas from Algeria.


Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET

Dispatched 7/14/71, Rcpt 2625, also LDX 7/14/71 @11:59 a.m.

CC: Col Kennedy, Mr. Saunders, Peter Flanigan, Peter Peterson, Johnston
sls

DISTRIBUTION SHEET

NSC Staff

Item _____

To _____

From _____

Date _____

Classification _____

_____ Dr. Kissinger

_____ Gen. Haig

_____ Mr. Halperin

_____ Mr. Young

_____ Mr. Rodman

_____ Mr. Lord

_____ Cdr. Howe

_____ Mr. Houdek

_____ Mr. Latimer

_____ Mr. McManis

_____ Mrs. Davis

_____ Mr. Guthrie

_____ Mr. Wandler

_____ Dr. Smith

_____ Mr. Court

_____ LTC Merritt

_____ Mr. Sansom

_____ Mr. Hamilton

_____ Mr. Sachs

_____ Lt. Carter

_____ Maj. Murphy

_____ Mr. Bushnell

_____ LTC Knubel

D _____ Col. Kennedy

_____ Mr. Negroponte

_____ Mr. Crocker

_____ Col. Loeffke

_____ Mr. Lehman

_____ Mr. Wright

_____ Mr. Levine

_____ Mr. Rondon

_____ Col. Behr

_____ Mr. Guhin

_____ Mr. Nachmanoff

_____ Mr. Hewitt

_____ Miss Brownell

_____ Mr. Sonnenfeldt

_____ Mr. Hyland

_____ Mr. Downey

_____ Mr. Clift

_____ Mr. Kohl

_____ Mr. Holdridge

_____ Mr. Smyser

_____ Mr. Froebe

_____ Mr. Edmundson

_____ Mr. Stearman

_____ VIG

D _____ Mr. Saunders

_____ Mr. Hoskinson

_____ Miss Neaher

_____ Mr. Bergsten

D _____ Mr. Johnston

_____ Mr. Hormats

_____ Mr. England

_____ Mrs. Moock

_____ Mr. Ash

_____ Mr. Chapin

_____ Secretariat

Other _____

_____ Vice President

✓ _____ Secretary of State

_____ Secretary of Defense

_____ Director, OEP

_____ Attorney General

_____ Under Secretary of State

_____ Deputy Secretary of Defense

_____ Chairman, JCS

_____ Director, CIA

_____ OMB (J. Frey)

_____ JCS, Adm. Robinson

_____ Director, USIA

Other Departments and Agencies:

✓ _____ Peter G. Langman

_____ OIGP - Peterson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1971

FOR: Jeanne Davis

FROM: Dick Kennedy *RTK*

Approved for signature. May I please
have a xerox of the signed letter.

Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29906 - 30110

SECRET/EXDIS

July 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: ERNEST JOHNSON *ER*

I have now cleared with Peter Peterson and Peter Flanigan the attached memorandum to the President recommending that he allow State to respond to the Federal Power Commission that it has no objection on foreign policy grounds to the approval of applications to import natural gas from Algeria. You had previously approved my submitting this memorandum to Flanigan and Peterson for clearance.

All that remains now to be done is that the memorandum be sent to the President promptly since Secretary Rogers believes it important that the decision be communicated to him by July 6.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign on behalf of HAK the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

SECRET/EXDIS

HAK & Flanigan
ER
note
to do
weel

July 14, 1971

Situation Room:

'71 Please LDX to State and return to

me.

JUL 14 AM 11:59

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Thelma Seibert

30110

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

29906 - 20110

SECRET/EXDIS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *Hayfu*
SUBJECT: Natural Gas Imports from Algeria (El Paso)

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) recommends that you authorize State to inform the Federal Power Commission (FPC) that on foreign policy grounds it has no objections to the approval of the applications of three U.S. firms to import natural gas from Algeria.

Issues

There is general agreement that the U.S. will require natural gas imports from foreign sources to meet future requirements, that U.S. exports will benefit from the project (Ex-Im has already approved a preliminary commitment of \$256.5 million for construction of facilities for the project in Algeria), and that it would improve relations with Algeria while reducing Soviet influence and strengthening elements within Algeria who favor closer ties with the U.S. The security risk of depending on foreign supplies is minimal, since these imports from Algeria represent only about 1.5 percent of U.S. consumption, a large number of foreign sources are being actively considered as future sources of natural gas, gas is not essential to our military machine, and domestic gas by virtue of its lower price will be favored over foreign gas.

The major issue concerns the question of Algeria expropriation of foreign property, both U.S. and non-U.S. After discussing the expropriation problem with Secretary Connally you directed that we hold up on this project. However, I now believe that the expropriation issue should not stand in the way of our approval. Several important changes have occurred:

-- U.S. Expropriated Property - Algeria recently settled all expropriation claims with U.S. petroleum companies. Some smaller claims remain unresolved; but Algeria has indicated a willingness to settle these claims, making payments through El Paso revenues.

-- French Expropriated Property - Last February Algeria nationalized French gas interests, including part of the field which will be the origin of

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gas exports to the U.S. In March, President Pompidou asked that we take no action that would complicate Franco/Algerian relations while negotiations for nationalized properties were under way. In April (Tab B) you replied through Ambassador Watson that there would be no preliminary Ex-Im Bank commitment to Algeria for six or seven weeks, that State Department would have to give the FPC its views on gas imports from Algeria in response to a standard requirement of the FPC, and that we did not expect a final FPC decision until September. In response, Pompidou expressed disappointment but made no further request.

-- Since your April message:

. We have honored our word to Pompidou. (The Ex-Im Bank preliminary commitment for financing the El Paso project was not given until more than six weeks after your message was conveyed to Pompidou, and State believes that the French are reconciled to Ex-Im's assisting Algeria with the project and our importing the gas therefrom.)

. French companies have continued to invest in projects for new gas exports from Algeria to France and have continued to import gas into France from Algeria.

. Algeria has just completed an agreement settling the claims of one of the two expropriated French companies, and settlement with the other company is likely to follow. (Tab C)

Proposed Scenario

FPC hearings on the applications will be completed in early July. State therefore must submit its views as soon as possible, since the FPC staff cannot make its recommendations without them. Further delay might mean postponement of the FPC decision until after September, in which case construction costs -- totaling more than \$1 billion -- would increase and contracts might have to be renegotiated or canceled (cost increases will ultimately be passed on to U.S. consumers). A delay would cause serious frictions in our relations with Algeria and might jeopardize the entire project, which would be a serious setback for our relations with Algeria.

Because of the progress which has been made in negotiations between the French companies and U.S. petroleum interests, the expressed willingness of Algeria to settle with the other U.S. firms, and the important foreign policy

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gains of improving our relations with Algeria, I believe that Secretary Rogers' recommendation should be approved. Peter Flanigan and Pete Peterson concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Secretary Rogers' request authorizing State to respond as soon as possible to the FPC that it has no objection on foreign policy grounds to approval of applications to import natural gas from Algeria.

Approve

Disapprove

Handwritten signature
Pres.

FPC to be notified on
Wed July 14

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET /EXDIS - Attachment

June 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: FPC Request for State Department
Views on Natural Gas Imports from
Algeria

Recommendation

That you authorize the State Department to respond favorably as soon as possible to the FPC request for our views on applications to import gas from Algeria, or in any case no later than July 6. The proposed text of our letter to the FPC is attached at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

I

Background - Applications to the FPC by three customers of El Paso Natural Gas to import about one billion cubic feet per day of gas from Algeria for 25 years raise a number of important foreign policy questions which we have carefully examined. The issues involved are discussed below.

II

Why the Project Should Be Approved

1. We need the gas. U.S. gas reserves are declining. Gas imports will be required from many sources to meet future requirements. Projects involving

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Venezuela, Nigeria, Trinidad, Ecuador and even the Soviet Union are being actively considered by U.S. commercial interests.

2. U.S. exports will benefit from the project. U.S. exports to Algeria stimulated by this project could reach a total of \$1 billion over the next few years. ExIm has already approved a preliminary commitment of \$256.5 million for construction of facilities for the project in Algeria.

3. It would improve relations with Algeria by creating long term mutual interests, reducing Soviet influence, and strengthening elements within Algeria who favor rapprochement with the U.S. Disapproval of the project would be a serious setback for our relations with Algeria and Algeria's development program.

III

Arguments Against Approval

1. Security of supply. By importing gas we will be dependent to some degree on foreign supplies which could be cut off in an emergency. However, given our growth in demand for gas, we will have little alternative but to import more gas in the future. Supply security can be enhanced by diversification of sources of imports. U.S. firms are actively pursuing other projects for gas imports from other foreign sources. Moreover, these imports from Algeria would represent only about 1.5% of U.S. consumption.

2. Nationalizations. One of our principal concerns raised in these applications is the question of Algerian expropriation of foreign property, both American and non-American.

a. U.S. property. With our urging Algeria has settled all expropriation claims with U.S. petroleum companies. Some smaller claims remain unresolved but Algeria has indicated a willingness to settle these claims, making payments through El Paso.

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b. French property. Last February Algeria nationalized French gas interests, including part of the field which will be the origin of gas exports to the U.S. In March President Pompidou asked that the U.S. take no action that would complicate Franco-Algerian relations while France was negotiating the nationalization problem. You replied through Ambassador Watson that the State Department would have to give the FPC its views on gas imports from Algeria, but that there would be no preliminary ExIm Bank commitment for six or seven weeks, and we did not expect a final FPC decision before September. The text of the message you approved to President Pompidou is attached at Tab B. In response, Pompidou expressed disappointment but made no further request.

We have honored our word to President Pompidou. The ExIm Bank preliminary commitment for financing the El Paso project was not given until more than six weeks after your message was conveyed to Pompidou. This commitment has not yet been made public, although we understand that the Government of Algeria may soon make a low-key press announcement in Algiers.

In the meantime, French companies are continuing to invest in a project for new gas exports from Algeria to France and have continued to import gas into France from Algeria. Reliable reports state Algeria is close to settlement with one of the French companies concerned. If this comes about, there will certainly be a settlement with the other French company as well.

IV

Consequences of Further Delay or Rejection

We are informed that FPC hearings on the applications will probably be completed in early July. The FPC tells us they want our views as soon as possible so that interested parties will have an opportunity to comment. The FPC staff cannot make its recommendations until our views have been received and considered. Delay in our response to the FPC beyond the early part

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of July could thus hold up consideration of the applications and a final decision. If FPC action is to be completed by September, we must get a response to the FPC in the next few weeks.

If FPC action is delayed much beyond September, construction costs totaling more than \$1 billion will increase and contracts may have to be renegotiated or canceled. Cost increases will ultimately be passed on to U.S. consumers.

I am concerned that for us to delay our response to the FPC much longer may jeopardize this project and would be a serious setback for our relations with Algeria. I hope we can send a favorable reply to the FPC as soon as possible.


William P. Rogers

Attachments:

- Tab A - Proposed letter to FPC
- Tab B - Message to President Pompidou

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY: THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR- MR SPRINGSTEEN IN DRAFT

AF: MR NEWSON AF- MR SMITH:

Z/ORF: FSE- MR AKINS D- MR SAMUELS EX-IMBANK- MR KEARNS:

WHITE HOUSE MRS DAVIS: S/S- MR CURRAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS:

SECRET STATE 065768

EXDIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO POMPIDOU

REF: PARIS 4611, 4113, 3939

1. YOU SHOULD SEEK EARLY MEETING WITH POMPIDOU TO CONVEY ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT RESPONSIVE TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY POMPIDOU IN HIS MARCH 11 CONVERSATION WITH YOU AND BY JOBERT IN FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION MARCH 15 WITH EMBASSY'S POLITICAL COUNSELOR.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE: POMPIDOU CAN BE SURE THAT WE HAVE GIVEN VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE POINTS WHICH HE RAISED WITH US AND THAT WE, LIKE HIM, CONTINUE TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING AND WHERE POSSIBLE EXPANDING US-FRENCH COOPERATION ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST. LIKEWISE, US HAS NO DESIRE TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO FRANCE'S ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE AMICABLY ITS PROBLEMS WITH ALGERIA.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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EM AT THE SAME TIME WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE OPPORTUNITY WE NOW HAVE TO RESTORE OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE IN THE INTEREST OF FRANCE AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HENCE, US CANNOT RPT NOT DELAY INDEFINITELY, WHILE FRENCH AND ALGERIANS ARE WORKING OUT THEIR BILATERAL PROBLEMS. DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO IMPORTATION OF LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS FROM ALGERIA AND FINANCING OF EL PASO PROJECT, WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO RPT NOR DESIRE OR INTENTION TO ERODE FRENCH RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA.

4. OUR CONSIDERATION OF ALL RELEVANT FACTORS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF THE EL PASO PROJECT WILL IN ANY CASE REQUIRE SOME SIX OR SEVEN WEEKS AND POMPIDOU CAN REST ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO PRELIMINARY EX-IM BANK COMMITMENT TO EL PASO PROJECT DURING THIS PERIOD. PART OF THIS PROCESS WILL BE FPC HEARINGS, INITIAL PHASE OF WHICH STARTED APRIL 3, IN RESPONSE TO A STANDARD REQUIREMENT THE DEPT OF STATE WILL HAVE TO ADVISE THE FPC OF ITS POSITION, BASED ON FOREIGN POLICY GROUNDS, CONCERNING THE IMPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS FROM ALGERIA. WE DO NOT RPT NOT EXPECT THAT A FINAL FPC DECISION WILL BE REACHED BEFORE SEPTEMBER.

5. AS FAR AS EXPORT-IMPORT BANK IS CONCERNED IT MADE KNOWN TO ALGERIANS TWO MONTHS AGO ITS READINESS CONSIDER FINANCING PORTIONS OF EL PASO PROJECT ONCE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON CERTAIN US-ALGERIAN NATIONALIZATION CASES. THESE CASES HAVE NOW BEEN RESOLVED AND POSSIBILITY OF A PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT BY EX-IM BANK WITH RESPECT TO FINANCING MIGHT, AS INDICATED EARLIER, ARISE IN ABOUT SIX TO SEVEN WEEKS. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER A PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT IS NORMALLY FOLLOWED IN DUE COURSE BY A FAVORABLE DECISION WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSED LOAN.

6. WE WOULD HOPE THAT FURTHER PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN FRANCO-ALGERIAN NEGOTIATIONS DURING THIS SIX TO SEVEN WEEKS PERIOD, SPECIFICALLY AGREEMENT ON COMPENSATION FOR NATIONALIZATION OF HASSI RHAMEL NATURAL GAS FIELD. AT SAME TIME WE EXPECT EXCHANGE OF EXPLORATORY MEMORANDA AND DRAFTS OF PROCEDURAL AGREEMENTS WITH ALGERIA WILL NECESSARILY CONTINUE. END OF MESSAGE.

7. IF ASKED, YOU MAY EXPLAIN TO POMPIDOU THAT QTE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENTS UNQTE INCLUDE A DRAFT OPERATING PROCEDURE BETWEEN

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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EX- IM BANK AND GOA FOR CONTROLLING FUTURE REQUESTS.
FROM GOA TO EX- IM FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THIS DRAFT HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH PRESENT EL PASO SONATRACH APPLICATION.
SAMUELS.

7109774

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Oil Company Settlement with Algeria

I refer to my memorandum to you of June 25, 1971, concerning the Department's letter to the Federal Power Commission on natural gas imports from Algeria.

The international French oil company, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, 35 per cent of which is owned by the French State, signed an agreement on June 30 with Algeria. The agreement settled the company's claims against Algeria arising out of the partial nationalization by the latter of the company's oil and gas assets last February 24. This settlement liquidates a substantial portion of the claims by the French companies involved in the oil and gas dispute. There are reports that the other principal French petroleum company affected by the nationalization, ELF-ERAP, will resume negotiations with the Algerians. Prospects for a settlement of its claims along the lines of that reached between CFP and the Algerian Government are regarded as good.

The settlement that has now been reached is undoubtedly the result of hard bargaining between the French company and the Algerians and a recognition of their mutual interest in reaching a settlement. However, we also believe that the Algerian attitude may have been affected by our observations to them that we hoped they would resolve their oil and gas problems with the French on a mutually satisfactory basis.

Recommendation:

In view of this highly favorable development, I would like to reiterate my recommendation to you

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in my memorandum of June 25 that the Department be authorized to respond favorably to the Federal Power Commission's request for its views on the importation of liquefied natural gas from Algeria.


William P. Rogers

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ACTION

June 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: ROBERT HORMATS
SUBJECT: Natural Gas Imports from Algeria (El Paso)

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) recommends that the President authorize State to inform the Federal Power Commission (FPC) as soon as possible (and in any case no later than July 6) that on foreign policy grounds it has no objections to the approval of applications of three U.S. firms to import natural gas from Algeria.

You will recall that you directed the El Paso deal be held up following a meeting between Secretary Connally and the President. And Peter Flanigan, citing your request in early June, ordered a two-month delay (until August 1) in sending State's letter to the FPC. The reason given was that the expropriation of French gas interests in Algeria and of several American investments made it undesirable that we should proceed to purchase natural gas from Algeria. Secretary Rogers now wishes a reversal of that decision. He cites the fact that Algeria has settled with nationalized American petroleum interests and is on the verge of announcing a settlement with one of the two nationalized French natural gas exporters. (Settlements with the second French firm and other U.S. firms are expected to follow.) Also, French companies have continued to import gas from Algeria.

With respect to the President's relations with Pompidou, our promise that Ex-Im Bank's preliminary commitment for financing the El Paso project would not be given until more than six weeks after the President's April message to Pompidou has been faithfully adhered to. And France is now fully reconciled to our assisting in the project and purchasing natural gas derived therefrom.

The memorandum for the President (Tab I) outlines the basic issues involved, discusses the changed attitude of Algeria toward the negotiation of settlements on expropriated properties, and recommends that he approve Secretary Rogers' request that State register no objection on foreign policy grounds to the approval of applications to import natural gas from Algeria.

The decision is requested by July 6 when the FPC hearings end. The FPC decision must be reached before September because bids for necessary construction of tankers and plant assume pre-September prices. Delay

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would cause frictions in our relations with Algeria, increase the costs of the project, and might jeopardize the entire project.

I am sending this to you for your preliminary approval before sending it to Flanigan and Pete Peterson for their concurrence. This will avoid boxing you into a corner should you not wish to recommend that the President approve Secretary Rogers' recommendation.

Approve sending to Flanigan and Peterson
for clearance

Disapprove, prefer to recommend to President
that State hold up on sending letter to FPC _____

Concurrence: H Saunders
H Sonnenfeldt

RDH:mmm

SECRET/EXDIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

29906

Honorable John N. Nassikas
Chairman, Federal Power Commission
Washington, D.C. 20426

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to your letters dated October 8, 1970 in which you requested the views of the Department of State on the applications filed by El Paso Eastern Company in Docket No. CP71-66 and by El Paso Atlantic Company in Docket No. CP71-67, both subsidiaries of El Paso Natural Gas Company, and on the application filed by Columbia LNG Corporation in Docket No. CP71-68. These applications requested authorization to import a total liquefied natural gas equivalent of about 365 million Mcf per year of natural gas in vaporous state from Algeria for an initial period of 25 years pursuant to Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. This letter also acknowledges your letter of March 19, 1971 in which you stated that the applications by the two El Paso subsidiaries had been withdrawn on November 25, 1970 and had been replaced by applications filed by Southern Energy Company in Docket No. CP71-151 and by Consolidated Gas Supply Corporation in Docket No. CP71-153 to import from Algeria the volumes of liquefied natural gas originally requested by the two El Paso subsidiaries.

The Department of State has carefully reviewed the foreign policy aspects of the proposed importation from Algeria. The Department places major importance on the expansion of economic relations with developing countries, including Algeria. The Department further believes that the existence of expropriation disputes involving US or foreign interests should not preclude the approval of commercial transactions. It also believes that the absence of diplomatic relations with a particular country should not preclude the approval of commercial transactions.

The Department is, of course, aware of the recent nationalization by Algeria of the share in the Algerian natural gas industry held by French companies and that the natural gas which would be imported into the United States under the subject applications would originate from fields in which French companies had certain interests. These actions have given rise to claims against Algeria by the French companies concerned.

The Department has noted that the Algerian nationalization of the French equity in these concessions and of other hydrocarbon concessions held by French companies followed a period of negotiations between Algeria and France centering around a revision of the 1965 agreement between the two governments. The 1965 agreement was itself a revision of parts of the Evian Agreements which accorded Algeria its independence in 1962. Both of these agreements encompassed a number of matters between these two countries in addition to hydrocarbons.

The problem of nationalizations of French-owned hydrocarbon concessions in Algeria is, therefore, only one part of a complex bilateral relationship. The Department has noted the acceptance by the Algerian Government of the principle of compensation for the nationalized assets and the Algerian Government has fixed a specific amount of compensation. Although the terms of the Algerian offer may not have been acceptable to the French companies, talks have been taking place between the two parties since the offer was made. In addition, liquefied natural gas imports from Algeria to France have continued and French companies have continued to invest in the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant in Algeria.

There presently exists some unresolved claims against Algeria by US interests. However, most of the major expropriation claims by US private interests in Algeria have been settled by agreement during the past year.

There can, of course, be no absolute guarantee that there will be no interruption of supply during any long term contract for the sale of gas. However, the Department believes the security of supply in this case is enhanced by certain factors. Through SONATRACH, the Algerian national oil company which is selling the gas, the Algerian

Government will own all the gas facilities in Algeria for this project and will have a major financial stake in continued gas sales. This project is a central part of Algeria's economic development effort and will be an important source of its foreign exchange earnings. Furthermore, different components of this project are highly interrelated and large-scale exports cannot easily be shifted from one market to another. In the present case, we have noted that most of the ships to transport the LNG are to be owned by a subsidiary of the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the buyer of the gas from SONATRACH.

Algeria, of course, is not the only potential source of natural gas imports by the United States. Insofar as the US supply picture requires imports of natural gas, the Department believes our security will be enhanced by maximum diversification of sources of supply.

We are of course not in a position to comment on the strictly US domestic aspects of these applications.

On the basis of its review, the Department of State perceives no objection on foreign policy grounds to the proposed importation. It assumes that this response will be made a part of the public record in these proceedings.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Trezise
Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

29906 - 30110

SECRET/EXDIS

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Brig Gen Alexander M. Haan
~~HENRY A. KISSINGER~~

SUBJECT:

Natural Gas Imports from Algeria (El Paso)

Secretary Rogers (Tab A) recommends that you authorize State to inform the Federal Power Commission (FPC) ~~as soon as possible (and in any case no later than July 6)~~ that on foreign policy grounds it has no objections to the approval of the applications of three U.S. firms to import natural gas from Algeria.

Issues

There is general agreement that the U.S. will require natural gas imports from foreign sources to meet future requirements, that U.S. exports will benefit from the project (Ex-Im has already approved a preliminary commitment of \$256.5 million for construction of facilities for the project in Algeria), and that it would improve relations with Algeria while reducing Soviet influence and strengthening elements within Algeria who favor closer ties with the U.S. ~~The security risk of depending on foreign supplies is minimal, since these imports from Algeria represent only about 1.5 percent of U.S. consumption, a large number of foreign sources are being actively considered as future sources of natural gas, gas is not essential to our military machine, and domestic gas by virtue of its lower price will be favored over foreign gas.~~

The major issue concerns the question of Algeria expropriation of foreign property, both U.S. and non-U.S. ~~You will recall that~~ After discussing the expropriation problem with Secretary Connally you directed that we hold up on this project. ~~However,~~ I now believe that the expropriation issue should not stand in the way of our approval ~~of the project~~. Several important changes have occurred:

Indel
- U.S. Expropriated Property - Algeria recently settled all expropriation claims with U.S. petroleum companies. Some smaller claims remain unresolved; but Algeria has indicated a willingness to settle these claims, making payments through El Paso revenues.

- French Expropriated Property - Last February Algeria nationalized French gas interests, including part of the field which will be the origin of gas exports to the U.S. In March, President Pompidou asked that we take

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no action that would complicate Franco/Algerian relations while negotiations for nationalized properties were under way. In April (Tab B) you replied through Ambassador Watson that there would be no preliminary Ex-Im Bank commitment to Algeria for six or seven weeks, that State Department would have to give the FPC its views on gas imports from Algeria in response to a standard requirement of the FPC, and that we did not expect a final FPC decision until September. In response, Pompidou expressed disappointment but made no further request. Since your April message:

• We have honored our word to Pompidou. (The Ex-Im Bank preliminary commitment for financing the El Paso project was not given until more than six weeks after your message was conveyed to Pompidou, and State believes that the French are reconciled to Ex-Im's assisting Algeria with the project and our importing the gas therefrom.)

• French companies have continued to invest in projects for new gas exports from Algeria to France and have continued to import gas into France from Algeria.

• Algeria has just completed an agreement settling the claims of one of the two expropriated French companies, and settlement with the other company is likely to follow. ~~(See Secretary Rogers' memorandum at (Tab C.))~~

Proposed Scenario

FPC hearings on the applications will be completed in early July. State therefore must submit its views as soon as possible, since the FPC staff cannot make its recommendations without them. ^{Further} ~~Any delay past the early July deadline would delay the FPC decision until after September, in which case construction costs -- totaling more than \$1 billion -- will increase and contracts may have to be renegotiated or canceled (cost increases will ultimately be passed on to U.S. consumers). The delay would cause serious frictions in our relations with Algeria and might jeopardize the entire project, which would be a serious setback for our relations with Algeria.~~

Because of the progress which has been made in negotiations between the French companies and U.S. petroleum interests, the expressed willingness of Algeria to settle with the other U.S. firms, and the important foreign policy gains ~~to be had from~~ improving our relations with Algeria, I believe that ~~approval of~~ Secretary Rogers' recommendation should be ^{granted}. Peter Flanigan and Pete Peterson concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Secretary Rogers' request authorizing State to respond as soon as possible to the FPC that it has no objection on foreign policy grounds to ~~the~~ approval of applications to import natural gas from Algeria.

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approve _____ Disapprove

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W ☒ LAIRD, M _____

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TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *French oil Company Settlement with Algeria re Natural Gas Imports & Reiteration of Earlier Record*

REFERENCE: S/S *7109774* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

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CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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JUL 17 1971				Memo sent to State per Kennedy enc HR (15)	

DISPOSITION

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

7205785

March 31, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: El Paso-Algerian LNG Project

On July 13, 1971, you authorized me to respond favorably to the Federal Power Commission's request for views on the plans of El Paso Natural Gas Company to import large quantities of LNG from Algeria. It now appears that two recent actions in the FPC could kill this project and thereby damage the highly favorable evolution of US-Algerian relations.

In its March 9 decision in the Distrigas case, the FPC allowed LNG imports for intrastate use but ruled that interstate sales could only be approved if they were cost competitive with other gas sources throughout the life of the project. A February 29 brief filed by the FPC Staff in El Paso's import request endorses the importation with the important qualification that the "cost of service" tariff be disallowed and that El Paso be required within a year after authorization to establish and justify a price scale.

El Paso, which plans to file a petition for clarification in the Distrigas case, has said that the \$1.5 billion of necessary financing will not be obtained for the project if the company cannot be assured of a price based on costs. It has also stated that it will not proceed with the project if it is locked into a price formula that will not take into account increased future costs for imported gas. It notes that United States producers cannot predict the cost of domestic gas over an extended period.

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Since this matter is within the regulatory purview of the Federal Power Commission, we are not proposing that any action be taken on the matter at this time. In view of your earlier endorsement of the Department's views on this subject, however, I wanted you to be informed of the foregoing.


William P. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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TO: PRES ☒
KISSINGER ☐
HAIG ☐

FROM: ELIOT ☐
ROGERS, W ☒
LAIRD, M ☐

U ☐
LOU ☒
C ☒
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LOG IN/OUT ONLY ☐
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CODE WORD ☐ RES DATA ☐
SENSITIVE ☐

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT ON EL PASO-ALGERIAN LNG PROJECT.

REFERENCE: S/S 7205785 OTHER ☐ NOT XEROXED ☐

APP'TS: PRES ☐ HAK ☐ TALKER ☐ MEMCON ☐ DATE REQ. ☐

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DISPOSITION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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NSC PLANNING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CONGRESSIONAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ☒
MEMO FOR PRES. ☒
REPLY FOR ☐ SIGNATURE ☐
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ☐
MEMO ☐ TO ☐
RECOMMENDATIONS ☐
JOINT MEMO ☐
REFER TO STATE ☐
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ☐
CONCURRENCE ☐
DUE DATE: 4/4

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
6/9/72	Saunders	Secretariat		HAK informed in preparation for a May breakfast with Peter Flanigan. Subsequent change (for the better) in status of El Paso has OBE'd issue of this memo for the time. Close-out. HHSaunders HS	

CROSS REF WITH ☐ NOTIFY ☐ DATE ☐

SEE LOG ☐ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO ☐

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SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ☐ SA, ☐ HP, ☐ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: ☐

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ☐ NO ☐

MICROFILM DATA

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1386

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/EXDIS

March 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Air Defense Network for Algeria (S/S 7202213)

The course of action outlined in Secretary Rogers' memorandum of February 8 has been approved, and the State Department is authorized to provide the necessary munitions export licenses.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

D
12
~~Harold H. Saunders~~
ACTION

1386

Harvey Jr

March 1, 1972

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*
SUBJECT: Air Defense Network for Algeria

Raytheon Company has asked whether the USG would provide items on the Munitions List in connection with a sale of radar equipment they would like to bid on in Algeria. The attached memo explains the issues and recommends the President's approval.

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's approval of the attached.

SECRET/EXDIS


MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION
1386

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER 
SUBJECT: Air Defense Network for Algeria

The Algerians have approached Raytheon about purchasing an air defense communications network. For Raytheon to do this would involve items from the Munitions Control List for which Algeria is ineligible according to present policy--not by law--because it does not have diplomatic relations with the US. The question is whether we would except Algeria from the ban for this project. Secretary Rogers recommends we do so, but seeks your concurrence (attached).

What is involved is a \$60-\$80 million air defense network, essentially a radar system for all purposes including military. It is not an offensive system and no weapons would be involved--although obviously the net effect would be to improve Algeria's defense capability. The British, French and Italians are also interested.

The immediate operational question stems from the fact that the sale would have to include items from the Munitions List. Raytheon does not want to go ahead and prepare an offer without an understanding that the USG is prepared to exempt Algeria from the ban in this case. There is no legal inhibition; this would be strictly a policy decision. Raytheon will also need financing, but State has discouraged them from thinking about any USG assistance which is prohibited by law.

The broader issue is whether we want to take another step towards developing a presence outside the framework of formal political ties in the Mid East.

The Arguments

On the pro side, such a project would give us the first contact with the Algerian military since the 1967 break in relations and would dilute the Soviet position as the sole supplier of the Algerian air force. There

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

- 2 -

would be advantage in a pragmatic broadening of our relationship with an important Arab state and no significant impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance because Algeria is so far from an active Arab-Israeli military front. Also among the advantages are the gain to US industry and the further broadening of the American technological and commercial presence in Algeria.

On the other hand, there is the argument that we do not see eye-to-eye on issues like Vietnam--although they have been helpful on the prisoner question--or the Palestine question. There is also the fact that Americans would be involved in helping Algeria strengthen its military defenses--with some effect on our friends in Tunisia and Morocco. The Secretary would propose briefing the Israelis at an appropriate time, putting it in the perspective that it is in our mutual interests to have an entree to the Algerian military and some leverage on the Soviet position there.

On balance, it seems to me that the US has an interest in developing a presence in the area which can supplement inter-governmental relations when they are at low ebb as now. In this connection, we have encouraged the private sector to look for opportunities. Raytheon's opportunity is one such case. Algeria is potentially one of the leaders of that area, and we have encouraged increasing--albeit commercial--ties with it.

RECOMMENDATION: That no objection be posed to Raytheon's bidding on this project and that State Department be authorized to provide necessary munitions export licenses.

Approve _____

Other _____

SECRET/EXDIS

7202213

NSC 1386

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1972

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Air Defense Communications Network
for Algeria

The Algerian Ministry of Defense has asked the Raytheon Company to submit a proposal for the construction of a \$60-\$80 million air defense communications system. The system would not include weapons. British, French and Italian firms are also interested in this contract. To be competitive, Raytheon must offer items on the Munitions Control List, but Algeria is ineligible to receive such items because of the absence of diplomatic relations.

I believe we should exempt Algeria from this ban for the purposes of this project, subject to DOD clearance of each item intended for export. If Raytheon obtained this contract it would give us for the first time direct contact with the Algerian military; it would undercut the Soviets; and it would be profitable for an American company. The system would not have a significant impact on the Middle East conflict in view of Algeria's distance from Israel and the defensive nature of the system.

Israel may nevertheless be apprehensive about our entering a military supply relationship with Algeria, however limited and defensive in nature. If we do decide to permit Raytheon to bid for the contract, we would at the appropriate time want to tell the Israelis in order to put this matter into perspective before they heard about it from other sources. In addition to pointing out that Algeria

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

2

will be obtaining the communications system it seeks from another country if not from us, we can make a valid argument with the Israelis that it would be in their interests as well as ours for the U.S. to obtain this entree to the Algerian military and to undercut in some measure the Soviet position there.

If Raytheon obtains the contract, it may request some US Government financing. We have discouraged this idea. Raytheon is planning to explore the possibility of exporting as many items as possible from its Canadian subsidiary and obtaining financing from the Canadian Government.

Before informing Raytheon that it may bid on this contract, I would like your concurrence.


William P. Rogers

SECRET/EXDIS

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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SUBJECT: Air Defense Communications Network for Algeria

REFERENCE: S/S #7202213 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS		X	
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

MEMO FOR HAK _____ ()
 MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (X)
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 ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ ()
 CONCURRENCE _____ ()
 DUE DATE: 02/14
 COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
3/1/72	Saunders	HAK	X	See for Decision (3/4)	
03/02				HAK Logd Memo to Pres	
03/02				Pres Apprond. Rcom.	
03/02	S	DAVIS	S	Memo to Chof (0304)	
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DISPOSITION

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 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
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RCPT # 3025
3/3/72
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 13 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/29/81

5561

OBE per Zammern,
get original
from Saunders.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

5561 (Revised)

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

October 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Schedule Proposal for President to Meet
with President Boumediene of Algeria

Prior to the outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities, you recommended that the President see President Boumediene of Algeria during his visit to the United States to address the UN General Assembly. The events of the past weeks do not suggest any need to revise that recommendation, but they have made the timing of a visit more uncertain.

Assistant Secretary Newsom, who will be visiting Algiers after your stop in Rabat, would like to be in a position to say that the President agrees in principle to meet with Boumediene, provided a mutually convenient time can be found. He would not raise the issue, but would like to respond along these lines if the topic comes up.

We have prepared a Schedule Proposal for you to forward to the President seeking his agreement in principle to meet with President Boumediene.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the attached Schedule Proposal to the President as soon as possible.

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

5561 (Revised)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
Date:
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
VIA: David Parker

MEETING: Algerian President Houari Boumediene

DATE: Uncertain, but probably between November 19 and mid-December. Agreement in principle is being sought now, provided a mutually convenient time can be found.

PURPOSE: To demonstrate our interest in carrying on a high-level dialogue with Arab leaders concerning the Middle East, and to demonstrate our interest in good relations with Algeria as our economic ties develop. You will want President Boumediene to understand your strategy of working for a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement that will be fair to all sides. He can be expected to make the point that a settlement must take into account Palestinian interests.

FORMAT: Oval Office
President Boumediene and Secretary Kissinger
45 minutes with interpretation

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided.

PRESS COVERAGE: The meeting would be announced and press coverage would be desirable.

STAFF: Secretary Kissinger

RECOMMEND: Secretary Kissinger

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None. This will be President Boumediene's first visit to any western country.

BACKGROUND: President Boumediene has been planning to visit the United States to address the UN General Assembly on behalf of the non-aligned nations. Assistant Secretary Newsom will be visiting Algiers to see President Boumediene after my trip to Morocco.

- 2 -

The Algerians may raise with Mr. Newsom the possibility of a meeting with you. I think it would be useful if he could have your agreement in principle to see Boumediene, provided that a convenient time can be arranged. Algeria did not participate heavily in the recent Middle East war and US-Algerian relations have survived the last few weeks surprisingly well. Algeria did join the other Arab oil producers in cutting back on oil production and in embargoing oil to the US, but gas shipments do not yet appear to have been cut back for political reasons. President Boumediene is an influential figure in the Arab world and among non-aligned countries. A meeting with Boumediene at this time would underscore the seriousness of our diplomatic effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

PRESS FOLLOW-UP: Mr. Ziegler would brief the press in general terms after the meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

5361

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1973
Hank Appelbaum

Brent would like for the BACK-
GROUND section of the schedule
proposal to be beefed up a little
giving greater weight to Boumed-
iene's leadership role in the
Arab and non-aligned communities
and thus stronger evidence of
our strong interest in having
the meeting approved. I under-
stand that Bill may be away
today helping Hal where possible,
and accordingly have sent it
to you.

Thanks very much.

Bud

Run thru
① "Interim it"
② Suspense

5561

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1973

Bill:

Based on current events, will you
please reevaluate this request.

Brent Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
5561

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

October 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT *w.b.2.*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for President to
Meet with President Boumediene of Algeria

You have recommended that the President see President Boumediene of Algeria during his visit to the United States to address the UN General Assembly (Tab A). I have prepared a Schedule Proposal at Tab B to forward to the President with your memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab B to the President.

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

Date:

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

VIA: David Parker

MEETING: Algerian President Houari Boumediene

DATE: Between October 29 and November 16

PURPOSE: To demonstrate our interest in good relations with Algeria as our economic ties deepen and as Algeria comes to play a prominent role in the Arab and "non-aligned" worlds.

FORMAT: Oval Office
President Boumediene and Secretary Kissinger
45 minutes with interpretation

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided.

PRESS COVERAGE: The meeting would be announced and press coverage would be desirable.

STAFF: Secretary Kissinger

RECOMMEND: Secretary Kissinger

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None. This will be President Boumediene's first visit to any western country.

BACKGROUND: Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, US-Algerian relations have steadily improved since 1968, with last year's conclusion of a long-term agreement on importation of Algerian natural gas as the most tangible sign of this relationship. In addition to his country's increasingly important role as a source of US energy requirements, Boumediene is an influential figure in the Arab world and among non-aligned countries generally. President Boumediene successfully hosted the conference of non-aligned nations in

September, and will be in the United States to address the UN General Assembly as the representative of the non-aligned. A meeting by the President with Boumediene would be an important gesture toward the non-aligned countries.

PRESS FOLLOW-UP:

Mr. Ziegler would brief the press in general terms after the meeting.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

5561

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

Date:

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

VIA: David Parker

MEETING: Algerian President Houari Boumedienne

DATE: Between October 29 and November 16

PURPOSE: To demonstrate our interest in good relations with Algeria as our economic ties deepen and as Algeria comes to play a prominent role in the Arab and "non-aligned" worlds.

FORMAT: Oval Office
President Boumedienne and Secretary Kissinger
45 minutes with interpretation

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided.

PRESS COVERAGE: The meeting would be announced and press coverage would be desirable.

STAFF: Secretary Kissinger

RECOMMEND: Secretary Kissinger

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None. This will be President Boumedienne's first visit to any western country.

BACKGROUND: Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, US-Algerian relations have steadily improved since 1968, with last year's conclusion of a long-term agreement on importation of Algerian natural gas as the most tangible sign of this relationship. President Boumedienne successfully hosted the conference of non-aligned nations in September, and will be in the United States to address the UN General Assembly on behalf of the non-aligned.

PRESS FOLLOW-UP: Mr. Ziegler would brief the press in general terms after the meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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NSC 5561


October 3, 1973

SECRET-EXDIS ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Call by President Boumediene of Algeria
on President Nixon

The Secretary has approved the attached memorandum
and asked me to send it to you as an urgent proposal
for the President's schedule.


Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

SECRET-EXDIS ATTACHMENT

7317847

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1973

SECRET-EXDIS


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of President Boumediene
of Algeria

We have been informed that President Boumediene of Algeria plans to address this session of the United Nations General Assembly. The purpose of his visit to New York will be to inform the members of the General Assembly of the views on international issues of the governments of the Non-Aligned Conference which President Boumediene chaired in Algeria at the beginning of September. Sources close to Boumediene have indicated that they believe he would be receptive to an invitation to meet with you informally during his stay in the United States.

Because of Algeria's importance in the Arab world, in the "third world", and as an increasingly important source of US energy requirements, I believe it would be in our interests to extend an invitation to him to meet with you informally when he comes to the United States. Since Boumediene is coming to the United States as the representative of the "non-aligned" nations, a meeting with you would also be an important gesture in their direction. His visit probably will not take place until after the end of October, when the Muslim holy month of Ramadan will end.

If you agree, we will instruct the US Interests Section in Algeria to extend an oral invitation to Boumediene to meet with you and to ascertain whether a mutually convenient date for such a meeting could be arranged.


Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET-EXDIS
GDS

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF

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 SUBJECT: *Requests appt w/ Pres for Pres Boumediene of Algeria, a non-aligned nation*
 REFERENCE: S/S *7318245* OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK (SCOWCROFT)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR HAK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO TO	
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NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>10/08</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
10/4/73	Quandt	HAK	X	Sign SP to Parker (10/08)	<i>Farrar</i>
10/5/73	Quandt	HAK	X	Sign SP to Parker (10/08)	<i>Dept folder</i>
10/23		Quandt	5	Further action/see note (10/25)	
10/31	<i>saunders</i> Quandt	HAK	X	Sign SP (11/04)	<i>FARRAR</i>
11/17		<i>saunders</i>	S	Recl (11/25)	
12/13	Quandt	NSC/S		Close out / DBE	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____
 OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
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 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ☒

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

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Memos & Misc

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

President Boumediene's Speech
at the United Nations

President Boumediene addressed the special session of the United Nations General Assembly yesterday on the issues raised by the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference held in Algiers last September. The basic theme of the speech was the allocation of the world's economic resources, which he characterized as being disproportionately controlled by the industrialized countries. He was critical of the limited amounts of assistance being provided to the developing world, contrasting the present situation with the era of the Marshall Plan. Ambassador Scali has characterized the speech as tough in substance, although delivered in a constructive and rational style.

Boumediene drew on the Algerian experience and that of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to make the following points:

- The developing countries should assume control over their own natural resources and establish organizations such as OPEC for fixing the export price of those resources.
- The developing countries must develop their agricultural potential and their ability to process their own raw materials.
- The richest countries must provide more aid to the poor ones.
- The debt burden of developing countries should be eliminated or lightened by cancellation or rescheduling of debts.
- A special program should be developed to increase aid for the twenty-five least developed countries, with major responsibility given to the World Bank and regional development banks. Contributions to such a program should be in proportion to national income.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

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
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

-2-

Boumediene argued that the United Nations is the most suitable forum for a dialogue on the allocation of resources. He contrasted it with the Washington Energy Conference, which he described as a preliminary to confrontation. He concluded his speech with an appeal for decisions that would lead to the eradication of poverty, disease, illiteracy and insecurity.

Attached at Tab A is a summary prepared by the State Department.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

President Boumediene's Speech to UNGA,
April 10, 1974

Introduction

Algerian President Boumediene delivered a 90-minute speech in Arabic before a packed and attentive General Assembly. His speech consisted primarily of an expose of the Algerian viewpoint of a new strategy for development. As his principal initiative, Boumediene suggested a special program for the least developed countries to be administered at least initially by IBRD and regional banks. He portrayed the world economic situation as one in which all strings of power were in hands of the minority of rich countries. The picture he drew was a harsh one of contrasts between dominant powers and poorer developing countries seeking to redress the profound imbalance between the rich and poor by taking control of production, transformation and pricing of their own raw materials. He urged other developing states to follow the oil producers' example by nationalizing their raw materials. He criticized the Washington Energy Group as confrontational. He made an effort to avoid inflammatory rhetoric but was clearly confrontational and uncompromising on substance.

Summary

Boumediene supported the cause of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, the Royal Khmer National Union Government, Guinea-Bissau, scored the "imperialistic take-over" in Chile, and called for evacuation of occupied Arab territories and return of the Palestinians.

Claiming that development has failed in the past two decades, Boumediene stressed the need to reallocate world resources and to establish a new priority for development. The strings in international economic

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GDS

relations are held by a minority of developed countries which dominate world resources. Developing countries must struggle for progress through national economic liberation, recover control over their natural resources, and battle with international monopolies and multinational corporations for control over raw material prices. OPEC has pointed the way and this model should extend to all basic raw materials of developing countries (copper, iron ore, bauxite, rubber, coffee).

If dialogue is desired, Boumediene agrees; but the UN is the place for it. The Washington Energy Conference sounded like confrontation.

Developed countries have profited at the expense of developing countries. Developed country products have increased in price 2-4 times in varying periods over the last 2-5 years. Profits have taken away over 1-1/2 times foreign aid grants in 1965 - '70, and debt service is currently at a level of \$9 billion a year.

The strategies to promote development that should be followed are:

- (a) Developing countries should take over their own natural resources;
- (b) Agriculture must be developed and industrialization must proceed including local processing of natural resources;
- (c) Financial, technical and commercial aid of rich and developed countries must be mobilized;
- (d) Debt burdens must be lightened;
- (e) More concentrated aid should be provided for the least developed countries.

Nationalization is an act of development, not ideological but a means of liberation, and a prerequisite for economic development. The West must accept the consequences of nationalization and establish a relationship of equality not exploitation. The UN must support the right to nationalize and condemn those who oppose it.

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Recovery of revenues is a major objective of LDC's and they will exercise the power to fix prices. Producing countries should form common fronts product-by-product to fix prices and restore the buying power of raw material exports.

Inflation is a phenomenon of the developed countries and not a consequence of increased oil prices, particularly since the impact of oil prices in overall costs is "ridiculously small".

Developed countries should end numerous expenditures for over-consumption, arms races, space programs, and replacement of products from the Third World with those from other sources.

In continuing the reform of the international monetary system, developing countries must be protected from inflation from the developed countries and they must be allowed to participate in the reform.

Markets of developed countries should be open to the products of the developing countries.

The developing countries must assume a rightful share of the leadership and management of world economic activities.

Foreign aid should be directed toward the elimination of social inequality; an increasing share must be nonreimbursable; the LDC debt burden should be reconsidered; and aid must be extended on an unconditional basis by the rich to the poor. Algeria will contribute to international aid within its capabilities.

Algeria will propose a program for the least developed countries which would include the granting of product aid by countries producing them, the provision of capital equipment financed by the international community, and a special program to be administered by the IBRD and the regional banks of Africa, Asia and Latin America while awaiting the development of special institutions.

Department of State
April 1974

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Talking Points

The President may wish to emphasize the following to President Boumediene:

-- While we frankly had reservations about what the Special General Assembly, called on short notice, could contribute to solving the obvious economic ills of the world, we plan to participate constructively.

-- We have read President Boumediene's speech with interest and are pleased that he recognizes the necessity of a dialogue between the developing and developed countries.

-- We believe that if the Assembly is to have positive results, it must proceed on the basis of consensus. No nation can or should accept the imposition of policies from outside in the sensitive and critical areas covered by the debate. In our judgment, if proposals adopted by the General Assembly are to be meaningful, they must rest on the consent of the countries whose participation is essential to make them work.

-- We wish to tell the President frankly there are a number of elements in his approach to which the United States is strongly opposed:

-- Nationalization of foreign holdings in a country without due respect for international law and agreed upon compensation, as he appears to suggest, will be counter-productive since additional foreign investment will be stifled.

-- Formation of additional cartels of raw material producers is not a constructive approach. If Algeria wishes to adhere to this policy, it must then recognize that consumers and producers of finished products will proceed to form common-interest groups of their own.

-- The impact on the world economy of the escalation in oil prices has been large and adverse. We think the only real solution of this problem lies in a reduction of prices. If key UN countries, including Algeria, are prepared to do their fair share in

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contributing to a solution of the current problems faced by the less developed countries, the United States will not be found wanting in joining in constructive efforts to ease the problems faced, particularly by the least developed countries who have few resources of their own.

-- In our judgment, only a cooperative effort to expand the global economy based on recognition of the interrelationship of decreasing supplies of raw materials sought in increasing quantities by an expanding world population can offer a hope for solution of the economic crisis which may overcome us all.

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SECRET (GDS)

MEETING WITH ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

Thursday, April 11, 1974

11:00 a.m. (90 minutes with interpretation)

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To establish a high-level dialogue with one of the key Arab leaders. In particular, you will want to try subtly to win President Boumediene's support for our strategy for bringing about an Arab-Israeli settlement step by step and to convince him of the importance we attach to achieving a modest Syrian-Israeli disengagement quickly. In addition, you will want to discuss US energy policy to convince Boumediene that we intend to work for cooperation between producers and consumers of energy, while striving to develop our own capacity for essential self-sufficiency. Finally, you will want to impress upon Boumediene our interest in an increasingly close bilateral relationship with Algeria.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background: An important part of your conversation will be a general discussion of your respective approaches to the world's problems. Boumediene is well able to carry on this kind of philosophical conversation; he will be pleased at your treating him as a spokesman for the non-aligned world; and he will be open-minded in listening to you explain why we approach the world as we do. A convincing presentation that he shares an interest in the kind of world we are trying to build could convince him that it is worth working with us.

President Boumediene is making his first visit to the United States in order to address a special session of the United Nations General Assembly, called at Algeria's request to discuss issues involving

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prices of raw materials and economic development. Since the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers last September, Boumediene has served as President of the non-aligned group and will speak in that capacity at the UN. Publicly he will portray his visit here as his conveying to you the concerns of the developing countries. He tends to see many of the world's problems in the fairly simple terms of the "industrialized" world having taken advantage of the poorer nations for a long time. While he has a strong streak of pragmatism and is not rigidly ideological, he comes at issues from this instinctive position and is under less pressure than we feel to come up with technically sound solutions to these complex problems.

His main objective at the UN, in addition to enhancing Algeria's own prestige and leadership, is to focus international attention on the terms of development assistance and trade between the industrialized countries and the less developed parts of the world. Many developing countries have suffered from rapid price increases in their imports from the industrialized countries, and only the oil-producing states have been able to offset this financial burden by raising prices of their own exports. The Algerians are concerned that the United States may try to drive a wedge between oil producers and non-oil producers in the developing world, but otherwise seem prepared to deal with these issues in a constructive manner. Boumediene will have addressed the UN General Assembly on April 10, and I will provide you later any particulars from that speech of which you would want to be aware.

Our objectives in this part of the conversation are: (1) to persuade him of the importance to the non-aligned world of your efforts to build a global structure of peace and (2) to convince him that we are prepared to do our part in trying to work out solutions to practical economic problems and that it will be easier to find solutions if a political confrontation between the rich and poor nations can be avoided.

More important for our Arab-Israeli negotiations is the fact that Boumediene is in a position to bridge the gap between Sadat's openly moderate step-by-step approach and Syria's tendency to hold out for more radical solutions. Boumediene has come to accept the idea of a political settlement, but is concerned that President Sadat

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may be making too many concessions without any assurances that Israel will withdraw from the occupied territories and that Palestinian interests will be met. Algeria reluctantly went along with the lifting of the oil embargo prior to Syrian-Israeli disengagement, but would be tempted to try to reimpose it if progress is not made on that front within the next two months.

Our objective on this issue is to encourage Boumedienne's support for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement on terms that are more modest than Syrian President Assad would like. Specifically, we are now confronted with the following situation: President Assad will probably ask for (1) Israeli withdrawal to a line that would force Israel to give up some of its settlements and (2) some Israeli commitment now to eventual total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. As you know, forcing Israel to face up to these issues in its present political condition would stall the negotiation. Therefore, we are urging a disengagement line that would move Israel back a small distance behind the pre-October ceasefire line so that Assad can claim to have regained some territory captured by Israel in 1967 as Sadat did, including the one major town on the Golan Heights. But this line would be short of any Israeli settlements. Neither the Israelis nor the Syrians have accepted this approach yet. We have Sadat's support for it, and we need Boumedienne's. We also need Boumedienne's support for not forcing the issue of total Israeli withdrawal at this stage. If we could swing Boumedienne and then Assad into full support of Sadat's gradual approach, we would have a strong foundation for maintaining the momentum of our peace efforts and for further constricting the Soviet role in the Middle East.

US-Algerian bilateral relations have been developing quite well since about 1969, largely because of a common interest in the export of Algerian liquid natural gas to the United States and Algeria's desire for American technology. The Export-Import Bank has played a significant role in these exchanges, and your talking points below offer you the opportunity to tell Boumedienne that the Bank is prepared to go ahead with a new \$49 million loan. While diplomatic relations have not yet been restored, this seems to be only a matter of time, provided an Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement can be reached. Reports suggest that Boumedienne may be prepared to

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discuss this issue. We can indicate our readiness to resume formal relations, but there is no need to press. In the meantime, our Interest Sections function virtually as embassies.

The State Department memorandum is at Tab B.


B. Participants: President Boumediene, Foreign Minister Bouteflika, Economic Counselor Idriss Djanairi, who will serve as interpreter on the Algerian side, and Camille Nowfal, State Department interpreter. (Foreign Minister Bouteflika was one of the four Arab foreign ministers who called on you last October 17.)

C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity and Ollie Atkins photo at the beginning. The Press Secretary will brief the press afterwards.

III. TALKING POINTS are at Tab A.

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WBQ:HMSaunders:tmt 4/10/74



SECRET (GDS)

TALKING POINTS

1. I am pleased to welcome you to Washington, Mr. President. I understand this is your first visit to the United States. I appreciated your receiving Secretary Kissinger last December and the opportunity to have a closer relationship with you and Foreign Minister Bouteflika.
2. Your country, because of its great sacrifices in fighting for its independence and its impressive efforts to develop its economy, has acquired a well-deserved position of leadership. Your visit here provides a particularly welcome opportunity for our two countries not only to improve our bilateral relationship but also to discuss broad issues of mutual interest.
3. I noted with interest your speech to the United Nations General Assembly yesterday. Perhaps we should begin our conversation by discussing our general approaches to world problems. Would you like to begin?
4. The United States, I can assure you, is deeply concerned over the problems of the terms of trade between the industrialized countries and the developing world, and we will do what we can to help. Please convey this assurance to other leaders with whom you are working. We feel that solutions will be easier if a political confrontation between the rich and poor nations can be avoided.
5. You know, Mr. President, that in the past five years, I have been working to bring about several major changes in the US foreign policy. I would like to take a moment to discuss these. In addition to explaining our general approach, this will help place in context our efforts in the Middle East. First, the United States has moved to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China. Our objective has been to minimize the danger of nuclear war which could grow out of superpower confrontations. Second, we have sought to end conflicts in which we have been involved, such as the war in Vietnam, on honorable terms. We are now turning our attention to the Middle East crisis. Our goal is not to establish a condominium of the superpowers at the expense of the developing countries. Rather, it is to create a situation in which no major power will seek unilateral advantages anywhere in the world, thus allowing all countries to enjoy their independence without outside interference and to pursue their interests in peaceful ways. It is in this kind of world that the United States has the most to offer and in which US interests will ultimately be best served.

SECRET (GDS)

6. I particularly want to explain, Mr. President, our approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement. As you know, we think that the most effective way of achieving a just and lasting peace is to move in a step-by-step fashion, relying on negotiations between the parties to resolve the many difficult issues along the way. From your own country's war for independence, you know that negotiations can be extremely difficult at times. But they nonetheless are the only alternative that holds promise of an equitable settlement in the Middle East. The United States will continue to play an active role in the negotiating process. We have committed ourselves, as I told your Foreign Minister last October 17, to work for the full implementation of Resolution 242.
7. Our immediate objective in the Middle East is to achieve an agreement on the disengagement of forces on the Syrian-Israeli front. We have received a proposal from the Israelis, and Secretary Kissinger will meet with Syrian General Shihabi tomorrow. There is still a substantial gap in the positions taken by the two sides, but we hope that this can be narrowed. Secretary Kissinger is prepared to visit the Middle East later this month in order to help bring about an agreement. We will work for a line that will bring the Israelis back behind the 1967 cease-fire line, but we do not want to press the Israelis too far at this point because, given their political situation, we are afraid this would stall the whole peace-making process. In our view, an agreement on the Syrian-Israeli front is the precondition for moving on to other vital issues, such as the question of the Palestinians, in which I know your country has an understandable interest.
8. With respect to the Soviet Union and its role in the Middle East, we have no desire to try to exclude it from the area or to limit its role in the negotiations. But I can tell you on a confidential basis that all the states in the area--Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel--have asked us to work closely with them in the negotiations, without involving the Soviet Union deeply in substantive issues at this point. We will continue to follow this approach as long as it proves to be the best way to achieve a peace settlement. Our approach is to follow the course that has the best chance of producing results, but we will stay in close touch with the USSR. Your understanding of this principle is very important to us.
9. With respect to the energy situation, our intention is to achieve essential self-sufficiency as soon as possible. In the meantime, of course, we will continue to import oil and gas and we have a strong interest in cooperative relations between consumers and producers. The Washington Energy Conference was simply a first step in this cooperation. We do not desire a confrontation between consumers and producers, since neither side would benefit.

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10. In conclusion, let me turn to our bilateral relationship. As you know, we are prepared for the full normalization of our relationship whenever you wish. We also hope to continue cooperation in technical and economic areas that are helpful to your development efforts. I am pleased to be able to inform you that we intend to authorize the Export-Import Bank to resume the normal processing of requests for financing of gas and oil-related projects in Algeria. They have now approved a \$48.7 million loan for a new crude oil pipeline in Algeria.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Boumediene Visit: Objectives and
Perspective

THE SETTING

President Houari Boumediene of Algeria is in the United States to address the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on raw materials and development, which was called at his request as President of the Non-Aligned States. This is Boumediene's first visit to a Western country, and it follows closely his recent trip to Lahore for the Islamic Summit, and to the People's Republic of China, North Korea and North Viet-Nam. After visiting New York and Washington, Boumediene plans to travel to Cuba and possibly other capitals in South America. You will find Boumediene a man of considerable intellectual force.

ANALYSIS

Boumediene's Enhanced Stature

President Boumediene emerged from the 1973 Conference of Non-Aligned States with enhanced stature as a leader of the Third World. Since then, he has continued to play the role with apparent relish, and with particular success during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war when Algeria was instrumental in enlisting Black African support for the Arab cause. Boumediene has also gained acceptance as one of the four most influential Arab leaders, together with Faisal, Asad and Sadat.

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Middle East

Immediately after the October cease-fire, Algeria felt left out of our Middle East peace initiatives. Secretary Kissinger's visit to Algiers in December 1973 opened a high-level dialogue with the Algerians which has been useful to both sides. Nevertheless, while we have succeeded in winning better private Algerian understanding of our peacemaking efforts, the Algerians have not appreciably softened their public attitude toward the United States. They reacted strongly against the Washington Energy Conference and also attached reservations to their agreement to go along with Sadat, Faisal and most other Arabs on lifting the oil embargo. The talks we shall have with Boumediene this week probably will be our most important discussion to date with the Algerians. Our main objective will be to describe to him how our negotiations for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement will proceed and try to persuade him not to do anything to hamper or embarrass our efforts.

It will be difficult to completely convince the Algerians that the United States and Algeria share the same objectives in any Middle East peace settlement, particularly with regard to the Palestinians. Despite substantial improvement in the dialogue between the United States and Algeria, they remain wary of our professions of good will toward the Arabs and skeptical of our ability to effect a Middle East settlement with which everyone can live. They are deeply suspicious of our traditional links with Israel and doubtful that any American Administration can pursue an even-handed policy vis-a-vis the Arabs, given "Zionist" influence in the United States.

Ideological Bias

The Algerians also have a strong ideological conviction that the United States and Algeria belong in two different worlds, the "industrialized" and the "exploited." They include the Soviet Union in the former, but not China. Boumediene made public statements during his visit to the People's Republic of

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China in February, in which he specifically included China among Third World countries, thus confirming China's special relationship to Algeria and other developing countries. In turn, China reportedly pledged its active support for Algeria's position at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and acknowledged Algeria's role as a non-aligned leader.

The Algerians assert that the United States wants to maintain the developing countries as sources of raw materials for the industrialized nations, and often attribute our alleged exploitation of underdeveloped nations to economic imperialism. Even our commonly acknowledged good works are viewed with suspicion and examined for motives that will fit their view of the world.

Continued Dialogue

Despite the problems in our relations, dialogue with the Algerians should be pursued. Because of their radical position on many world issues, they have credibility among Third World states which share their views. They have shown some signs of willingness to work with us in the search for peace in the Middle East and are in a position to be helpful because they can exert influence on the more recalcitrant Arab states.

The Algerians respect American technology and value our financing facilities and markets, thus providing a basis for long-term economic relationships. They are pragmatic and may be led to modify their extreme stances on matters which do not directly affect their national security or standing in the Third World. Economic self interest and dedication to the goal of economic development of the country are prominent among Algeria's priorities and are factors which can be used in bargaining for their cooperation on certain international problems.

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ALGERIAN OBJECTIVES

The Algerian objectives will be:

-- to enhance their own status as the spokesman for the non-aligned states and as a leader among the Arabs;

-- to help achieve a Middle East settlement on the most favorable terms from their viewpoint; i.e., Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and "justice" for the Palestinians;

-- to promote advantageous economic and commercial relations with the United States, including access to the U.S. market for their natural gas, and to the U.S. capital market to finance their economic development, without sacrificing their "revolutionary" anti-capitalistic image;

-- to secure economic justice for the LDC's by ensuring "fair" remuneration for their primary products.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

-- to continue the dialogue with the Algerians on our Middle East peace strategy, and seek their support for it;

-- to show the Algerians that we recognize their importance as Third World leaders and encourage them to use this position constructively;

-- to persuade the Algerians that it is in their interest and in the interests of the Middle East peace negotiations to work with us on international energy problems;

-- to continue high-level contacts in the hope that these will reduce Algerian suspicions and lead to improved long-term relations;

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--to establish conditions conducive to the
normalization of diplomatic relations.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Kenneth Rush". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Kenneth Rush
Acting Secretary

Attachment:

Issues and Talking Points

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

General

-- I am very pleased by the success of the efforts we have both made to improve relations between our two countries. These relations have grown and prospered because of the determination on both sides to set aside political differences and to build a long-term relationship based on our common interest in economic development and a peaceful and stable world. Now that a direct dialogue has been established following Secretary Kissinger's visit to Algiers, I look forward to working with you to strengthen our relations in all fields.

The Special Session of the UN General Assembly

Algerian Position

President Boumediene's call for the Special Session to discuss the problem of raw materials and the less developed countries was a direct result of the oil crisis and an obvious move to undermine the Washington Energy Conference which the Algerians strongly opposed, fearing that it would result in a reduction of oil prices. He is convinced that during the Special Session the United States will attempt to divide the non-aligned nations between the oil producing countries and the poorer non-producers of petroleum and that we will try to concentrate special attention on the petroleum issue and exert pressure to lower the price of oil. Algeria adamantly defends high oil prices and is encouraging other developing countries to seek higher prices for their raw materials. President Boumediene's speech at the opening session probably will focus on the needs and rights

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of the less developed countries and assert that they have been consistently exploited by the industrialized nations.

U.S. Position

The U. S. took the initiative in convening the Washington Energy Conference because it seemed important to us that major oil-consuming nations first meet to understand the nature of the problem and the range of possible remedies. We intend to pursue our efforts to resolve the energy problem on the basis of cooperation among all nations within the framework of the follow-on Coordinating Group which was established by the Conference.

The United States did not originally favor the Special Session, believing that the problems it will address would more appropriately be dealt with in established, specialized bodies. When it became apparent the UN members overwhelmingly supported the session, we concentrated our efforts on keeping political issues out of the meeting and avoiding a confrontation between developing and industrialized nations.

Talking Points

-- Refer to President Boumediene's keynote address at the Special Session (which will be delivered April 10) and, if it was constructive, make appropriate comments.

-- The United States does not oppose the Special Session. The subject matter is complex and requires thoughtful discussion. We intend to make a statement in the UNGA next week which describes our analysis of the issues facing us. The problems are global and require cooperative efforts since they cannot be solved by any one country. In today's complex and

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inter-dependent system of trade and monetary relations, multi-national corporations and regional economic groupings, international cooperation is required.

-- We do not see producers' and consumers' interests to be in conflict. The Washington Energy Conference was a first step to deal with world energy issues in a spirit of cooperation among all nations, without discrimination. It achieved, in terms of follow-on machinery and definition of objectives, substantially what we had hoped for. We think that early consultations with producer nations will be appropriate and the Coordinating Group is preparing for a producer-consumer conference as soon as possible.

Algeria and the Middle East

Algerian Position

Boumediene, although maintaining his public support for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, has privately indicated that any territorial settlement acceptable to Egypt and Syria will be acceptable to Algeria. His primary concern is that the overall settlement terms satisfy basic Palestinian demands and that Algeria be consulted and included in the Councils of the Arab leaders where the important decisions are made. Like most other Arab leaders, Boumediene endorses Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization as sole representative of the Palestinian people and is ambiguous about what "justice" for the Palestinians means in concrete territorial terms. He keeps his distance from the Pan Arab movement and is cautious about closer political cooperation within the Maghreb. When Algerian interests are served by closer cooperation with the other Arab states, there is a rapprochement; when they are not, Algeria goes its own way.

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U.S. Position

Difficult negotiations lie ahead, but we are committed to make a major effort for their success. We believe that establishment of the Geneva Conference and the successful implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement mark significant progress.

We are hopeful that with patience and time, we shall be able step by step to resolve the other major problems. We hope that the Arab countries can be persuaded to refrain from actions and public statements which undermine our efforts, and encouraged to lend us their positive support. Algeria, because it has the respect of both the radical and moderate Arab states, could be helpful in influencing them in the direction which the U.S. desires.

Talking Points

-- I very much appreciate your assistance and advice in connection with our efforts to achieve a final settlement in the Middle East. Your good relations with the Syrians have been particularly useful and I hope we may count on your continued support in efforts to arrive at a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

-- We now have Israel's concrete ideas from General Dayan, and Secretary Kissinger will be meeting with President Asad's representative tomorrow. The negotiations are progressing as planned, and we will continue to give highest priority to achieving a disengagement on the Syrian front.

-- After such an agreement is reached, we will have to move on to the more basic problems that must be solved in connection with a final settlement. We realize that this will require long and difficult negotiations between the parties and that difficult decisions will be required by both sides. We are fully committed to make a major and sustained effort to achieve a just and durable peace.

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-- Although the stage for formal discussion of how the interests of the Palestinians will be represented in the negotiations has not yet been reached, I want you to know that we consider this issue and the satisfaction of legitimate Palestinian interests a fundamental aspect of any overall settlement. In view of your excellent relations with the various Palestinian groups, we will be looking to you for help and advice on this subject.

U.S.-Algerian Bilateral Relations - Energy

Algerian Position

Algeria has looked to the United States for equipment and technology to develop its hydrocarbon industry and it regards the United States as a potentially important market for Algerian liquefied natural gas (LNG). The availability of financing through the Eximbank is an important factor in assuring that U.S. suppliers of goods and services remain competitive on the Algerian market. The Algerians have expressed concern over Eximbank's "freeze" on financing of new projects in Algeria since the oil embargo went into effect and have made repeated efforts to obtain the Bank's clearance on one major project for construction of a crude oil pipeline. The Algerians are also concerned about the status of the applications to import LNG which are now pending before the Federal Power Commission. If the FPC fails to approve these applications, the Algerians will have to recommence lengthy negotiations with other prospective buyers of their gas, which could result in a deferment of much-needed earnings from gas sales.

U.S. Position

We are eager to develop our commercial relations with Algeria, which is the third most important customer in Africa for U.S. exports. In the framework of support for our export promotion policy, we are now prepared to authorize the Eximbank to resume the

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normal processing of requests for financing of gas and oil-related projects. (As an immediate consequence of this, Exim will approve a final commitment for a \$48.7 million loan and guarantee for the Haoud el Hamra-Skikda crude oil pipeline, under which General Electric will furnish \$50 million worth of U.S. goods and services to the Algerian State Oil Company, SONATRACH).

The interagency International Energy Review Group is now considering the future of liquefied natural gas in our total energy picture, and the importance of Algerian and other foreign LNG may be subject to reevaluation when the IERG reports its findings. Meanwhile, the Department will withhold its decision on whether or not to support the applications now pending before the FPC.

Talking Points

-- I am pleased to be able to tell you that the Department of State will inform Eximbank right away that it favors resumption of normal processing of the full range of projects for Algeria. The Bank will, of course, continue to apply normal banking standards for each application and will also be concerned with the level of the Bank's overall exposure in Algeria.

-- The Arab Oil Ministers' decision to lift the oil embargo and resume normal production was both wise and statesmanlike. The use of oil as a political weapon damages the Arab image in this country and undermines my Administration's efforts to build a constructive relationship with the Arab World and work for a just peace settlement.

Resumption of Diplomatic Relations

Algerian Position

We have had indications that Algeria does not intend to propose the resumption of diplomatic relations during Boumediene's visit but intends to wait for a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

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U.S. Position

We have informed the Algerians on many occasions that we are ready to resume relations whenever Algeria wishes. We do not intend to raise the question, but if Boumediene does so, we shall assume this position.

Talking Points

-- I reiterate what we have said on several previous occasions; we are prepared to resume relations whenever Algeria wishes.

Department of State
April 1974

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ACTION
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET (GDS)

April 10, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT *W B Q*

SUBJECT:

President Boumediene's Visit
April 11, 1974

Attached is the briefing memo with talking points for you to forward to the President for his meeting with President Boumediene Thursday, April 11, 1974 at 11:00 a.m. In addition, we want to draw your attention to the following issues:

--We have received "reliable" reports that Foreign Minister Bouteflika is recommending to Boumediene that the time has come to normalize relations with the United States. Smail Hamdani, Deputy Secretary General at the Presidency, informally raised the question by asking if David Newsom might be named Ambassador to Algeria. The final step, however, may still have to wait until after Syrian disengagement.

--One positive item that either the President or you can mention to the Algerians is the Export-Import Bank decision to provide a \$48.7 million loan to Algeria for the construction of a new oil pipeline. This had been held up pending State Department approval, but is now ready to be announced.

--By contrast with the Exim Bank decision, we have nothing new to tell the Algerians on Federal Power Commission approval of pending applications for the import of Algerian Liquid Natural Gas. The whole issue of gas imports is currently under review, and if the issue comes up you can say this.

--In addition to talking about Syrian-Israeli disengagement, the Algerians are likely to raise the issue of Palestinian representation at Geneva. On this point, it might be worth discussing straight forwardly with Boumediene our view that it is tactically important to approach this issue gradually so as not to provoke a sharp Israeli reaction that would bring negotiations to a halt.

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SECRET (GDS)

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--As you know, the Algerians are proud, sensitive and more than a little suspicious of our intentions. They will be very flattered by any positive references which the President or you might make about their struggle for independence, their determined efforts to build their state on firm foundations after independence, their resistance to any outside interference in their affairs, their economic development efforts, and their role in the Arab and non-aligned worlds. At the same time, you will want to be sensitive to the Algerian view that these have been national achievements, not those of individuals. The Algerian leadership shuns any hint of a cult of personality around Boumediene and Boumediene himself does not open up about his personal background.

--Finally, although Boumediene is the central figure, it would be wise to pay special attention to Bouteflika.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the attached talking points to the President.

SECRET (GDS)

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

WHITE HOUSE
TUATION ROOM
JUN 6 AM 8:23

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01179 291616Z

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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R 291526Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0581

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1179

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EGEN
SUBJ: EXIM BANK PRESIDENT CASEU'S MEETING WITH
BOUMEDIENE

1. ON MAY 28 EXIM BANK PRESIDENT CASEY, ACCOMPANIED BY CHIEF USINT, HAD 45 MINUTE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN CONVERSATION BOUMEDIENE EXPRESSED DESIRE DEVELOP LONG-TERM ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. AND PARTICULARLY WITH EXIMBANK. CASEY RESPONDED THAT BANK WAS PLEASED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN DONE THUS FAR AND FORESAW CONTINUED CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IN FUTURE. IN REPLY TO BOUMEDIENE'S QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS CEILING ON LOANS FOR GIVEN COUNTRY, CASEY EXPLAINED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO COUNTRY CEILING, CONGRESS PLACES LIMIT ON YEARLY TRANSACTIONS AND HENCE BANK STUDIES EACH PROJECT INDIVIDUALLY ON BASIS VALUE IN TERMS U.S. EXPORTS AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT.

3. BOUMEDIENE ASKED WHICH PROJECTS WERE NOW BEING CONSIDERED. CASEY MENTIONED PLANES, LOCOMOTIVES, SATELLITE GROUND STATIONS, AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS AND HOME TELEVISION PROJECTS. BOUMEDIENE SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN LATTER AND ASKED WHAT CASEY THOUGHT OF PROJECT. BOUMEDIENE AGREED WITH CASEY'S VIEW THAT PROJECT WAS WELL-CONCEIVED.

74 MAY 30 AM 8:22

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ALGIER 01179 291616Z

4. FUTURE LNG PROJECTS WERE MENTIONED BUT CASEY MADE POINT THAT QUESTION OF GAS PRICES, ON WHICH PROJECTS DEPEND, WAS MATTER BETWEEN ALGERIA AND COMPANIES. BOUMEDIENE ALSO MENTIONED BANK'S POSSIBLE INTEREST IN FUTURE IRON AND STEEL PROJECTS AND HE REGISTERED GOOD-HUMORED COMPLAINT THAT CATERPILLAR WAS INTERESTED IN PRESERVING ITS OWN MARKET AND DID NOT WISH TO COOPERATE WITH ALGERIA IN BUILDING HEAVY EQUIPMENT PLANT

5. BOUMEDIENE SAID GREATEST NEED FOR FINANCING WOULD OCCUR BETWEEN NOW AND 1980 WITH LARGEST INVESTMENT IN PETROLEUM AND GAS SECTORS. HE NOTED THAT SOME MODERN TECHNOLOGY WAS AVAILABLE ONLY IN U.S. ALGERIA, HE SAID, HAD CARRIED OUT ITS REVOLUTIONS AND WAS NOW LOOKING TOWARD U.S. WITH "OPEN DOOR". POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WERE BOUND TO DEVELOP WITH ECONOMIC ONES. HE HAD TALKED AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER ON THIS SUBJECT AND CONSIDERED THAT "RELATIONS MUST DEVELOP".

6. CASEY SAID BANK RECOGNIZED EXCELLENT PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN ALGERIA AND HOPED CONTRIBUTE TO ALGERIAN EFFORTS. HE HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS WITH DR. KISSINGER AND BOTH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT NIXON EXPECTED BANK TO DO ITS PART. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BANK AND ALGERIAN OFFICIALS TO DEVELOP CLOSEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP.

7. BOUMEDIENE REPLIED THAT U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE EXAMPLE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH BENEFITS TO BOTH PARTNERS.

8. COMMENT: CASEY'S MEETING WITH BOUMEDIENE WAS USEFUL FOLLOW-UP TO SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS OF U.S.-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH BOUMEDIENE APRIL 29/30. WE HAVE NOT YET HAD ALGERIAN REPLY TO OUR APPROACH OF MAY 7 RE POSSIBILITY ESTABLISHING JOINT COMMISSION (ALGIERS 1017). BELIEVE THIS MATTER IS IN HANDS MINISTER INDUSTRY ABDESSELAM WHO IS NOW IN GERMANY. WE LEARNED DURING CASEY'S VISIT THAT ABDESSELAM INTENDS BRING LARGE ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO U.S. IN FALL, PROBABLY OCTOBER. EAGLETON

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SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 1922

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01103 211200Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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P 210800Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0543

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1103

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: XGDS4
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: TWO SIDES OF BOUMEDIENE

1. SUMMARY DURING RECENT MONTHS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAS RISEN TO POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THIRD WORLD AND HAS, WITH HIGH OIL PRICES, SEEN HIS COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS GREATLY ENHANCED. THOUGH MANY OBSERVERS THEREFORE BELIEVE HIS POSITION IS STRONGER THAN EVER IT COULD BE MISTAKE TO CONFUSE HIS EXTERNAL SUCCESSES WITH INTERNAL STANDING. WHILE CONCENTRATING ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUMEDIENE HAS NEGLECTED SOME OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUPPORTERS INCLUDING ARMY OFFICERS, AND CONCENTRATED RESPONSIBILITY IN HIS OWN PERSON. HE HAS ALSO REVEALED HIS MARRIAGE TO YOUNG WOMAN OF DOUBTFUL BACKGROUND AND TARNISHED HIS IMAGE AS ASCETIC LEADER REMOVED FROM SELFISH IMPULSES.

BOUMEDIENE IS AWARE OF POPULAR GRIEVANCES AND NEED TO DEVOTE MORE TIME TO DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. THEREFORE HE WILL PROBABLY TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES, INCLUDING DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE, TO REDRESS SITUATION. THUS, WITH CAVEAT THAT ONE MAN RULE IS ALWAYS VULNERABLE, WE CONTINUE TO RATE ALGERIA AMONG MOST STABLE THRID

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 ALGIER 01103 241250Z

2. DURING PAST SIX MONTHS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAS VISITED MOSCOW, PEKING, PIYONGYANG, HANOI, WASHINGTON AND HAVANA. HE HAS HOSTED NON-ALIGNED AND ARAB SUMMITS AND HAS RECEIVED A STEADY FLOW OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE FORCED A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA TO BRING THRID WORLD GRIEVANCES BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS.

4. IT IS WIDELY ASSUMED BY FOREIGN OBSERVERS THAT BOUMEDIENE'S INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSSES, COMBINED WITH ALGERIA'S ENHANCED ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, HAVE STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION WITHIN ALGERIA. HOWEVER, AS POLICY-MAKING BY COUNCIL OF REVOLUTION HAS GIVEN WAY TO PRESIDENTIAL RULE, BOUMEDIENE HAS BECOM INCREASINGLY EXPOSED TO POPULAR GRIEVANCES ON INFLATION, SHORTAGES, POLITICAL REPRESSION AND ASSORTED ISSUES. HE HAS ALSO AT TIMES ANTAGONIZED SOME OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES WHOSE CRITICISMS CENTER ON ARBITRARY FROM OF HIS RULE MORE THAN ON ITS SUBSTANCE. THEIR DISAFFECTION (PERHAPS TEMPORARY) IS PARTLY DERIVED FROM THEIR AWARENESS THAT HE HAS PERSONAL FLAWS AND HIS JUDGMENT IS FALLIBLE. WHEN IN 1965 BOUMEDIENE OUSTED BEN BELLA (WHO WAS CRITICIZED FOR LETTING DOMESTIC AFFAIRS DRIFT WHILE HE ENGAGED IN FOREIGN ADVENTURES) HE UNDERTOOK TO DO AWAY WITH ONE MAN RULE AND DEVOTE HIMSELF TO BUILDING A PROSPEROUS ALGERIA. INCREASINGLY, ALGERIANS QUESTION WHETHER BOUMEDIENE IS FOLLOWING PATH OF HIS PREDECESSOR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01103 011200Z

5. PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT, THOUGH SUBTERRANEAN, CURRENT COMPLAINT AMONG HIS INITIMATES INVOLVES HIS MARRIAGE LAST SUMMER TO A DIVORCED WOMAN OF DOUBTFUL MORALS AND UNCERTAIN (PARTIALLY EUROPEAN AND CHRISTIAN) PARENTAGE. HE WAS GIVEN FULL DOSSIER ON HER PAST BEFORE THEIR MARRIAGE BUT WENT AHEAD AGAINST ADVICE OF THOSE WHOSE FORTUNES ARE TIED TO HIS. HIS PERSONAL LIFE IS NO LONGER ABOVE REPROACH.

6. AGRARIAN REVOLUTION, HOWEVER LOFTY ITS AIMS, IS ANOTHER FOCUS OF DISCONTENT SINCE ITS IMPLEMENTATION OFFENDS A WIDE SECTION, IF NOT MAJORITY, OF POPULATION. TENSION IS ALSO CREATED BY HIS STUBBORN SEARCH FOR A SOCIALIST WAY IN SPITE OF FACT THAT MOST ALGERIANS, INCLUDING HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES, ARE NOT TRUE BELIEVERS. OTHERS FAULT HIS FAILURE TO MOVE TOWARD REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND TO FIND A ROLE FOR FLN PARTY.

7. BOUMEDIENE'S RULE IS BASED ON COHESION OF SMALL "OUJDA GROUP" WHICH HAS REMAINED UNITED THROUGH GRADUAL ELIMINATION OF RIVAL LEADERS AND HAS EMERGED AS A PRIVILEGED ELITE WHICH DEFENDS ITSELF AGAINST OUTSIDERS. THROUGH TRUSTED ASSOCIATES BOUMEDIENE HAS RETAINED CONTROL OF ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES AND HAS KEPT HIS ASSOCIATES OFF-BALANCE BY SKILLFULLY PLAYING ON THEIR AMBITIONS AND WEAKNESSES. WHEN THEY BECOME AWARE OF HIS MANIPULATIONS, HOWEVER, THEY SOMETIMES HAVE FEELING THEY ARE BEING USED.

8. RECENTLY WE HAVE HEARD THAT BOUMEDIENE HAS, IN HIS PRE-OCCUPATION WITH WORLD ROLE, BEEN NEGLECTING ARMY OFFICERS WHOSE CAMPS HE USED TO VISIT REGULARLY. AT SAME TIME HE IS REPORTEDLY ONCE AGAIN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND ARMY WHICH COULD SATISFY SOME BUT ANTAGONIZE OTHERS. (HE DOES NOT, HOWEVER, LIKE TO MAKE CHANGES AND MAY MERELY BE KEEPING HIS TEAM OFF BALANCE.)

9. THROUGH MILITARY SECURITY AND PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AS WELL AS PRIVATE CHANNELS,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 ALGIER 01103 211250Z

BOUMEDIENE IS AWARE OF ALL THE GRIEVANCES MENTIONED ABOVE AND PROBABLY MORE. WE CAN ASSUME THEREFORE THAT HE WILL TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT FURTHER EROSION OF HIS POPULARITY AND CONTAIN DISSENT AMONG HIS ASSOCIATES. WITH JUDICIOUS APPROPRIATION OF REWARDS AND POSITIONS, RENewed ATTENTION TO THE ARMY, CAUTION ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND DISSOLUTION OF HIS MARRIAGE HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE AS UNDISPUTED LEADER OF AN INCREASINGLY PROSPEROUS AND INFLUENTIAL COUNTRY. IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT HOWEVER TO RECOVER AMONG HIS OWN PEOPLE THAT AURA OF MAGIC WHICH ONCE SURROUNDED HIS ASCETIC PERSONALITY. AND FINALLY, POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN CHANGE CAN NEVER BE RULED OUT IN A COUNTRY WHOSE INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES ARE NOT ROOTED IN TRADITION OR ALWAYS BASED ON CONSENSUS.

10. IN SPITE OF BOUMEDIENE'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WE BELIEVE USG SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIDER ALGERIAN REGIME AMONG MOST STABLE IN THIRD WORLD AND BOUMEDIENE HIMSELF A WORTHY PARTNER IN QUEST FOR PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG NATIONS OF DIVERSE BACKGROUND.

11. ABOVE IS EXDIS-NOPORN BECAUSE IT CONTAINS INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCES.
EAGLETON

NOTE BY OC/TI NOT PASSED SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 2377

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01018 081815Z

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ACTION SS=30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

079284

P 081700Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0503

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1018

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EGEN
SUBJECT: US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

REF: JERUSALEM 3631; STATE 085347; ALGIERS 1017

1. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH
DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI AND CHIEF ALGIN BOUSSELHAM,
ECONOMIC OFFICER HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSION ON ALGERIAN
PROJECTS WITH BOUSSELHAM.

2. BOUSSELHAM EMPHASIZED ALGERIAN INTEREST IN TWO
AREAS - (A) EXPORTS OUTSIDE OF HYDROCARBONS
AND (B) IMPROVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR. AMONG MAJOR
PROJECTS UNDER (A) HE MENTIONED STEEL, AUTOMOBILES,
HOME ELECTRONICS, AND ALUMINUM. THIS WILL BE SET OUT
IN THE 1974/77 4-YEAR PLAN WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE
APPROVED SHORTLY.

3. ALGERIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE AND INDUSTRY ABDESSELAM
AND MINISTER OF FINANCE MAHROUG PLAN TO COME TO US
TO EXPLAIN NEW 4-YEAR PLAN. BOUSSELHAM WAS ABOUT TO
MEET WITH ABDESSELAM AND SO WAS NOT SURE OF HIS PLANS,
BUT MAHROUG WOULD LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON JUNE 10 FOR
6-20 MEETING. HE HAS THEN SCHEDULED MEETING IN NEW
YORK WITH CHASE, FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK AND BANK OF

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 01018 081815Z

AMERICA.

A BOUSSELHAM WAS AWARE OF POSSIBLE VISIT OF EXIM PRESIDENT WILLIAM CASEY TO ALGERIA. BOUSSELHAM FELT TRIP SHOULD BE WELL PREPARED WITH ALGERIANS READY TO CITE PRIORITY PROJECTS. HE MENTIONED SEPTEMBER AS A POSSIBLE DATE. HOWEVER, USINT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED BY GOA FOR VISIT TO ALGIERS. TODAY WE RECEIVED CALL FROM TOM MORAN OF EXIM THAT HE, MORAN, WOULD BE ARRIVING MAY 14, AND CASEY AND HAMMOND OF EXIM MAY 27, ALL FOR DAY AND A HALF VISITS. BOUSSELHAM IS RETURNING WASHINGTON TODAY AND USINT SUGGESTS CAREFUL PLANNING WITH BOUSSELHAM ON ECONOMIC COORDINATION PROPOSAL WITH EXIM PRIOR VISIT. CASEY VISIT COULD WELL BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN CONNECTION WITH PROPOSED ECONOMIC COOPERATION, REFTEL. EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 2363

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01017 081804Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
***** 079157

P 081700Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0502

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1017

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EGEN
SUBJ: US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

REF: JERUSALEM 3631; STATE 085347

1. MAY7, ACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMIC OFFICER HIGGINSON, I CALLED ON DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CHIEF ALGINT BOUSSELHAM, TO MAKE OPENING PRESENTATION ON US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AS FOLLOW UP TO SECRETARY'S CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE APRIL 29-30.

2. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS JERUSALEM REFTL, I STRESSED THAT WE WERE PRESENTING ILLUSTRATIONS BASED ON OUR APPROACH TO SAUDIS BUT THAT WE RECOGNIZED DIFFERENT SITUATION OF ALGERIA AND WERE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT STRUCTURE AND DIRECTION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM

3. I TOLD HAMDANI SECRETARY AND DEPT WOULD BE FOLLOWING UP ON OUR EFFORTS TO INTENSIFY US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON.

4. HAMDANI LISTENED INTENTLY AND TOOK NOTES ON THE FIVE AREAS OF OUR SAUDI PRESENTATION: (A) INDUSTRIAL

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

SECRET

AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; (B) ENERGY; (C) TRADE;
(D) FINANCE AND INVESTMENT; AND (E) TECHNOLOGY AND
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. I ALSO REFERRED TO OUR SUGGESTION
TO SAUDIS THAT A JOINT COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC
COOPERATION MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED.

6 AS CURRENT EXAMPLE OF PROJECTS IN WHICH U.S. GOVERNMENT IS TAKING INTEREST, I MENTIONED AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY AND ALGERIAN MINISTRY HYDRAULICS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING IN CONNECTION WITH A SATELLITE PHOTO INTERPRETATION LAB IN ALGERIA. I ALSO LEFT WITH HAMDANI A PIECE OF PAPER ON GENERAL MOTORS STUDY GROUP WHICH IS VISITING ALGERIA MAY 17-22.

7. HAMDANI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION FOR OUR PRESENTATION AND INDICATED HE WOULD HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS AFTER MATTER HAD BEEN STUDIED WITHIN GOA. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO HELP PLAN AND COORDINATE VISIT OF GENERAL MOTORS STUDY GROUP, AND DURING SEPARATE CONVERSATION MAY 8 HE INDICATED THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN GM GROUP'S VISIT AND POSSIBLE PROPOSALS RE MANUFACTURE OF AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS FOR EXPORT WITHIN THE ARAB AREA. EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'74 APR 30 PM 7:48

CONFIDENTIAL 3100

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00919 301146Z

46 S
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

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O 301115Z APR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0454
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USDEL ALEXANDRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 0919
EXDIS
SECTO 49

FOR DONALDSON FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: SAUDI ARABIAN "INFORMAL IDEA" FOR FOLLOW UP TO
SPECIAL GA SESSION

REF: STATE 087524

1. I BELIEVE BAROODY IDEA HAS TO BE DISCUSSED IN FIRST INSTANCE
WITH YAMANI TO SEE WHETHER THIS IS A SAUDI GOV PROPOSAL OR
JUST A BAROODY INITIATIVE. FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVE AKINS
SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED FIRST TO ASCERTAIN THIS AS
WELL AS WHETHER IS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OTHERS.

2. I NOTE IN PRESS TICKER BAROODY HAS SUBMITTED SOMETHING
LIKE HIS IDEAS TO GA. IS THIS CORRECT? KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION INSERTED PER MR. NEWLIN, S/S-0

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Department of State TELEGRAM

'74 APR 30 AM 10:17

SECRET 1595

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00912 300125Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

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O 300110Z APR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0407
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0447

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0912

EXDIS

SECTO 0043

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR SCALI FROM SECRETARY

SECSTATE FOR ENDERS AND BUFFUM FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH BOUMEDIENE

I HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH BOJMEIENE RE
CURRENT STATE OF GA, AND WE AGREED THAT SCALI
SHOULD GET TOGETHER WITH BOUTEFLIKA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
TO SEE WHETHER SOME CONSTRUCTIVE WORK CAN BE DONE
TOGETHER OF A CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE ON THE PRINCIPLES.
YOU SHOULD BE HELPFUL AND FLEXIBLE BUT NOT GIVE UP
OUR BASIC POSITION.

AS TO OUR POSTURE ON THE FUND, YOU SHOULD
PROCEED ON BASIS YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN
TOSECS 05 AND 06. I CAN TALK TO SHULTZ WHEN I GET
BACK IF YOU HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES
WITH TREASURY SATISFACTORILY.

PLEASE WIRE US YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON HOW WE
SHOULD VOTE IN LIGHT OF HOW SUCCESSFUL YOU HAVE
BEEN IN RESHAPING GA RES PURSUANT TO TOSECS 05 AND 06.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00912 300125Z

BOUTIFLIKA IS AWAITING YOUR CALL. KISSINGER

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'74 FEB 15 AM 8.39

SECRET 260

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00348 141531Z

51
ACTION SS-30

17

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
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Z O 141505Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0137
AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0348

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO
PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, EG, SA
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTERS' TRIP
TO PARIS AND WASHINGTON

1. EGYPTIAN FONMIN FAHMI PHONED ME AT 1430 TO SAY
THAT HE AND PARTY OF THREE EGYPTIANS AND SAUDI FONMIN
SAQQAF AND PARTY OF TWO SAUDIS ARE LEAVING ALGIERS
FOR WASHINGTON VIA PARIS AT 1500 TODAY ARRIVING
PARIS 1800.

2. EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI MINISTERS WILL PROCEED TO
WASHINGTON BY BEST POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS PROBABLY
TOMORROW FEBRUARY 15. IN WASHINGTON THEY WISH TO
MEET WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT NIXON. I ASKED
FAHMI WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE GOOD NEWS AND HE
REPLIED "YES" BUT GAVE NO DETAILS.

2. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR THEN CAME ON PHONE AND
ASKED THAT WE NOTIFY OUR AMBASSADOR IN PARIS AND
ASK HIM TO CONTACT EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR PARIS
OR RANKING EGYPTIAN AVAILABLE TO ASK THAT THEY
OBTAIN OVERNIGHT HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR EGYPTIAN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ALGIER 00348 141531Z

AND SAUDI PARTIES. HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONTACT HIS AMBASSADOR. HE ASKED THAT FRENCH AUTHORITIES NOT BE INFORMED (THOUGH THEY WILL PRESUMABLY KNOW WHEN PARTY TRANSITS AIRPORT). EXACT ETA WASHINGTON WILL BE PASSED THROUGH OUR EMBASSY PARIS.

3. MINI SUMMIT HAS ENDED. FAISAL LEFT ALGIERS AT 1400.
EAGLETON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

11

23
0725/10/02



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 268

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00174 281158Z

43

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

109200

P R 281053Z JAN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0053
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0174

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ENGR, XF, AG
SUBJ: VIEWS OF ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT RE LIFTING OF
OIL BOYCOTT

: JIDDA 432

1. AGREE WITH SUDI COMMENT PARA 3 REFTEL THAT U.S.
INTERVENTION WITH ALGERIANS FOR LIFTING OIL BOYCOTT
WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL.

2. WE HAVE NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING LIFTING
OF BOYCOTT WITH HIGH LEVEL ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT BUT
HAVE IMPRESSION FROM COMMENTS MADE DURING VISIT
CODEL FANNIN JANUARY 21 THAT THEY ARE AWAITING
INITIATIVE FROM MAJOR ARAB PRODUCERS AND WILL FOLLOW
THEIR LEAD.

EXDIS
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ALGIER 00174 281158Z

3. AT ANY ARAB GATHERING TO DISCUSS BOYCOTT ALGERIA WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SEEN TAKING MOST MODERATE POSITION AND HENCE WOULD PROBABLY SIDE WITH KUWAITIS AND OTHERS WHO WANT TO DELAY LIFTING BOYCOTT UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET.

4. BELIEVE IF SAUDIS WISH TO LINE UP ALGERIANS THEY SHOULD DO SO VIA DIRECT CONTACTS BEFORE ARAB MEETING BUT AT TIME THEY CAN ASSURE ALGERIANS THAT SEVERAL OTHER ARAB PRODUCERS ARE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH EARLY LIFTING OF EMBARGO.

5. ALGERIA'S MAJOR INTEREST IN ENDING BOYCOTT WOULD NOT BE IN INCREASING OIL EXPORTS, WHICH ARE NOW NEAR MAXIMUM OF PRODUCTION, BUT IN NORMALIZING LNG EXPORTS BEFORE REPAIRS AT SKIKDA PLANT PROVIDE SUPPLIES OF LNG FOR IGMS. MARKET. ACCORDING TO LE MONDE ALL THREE TRAINS AT SKIKDA ARE EXPECTED TO BE OPERATING BY END OF FEBRUARY.
EAGLETON

#0174

NNN
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

0735/10/520

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Department of State

SCOWCROFT

TELEGRAM

SECRET 556

EYES ONLY

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00142 221440Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO: OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

048049

R 221428Z JAN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0040

SECRET ALGIERS 0142

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REF: STATE 012875

DELIVERED THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO ABERKANE OF
FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO PASSED IT ON TO BOUMEDIENE
EVENING JANUARY 21 SO THAT IT REACHED HIM DURING
SADAT'S VISIT TO ALGIERS.
EAGLETON

74 JAN 23 AM 8.28

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 29 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 150 74 JAN 9 AM 8:46

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00037 081457Z

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

042519

R 081032Z JAN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9992
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET ALGIERS 0037

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP

SUBJ: CODEL JOHNSTON INTEREST IN MEETING WITH ARAFAT

STAFF MEMBER OF SENATOR JOHNSTON'S PARTY TOLD EMBOFF
THAT SENATOR HAD CONTACT THROUGH WHICH HE INTENDED TO
ARRANGE MEETING WITH ARAFAT WHILE IN BEIRUT. STAFF
MEMBER (PROTECT) SAID HE DOUBTED MEETING WOULD
INFLUENCE PLO POLICIES, BUT "IT WOULD BE A GOOD NEWS
STORY". HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED
WITH DEPARTMENT.
EAGLETON

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. A small star is positioned to the left of the eagle's head.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
73 DEC 13 PM 12:38
10001

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02592 131242Z

ROLE, CONSENSUS ADOPTED SHOULD BE BASICALLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE IN CHARACTER AND DO NOTHING TO UPSET, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, CAREFUL BALANCE CONTAINED IN JOINT US-USSR LETTER. YOU SHOULD CONCERT WITH SOVIET DEL WITH A VIEW TO GETTING SC PRESIDENT TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON FOLLOWING BRIEF SC CONSENSUS STATEMENT. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT PHRASEOLOGY WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY NON-ALIGNED WITH OTHER SC MEMBERS.

"IN RESOLUTION 338 OF 22 OCTOBER 1973, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES. THE COUNCIL HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE LETTER OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (DOCUMENT S/) AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST TO BEGIN ON DECEMBER 18, 1973 AT GENEVA WILL MAKE A SPEEDY PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242.

THE COUNCIL WELCOMES THE FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE CONVENED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HIS APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE WILL HAVE A USEFUL ROLE DURING THE DELIBERATIONS. THE COUNCIL EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL KEEP IT SUITABLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS." END
KISSINGER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 385

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02588 131206Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 7031 W

119988

O 131127Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9921

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2588

EXDIS

SECTO 0083

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO AFRICAN POSTS

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO AFRICAN POSTS (TOSEC 112) APPROVED.
KISSINGER

78 DEC 13 PM 12:33

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top left corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
STILL ROOM
73 NOV 19 PM 3:13

028637

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2422

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, ENRG
SUBJECT: BOUMEDIENE'S CURRENT ATTITUDE RE MIDDLE EAST AND
OIL BOYCOTT

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

2. ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR, BOUMEDIENE IS NOW FED UP WITH MIDDLE EAST AND WANTS TO HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. HE WISHES INSTEAD TO CONCENTRATE ON ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT. I ASKED HOW THIS FIT IN WITH ALGIERS SUMMIT AND HE REPLIED THAT BOUMEDIENE WAS HAPPY ENOUGH TO HAVE SUMMIT HERE BUT WOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVES. HE WAS FED UP WITH PALESTINIANS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02422 191056Z

AS WELL AS EGYPT AND OTHER EASTERN ARAB STATES. ZEGHAR INSISTED THAT BOUMEDIENE WAS GENUINELY DISENCHANTED, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF SUMMIT GAVE HIM SOME KIND OF MANDATE TO PARTICIPATE IN ARAB EFFORTS HE WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT IT.

3. ZEGHAR HAD SEEN MININDUSTRY ABDESSELAM NOVEMBER 17 WHEN LATTER WAS LEAVING FOR GENEVA AND ZEGHAR IS SCHEDULE TO JOIN ABDESSELAM NOVEMBER 19 IN EUROPE. ZEGHAR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED OIL WITH BOUMEDIENE. HE REPORTED "IN CONFIDENCE" THAT HE EXPECTED ARAB OIL EMBARGO TO BE RELAXED BY END OF NOVEMBER. SINCE HE HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT EUROPE I ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD APPLY TO EMBARGO ON OIL TO U.S. HE ANSWERED "IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE ISRAELI'S TO MOVE BACK." HE DID NOT SEEM TO WISH TO SAY MORE.

4. ZEGHAR IS STILL AWAITING INSTRUCTION TO GO TO U.S. TO PREPARE FOR BOUMEDIENE'S TRIP TO UNGA, INCLUDING CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS LEADERS. PLANNING FOR TRIP IS APPARENTLY DELAYED UNTIL AFTER ARAB SUMMIT.
EAGLETON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

0735/10/5410



TELEGRAM

73 NOV 11 AM 9:42

WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM

092325

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
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1. HAMDANI PHONED AT 1900 LOCAL TO SAY HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH BOUMEDIENE YOUR PROPOSAL AS PER ADDIS REPTL. BOUMEDIENE HAD ASKED HIM TO LET YOU KNOW THAT GOA REGRETTED THAT IT MUST ASK THAT VISIT NOT TAKE PLACE NOW. DESIRE IS THAT YOU SHOULD COME AT A LATER DATE TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU OUTSIDE ALGERIA WAS ALSO RULED OUT. GOA SAW NO REASON WHY USG SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO WORK WITH PARTIES DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN MIDDLE EAST SEARCH FOR SETTLEMENT, BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT BILATERAL RELATIONS. REFERRING PUBLICITY OVER KUWAIT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SISCO'S VISIT, HAMDANI SAID THAT GOA DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE ITS POSITION PUBLIC. THIS WAS BECAUSE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02363 102049Z

OF RESPECT FOR YOU PERSON AND DESIRE FOR GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH
H
US.

2. I TOLD HAMDANI THAT I REGRETTED HIS GOVT'S DECISION BUT
WOULD TRANSMIT MESSAGE.

3. COMMENT: IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT GOA (BOUMEDIENE, PERHAPS IN
CONCERT WITH BOUTEFLIKA) DOES NOT AT THIS STAGE WISH TO ENGAGE, OR
BE SEEN ENGAGING, IN CONSULTATIONS WITH USG RE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS
LESSNCLEAR WHY YOU WERE INVITED IN FIRST PLACE. BEST GUESS IS THAT
CHANGE STEMS FROM UNHAPPINESS OVER RECENT UNILATERAL DECISIONS BY
EGYPT, BOUMEDIENE'S DESIRE TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM AN AMERICAN
SPONSORED EFFORT, AND HIS IRRITATION OVER DIFFICULTIES WE ASSUME HE
IS HAVING IN ORGANIZING AN ARAB SUMMIT IN ALGIERS.1

4. I VERY MUCH REGRET FAILUR OF OUR EFFORT TO ARRANGE YOUR
CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR TOUCHY ALGERIAN FRIENDS, AND HOPE THERE WIL BE
SOME WAY FOR USINT TO BE BRIEFED THROUGH BLAKE'S VISIT HERE OR
MY MEETING YOU SOMEPLACE IN REGION.
EAGLETON

EXDIS
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 492

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02362 101715Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

O 101558Z NOV 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9807
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2362

EXDIS

FOR ASST SEC NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (DAVIDD. NEWSOM)
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSIONS WITH GOA

1. HAMDANI AS TIED UP IN MEETINGS ALL MORNING BUT I FINALLY GOT TO HIM AT HIS HOME THIS AFTERNOON, GAVE HIM YOUR MESSAGE. ALMOST VERBATIM FROM NOTES. HE DECLINED TO INDICATE WHETHER HE THOUGHT EITHER SUGGESTION WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY GOA BUT SAID HE CONSIDERED YOUR FORMULATION OF NEED FOR US-ALGERIAN CONSULTATION "POSITIVE". HE HOPED TO DISCUSS SUBJECT WITH BOUMEDIENE EARLY EVENING AND WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS DECISION IS MADE. HE WARNED THAT GOA MIGHT WANT SOME TIME FOR "REFLECTION".

2. I BELIEVE HAMDANI WILL PRESENT PROPOSAL TO BOUMEDIENE IN POSITIVE MANNER AND, IF HIS OPINION IS SOUGHT, WILL SPEAK IN FAVOR OF YOUR COMING TO ALGIERS. AT END OF OUR MEETING NOV I HE HAD SEEMED VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH POSTPONEMENT OF VISIT. YOUR MESSAGE WILL GIVE GOA CHANCE TO RECONSIDER.

3. I HAVE PHONED ZEGHAR'S HOUSE ALMOST DAILY HOPING HE WOULD BE BACK IN ALGIERS WHERE HE COULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN

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CONFIDENTIAL

49

FORM

73 NOV 11 AM 9:42

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02362 101715Z

CONNECTION WITH YOUR VISIT, HIS FAMILY NOW DOES NOT EXPECT HIM BACK FOR SEVERAL DAYS. BEST WAY TO TRY TO PHONE HIM IS THROUGH HIS GENEVA OFFICE, PHONE 33-38-30 RPT 33-38-30. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE A TELCON WITH HIM FROM ATHENS TO KEEP IN TOUCH AND REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER HE IS AWARE OF YOUR PLANNED, AND THEN POSTPONED, VISIT. I HAVE NOT WANTED TO PHONE HIM FROM ALGIERS BECAUSE OF INSECURE LINE.
EAGLETON

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520/10/5610

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Department of State ^{WHITE HOUSE} **TELEGRAM**

'73 NOV 8 PM 11:36

CONFIDENTIAL 278

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02345: 081701Z

46
ACTION SS=30

02

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 /031 W

068911

O R 071212Z NOV 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9792
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BIERUT
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2345

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (NEWSOM, DAVCD D.)
SUBJ: ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT ASKS POSTPONEMENT OF NEWSOM
VISIT

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. DIRECTOR ESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS
AT FONMINISTRY, ABERKAME, CALLED ME TO MINISTRY MORNING
NOV. 8. HE SID HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE US THAT
BECAUSE ALGERIAN OFFICIALS WOULD BE SO DEEPLY INVOLVED
IN PREPARING FOR THREE CONFERENCES (OAU MINISTERES,
ARAB SUMMIT, AND NON-ALIGNED CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE)
THEY REGRETFULLY MUST ASK THAT ASST SEC NEWSOM POSTPONE
HIS VISIT TO ALGERIA UNTIL "SOME LATER DATE".

2. AS CONVERSATION PROCEEDED ABERKANE MADE IT CLEAR THAT
ALGERIAN OFFICIALS WERE UNHAPY RE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ME. I SUSPECT THAT THIS UNHAPPINESS,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02345 081701Z

ALONG WITH PIQUE OVER EGYPT'S UNILATERAL RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S., HAS AT LEAST AS MUCH TO DO WITH CANCELLATION OF NEWSOM'S VISIT AS THE PROBLEM OF CONCURRENT CONFERENCES IN ALGIERS.

3. FROM WHAT ABERKANE SAID AND IMPLIED ALGERIANS APPEAR TO BE UNHAPPY THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NOT SCHEDULED A STOP IN ALGIERS ON HIS ORIGINAL PROGRAM. ABERKANE MENTIONED THAT SECRETARY WAS NOT VISITING DAMASCUS AND OTHER ARAB STATES (READ ALGERIA) WHERE HE WOULD HAVE OBTAINED FULL RANGE OF ARAB VIEWS, IMPLICATION BEING THAT EGYPTIANS WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN A SETTLEMENT TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. SEVERAL TIMES HE MENTIONED ALGERIA'S POSITION AS A LEADER OF THIRD WORLD.

4. IN REPLY I NOTED THAT ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT INVITED SECRETARY TO VISIT ALGIERS AND IN ANY CASE SECRETARY'S TIGHT SCHEDULE REQUIRED HIM TO CONCENTRATE ON THOSE AREAS MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS TO AVOID RENEWED FIGHTING AND MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD LONG TERM SETTLEMENT.

5. I AM EXPECTING TO SEE DPSEC GEN PRESIDENT HAMDANI LATER TODAY AND WILL TRY TO GET HIGHER LEVEL READING OF ALGERIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN ME AND NEWSOM'S VISIT FROM HIM. (PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR IS NOT NOW IN ALGIERS.)

6. AS NEWS OF "POSTPONEMENT" OF VISIT BECOMES KNOWN, WE PROPOSE TAKE LINE HERE ACCEPTING AT FACE VALUE ABERKANE'S EXPLANATION THAT NUMEROUS MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES IN ALGIERS MADE THIS A BAD TIME FOR VISIT. EAGLETON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

NOTE BY OC/T: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED, EXDIS CAPTION INSERTED PER S/S-O, MISS, ELTZ, 11/8/73.

920/10/520

EXDIS
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 129

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02327 021851Z

47
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-71 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /001 W

O R 021835Z NOV 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9770
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2327

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJ: TRAVEL OF ASST SECRETARY NEWSOM

1. HAVE JUST HEARD NEWS REPORT THAT BOUMEDIENE IS IN CAIRO WHICH PROBABLY EXPLAINS WHY HAMDANI HAS NOT YET GIVEN ME BOUMEDIENE'S REPLY TO SUGGESTION THAT NEWSOM VISIT ALGIERS. REPLY MIGHT NOW BE DELAYED SEVERAL DAYS.

2. WHATEVER BOUMEDIENE DECISION, I WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE NEWSOM AND BLAKE, AND MEET VERY BRIEFLY WITH THE SECRETARY, IN RABAT. IF BY THAT TIME NEWSOM'S VISIT TO ALGIERS IS ON WE COULD USEFULLY DISCUSS PLANNING FOR VISIT. IF NEWSOM DOES NOT VISIT ALGIERS, SEEING HIM IN RABAT WOULD BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. IN EITHER CASE SOME BARAKA IN EYES OF ALGERIANS WOULD BE DERIVED FROM MY SEEING SECRETARY.

3. ASSUME PARKER COULD PUT ME IN HIS GUEST COTTAGE FOR 2 DAYS?

4. DEPARTMENT PLEASE ADVISE.
EAGLETON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
017863

473 NOV 2 PM 9:05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 108.

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02326 021846Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSD-00 /031 W

P 021820Z NOV 73
FM USINT ALGTERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9778

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2326

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, AG
SUBJ: ALGERIAN LNG AND PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS TO US

REF: ALGIERS 2306

1. AMCIT FRANK SCHULTZ, WHO HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN CONSULTANT TO SONATRACH, CALLED AT USING NOV. 2, HAVING JUST SPOKEN WITH SONATRACH PRESIDENT GHUZALI AND V.P. AIT-LAOUSSINE. SCHULTZ SAID SONATRACH HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT DEPARTMENT HAD RECENTLY SENT LETTER TO FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION TO EFFECT THAT DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL OF NEW CONTRACTS FOR LNG SHIPMENTS TO US WAS SUSPENDED FOR TIME BEING. SCHULTZ ASSUMED USINT WAS AWARE OF LETTER BUT I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT.

2. SCHULTZ ARGUED THAT ANY HOLDUP IN FPC APPROVAL OF EL PASO AND ESCOGAS CONTRACTS WOULD NOT BE IN NATIONAL INTEREST. HE FEARS THAT IF PROGRESS TOWARD FPC APPROVAL IS NOT BEING MADE ON DEC. 31 DEADLINE ALGERIAN WILL, AS PER CLAUSE IN CONTRACTS, CONSIDER CONTRACTS VOID. THIS WOULD REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION ON TERMS WHICH HE IS CERTAIN WOULD BE MUCH LESS SATISFACTORY TO AMERICAN CONSUMERS THAN THOSE OF CURRENT CONTRACTS.

3. SCHULTZ SAID GHUZALI HAD ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NO EMBARGO ON LNG SHIPMENTS TO U.S. PROBLEM AT SKIKDA WAS PURELY TECHNICAL AND SONATRACH HAD INVITED CABOT CORP. TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO ALGERIA TO INVESTIGATE THEMSELVES.

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
017310

NOV 2 PM 9.05

2

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 02326 021846Z

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT REPAIRS WILL REQUIRE ABOUT 30 TO 40 DAYS.

4. RE ALGERIAN PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS, SCHULTZ SAID AIT-LAOUSSINE TOLD HIM THAT MINISTER OF INDUSTRY ABDESSELAM DID NOT REPEAT NOT WANT SONATRACH TO CHECK CAREFULLY ON ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF OIL SHIPMENTS. AIT-LAOUSSINE HAD COMMENTED THAT IF THEY DID ANY CHECKING IT WOULD BE ON LARGE COMPANIES SUCH AS ESSO WHICH AS SCHULTZ NOTED WOULD FIND IT EASIER THAN SMALL COMPANIES TO COVER UP SHIPMENTS THROUGH ITALY OR ELSEWHERE. HE LISTED US PURCHASERS OF ALGERIAN OIL, WITH BARRELS PER DAY IN THOUSANDS, AS : ESSO - 150, GULF -100, SUN-50, CLARK-20, AND MOBIL 20-30.

5. SCHULTZ SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT ANY REDUCTION IN ALGERIAN OIL EXPORTS (PERHAPS 5 PERCENT) THUS FAR WOULD BE RESULT OF PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARAB EMBARGO.

6. I TOLD SCHULTZ HIS VIEWS WOULD BE REPORTED TO DEPARTMENT. IN VIEW OF EFFORTS ALGERIANS ARE MAKING TO MAINTAIN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE IS NO LNG EMBARGO AND THEIR LACK OF ZEAL IN IMPOSING PETROLEUM EMBARGO I HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL CONSIDER RENEWING ITS APPROVAL OF LNG CONTRACTS.
EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 01 PM 2:54

02

CONFIDENTIAL 492

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02306 301152Z

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

113278

P 301138Z OCT 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9761

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2306

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, AG

SUBJ: ALGERIAN APPLICATION OF OIL PRODUCTION CUTBACK AND EMBARGO

1. WE HAVE AVOIDED DIRECT CONTACT WITH SONATRACH RE THEIR APPLICATION OF OIL EMBARGO AND CUTBACK. HOWEVER, FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCE WHO HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS AT PORTS OF ARZEW AND SKIKDA TELLS US HAS IMPRESSION ALGERIANS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTS. HE SAID A CAPTAIN OF ONE SHIP WHICH HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SCHEDULED TAKE CRUDE TO US BUT HAD CHANGED DOCUMENTATION TO ANOTHER DESTINATION WAS TOLD BY AN ALGERIAN OFFICIAL THAT HE DID NOT CARE WHAT HAPPENED "ONCE SHIP IS ON HIGH SEAS".

2. WHETHER ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WILL, IN FACT, CUTBACK EXPORTS TEN PERCENT IS ALSO OPEN TO QUESTION. WE NOTE THAT ALGERIA HAD OVERSOLD PRODUCTION SOME FIVE TO TEN PERCENT AND SUSPECT THAT AT LEAST PART OF 10 PERCENT CUTBACK WILL BE FROM PRODUCTION THAT NEVER EXISTED. ON OTHER HND, GETTY REP HERE BELIEVES SMALL PRODUCTION FROM GETTY WELLS DROPPED ABOUT 10 PERCENT DURING FIRST WEEK AFTER EMBARGO.

3. IF AMERICAN COMPANIES ARE DISCREET IN THEIR HANDLING OF EMBARGO WE BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE THEY WILL BE ABLE LIFT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 02306 301152Z

A GOOD PORTION OF THEIR ANTICIPATED IMPORTS FROM ALGERIA
WITH ULTIMATE DESTINATION REMAINING THE U.S. THIS POSSIBILITY
SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE CLOSELY HELD.
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620/10/5210

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PAGE 01 ALGIER 02234 161411Z

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73
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAЕ-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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R 161159Z OCT 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9721

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2234

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJ: E & E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204191

1. RE PARA 2 REFTTEL:
A) CURRENT SITUATION DOES NOT RPT NOT WARRANT A WARNING
TO AMCITS AGAINST TRAVEL TO ALGERIA.
B) DO NOT BELIEVE AMCITS SHOULD BE ADVISED BEGIN LEAVING.
C) DO NOT BELIEVE ANY TYPE OF EVACUATION NEEDED AT THIS
TIME.

2. RE PARA 3 REFTEL:
A) ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PRIVATE AMERICANS WHO MIGHT REQUEST EVACUATION IF SITUATION DETERIORATED SERIOUSLY IS: FOR ORAN CONSULAR DISTRICT 230
FOR ALGIERS & REMAINDER OF ALGERIA 400
B) NUMBER OF TOURISTS IN ALGERIA ARE APPROXIMATELY: TEN FOR ORAN CONSULAR DISTRICT AND 30 FOR ALGIERS AND REMAINDER OF ALGERIA.
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PAGE 01 ALGIER 02233 161155Z

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ACTION SS-30

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USCS-00 NSAE-00 INRC-00 /031 W

116435

P 161124Z OCT 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9720
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2233

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJ: E & E PLANNING

REF: STATE204192

1. THERE ARE TWO COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS ALGIERS-MADRID
(AIR ALGERIA) PER WEEK ON WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS, NORMALLY
CARAVEL. WOULD REQUIRE CHARTER US AIRCRAFT FOR EVACUATION.

2. DIRECT FLIGHTS AVAILABLE FROM ORAN TO FRANCE, NONE
TO SPAIN.

3. WE NOTE SIX DAILY FLIGHTS ALGER-PARIS OR MARSEILLES.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 443

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PAGE 01 ALGIER 02203 111842Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 /026 W

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O 111700Z OCT 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9698

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2203

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, AG
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. ALGERIA IS CALM, NORMAL LIFE IS CONTINUING AND WE SEE NO PARTICULAR THREAT TO SAFETY OF AMCITS AS OF THIS TIME. SITUATION COULD CHANGE IF ME FIGHTING SHIFTS CLEARLY IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR AND ARAB MEDIA LAY BLAME TO US.

2. WE HAVE UPDATED LIST OF AMERICAN COMPANIES OPERATING IN ALGERIA AND ARE IN PROCESS OF UPDATING WARDEN SYSTEM WHICH PLACES RESPONSIBILITY ON COMPANY REPS IN ALGIERS AND ORAN TO COMMUNICATE WITH COMPANY PERSONNEL IN DESERT AND ELSEWHERE.

3. OUR WEAK LINE IS COMMUNICATIONS. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, WE HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY WITH OUR NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, PINETREE NET (TESTED NEGATIVELY OCT. 6, 7, AND 8) CANNOT BE RELIED ON AND ONLY LINKS WITH AMCONSUL ORAN ARE TELEX (THROUGH PTT) AND TELEPHONE. LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM WORKS POORLY AND MAY NOT WORK AT ALL IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. WE HAVE ABOUT DOLS FIVE THOUSAND IN US CURRENCY ON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 02203 111842Z

HAND WHICH SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO COVER EVACUATION OF
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS, BUT WILL NOT COVER
OTHER AMCITS. GOA INSISTS ON PAYMENT IN HARD CURRENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL AIR AND SEA TRAVEL FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL AND NON-RESIDENTS AND WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT
US TREASURY CHECKS. IN PAST, AIR ALGERIE HAS USUALLY
BEEN WILLING TO ISSUE TICKETS AGAINST OUR VOUCHER BUT
WE CANNOT ASSURE ITS WILLINGNESS TO DO SO IN EMERGENCY.
HENCE, REQUEST USINT BE SUPPLIED WITH \$5,000 EMERGENCY
FUND SO AS TO HAVE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR EVACUATION
COSTS.
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SECRET 510

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02061 211431Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 211221Z SEP 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9617

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2061

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR AG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

1. DAVID ROCKEFELLER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE, AND LATER WITH HAMDANI AND ZEGHAR, ON SEPTEMBER 20 HELPED US EXPLORE SOME PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN THOUGHTS RE BOUMEDIENE'S APPEARANCE AT UNGA. TRIP WILL PROBABLY OCCUR AFTER RAMADAN, AND A GUESS WOULD PLACE IT SOMEWHERE BETWEEN OCTOBER 28 AND NOVEMBER 15.
2. HAMDANI AND ZEGHAR SHOWED OBVIOUS INTEREST IN TAKING ADVANTAGE OF VISIT TO UN TO BRING BOUMEDIENE INTO CONTACT WITH US LEADERS AND PEOPLE. THEY WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO BRING BOUMEDIENE AROUND TO THEIR WAY OF THINKING.
3. HAMDANI AND ZEGHAR EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN BOUMEDIENE AND DR. KISSINGER IN NEW YORK. THEY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO FIND WAY TO GET BOUMEDIENE OUT OF NEW YORK TO GIVE HIM WIER EXPOSURE TO THE US, THE FIRST WESTERN COUNTRY HE HAS VISITED.
4. I DID NOT RAISE, NOR DID THEY, POSSIBILITY THAT BOUMEDIENE MIGHT GO TO WASHINGTON FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON. HOWEVER THIS POSSIBILITY CANNOT HAVE ESCAPED THEM, AND IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION CHIEF ALGINT BOUSSELHAM EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL HOPE THAT SUCH AN INVITATION WOULD BE EXTENDED AND HIS BELIEVE THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD NOT

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 02061 211431Z

TURN IT DOWN.

5. AT END OF DISCUSSION AT ZEGHAR'S HOUSE HAMDANI SAID HE AND OTHERS IN PRESIDENCY WOULD LIKE TO REFLECT ON POSSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH BOUMEDIENE'S TRIP.

6. COMMENT. ALGE

USNS WILL EXPECT USG TO TAKE LEAD IN SUGGESTING CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES THAT GO BEYOND BOUMEDIENE'S MANDATE TO ADDRESS UNGA ON BEHALF OF NON ALIGNED NATIONS. IN MEETINGS WITH US OFFICIALS BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE REPRESENTING NON ALIGNED AS WELL AS ALGERIA. THIS SHOULD REMOVE PROTOCOL PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH LACK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

7. RECOMMEND THAT A MEETING BE ARRANGED BETWEEN BOUMEDIENE AND THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK. PURPOSE WOULD BE TO DISCUSS NON ALIGNED ISSUES, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND US-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS. ALSO SUGGEST BOUMEDIENE SHOULD BE INVITED TO SPEND DAY IN WASHINGTON WHERE HE WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON.
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PAGE 01 ALGIER 00895 141130Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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R 141017Z APR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8940

~~SECRET~~ ALGIFRS 0895

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, AG, US
SUBJECT: VOICE OF PALESTINE

REF: STATE 068250

FROM ASST SECRETARY NEWSOM

1. I DISCUSSED VOICE OF PALESTINE BROADCASTS FROM ALGIERS WITH HAMDANI, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF PRESIDENCY, APRIL 13, POINTING OUT STRONGLY ADVERSE REACTION TO ALGERIA'S PERMITTING THREATENING ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS.

2. HAMDANI REPLIED WITH LONG EXPLANATION OF HIS ROLE AS BROADCASTER FOR FLN IN MOROCCO DURING ALGERIAN WAR AND EFFORTS FRENCH PUT PRESSURE ON MOROCCO MUZZLE HIS BROADCASTS. HE TOOK CONTINUING POSITION THAT EITHER HE BROADCAST FREELY OR HE WENT OFF AIR AND IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOROCCO AGREE TO LATTER CHOICE. SAME SITUATION EXISTED IN ALGERIA WITH VOICE OF PALESTINE. HOWEVER, HE WOULD TELL ME ON STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT ON "MORAL" RATHER THAN "POLITICAL" GROUNDS HE HAD SPOKEN TO VOICE OF PALESTINE PEOPLE AND HAD SAID ALGERIA COULD NOT AGREE TO THREATENING BROADCASTS AGAINST LIVES AND PROPERTY INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS. HE ASSURED ME THERE WOULD BE NO MORE SUCH ATTACKS FROM VOP, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT "INTERVENE" WITH THEIR "POLITICAL" VIEW OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST. I EXPRESSED STRONG REGRET OVER THIS LIMITATION SINCE IT ONLY SERVED PERPETUATE CURRENT LIES REGARDING U.S.

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ROLE IN BEIRUT EVENTS, PERPETUATION NEITHER IN OUR INTERESTS
NOR ALGERIA'S. HE INSISTED ALGERIA HAD DONE ALL IT COULD.

EM ABOVE GIVES EAGLETON BASIS FOR FURTHER DEMARCHE IN
EVENT VOP ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS RESUMED. CLOSE ALGERIAN
OBLIGATIONS TO PALESTINIANS, HOWEVER, PROBABLY PRECLUDES
STRONGER ACTION THEIR PART. EVEN ACTION THEY HAVE TAKEN,
HOWEVER, IS SENSITIVE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW; ANY
REFERENCE TO IT BY DEPARTMENT TO PRESS COULD BE SERIOUSLY
EMBARRASSING TO OUR RELATIONS WITH HAMDANI AND ALGERIANS.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00747 281649Z

44

ACTION SS-25

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INFD OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

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R 281545Z MAR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8835

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0747

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR AG
SUBJECT: RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

FOR ASST SEC NEWSOM

REF: STATE 55290

1. EVENING MARCH 27 I DISCUSSED WITH ZEGHAR QUESTION! RAISED REFTEL RE DANGER THAT PUBLICITY IN CONNECTION! WITH NEWSOM'S VISIT TO ALGIERS MIGHT STIMULATE PRESSURES AGAINST RENEWAL OF RELATIONS. ZEGHAR AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID REPETITION OF NEWSOM'S EXPERIENCE IN SUDAN IN DECEMBER 1971.

2. ZEGHAR'S INITIAL SUGGESTION WAS THAT WE SHOULD TELL PRESS THAT NEWSOM'S VISIT WAS ROUTINE, IN CONNECTION WITH ACCORD ON EL PASO PROJECT FINANCING. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF JOURNALISTS PRESSED RE RENEWAL OF RELATIONS IT COULD BE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT PURPOSE OF VISIT.

3. ZEGHAR SAID HE WOULD ACT ON MY SUGGESTION THAT HE BRING MATTER TO BOUMEDIENE'S ATTENTION SO THAT HIS VIEWS AS TO HOW TO HANDLE PUBLICITY COULD BE RELAYED TO US. THIS WILL ALSO HELP FOCUS BOUMEDIENE'S ATTENTION ON MECHANICS OF RENEWAL AND PUBLICITY.

4. I RAISED ONLY INDIRECTLY POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLIER

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00747 281649Z

EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON RESUMPTION BY OBSERVING THAT THIS WOULD BE MOST CERTAIN WAY TO AVOID NEGATIVE PRESSURES. ZEGHAR DID NOT PICK UP THIS SUGGESTION.

5. ZEGHAR FIRST DENIED THAT PRESSURES FROM OTHER ARAB STATES COULD SWAY BOUMEDIENE AGAINST RESUMPTION BUT LATER HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS SOME DANGER FROM OPPONENTS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE ALGERIA. CURRENT DISARRAY IN EASTERN ARAB WORLD IS HELPFUL SINCE AT SUCH TIMES BOUMEDIENE IS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO EASTERN ARAB PRESSURES. ZEGHAR SAID BOUMEDIENE BELIEVES LATEST SHAKEUP IN EGYPT INDICATES THAT SADAT IS VERY WEAK INTERNALLY. HE ALSO HINTED THAT ALGERIANS BELIEVE LIBYA MIGHT NOW BE SWUNG AWAY FROM EASTERN TIES INTO CLOSER COOPERATION WITH MAGHREB.

6. IMPRESSION FROM ZEGHAR IS THAT NEWSOM'S VISIT WILL BE A NECESSARY ELEMENT TO PLACE BOUMEDIENE IN POSITION OF HAVING TO MAKE A VERBAL COMMITMENT RE RELATIONS. ZEGHAR SUGGESTS, AND I AGREE, THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR NEWSOM TO HAVE WITH HIM, AS HE DID LAST YEAR, A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE. THIS LETTER WOULD PROBABLY NOT MAKE A DIRECT REFERENCE TO RENEWAL OF RELATIONS BUT USE PHRASE WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS RELATED TO RESUMPTION, SUCH AS "MR. NEWSOM WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH YOU WAYS IN WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALGERIAN AND THE UNITED STATES CAN BE STRENGTHENED". ZEGHAR SAID HE WOULD TAKE SOUNDINGS WITH BOUMEDIENE AS TO WHETHER AN ANNOUNCEMENT RE RENEWAL CAN BE MADE AT TIME OF VISIT OR LATER IN CONNECTION WITH BOUMEDIENE'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER.
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00723 261743Z

EFFORTS BY EXIM BANK AND OTHERS WITHIN USG TO ACCOMMODATE ALGERIAN SENSITIVITIES RE. LOAN AGREEMENT HAVE DONE MUCH TO RESTORE PROJECT'S SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WHO HAS PERSONALLY TAKEN CHARGE OF ALGERIAN SIDE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR, SONATRACH PRESIDENT GHOZALI, WHO RETURNS TO U.S. MARCH 27, TOLD BOUMEDIENE THAT PROSPECTS FOR FINAL GO AHEAD ON ELI PASO PROJECT BEFORE END OF MARCH ARE VERY GOOD. HENCE, BOUMEDIENE'S CAUTION HAS GIVEN WAY TO OPTIMISM.

3. MOMENTUM TOWARD RENEWAL OF RELATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE UNLESS AN OUTSIDE NEGATIVE FACTOR, IN MIDDLE EAST OR ELSEWHERE, INTERVENES BETWEEN NOW AND NEWSOM'S VISIT. EAGLETON

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PAGE 01 ALGIER 00662 191650Z

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

091815

R 191611Z MAR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8786

SECRET ALGIERS 0662

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SU, AG

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR, MARCH 18 HE TOLD ME HE HAD CONTINUED HIS EFFORTS WITHIN GOA TO DISCREDIT BLACK SEPTEMBER. HE HAD SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER CALLED IN LOCAL ACTING CHIEF OF FATAH WHO HE BELIEVED USED NAME ABOU JIHAD, AND HAD CRITICIZED STRONGLY THE KHARTOUM KILLINGS. ABOU JIHAD HAD ASKED ON WHOSE BEHALF ZEGHAR WAS SPEAKING AND ZEGHAR REPLIED THAT HE WAS AN EX-OFFICER OF THE ALGERIAN ARMY AND REFLECTED OPINION OF ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT. ZEGHAR LEARNED THAT ABOU JIHAD LATER INQUIRED OF ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON, MOHAMED YAZID, RE ZEGHAR'S CREDENTIALS AND WAS TOLD THAT HE SHOULD TAKE ZEGHAR SERIOUSLY.
2. ZEGHAR SAID HE WARNED ABOU JIHAD THAT IF BLACK SEPTEMBER ATTEMPTED ANY TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ALGERIA THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS. HE MENTIONED FACT THAT THERE WERE SEVEN THOUSAND PALESTINIANS LIVING IN ALGERIA. ABOU JIHAD ASKED IF THAT WAS THREAT AND ZEGHAR REPLIED IT COULD BE TAKEN AS HE LIKED.
3. ZEGHAR SAID THAT MOHAMED YAZID, WHO IS IN ALGERIA IN CONNECTION WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER SAAB SALAM'S VISIT, HAD SENT REPORT TO BOUMEDIENE CRITICAL OF KHARTOUM OPERATION SUGGESTING REDUCING SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00662 191650Z

4. ZEGHAR INDICATED INTEREST IN EVIDENCE OF LINK BETWEEN
BSO AND FATAH WHICH PASSED HIM PER STATE 47847.
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PAGE 01 ALGIER 00613 131756Z

73-62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT 01 ADP 00 /026 W

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R 131714Z MAR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8757
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

SECRET ALGIERS 0613

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS ASEC AG LY
SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: TRIPOLI 0305

IF FRENCH ARE DISPOSED TO MAKE DEMARCHE TO LIBYANS
ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS AND TO INCLUDE ALGERIANS IN
THEIR INITIATIVE, USINT ASSUMES THIS SHOULD BE EN-
COURAGED. HOWEVER, GOA'S BEARISH ATTITUDE IN CONNECTION
WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO HANDLE TERRORISM REMAINS
BASICALLY UNCHANGED, AND THERE CONTINUES GREAT VOCAL
DEDICATION HERE TO PALESTINIAN "CAUSE". THUS WE
BELIEVE GOA WOULD PREFER THAT AMBASSADOR KAAFI
EXERCISE GREAT DISCRETION IN SEEKING LARGE ASSURANCES
OF PROTECTION AND AVOID IDENTIFYING ALGERIA WITH ANY
GENERAL (ESPECIALLY WESTERN EUROPEAN LED) INITIATIVE.
DAVIS

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

73 MAR 13 AM 8:20

SECRET ROOM

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SECRET

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched over the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched along the bottom, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

073 MAR 13 AM 8:55

SECRET 401

PAGE 01 ALGIER 0059Z 121937Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 1026 W

P 121700Z MAR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8748

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0598

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF
SUBJ: ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER
ORGANIZATIONS

REF: STATE 044811

1. MARCH 12 I CALLED ON DIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY, ALGERIA, TO PRESENT VERBAL DEMARCHES AS OUTLINED REFTEL. I OBSERVED THAT USG DID NOT WISH TO CONDEMN ALL PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS BUT BELIEVED EFFECTIVE ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO CURB ACTIVITIES OF PLO AND SIMILAR GROUPS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. I NOTED THAT ALGERIA HAD ALREADY BEEN EMBARRASSED BY ACTIVITIES OF NON ALGERIANS BEARING ALGERIAN PASSPORTS AND OUTLINED OTHER TYPES OF SUPPORT WHICH USG HOPED ALGERIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD AVOID RENDERING TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

2. BELIEVING WE COULD NOT EXPECT A PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM GOA CONDEMNING MURDER OF U.S. OFFICIALS IN KHARTOUM, I TOLD ABERKANE WE HOPED THAT ALGERIA WOULD CONTINUE TO REFRAIN FROM DOING OR SAYING ANYTHING THAT WOULD APPEAR TO CONDONE BLACK SEPTEMBER OPERATION.

3. ABERKANE REPLIED THAT ALGERIA WAS AGAINST KHARTOUM OPERATION AND ANY OPERATION WHICH INVOLVED THREATENING OF HOSTAGES. ALGERIANS DID NOT KNOW WHO

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00598 121937Z

HAD ORGANIZED KHARTOUM OPERATION.

4. CONVERSATION TURNED TO QUESTION OF FATAH CONNECTION WITH BSO. I TOLD ABERKANE WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT SUCH A CONNECTION EXISTED THOUGH THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL FATAH LEADERS APPROVED OF BSO TYPE OPERATIONS. ABERKANE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO ADMIT SUCH A CONNECTION AND ARGUED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT FATAH MEMBERS HAD AT TIMES COOPERATED WITH BSO OPERATIONS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE PRIOR TO KHARTOUM OF CONNECTION BETWEEN TWO ORGANIZATIONS AND SUGGESTED THAT ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT COULD CHECK FACTS WITH THEIR AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON, MOHAMED YAZID, WHO WOULD BE IN ALGIERS WITH THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK.

5. ABERKANE'S POSITION MARCH 12, AND PARTICULARLY HIS ASSURANCES THAT ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT OPPOSED TAKING OF HOSTAGES, WAS IMPROVEMENT OVER HIS AMBIGUOUS POSITION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING KHARTOUM KILLINGS. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS A LATER CONFIRMATION OF ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN, OR ASSOCIATED WITH, EVENTS IN KHARTOUM.

6. EARLIER IN DAY DURING CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDENT ZEGHAR I SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE WISE FOR HEAD OF ALGERIAN LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, BENTOUMI, NOT TO TRY TO GO TO KHARTOUM (AS HE PREVIOUSLY HAD TO SWITZERLAND, GERMANY AND CAIRO) TO DEFEND BSO PRISONERS. ZEGHAR IMMEDIATELY PHONED SEGEN OF PRESIDENT DR. AMIR AND WAS TOLD THAT BENTOUMI WOULD NOT BE GOING TO KHARTOUM. ZEGHAR SAID PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAD GIVEN ORDERS THAT ALGERIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED.

7. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SUDANESE GOVERNMENT GAVE ALGERIAN AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS FULL INFO RE KHARTOUM BSO OPERATION, INCLUDING FATAH CONNECTION.

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SECRET 156

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00541 061618Z

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43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

110630

R 061545Z MAR 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8707

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0541

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR AG
SUBJECT: U. S. ALGERIAN RELATIONS

FOR NEWSOM

1. ZEGHAR ASKED ME TO COME BY TO SEE HIM THIS NOON AFTER I HAD SEEN HAMDANI. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT SONATRACH (ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT) HAD RESPONDED FORTHRIGHTLY TO EXIMIS LETTER.

2. WHEN I SAW ZEGHAR MARCH 4 JUST BEFORE HIS LUNCH WITH BOUMEDIENE I SUGGESTED HE SOUND OUT LATTER CONCERNING INTENTIONS RE RESTORATION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. ZEGHAR SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH BOUMEDIENE AND WAS ASSURED THAT "RELATIONS WILL BE RESTORED", AND ALGERIA WILL NOT BE HELD BACK BY EGYPT. HE DID NOT HOWEVER SEEM TO HAVE PINNED DOWN ANY TIMING EVEN THOUGH THEY DISCUSSED TWO CANDIDATES FOR AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON (CURRENT AMBASSADORS IN LONDON AND IN BRUSSELS). ZEGHAR WAS PLEASED WITH THESE CHOICES SINCE THEY ARE FRIENDS OF HIS AND MORE LOYAL TO PRESIDENT THAN TO BOUTEFLIKA.

3. IN ANSWER TO MY PROBING RE MORE DEFINITE INFO ON TIMING, ZEGHAR SAID HE WOULD SPEAK WITH PRESIDENT AGAIN THIS COMING WEEKEND. HE WILL SUGGEST THAT BOUMEDIENE GIVE INFO RE RELATIONS TO NEWSOM WHEN LATTER VISITS ALGIERS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00541 061618Z

4. DURING MEETING WITH HAMDANI THIS MORNING HE SUGGESTED THAT VISIT BY NEWSOM TO DISCUSS FULL RANGE OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE USEFUL. ZEGHAR IS COUNTING ON SUCH A VISIT. SUGGEST THAT AS SOON AS IT IS CLEAR THAT EXIM-SONATRACH AGREEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED I BE AUTHORIZED TO SUGGEST A DATE OR DATES FOR NEWSOM'S VISIT HERE. AT THIS POINT I HESITATE TO GUARANTEE ANYTHING RE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT EVEN IF DEFINITE DECISION IN THIS REGARD IS NOT FORTHCOMING, NEWSOM'S VISIT WOULD BE EXCELLENT WAY TO USHER IN "POST EL PASO" ERA IN U.S. ALGERIAN RELATIONS.
EAGLETON

SECRET

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PAGE 01 ALGER 01315 281111Z

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
JUL 29 AM 9:16
039

EXDIS

SUBJ: SPECULATION ON PRC INTEREST IN BURUNDI

REF: USUN 2610

1. USINT HAS FOUND NO REPEAT NO LOCAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DJERMAKOYE'S THESIS THAT ALGERIA MIGHT BE ASSISTING ANY PRC EFFORTS TO SECURE BASE IN BURUNDI OR OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRY.

2. WE HAVE SEEN NO OFFICIAL GOA STATEMENT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN BURUNDI, AND LOCAL PRESS TREATMENT OF SITUATION THERE HAS BEEN DECIDEDLY LOW KEY WITHOUT ANY IMPLICATION OF ENDORSEMENT OR CRITICISM FOR PARTIES TO TRAGIC EVENTS.

3% ALGERIAN-ZAIRIAN RELATIONS OVER PAST FEW YEARS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY CORRECT BUT WITH SOME UNDERCURRENT OF GOA TENDENCY TO TREAT MOBUTU REGIME AS CREATURE OF "IMPERIALISTS-COLONIALISTS". THIS ALGERIAN PREDISPOSITION HAS CROPPED UP IN PAST, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN BRAZZAVILLE AND ZAIRE FEUDING HEATED UP. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THERE IS NOW SLIGHT WARMING TREND IN GOA-ZAIRIAN RELATIONS AND WE HAVE HEARD THAT MOBUTU MAY BE PLANNING OFFICIAL VISIT HERE THIS YEAR.

4. WHILE GOA OFTEN FINDS AN IDENTITY OF INTERESTS WITH PRC, ESPECIALLY ON IDEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PLANE,

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PAGE 02 ALGER 01315 281110Z

WE STRONGLY DOUBT THAT THIS IS EXTENDED BY BOUMEDIENE
REGIME TO INCLUDE ANY SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE TO
CHINESE (OR ANY OTHER NON-AFRICAN COUNTRY) TO ESTABLISH
"FOOTHOLD" ON CONTINENT. XDGSEAGLETON

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Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL 282

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01108 221002Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

033148

R 220933Z JUN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7534

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1108

EXDIS

REF: STATE 108939

1. DURING CALL ON DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI JUNE 21
I READ TO HIM TEXT OF ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON
TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE (REFTEL). HE EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR MESSAGE AND SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST
IN PARA EIGHT RE CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND
COOPERATION. HE MENTIONED THAT ALGERIA BELIEVED THAT
A MEDITERRANEAN GROUPING SHOULD PLAY ROLE IN DEVISING
FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

2. AT HAMDANI'S REQUEST I LEFT HIM OUTLINE OF ENGLISH
TEXT TO USE FOR HIS BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 536

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01039 121128Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 121058Z JUN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7490

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1039

EXDIS

FOR ASST SEC NEWSOM

SUBJECT: WESTERN HIJACKING

REF: STATE 103560

1. UPON RECEIPT REFTEL I PHONED ZEGHAR'S RESIDENCE AND WAS TOLD HE WAS OUT. SEVERAL FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO REACH HIM OVER WEEKEND PRODUCED SAME REPLY AND IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HE DID NOT AT THAT TIME WISH TO SEE ME. POSSIBLY HE FELT HE HAD DONE ALL HE COULD AND WAS EMBARRASSED BY HIS INABILITY TO BUDGE HIS GOVT ON IMMEDIATE HANDOVER OF RANSOM MONEY. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE (AND HE SEEMED TO FEAR SOME SUCH DEVELOPMENT WHEN I SAW HIM JUNE 9) THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY PRESIDENT TO DISENGAGE HIMSELF AS AN INTERMEDIARY ON HIJACKING QUESTION. WHEN I MADE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HIM THIS MORNING, I WAS TOLD (AND THIS SEEMS TO BE TRUE) THAT HE HAD LEFT AT 0800 FOR RABAT.

2. WE NOW HAVE IN ALGIERS NO DIRECT CHANNEL THROUGH TO PRESIDENCY WHICH IN ANY CASE HAS LITTLE AUTHORITY IN BOUMEDIENE'S ABSENCE. ALTHOUGH SEC GEN PRESIDENCY AMIR REMAINS HERE, ZEGHAR TOLD ME JUNE 9 THAT HAMDANI HAD TOLD AMIR NOT TO HAVE CONTACT WITH AMERICANS SINCE THAT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY.

3. IN ABSENCE OTHER CHANNELS I AM CALLING ON DIREC OF CONSULAR AND JURIDICAL AFFAIRS AT FONMINISTRY, MEDJID.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01039 121128Z

AT 1100 TODAY TO GIVE HIM SOME REPLIES ALONG LINES TAKEN
IN DEPT WITH BOUSSELHAM TO QUESTIONS HE RAISED DURING
OUR CONVERSATION JUNE 9. I WILL ALSO GIVE HIM INFO
RECEIVED FROM DEPT ON BACKGROUND OF HIJACKER HOLDER.
EAGLETON

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SECRET 238

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01035 091921Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

071334

O 091835Z JUN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7486

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1035

EXDIS

SUBJECT: WESTERN HIJACKING

1. JUST SPENT HOUR AND HALF AT RACHID ZEGHAR'S HOUSE WHICH PROVIDED MUCH INSIGHT INTO INTERNAL WORKINGS OF TOP-LEVEL GOA AND THEIR REACTIONS TO WESTERN HIJACKING. DURING THAT TIME ZEGHAR HAD TWO PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENCY. FIRST, HE CALLED SEC GEN DR. AMIR, WHO WAS IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, HAMDANI, AND OTHERS IN PREPARATION FOR RABAT SUMMIT. ZEGHAR INITIATED FIRST CALL, THEN AMIR CALLED BACK HALF HOUR LATER TO ASK FOR A PHONE NUMBER AND CONVERSATION RE HIJACKING CONTINUED. DURING SECOND CONVERSATION HE REPEATED TO AMIR SOME COMMENTS WHICH HE SAID I HAD MADE TO HIM BY PHONE BETWEEN CONVERSATIONS.

2. IMPRESSION WAS OF OVERWORKED TOP-LEVEL ALGERIANS MEETING CONTINUOUSLY AT PRESIDENCY PREPARING FOR RABAT MEETING AND MEANWHILE DEALING WITH HIJACKING QUESTION ON BASIS FRAGMENTARY INFO AND MISINFORMATION FROM VARIOUS SOURCES. AT THIS MOMENT BOUMEDIENE IS APPARENTLY VERY IRRITATED BY OUTSIDE PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION ACTIONS AND "WORLD PRESS". DR. AMIR AND THEN HAMDANI WHO BROKE INTO CONVERSATION ASKED ZEGHAR WHETHER HE HAD CONVEYED TO ME THEIR ASSURANCES OF YESTERDAY THAT MONEY WOULD BE RETURNED. ZEGHAR REPLIED IN AFFIRMATIVE AND FROM BACKGROUND CAME SUGGESTION BY PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE THAT TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIONS IN FUTURE USG SHOULD WRITE LETTER TO ALGERIA REQUESTING NO MORE HIJACKED AMERICAN PLANES BE PERMITTED TO LAND

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01035 091921Z

AT ALGERIAN AIRPORTS. AT ONE POINT AMIR SAID THAT UNDER PRESSURES ALGERIA'S ATTITUDE WAS HARDENING.

3. ZEGHAR APPEARED RELUCTANT TO PRESS VERY HARD AND AT END OF CONVERSATION HE LOOKED QUITE WORRIED AND SAID BOUMEDIENE MIGHT THINK HE HAD NOT PROPERLY FULFILLED HIS ROLE IN ASSURING AND CALMING AMERICANS. ALGERIANS CLEARLY HAVE NO CONCEPT OF U.S. FREEDOM OF PRESS SINCE THERE WERE REQUESTS THAT AMERICANS TELL PRESS TO LAY OFF, AND IN SECOND CONVERSATION AMIR ASKED ZEGHAR TO TELL HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS THAT EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD ASK FRENCH GOVT TO TELL FRENCH RADIO AND TELEVISION (WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CARRIED SOME REPORTS THAT ALGERIANS CONSIDER OFFENSIVE) TO STAY OUT OF MATTER. ZEGHAR'S CHARACTERISTIC ANSWER WAS THAT FRENCH WERE NO DOUBT TRYING TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN ALGERIANS AND AMERICANS.

4. DURING SECOND CONVERSATION ZEGHAR PASSED TO AMIR SOME OF MY COMMENTS RE USG'S APPRECIATION OF WAY ALGERIANS ASSURED SAFETY OF CREW AND PLANE. (IN PRESIDENCY THERE WAS APPARENTLY FEELING THAT USG AS WELL AS U.S. MEDIA WERE ATTACKING ALGERIA AND WERE NOT GRATEFUL FOR ORIGINAL ASSISTANCE). HE ALSO TOLD AMIR THAT USG AND USINT WERE HOPING TO WORK TOGETHER WITH GOA TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO HIJACKING PROBLEM.

5. RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS WAS INCONCLUSIVE. ZEGHAR CONFESSED HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHEN MONEY WOULD BE HANDED OVER. INVESTIGATION OF HIJACKERS CONTINUES WITH ALGERIANS LOOKING CLOSELY AT MOTIVES AND ACTIONS OF HOLDER AND KERKOW. AMIR TOLD ZEGHAR THAT HOLDER CLAIMS HE GAVE SOME OF MONEY (WE HAVE HEARD FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT ONE PACKAGE OF BILLS WAS OPEN AND SOME MISSING) TO CREW OF AIRPLANE. ZEGHAR IMMEDIATELY ANSWERED THAT THIS WAS ABSURD AND BOTH HE AND AMIR AGREED THAT MONEY WAS PROBABLY WITH KERKOW WHO HAD NOT BEEN SEARCHED THOROUGHLY. (WOULD APPRECIATE OFFICIAL DENIAL OF CHARGE AGAINST WESTERN PILOTS WHICH I CAN PASS BACK TO ZEGHAR.) HOLDER AND KERKOW REMAIN UNDER DETENTION AND INCOMMUNICADO.

6. ALTHOUGH ZEGHAR DUTIFULLY TOLD ME THAT HAMDANI,



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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01035 091921Z

WHO HE SAYS HAS BEEN "GIVEN AUTHORITY" TO DELIVER RANSOM MONEY, WAS TOO BUSY WITH MOROCCAN AFFAIRS TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER. I THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT DELAY IS INSPIRED BY BOUMEDIENE'S REACTION TO "PRESSURES". DR. AMIR AND SEC GEN DEFENSE LATRECHE ARE DINING AT ZEGHAR'S TONIGHT AND ZEGHAR WILL SEE PRESIDENT AT MIDNIGHT. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT ZEGHAR WILL FEEL HIS POSITION STRONG ENOUGH TO PRESS BOUMEDIENE VERY FAR ON OUR BEHALF. NEVERTHELESS, I WILL CHECK WITH ZEGHAR TOMORROW MORNING TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT.

7. HAVE JUST SEEN STATE 102414 ASKING NUMBER OF US MISSIONS TO SEEK OTHER GOVERNMENTS' SUPPORT OF US EFFORTS WITH ALGERIAN GOVT. IF ALGERIAN GOVT BECOMES AWARE OF THESE DEMARCHES TIMETABLE FOR RECOVERY RANSOM WILL PROBABLY BE SET BACK.

8. ALTHOUGH PROSPECTS FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN OF RANSOM DO NOT NOW LOOK BRIGHT, BOUMEDIENE'S SUGGESTION (SIMILAR TO BESSAIEH'S YESTERDAY) THAT US MIGHT ASK ALGERIA TO TURN AWAY HIJACKERS IN FUTURE INDICATES THAT GOA IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO DISCOURAGE REPETITION OF HIJACKINGS. EAGLETON

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CONFIDENTIAL 250

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00969 021432Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

013531

O 021405Z JUN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7437

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 0969

EXDIS

FOR P AND EUR

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO
SOVIET UNION

REF: STATE 096887

1. ALGERIAN OFFICIALS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SURPRISED THAT SOVIETS RECEIVED PRESIDENT AFTER U.S. MINING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE HARBORS. ONCE VISIT TOOK PLACE, ALGERIANS WERE SUSPENDED BETWEEN THEIR POSITION THAT DETENTE WILL BENEFIT ALL COUNTRIES AND THEIR SUSPICION THAT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR WILL SOMEHOW BE MADE AT EXPENSE OF "JUST CAUSES", THE ARABS, AND THE THIRD WORLD.

2. ALGERIAN CONFUSION IN THIS RESPECT PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR ABSENCE OF ANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OR SEMI-OFFICIAL EDITORIAL COMMENT ON MOSCOW MEETING. NEWS COVERAGE WAS RELATIVELY STRAIGHT-FORWARD BUT WITH PROMINENCE INITIALLY GIVEN TO SOME PRESS REPORTS OF COOL RECEPTION BY RUSSIAN PEOPLE.
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72 JUN 2 PM 2:42

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 370

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00127 251642Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 251616Z JAN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6925

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0127

EXDIS

REF: STATE 013709

ON JANUARY 25 I BRIEFED DESECEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI ON
PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETINGS WITH ALLIED LEADERS PRIOR TO
HIS PEKING AND MOSCOW TRIPS AS PER INSTRUCTIONS REFTL.
HAMDANI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WOULD PASS ON
INFO TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE. HIS ONLY QUESTION WAS
WHETHER PRESIDENT NIXON HAD DISCUSSED WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN
AND NORTH AFRICA WITH POMPIDOU. SPECIFICALLY, HE WONDERED
WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY SIGNS OF FRENCH CONCERN RE
INCREASED ROLE OF U.S. IN MAGHREB REGION (MEANING ALGERIA).
I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN BRIEFING MATERIAL TO
INDICATE THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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72 JAN 25 PM 2:55

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SECRET 377

PAGE 01 ALGIERS 00009 040828Z

17
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

060522

R 031727Z JAN 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6852

SECRET ALGIERS 009

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RAYTHEON

REF: STATE 233654

DURING SOCIAL CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR JANUARY 1 WE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE RAYTHEON CONTRACT FOR ALGERIAN AIR CONTROL PROJECT. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION I MENTIONED THAT MILITARY NATURE OF PROJECT WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL CLEARANCES FOR EXPORT OF CERTAIN ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE PART OF PLAN. THIS INFO DID NOT APPEAR TO WORRY ZEGHAR WHO PROBABLY ASSUMES RAYTHEON WILL BE ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE THAT WILL OBTAIN NECESSARY CLEARANCES. ZEGHAR SEEMED MORE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE COMPETITION AND MENTIONED FRENCH AS WELL AS BRITISH INTEREST IN PROJECT. APPARENTLY NOW THAT ERAP/SONATRACH ACCORD AND AGREEMENT RE ALGERIAN WORKERS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED FRENCH ARE ONCE AGAIN ABLE TO COMPETE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ON FAVORABLE BASIS. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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SECRET 900

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01909 131136Z

18
ACTION: SS-25

INFO: OCT-01 /026 W

R 131115Z DEC 71
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6788

SECRET ALGIERS 1909

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RAYTHEON

REF: STATE 223642

RE PARA TWO REFTTEL, MY UNDERSTANDING FROM DISCUSSION WITH RAYTHEON REP PALESTER IS THAT ALGERIAN RADAR PROJECT IS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY, THOUGH MOST OF ITS COMPONENTS MIGHT BE SAME AS THOSE USED IN CIVIL NETWORK. IT IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY THAT MUCH, IF ANY, OF IT COULD BE FINANCED BY EXIMBANK. PALESTER, WHO WILL BE DISCUSSING MATTER LATER THIS MONTH WITH DEPT, THOUGHT SOME COMPONENTS MIGHT BE MANUFACTURED IN CANADA WHERE CREDITS WOULD BE MORE READILY AVAILABLE THAN IN U.S. FURTHERMORE, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR HAS GIVEN US IMPRESSION, THOUGH IT NEEDS MORE EXPLORATION, THAT ALGERIAN DEFMINISTRY WOULD BE ABLE TO PAY FOR LARGE PART OF PROJECT IN CASH DURING PERIOD OF ITS CONSTRUCTION. GP-3. EAGLETON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
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71 DEC 13 AM 11:28

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SECRET 404

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01894 091538Z

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 091503Z DEC 71
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6777

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1894

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RAYTHEON

REF: ALGIERS 1814: STATE 215399

1. RAYTHEON REP PALESTER WHO WAS IN ALGIERS DECEMBER 6-9 STAYED AT HOUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR AND HAD MEETINGS THERE ON DECEMBER 7 AND 8 WITH AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT CHERCHELLI WHO HAD BEEN DESIGNATED BY SEC GEN MINDEFENSE LATRACHE TO DISCUSS RADAR NETWORK. I SAW PALESTER SEVERAL TIMES AND HE WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH AF/N ON HIS RETURN TO U.S. MID-DECEMBER.

2. PALESTER IS CONVINCED THAT ALGERIAN APPROACH TO RAYTHEON IS SERIOUS. ALGERIA, HE BELIEVES, HAS NEED FOR A COUNTRY WIDE RADAR NETWORK. PALESTER BELIEVES RAYTHEON COULD PLAN AND EXECUTE SUCH NETWORK WITHOUT USING HIGHLY CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT. PALESTER TOLD CHERCHELLI THAT FIRST STEP WOULD BE FOR RAYTHEON TO PRESENT A "ZERO PHASE" OUTLINE. THIS WOULD GIVE ALGERIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY GENERAL IDEA WHAT RAYTHEON COULD DO BUT WOULD NOT BE A DETAILED PLAN. AFTER THAT, IF ALGERIANS WERE INTERESTED, RAYTHEON COULD GO AHEAD WITH "PHASE 1 PLANNING" ON WHICH A PRICE TAG OF DOLS 250,000 (SEE ALGIERS REFTEL) HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PLACED. PALESTER TOLD CHERCHELLI THAT ALGERIAN GOVT COULD PROBABLY OBTAIN RAYTHEON "PHASE 1 PLANNING" BY MAKING ONLY A TOKEN PAYMENT TO SHOW SERIOUS INTENTIONS.

3. PALESTER AND ZEGHAR BELIEVE THAT DEFMINISTRY, HAVING BEEN GIVEN GO-AHEAD BY PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE, WOULD PREFER U.S.

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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71 DEC 9 PM 2:33

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

SECRET

PAGE 02 ALGER 01894 091538Z

EQUIPMENT. ALGERIANS DO NOT APPEAR INTERESTED IN SOVIET EQUIPMENT BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS BAD EXPERIENCE WITH IT. ITALIANS ARE INTERESTED IN PROJECT BUT THEIR ABILITY TO PRESENT NECESSARY PACKAGE IS DOUBTED. FRENCH HAVE APPARENTLY DONE SOME DETAILED PLANNING BUT FOR POLITICAL REASONS ALGERIANS PREFER NOT GO TO FRENCH. MOST SERIOUS COMPETITOR APPARENTLY IS BRITISH MARCONI WHICH HAS ADVANTAGE OF GOOD FINANCING BUT IS PROBABLY TECHNICALLY INFERIOR TO RAYTHEON.

4. ON RETURN TO U.S. PALESTER WILL FIRST WANT TO HAVE INDICATION FROM USG THAT IT LOOKS WITH FAVOR ON PROJECT. IF ANSWER IS POSITIVE HE BELIEVES RAYTHEON WILL GO AHEAD WITH "PHASE ZERO" PRESENTATION WHICH ALGERIANS WANT WITHIN TWO TO THREE MONTHS. HE BELIEVES (AND I AGREE) THAT IF PROJECT MOVES AHEAD IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE LT. CHERCHELLI (WHO IS AVIATOR) VISIT U.S. TO CONTACT NOT ONLY RAYTHEON BUT ALSO SEE SOMETHING OF U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ZEGHAR SAID HE WILL SPEAK TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE FOR SUCH A VISIT. PALESTER ALSO BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT AN EARLY STAGE FOR RAYTHEON BOARD PRESIDENT ADAMS TO VISIT ALGIERS TO HAVE PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH COUNTRY AND PEOPLE WITH WHOM HIS COMPANY WOULD BE UNDERTAKING A LARGE (EVENTUALLY DOLS 80 MILLION) PROJECT.

5. PALESTER MENTIONED THAT IN DISCUSSION WITH CHERCHELLI LATTER HAD REVEALED "IN CONFIDENCE" THAT ALGERIANS WILL BE GETTING SOME SOVIET AIR-GROUND MISSILES. THUS IF RAYTHEON GETS CONTRACT IT WOULD BE INSTALLING IFF EQUIPMENT IN MIGs.

6. COMMENT: ZEGHAR'S ABILITY TO INTEREST PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AND ALGERIAN MILITARY IN U.S. RADAR EQUIPMENT IS A BREAKTHROUGH WHICH COULD HAVE LONG-RANGE FAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. NO DOUBT, AS IN OTHER DEALINGS WITH ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES, NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PROTRACTED AND DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE ADVANTAGES (COMMERCIAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY) MAKE RAYTHEON PROJECT ONE WHICH SHOULD HAVE USG BACKING. GP-1.
EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 267

PAGE 01 ALGERI 00983 151559Z

45
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 7046 W

RI 151515Z JUNI 71
FM: USINT ALGIERS
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6179

SECRET ALGIERS 0983

EXDIS:

1. HAD LONG SESSION EVENING JUNE 14 WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT RACHID ZEGHAR WHO HAD SPENT PREVIOUS WEEK IN EUROPE, PROBABLY IN CONNECTION WITH ALGERIAN EFFORTS TO SETTLE AT LEAST PART OF PETROLEUM DISPUTE WITH FRANCE. ZEGHAR IS LEAVING FOR "EUROPE" (PROBABLY PARIS) AGAIN TODAY "ON A MISSION FOR PRESIDENT." ZEGHAR SAID THAT BOUMEDINE HAD SPENT MOST OF JUNE 12-13 WEEKEND WITH HIM AT SMALL HOUSE HE MAINTAINS ON HIS PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY FOR USE BY PRESIDENT. BOUMEDINE HAD BEEN "VERY HAPPY AND DEEPLY TOUCHED" BY NEWS THAT EXIMBANK HAD MADE PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT FOR FINANCING EL PASO-SONATRACH LIQUEFACTION PLANT. ZEGHAR REMINDED ME THAT BOUMEDIENE IS AT TIMES AN EMOTIONAL MAN. HE SAID PRESIDENT REFERRED TO U.S. ACTION AS A "GESTE DE SEIGNEUR" (NOBLE GESTURE) AND TOLD ZEGHAR THAT THIS NOW PROVED ZEGHAR CORRECT IN ADVISING HIM THAT AMERICANS WERE TRUE TO THEIR WORD AND U.S. WAS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH ALGERIA SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS.

2. BOUMEDIENE SAID HE WISHED TO SEND A PRESENT TO TRICIA NIXON COX THROUGH ZEGHAR. FONMINI BOUTEFLIKA, ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR, WAS JEALOUS OF THIS PROCEDURE AND ASKED THAT CHIEF OF ALGINT BOUSSELHAM, WHO IS NOW IN ALGIERS, CARRY PRESENT BACK TO WASHINGTON. ZEGHAR SAID HE WISHED TO SEND PRESENT THROUGH ME BUT I SUGGESTED THAT BOUSSELHAM WOULD BE GOOD CHANNEL. ZEGHAR THEN PHONED BOUTEFLIKA TO TELL HIM THIS HAD BEEN AGREED. HE ALSO CHECKED WITH BOUTEFLIKA TO ENSURE THAT NO BLACK PANTHERS WOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN FESTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH JUNE 19 NATIONAL HOLIDAY (SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF BOUMEDIENE'S TAKEOVER FROM BEN BELLA).

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SECRET

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02. ALGER 00983 151559Z

ZEGHAR SAID SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS HE HAD SEEN IN LAST FEW DAYS HAD EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASM OVER EXIMBANK LOAN. ALGERIAN CABINET WOULD PROBABLY BE DISCUSSING DURING NEXT WEEK OR TWO CANDIDATE TO OCCUPY POSITION OF ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. NAMES THAT ZEGHAR HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT ARE LAMINE KHENE, WHO WAS MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS UNTIL JULY 1970, AND CAMEL PRESIDENT ABDELKADER CHANDERLI. I TOLD ZEGHAR IT WAS ENCOURAGING SIGN THAT ALGERIAN GOVT WAS AT STAGE OF CONSIDERING CANDIDATES FOR AMBASSADORIAL POST IN WASHINGTON BUT I FEARED SOME OF THEIR ENTHUSIASM WAS BASED ON NOTION THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL WERE ABOUT TO AGREE TO OPEN SUEZ CANAL THUS PROVIDING ALGERIA EASY MEANS OF RENEWAL WITH U.S. ZEGHAR INDIRECTLY ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS CONSIDERATION. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT CHANCES WERE 90 PER CENT CERTAIN THAT EVEN WITHOUT A ME SETTLEMENT RELATIONS COULD BE RESTORED ON BASIS ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP THAT WOULD BE CREATED AFTER FPC APPROVES EL PASO-SONATRACH LNG PROJECT.

4. IN A SIDE COMMENT ZEGHAR SAID A "SOVIET MISSION" HAD WANTED TO SEE BOUMEDIENE RECENTLY BUT BOUMEDIENE HAD ASKED HAMDANI TO RECEIVE THEM INSTEAD. (MISSION WAS PROBABLY SHEVCHENKO (FNU), SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SOVIET FONMIN WHO WAS HERE JUNE 3.) IN CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI SOVIET CRITICIZED ALGERIA'S OPENING UP TO U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS. (ZEGHAR HAD TOLD ME A MONTH AGO THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS HAD MADE SIMILAR COMMENT TO HAMDANI.) ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR, HAMDANI TOLD SOVIET IN STRONG TERMS THAT U.S. WAS BEING HELPFUL TO ALGERIA WHEREAS SOVIET UNION WAS NOT SINCE SOVIETS HAD SUPPORTED FRENCH POSITION. (THIS WAS PROBABLY A REACTION TO SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS AND A REFERENCE TO ALLEGED SOVIET POSITION THAT PRIVILEGED FRENCH ROLE IN ALGERIA IS ACCEPTABLE BUT NOT REPLACEMENT OF FRENCH BY AMERICANS.)

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH IT IS NECESSARY TO FILTER OUT OF ZEGHAR'S ENTHUSIASTIC PRESENTATIONS HIS EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS, ON THIS OCCASION I FOUND HIM MORE EUPHORIC THAN EVER IN PAST AND BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S REACTION TO EXIM LOAN. OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL POSITION IN ALGERIA HAS NOW REACHED A NEW HIGH POINT. (ONE SMALL SIGN IS MY BEING INVITED WITH CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS TO FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA'S DINNER FOR

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Department of State

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PAGE 03. ALGERI 00983 151559Z

ITALIAN FONMIN MORO TONIGHT.) IF MOMENTUM TOWARD
IMPLEMENTATION OF EL PASO PROUECT CAN BE MAINTAINED, IT
SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN AND EXPLOIT THIS FAVORABLE
ATMOSPHERE. GP-1.
EAGLETON

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SECRET

29

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**
W4

SECRET 756

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00948 091816Z

50 45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

072904

P 091355Z JUN 71
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6160

SECRET ALGIERS 0948

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (REFS NUMBERS ALGIERS 941 VICE 491 AND
STATE 90108 VICE 09108)

REF: ALGIERS 941; STATE 90108 AND 101089

1. I NOW HAVE APPOINTMENT TO SEE HAMDANI AT 9:00 AM ON
JUNE 10. IS THERE ANYTHING I CAN TELL HIM RE DEPARTMENT'S
LETTER TO FPC ON EL PASO PROJECT?

2. SONATRACH REP CHANDERLI TELLS ME HE WILL BE PHONING
HENRY KEARNS LATER TODAY TO ASSURE HIM THAT SONATRACH WILL
COMPLY WITH KEARNS' REQUEST TO ELIMINATE PURCHASE OF CERTAIN
NON-US GOODS IN CONNECTION WITH EL PASO PROJECT. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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SECRET

28

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 300

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00909 271758Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 271710Z MAY 71
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6138
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T ALGIERS 0909

EXDIS

REF: STATE 090108

1. APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED RE: PROGRESS OF EXIMBANK
LOAN AND CREDIT GUARANTEE FOR EL PASO PROJECT. I TOLD
HAMDANI MAY 26 THAT EXIMBANK CONSIDERATION OF PROJECT WAS
CONTINUING IN NORMAL MANNER. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD ME THAT
NECESSARY TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL DATA HAS BEEN SUBMITTED
TO BANK. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS IS NOT CASE.

2. HAMDANI INDICATED THAT HE AND PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ARE NOW
RELATIVELY RELAXED RE PROJECT. GP-3
EAGLETON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAY 27 PM 4:41

2/3

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TELEGRAM

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

WH

1248

18 PM 3:30
71 FT

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SUBJECT: US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS

4. ZEGHAR TOLD ME HE HAD "VERY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION" HE WANTED ME TO KNOW: "PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TOLD ME THAT AS SOON AS EGYPT RECOGNIZES ISRAEL, ALGERIA WILL RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH U.S." I INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT IF EGYPT REACHES A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL ALGERIA WILL LOSE NO TIME IN RENEWING WITH U.S. GP-1.
EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 314

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00105 190202Z

88

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 FILE-01 /047 W

O R 190145Z JAN 71 ZFF#
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5622
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET ALGIERS 105

EXDIS TOUNS 01

SUBJECT: OIL SITUATION

REF: STATE 8699

1. SINCE LIBYA PLAYS MUCH MORE CRUCIAL ROLE IN OIL CRISIS THAN ALGERIA, BELIEVE IT IS FOR AMBASSADOR PALMER TO DETERMINE WHETHER UNDER SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO LIBYAN AND ALGERIAN GOVERNMENTS AND WHAT BEST LINE WOULD BE. FROM ALGERIA, WHERE ATTENTION IS CONCENTRATED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRENCH, PROPOSED MESSAGE SEEMS SOMEWHAT ALARMIST SINCE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT YET, RPT YET, SEEM TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF ANY INTERRUPTION OF PETROLEUM SUPPLIES IN CONNECTION WITH OIL INDUSTRY NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPEC.

2. NEVERTHELESS, I SEE NO OBJECTION TO CONVEYING TO ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WHATEVER MESSAGE IS CONSIDERED MOST APPROPRIATE FOR LIBYAN GOVERNMENT SINCE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO TRY TO COORDINATE THEIR POSITIONS. WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND HOWEVER THAT THEIR BASIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, I.E., LIBYANS CAN AFFORD TO "LEAVE OIL IN GROUND MANY MORE YEARS" WHILE ALGERIANS WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO FORGO OIL EARNINGS EVEN FOR SHORT PERIOD. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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WH
71 JAN 19 AM 8:07
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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION



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PAGE 01 ALGIER 01897 311136Z

21
ACTION UPW-01

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 USIE-00 EA-15 P-03 PRS-01 PM-05

DODE-00 CIAE-00 INR-08 NSAE-00 RSC-01 IO-13 SS-20

NSC-10 RSR-01 /111 W

035968

P R 311050Z DEC 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5549
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1897

JOINT USINT/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN TV FILM WITH AMERICAN PRISONERS

ALGERIAN TV SHOWED DURING ITS NEWS PROGRAM LAST NIGHT
APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTE FILM INCLUDING SCENES OF AMERICAN
POWS. THIS FILM REPORTEDLY MADE BY ALGERIAN CREW (SEE
ALGIERS 1895 RE EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH VAN DONG OF RDV
IN "EL MOUDJAHID" DECEMBER 30). RTA OFFICIALS INFORM US
NBC, CBS AND ABC ARE TODAY NEGOTIATING PURCHASE OF THE FILM.
GP-4.
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PAGE 01 ALGIER 01729 161820Z

53-42
ACTION AF-05

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
SY-01 USSS-00 PRS-01 FBI-01 L-02 USIA-04 RSR-01 RSC-01

/054 W

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R 161752Z NOV 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5456

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1729

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: ALGERIA: ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

REF: ALGIERS 1727

1. CLEAVER'S INTERVIEW WITH DER SPIEGEL (REFTTEL) TAKES HIS ACTIVITIES HERE A STEP BEYOND SITUATION THAT WE HAVE UNTIL NOW BEEN DISCUSSING WITH ALGERIAN OFFICIALS. WHEN CLEAVER MADE HIS STATEMENT TO SANCHE DEGRAMONT OF NEW YORK TIMES THAT IT WOULD GIVE HIM GREAT SATISFACTION IF RICHARD NIXON WERE KILLED WE WERE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE HAD BEEN ACCURATELY QUOTED OR WHETHER THIS WAS PERHAPS AN OFFHAND REMARK THAT DEGRAMONT HAD LED HIM INTO MAKING. NOW THAT WE HAVE A TAPE RECORDING OF HIS DETAILED CALL FOR ASSASSINATION THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT HE IS PREPARED TO GO ON RECORD ON THIS ISSUE AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO FROM HIS ALGERIAN SANCTUARY.

2. HERETOFORE OUR PRINCIPAL MESSAGE TO ALGERIANS HAS BEEN THAT CLEAVER'S AND LEARY'S ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS DAMAGE ALGERIA'S REPUTATION IN US. DER SPIEGEL INTERVIEW NOW RAISES QUESTION WHETHER GOA WILL CONTINUE TO PERMIT ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY THAT COULD RESULT IN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OR OTHER TERRORISTIC ACT IN US. DURING MY MOST RECENT CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI NOVEMBER 13 (ALGIERS 1726) HE ASSURED ME ON PART OF FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA AND PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE THAT ACTIVITIES THREATENING SECURITY OF US OR PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01729 161820Z

3. IF CLEAVER STATEMENT RE ASSASSINATION IS PUBLISHED IN DER SPIEGEL OR IF SIMILAR STATEMENT IS PUBLISHED ELSEWHERE I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO BRING MATTER URGENTLY TO ATTENTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER HAMDANI. MESSAGE COULD RUN SOMETHING AS FOLLOWS: I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY USG TO ASK HAMDANI TO BRING TO ATTENTION HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOA FACT THAT ELDRIDGE CLEAVER HAS IN CLEAR TERMS CALLED FOR ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING PRESIDENT NIXON (CITING QUOTES FROM INTERVIEW). USG HAD TAKEN NOTE OF HAMDANI'S ASSURANCES ON BEHALF HIS GOVERNMENT THAT ACTIVITIES BY PANTHERS THREATENING USG OR PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. WE BELIEVE THAT ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WILL AGREE THAT STATEMENTS SUCH AS ONE QUOTED ABOVE CONSTITUTE ACTION OF TYPE THAT GOA ASSURED US WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. USG HOPES THAT GOA WILL NOW BE ABLE TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THEIR ASSURANCES IN THIS REGARD WILL BE HONORED.

GP-3.
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PAGE 01 ALGIER 01727 161721Z

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 SCS-04
SCA-01 PPT-02 SY-03 FBI-01 USSS-00 JUS-02 SNM-01
TRSY-11 BNDD-01 RSR-01 /132 W

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P 166627Z NOV 70 ZFF BONN
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 5455

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 1727

SUBJECT: CLEAVER INTERVIEW WITH DER SPIEGEL

1. ELDRIDGE CLEAVER GAVE INTERVIEW ON NOVEMBER 7 IN ALGIERS TO REPRESENTATIVE OF WEST GERMAN WEEKLY DER SPIEGEL. USINT HAS BEEN GIVEN CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO TAPES OF INTERVIEW BY PERSON WHO WAS PRESENT. MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST FOLLOW:

(A) ROLE OF BLACK PANTHER INTERNATIONAL SECTION: BLACK PANTHER STATEMENT THAT INTERNATIONAL SECTION IS RIVAL TO STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT INDICATE PANTHERS CONSTITUTE REVOLUTIONARY COUNTER-GOVERNMENT, BUT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS BEAR SEEDS OF FUTURE GOVERNMENT ONCE PARTIES HAVE STRUGGLED TO FINAL VICTORY. AS PRESENT TIME, PANTHERS HAVE NO INTENTIONS OF FUNCTIONING AS RIVAL OR PARALLEL GOVERNMENT. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPRESENTS AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ON INTERNATIONAL LEVEL AND PANTHERS SEEK TO COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF USG WHEREVER THEY (PANTHERS) MAY BE. "SINCE WE ARE HERE, ON INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, WE MUST DEAL WITH OVERSEAS OPERATIONS OF USG CARRIED ON THROUGH STATE DEPARTMENT, PENTAGON, ETC."

(B) MEANS USED: BLACK PANTHERS SEEK USE ALL MEANS, BAR NONE, TO MAXIMIZE PRESSURES AND POWERS THEY CAN BRING TO BEAR TO DISRUPT GOVERNMENT AND SEIZE POWER.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01727 161721Z

(C) PEACEFUL CHANGE: BLACK PEOPLE LOST FAITH IN POSSIBILITY ON NON-VIOLENT ADVANCE WITH ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. CLEAVER PERSONALLY NOT CONCERNED WITH PIECEMEAL CHANGE AND CAN NEVER BE SATISFIED UNTIL "WE HAVE TOTALLY AND COMPLETELY WHAT IS OURS."

(D) POLICE MEASURES: MURDERS OF BLACK PANTHERS BY THE POLICE AMOUNT TO 31 SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE PANTHERS IN 1966. VIEW REPRESSIVE MEASURES IN FORCE, IDENTITY OF MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND OTHER LEADERS NO LONGER MADE PUBLIC NOR IS SIZE OF PARTY, WHICH HAS GROWN AND INCREASED IN STRENGTH.

(E) ASSASSINATION: "IT MAY BE REGRETTABLE OBJECTIVELY THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO RESORT TO ARMS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS, BUT WE MUST HAVE OUR FREEDOM AND WE MUST HAVE OUR LIBERATION. AND IT IS AN EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUE THAT MUST BE CARRIED OUT TO TEACH PEOPLE TO HATE THE ENEMY IN ORDER FOR THE PEOPLE TO GO FORTH TO KILL THE ENEMY, BECAUSE OTHERWISE, WE CANNOT GET OUR FREEDOM. SO WE URGENTLY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY TRY EVERY MEANS WE CAN TO EDUCATE THE PEOPLE TO THE CORRECT TECHNIQUE THEY MUST FOLLOW AND EMPLOY IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT THEIR LIBERATION. FOR INSTANCE, I MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT PRESIDENT NIXON. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS INCREASED THE REPRESSION AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE AND OTHER PROGRESSIVE FORCES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES SINCE HE BECAME PRESIDENT. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WIPING OUT THE WORK THAT THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT HAD DONE FOR MANY YEARS--HE'S WELL-HATED BY A BROAD NUMBER OF PEOPLE--AND WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD EDUCATIONALLY AND ALSO INSPIRATIONALLY IF HE WAS ELIMINATED THROUGH VIOLENT METHODS SO PEOPLE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT NOT ONLY IS IT DESIRABLE TO ELIMINATE INDIVIDUALS LIKE RICHARD NIXON BUT THAT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE--THAT PEOPLE HAVE IT WITHIN THEIR POWER, IF THEY MOVE, TO ELIMINATE INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS RICHARD NIXON WHO ARE OPPRESSING THE PEOPLE. (REPORTER: "MR. HILLYARD HAS EVEN STATED THAT 'WE WOULD KILL NIXON IF HE LANDS IN THE WAY OF OUR FREEDOM.'") MR. NIXON STANDS IN THE WAY OF OUR FREEDOM, AND IT IS MY OPINION THAT HE SHOULD BE BRUTALLY ELIMINATED. (REPORTER: "BUT HE ONLY WOULD BE REPLACED BY A--") O.K. WE'VE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF A SUCCESSION OF PRESIDENTS WHO HAVE CONTINUED WITH OPPRESSION OF OUR PEOPLE, BUT SO FAR WE HAVE NOT HAD THE PLEASURE AND THE CREDIT OF ELIMINATING ONE OF THEM OURSELVES."

(F) VIOLENCE: THE FUNCTION OF THE VIOLENT ACTION IS TO STEP OUTSIDE THE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS LAID DOWN BY THE OPPRESSIVE

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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01727 161721Z

REGIME. IT IS AN ACT OF INITIATIVE WHEN A MAN TAKES UP ARMS AND GOES AFTER HIS OPPRESSORS.

(G) ANGELA DAVIS: SHE WAS NOT UNDERGROUND WITH THE PANTHERS. SHE WAS IN THE HANDS OF INCOMPETENT PEOPLE, FEARFUL OF WHAT THEY WERE DOING. SHE IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BLACK PANTHERS BUT ONCE BELONGED TO THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WHICH NO LONGER EXISTS.

(H) TIMOTHY LEARY: PANTHERS HAVE NO COALITIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS. DR. LEARY IS AN INDIVIDUAL. HOWEVER PANTHERS RECOGNIZE THE PROGRESSIVE ROLE HE HAS PLAYED IN THE PAST. USE OF DRUGS IS PROGRESSIVE IN THAT THEY PROVIDE A WAY TO BREAK OUT OF SOCIETY. MANY WHO STARTED WITH DRUGS HAVE SINCE TURNED INTO AUTHENTIC REVOLUTIONARIES.

(I) PANTHERS AND DRUGS: PANTHERS NEED SOBER AND CLEAR-HEADED PEOPLE--NOT DRUG TAKERS. PANTHERS TRY TO COMBAT DRUGS. HEROIN HAS DECIMATED YOUNG PEOPLE OF BLACK COMMUNITY.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH OF ABOVE WILL APPEAR IN DER SPIEGEL AND UNTIL IT DOES WE MUST TREAT IT AS CLASSIFIED. WOULD APPRECIATE REPORT BY CABLE FROM EMBASSY BONN, INCLUDING FULL QUOTES RE ASSASSINATION, AS SOON AS ARTICLE APPEARS, AS WELL AS SEVERAL COPIES BY INTERNATIONAL AIRMAIL. GP-4.
EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 799

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01665 301827Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 301755Z OCT 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5415

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1665

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ALGERIA: ANDERSON-BOUTEFLIKA MEETING

1. LARGELY THROUGH EFFORTS BOUMEDIENE'S CONFIDANTE, RACHID ZEGHAR, AT WHOSE INVITATION ATLANTIC RICHFIELD/SINCLAIR CHAIRMAN ROBERT O. ANDERSON CAME TO ALGIERS, BOUMEDIENE ASKED FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA TO RECEIVE ANDERSON AT HIS GUEST VILLA MORNING OCTOBER 30. ANDERSON GAVE ME VERY BRIEF RUNDOWN ON HIS CONVERSATION JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AT AIRPORT AND ZEGHAR FILLED IN SOME DETAILS LATER. ONLY OTHER PERSONS AT MEETING WERE ZEGHAR AND BOUKDUAKDJI OF FONMINISTRY AS INTERPRETER.

2. ANDERSON ASKED THAT I LET DEPARTMENT KNOW HE WOULD IF POSSIBLE LIKETO SEE SECRETARY SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN US NEXT WEEK SO AS TO PASS ON DETAILS OF CONVERSATION WHILE THEY ARE STILL FRESH IN HIS MIND. IT IS LIKELY THAT PART OF BOUTEFLIKA'S MESSAGE HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE MEETING LAST WEEK WITH SECRETARY IN NEW YORK (WHICH WE ASSUME DID NOT OCCUR).

3. ACCORDING TO BOTH ANDERSON AND ZEGHAR ANDERSON WAS VERY WARMLY RECEIVED AND BOUTEFLIKA MADE NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO DESIRE TO IMPROVE AND ENLARGE RELATIONS WITH US IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS. ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR BOUTEFLIKA SAID THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WHEN POLITICAL SITUATION BECAME SUFFICIENTLY STABILIZED PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD VISIT ALGERIA. ANDERSON ALSO WAS ASKED TO RETURN WITH HIS FAMILY FOR TOUR OF COUNTRY AS GOA'S GUEST.

4. BOUTEFLIKA SAID THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL IN EFFORT FIND VIETNAM SETTLEMENT. ALGERIA'S RELATIONS

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WITH VIETNAM COMMUNISTS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS REGARD. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TRANSFERRING PARIS PEACE TALKS TO ALGIERS. ANOTHER WOULD BE SOME KIND OF SECRET INFORMAL SOUNDING BY A PRIVATE AMERICAN SENT TO ALGIERS TO SPEAK WITH VIETNAMESE WHOM ALGERIANS WOULD BRING DOWN FROM PARIS.

5. ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR BOUTEFLIKA ALSO SAID THAT GOA WOULD BE HAPPY TO FACILITATE CONTACT WITH PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN LEADERS AND RE MIDDLE EAST HE SUGGESTED THAT US SHOULD SEND AS MANY PLANES AND OTHER ARMS AS IT WISHED TO ISRAEL AND GET IT OVER WITH SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE CONTINUAL SERIES OF REPORTS OF NEW ARMS DELIVERIES TO POISON ATMOSPHERE AND MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ALGERIANS TO FIND PERIOD DURING WHICH TO HELP AMERICANS IN POLITICAL FIELD.

6. BOUTEFLIKA REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF EL PASO GAS PROJECT AND TO ALGERIA'S DESIRE TO OPEN DOORS TO AMERICAN COMMERCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

7. IT WAS ZEGHAR'S IMPRESSION THAT BOUTEFLIKA HAD TAKEN GOA A STEPFURTHER THAN PREVIOUSLY IN EXPRESSING DESIRE FOR CLOSER US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. HAVING INFO SECOND HAND IT IS HARD FOR ME TO JUDGE WHETHER MESSAGE REPRESENTS BASIC CHANGE, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY POSITIVE IN TONE.

8. ANDERSON'S VISIT HERE HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. GP-1.
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CONFIDENTIAL 708

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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 241121Z SEP 70 ZFF6
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5299
AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS 1459
EXDIS
REF: STATE 156214

1. ALTHOUGH RESERVATIONS NOT YET CONFIRMED AM PLANNING ARRIVE
ROME FROM PARIS 1130 SEP. 29 PA 114. PLAN CONNECT WITH FLIGHT
W 247 AND 1610 ARRIVING NAPLES 1655 UNLESS EMBASSY ROME
ADVISES OTHER MANS FOR ROME-NAPLES TRAVEL. PLAN LEAVE NAPLES
SEPT. 30 AT 1830 ON AZ 073 ARRIVING ROME 1925. LEAVE ROME
(FOR PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS WASHINGTON) 0815 OCT. 1
TW 891 ARRIVING DULLES 1405 HOURS TW 811.

2. FOR DEPARTMENT, AF, BLAKE: ABOVE SCHEDULE BASED ON ASSUMPTION
YOU WILL APPROVE MY DEPARTURE ALGIERS AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 25 AS
SUGGESTED ALGIERS 1456. OTHERWISE WILL SEEK RESERVATION ON DIRECT
FLIGHT ALGIERS-ROME.

3. FOR ROME, PLEASE ADVISE IF HOTEL ROOM IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
NIGHT SEPT. 30 AND I WILL TRY TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS. ALSO
ADVISE IF 1830 DEPARTURE FROM NAPLES FITS IN WITH PROGRAM. GP-3.
EAGLETON

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER INSTRUCTIONS MR. MC GAFFEY, S/S-0.

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

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RELATIONS ON WHICH IT WAS EASIER TO AGREE AND IN WHICH TWO STATES HAD MUTUAL INTERESTS. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT EL PASO PROJECT HAD NOT ADVANCED AS RAPIDLY AS EXPECTED THOUGH HE

APPRECIATED DEPARTMENT'S POSITIVE POSITION. HE THEN POSED QUESTION: "CAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE DO MORE?".

4. HAMDANI WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT WHEN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAD BEEN SOLIDIFIED (CONCRETISEES) A NEW SITUATION WOULD PREVAIL. ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, DOES NOT CONSIDER CURRENT USINT STATUS AS OTHER THAN PROVISIONAL. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO RENEW RELATIONS BUT QUESTION IS WHEN AND HOW.

5. I THANKED HAMDANI FOR HIS CLEAR EXPLANATION (THOUGH HIS FORMULA FOR RENEWING RELATIONS WAS HARDLY PRECISE). I THEN REFERRED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA WHERE US DISENGAGEMENT HAD CHANGED SITUATION CONSIDERABLY SINCE 1967. IN MIDDLE EAST TOO THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT OF TYPE HAMDANI HAD PREVIOUSLY URGED IN DIRECTION OF BALANCE ENVISAGED DURING SCRANTON'S TOUR IN 1968. PALESTINIAN RIGHTS WERE NOT IGNORED BY NOVEMBER 1967 RESOLUTION AND WOULD NO DOUBT BE SUBJECT OF LATER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED. IN ANY CASE, MIDDLE EAST WAS IN STATE OF FLUX AND ALGERIA WAS NO LONGER TIED TO POSITION IT HAD TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF UAR WHEN IT BROKE RELATIONS IN 1967 (HAMDANI INTERRUPTED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ALGERIA NOW HAD MORE FREEDOM TO MANEUVER).

6. I SAID I FOUND HAMDANI'S SUGGESTION THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS ENCOURAGING SINCE WE WERE CONVINCED THAT EL PASO PROJECT WAS MOVING AHEAD EVEN THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN, AND WOULD BE IN FUTURE TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT CAUSE DELAYS. HAMDANI HAD ASKED WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE COULD DO MORE TO HELP. ANSWER WAS YES IF ALGERIAN POSITION IN U.S. COULD BE STRENGTHENED AND MOST OBVIOUS WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING U.S. CLAIMS. IN COMMENT ON LATTER HAMDANI REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS SUGGESTION THAT PERHAPS A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO PAY CLAIMS (2 TO 3 MILLION DOLLARS) WITHOUT TAKING MONEY FROM GOA AND THEREBY CREATING A PRECEDENT FOR VAST FRENCH AND OTHER CLAIMS. I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE DISCUSSING SUBJECT IN WASHINGTON.

7. I THEN PROBED TO TRY TO BRING HAMDANI TO MORE PRECISE STATE-

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MENT OF HOW AND WHEN HE ENVISAGES RENEWAL OF RELATIONS. HE WOULD NOT BE PINNED DOWN, TAKING REFUGE IN FACT THAT NEITHER OF US WOULD WISH TO SET CONDITIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HOWEVER THAT APPROVAL BY FPC AND SIGNING OF CONTRACTS WITH US GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES WOULD BE IMPORTANT STEPS.

8. HAMDANI ENDED WITH STATEMENT THAT HE HOPED HIS EXPOSITION OF ALGERIAN POSITION DID NOT EXAGGERATE NEGATIVE ASPECTS (VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST). HE WANTED TENOR OF HIS VIEWS TO BE POSITIVE. ALGERIA WISHED TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN ITS RELATIONS WITH US WHILE SEEKING BASIS FOR RENEWAL. HE HAD RECENTLY ELICITED PROMISE FROM BOUTEFLIKA THAT A MORE SENIOR HEAD OF ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE NAMED AT EARLY DATE.

9. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, HAMDANI SAID BOUTEFLIKA WAS DUE BACK FROM LUSAKA LATER SEPTEMBER 12 BUT HIS PLANS FOR TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WERE NOT YET KNOWN. HE SAID HE WOULD ACCOMPANY BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFLIKA TO NOUADHIBOU SEPTEMBER 13 AND BOUTEFLIKA MIGHT GO DIRECTLY TO NEW YORK FROM THERE. MOHAMED YAZID WILL STAY ON AS ACTING HEAD OF ALGERIAN DELEGATION DURING THIS SESSION OF UNGA.

10. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIS CONVERSATION DID NOT ESTABLISH TIME-TABLE OR EVEN CLEAR BASIS FOR RENEWAL OF RELATIONS, THERE ARE SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS THAT CAN USEFULLY BE EXPLORED WHEN I AM IN WASHINGTON. GP-1.
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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 091445Z SEP 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 523

SECRET ALGIERS 1391

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS

1. HAVING REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY CONVERSATIONS AT TIME OF BORMAN VISIT, ON MY RETURN TO ALGIERS SEPTEMBER 7, I MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR EARLY THIS MORNING. ONE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING AND OTHERS I HOPE TO HAVE BEFORE CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH IS TO DETERMINE (WITHOUT TAKING OFFICIAL INITIATIVE) WHETHER ANYTHING CAN OR SHOULD BE DONE DURING CURRENT PERIOD TO MOVE TOWARD AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS.

2. CONVERSATION WITH ZEGHAR, TO WHOM I DELIVERED LETTER FROM FRANK BORMAN, LASTED ONLY 45 MINUTES BECAUSE OF ARRIVAL AT HIS HOUSE OF NEW GOVERNOR OF ALGIERS, COLONEL SILMANE HOFFMANN, WITH WHOM I EXCHANGED CONGRATULATIONS AND COMMENTS ABOUT HIS NEW JOB PRIOR TO TAKING MY LEAVE. IT WAS TOWARD END OF CONVERSATION THAT ZEGHAR BEGAN TO FOCUS CLEARLY ON QUESTION I HAD POSED RE REAL STATUS OF HIGH ALGERIAN THINKING ABOUT RELATIONS WITH US. I OBSERVED THAT MORE THAN A YEAR AGO WE HAD BEEN GIVEN IMPRESSION (LARGELY THROUGH ZEGHAR) THAT ALGERIA WAS MOVING TOWARD RESUMPTION AND I DID NOT WANT TO TAKE WITH ME TO WASHINGTON UNREALISTICALLY OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT IN GLOW OF KINDLY BUT NOT VERY SPECIFIC COMMENTS GENERATED AT TIME BORMAN VISIT.

3. I REVIEWED WITH ZEGHAR SOME OF VIEWS GIVEN TO HAMDANI AUGUST 10 WHICH GALANTO HAS RETIERATED SINCE THEN ON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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70 SEP 9 PM 8:15

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SECRET

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WHY WE DO NOT CONSIDER INDEFINITE NATURE OF USINT STATUS SATISFACTORY. ZEGHAR, WHO IS ENTHUSIASTIC ADVOCATE OF RENEWED RELATIONS, SAID HE WOULD SEE BOTH BOUTEFLIKA (WHO IS NOT IN LUSAKA) AND PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROGRESS TOWARD RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS IS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH BOUMEDIENE DURING WEEKEND AND LATTER HAD REITERATED HIS DESIRE TO SEE RESUMPTION OF REALTIONS BUT AS IN PAST WAS LOOKING FOR PEG ON WHICH TO HANG IT ZEGHAR INDICATED THAT EL PASO DEAL AND CLOSE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP IT WOULD ENTAIL WOULD PROVIDE SUCH A PEG BUT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS PROPOSITION TO WHICH BOUMEDIENE WAS DEFINITELY COMMITTED. RE EL PASO DEAL I BSERVED THAT DURING PAST YEAR WE HAD HEARD NUMBER OF HINTS FROM ALGERIAN OFFICIALS THAT BUILDING A SOLID ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING EL PASO PROJECT, WOULD LOVCALLY LEAD TO FULL RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. HOWEVER LOOKING AT IT FROM WASHINGTON IT SEEMED MORE REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS SHOULD COME FIRST SO AS TO STRENGHTEN POSITION OF THOSE WHO WERE WORKING TOWARD GREATER ECONOMIC COOPERATION INCLUDING FINANCING EL PASO PROJECT. ZEGHAR INDICATED HE WOULD STRESS THIS POINT IN HIS TALKS WITH BOUTEFLIKA AND BOUMEDIENE.

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two olive branches are held in the eagle's talons.

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INFO OCT-01 1046 W

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
070

S E C R E T ALGIERS. 1390

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS

1. IN PREPARATIONS WITH MY MEETING TODAY WITH RACHID ZEGHAR I HAD LONG CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT WITH OUR MUTUAL NEIGHBOR AND ZEGHAR'S CLOSE FRIEND, AMERICAN SONATRACH EMPLOYEE DON SARBER. SARBER HAD SEEN ZEGHAR PREVIOUS NIGHT AND AS IN PAST WAS ABLE TO REFLECT SOME OF ZEGHAR'S VIEWS FROM SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE FROM THOSE HE GIVES DIRECTLY TO ME. SARBER HAD FOUND ZEGHAR JUSTIFIABLY HAPPY OVER FRANK BORMAN'S SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO ALGIERS. SARBER HAD CAUGHT SENSE OF OPTIMISM AND HAD HIMSELF CONCLUDED THAT US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS WOULD SOON BE RENEWED. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD REFLECTED SIMILAR OPTIMISM MORE THAN A YEAR AGO BUT THAT OUR PROBES AT THAT TIME WITH ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT. SITUATION HAD NOW PERHAPS CHANGED BUT BEFORE GOING TO WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE DEFINITE INDICATION OF HIGH LEVEL ALGERIAN THINKING.

2. ZEGHAR HAD MENTIONED TO SARBER THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT PRESIDENT NIXON'S REACTION TO BORMAN'S ACCOUNT OF HIS VISIT TO ALGERIA. HE ALSO CLEARLY HINTED THAT HE HOPED TO HEAR SOMETHING OF HOW HIS PRESENTS TO PRESIDENT NIXON HAD BEEN RECEIVED. (ZEGHAR DID NOT RAISE THESE POINTS WITH ME THIS MORNING). I TOLD SARBER THAT STATE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN VERY HAPPY WITH WARM RECEPTION GIVEN BORMAN BUT THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ANY INFO RE BORMAN'S RETURN AND REPORT TO PRESIDENT.

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3. SARBER SAID THAT IN HIS TALK WITH ZEGHAR LATTER HAD ASKED WHETHER ALGERIAN SETTLEMENT WITH SINCLAIR WAS NOT NOW MAJOR PROBLEM AFFECTING US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS. SARBER HAD READILY AGREED THAT IS WAS. ZEGHAR SUGGESTED AS HE AND OTHER ALGERIANS HAVE IN PAST, THAT WHOLE MATTER COULD QUICKLY BE SETTLED IF ATLANTIC RICHFIELD/SINCLAIR PRESIDENT ROBERT ANDERSON WOULD VISIT ALGERIA AND, WITH ZEGHAR MAKING ARRANGEMENTS, MEET WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE. SARBER SAID IF ZEGHAR WOULD LINE UP PRESIDENT HE WOULD GET THROUGH TO ANDERSON, TO WHICH ZEGHAR SUGGESTED THAT FIRST SARBER SHOULD TRY TO OBTAIN FROM ANDERSON INDICATION OF SINCLAIR'S PRICE FOR SETTLEMENT. ZEGHAR WOULD THEN OBTAIN BOUMEDIENE'S AGREEMENT TO PAYING PRICE AND THUS SET STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT WHEN ANDERSON COMES LATER TO MEET BOUMEDIENE. SARBER EXPECTS MATTER TO PROCEED ON THIS BASIS.
GP-1.
EAGLETON.



SUMMARY
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PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 RSR-01 /150 W

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R 011108Z AUG 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5134
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ALGIERS 1122

SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND US PEACE PLAN

1. ALGIERS' PRESS TODAY FEATURES ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. PLAN AND REPORTS OTHER ASPECTS OF SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST, SUCH AS STRIKE IN AMMAN AND DENIAL THAT LIBYA HAS APPROVED UAR DECISION, WITH USUAL PRO-PALESTINIAN BIAS.

2. IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT HARDAN AL TIKRITI ARRIVED JULY 31. BOTH HE AND PLO REP HASSAN EL KHATIB HAVE MET WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE DELIVERING MESSAGES RESPECTIVELY FROM IRAQI PRESIDENT AL BAKR AND YASSER ARAFAT. KHATIB WAS ALSO RECEIVED BY INFORMATION MINISTER TALEB AMIDST LOCAL RUMOR, BUT NO HARD INFO, THAT FATAH MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR AN ALGERIAN RADIO BROADCASTING OUTLET. KHATIB REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESS HE FOUND POSITION OF ALGERIAN LEADERS IS TOTALLY IDENTICAL TO PALESTINIAN VIEW.

3. COMMENT: USING PRESS REPORTS FROM ME, LOCAL MEDIA ARE GIVING

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IMPRESSION OF GATHERING STRENGTH OF ARAB OPINION OPPOSING PEACE
PLAN. AT SAME TIME ALGERIAN POSITION IS STILL BEING EXPRESSED
WITH MODERATION IN TERMS OF SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER PALESTINIANS
THEMSELVES DECIDE TO DO. ALGERIAN POSITION WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE
TO BE FORMULATED ON THAT BASIS RATHER THAN IN COORDINATION WITH
IRAQ AND OTHER STATES WHICH MIGHT OPPOSE PLAN. EXEMPT.
EAGLETON

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AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1083

LIMDIS NOFORN

SUBJECT: SOVIET ARMS FOR LIBYA

DURING CALL BY EMBOFF JULY 23 ON WELL-INFORMED YUGOSLAV MILATTACHE (PROTECT), LATTER EXPRESSED INTEREST TO HEAR OF BBC MENTION THAT MORNING OF UNLOADING OF SOVIET ARMS AT TRIPOLI, SAID "WE" HAD BEEN EXPECTING THIS FOR SOME TIME AND ASKED IF AIRCRAFT AMONG ITEMS MENTIONED. WHEN TOLD THEY WERE NOT, HE SAID YUGOSLAV GENERAL STAFF AWARE LIBYANS HAD, BY TIME OF MAY 10 VISIT OF ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA AND SECGEN MINISTRY NATIONAL DEFENSE CHABOU TO LIBYA, DECIDED NOT GO THROUGH WITH AGREEMENT BUY 100-ODD MIRAGES. LIBYANS OBLIGED BUY 25 PERCENT OF ORIGINAL ORDER AS THEY HAVE PUT DOWN MONEY AND FRENCH WILL NOT GIVE IT BACK. HOWEVER, THEY PLAN BUY MIGS INSTEAD OF REMAINDER. (QUESTIONED DIRECTLY, MILATTACHE AVOIDED SAYING EXACTLY HOW MANY MIGS LIBYANS PLANNED BUY.) MILATTACHE ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY CONFRONTED FRENCH ARMED SERVICES ATTACHE COLONEL LARRIEU WITH THIS INFO. AFTER INITIAL DENIAL, LARRIEU SAID, "AH, HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT?" GP-1.

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PRS-01 P-03 USIA-12 DODE-00 SS-20 NSC-10 STR-08 CEA-02
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FM USINT ~~ALGIERS~~
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5103
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ALGIERS 1078

SUBJECT: PETROLEUM

1. ALL FRENCH PETROLEUM COMPANIES EXCEPT ASCOOP RECEIVED LETTERS JULY 21 FROM MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND ENERGY ABDESSALAM INFORMING THEM THAT NEW TAX PREFERENCE PRICE WAS BEING SET UNILATERALLY AT DOLS 2.85 PER BARREL OR AN INCREASE OF SEVENTY-SEVEN CENTS. ASCOOP WAS PRESUMABLY EXEMPTED BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL STATUS UNDER 1965 OIL AGREEMENTS. GOA WITHHELD ANY MENTION OF INCREASE UNTIL THIS MORNING JULY 23. WE ASSUME DELAY IN GUIDED PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT WAS CAUSED BY ABSENCE OF ABDESSALAM WHO IS ATTENDING MAGHREB MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE.

2. FRENCH PETROLEUM SOURCES HERE PROFESS TO BE SHOCKED BY MOVE EVEN THOUGH IN RETROSPECT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE IN HIS SPEECH AT SKIKDA JULY 16 GAVE CLEAR WARNING THAT FRENCH POSITION HAD TO CHANGE. HE REITERATED THAT OIL RICHES "CONSTITUTED PROSPERITY OF ALGERIAN PEOPLE". FRENCH OIL COMPANIES HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT "THERE IS SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN ALGERIA. WE ARE NO LONGER

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IN 1830 (FRENCH CONQUESTS) OR 1962 (INDEPENDENCE) OR EVEN 1965 (DATE OF OIL AGREEMENTS) BUT 1970 AND TIMES HAVE CHANGED." HE CALLED FOR COOPERATION ON BASIS OF EQUALITY AND SAID THAT GOA WAS READY TO AGREE TO NEW ACCORDS AS LONG AS INTEREST OF ALGERIA ARE SAFEGUARDED.

3. REFERENCE PRICE OF DOLS 2.85 WAS FULL AMOUNT DEMANDED OF FRENCH BY ALGERIANS IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BROKE OFF LAST JUNE. PRICE IS APPROXIMATELY SAME AS THAT ENFORCED AGAINST SEQUESTERED AMERICAN COMPANIES SINCE 1969 AND IN EFFECT KEPT THESE FIRMS OPERATING AT BREAK-EVEN POINT OR EVEN AT DEFICIT. UNILATERAL ALGERIAN DECISION IS VIOLATION OF FRENCH-ALGERIAN PETROLEUM ACCORDS OF 1965 AND OPENS UP FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ON ASSUMPTIONS WHICH HAVE UNTIL PRESENT GOVERNED ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TW COUNTRIES. FRENCH CANNOT IGNORE THIS ACTION WHICH BORDERS ON CONFISCATION OF THESE VALUABLE ASSETS. YET FRENCH MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT SINCE THEY ARE SO DEPENDENT ON THESE ENERGY SOURCES.

4. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT GOA FELT OBLIGED TO FORCE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE PRESSURES WERE BUILDING UP AGAINST ITS MONETARY RESERVES BECAUSE OF THE STEP-UP IN SPENDING RESULTING FROM MORE ACTIVE STAGE IN FOUR YEAR PLAN. GOA SEEMED WILLING ORIGINALLY TO WAIT OUT RESULTS OF LIBYAN NEGOTIATIONS IN BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD FOUNDER WITH GOL TAKING DRASTIC MEASURES AGAINST U.S. COMPANIES OR THAT MAJOR TAX INCREASES WOULD BE ACCEPTED. WHEN LIBYANS SHOWED UNEXPECTED PATIENCE AND FRENCH EXPECTABLY STUBBORNNESS GOA APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT ARBITRARY DECISION WAS CALLED FOR SINCE NEGOTIATIONS WERE AT DEAD END. WE ASSUME FURTHER THAT ALGERIAN ACTION WILL HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON LIBYAN NEGOTIATIONS.

5. SEMI-OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER EL MOUDUAHID OF JULY 23 ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY VIOLATION OF 1965 ACCORDS BY QUOTING OPEC RESOLUTION XVI-90 WHICH PROVIDES FOR ACTION BY PRODUCING COUNTRY WHEN NEGOTIATIONS FAIL TO REACH CONCLUSION AFTER REASONABLE INTERVAL. AUTHOR OF ARTICLE (WHICH SEEMS CLEARLY TO HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL) JUSTIFIES DOLS 2.85 PRICE WHICH HE WRITES, IS CALCULATED BY "SIMPLE MATHEMATICAL COMPARISON WITH OIL COMING FROM OTHER PRODUCING COUNTRIES." PRICE IS BASED ON "QUALITY OF PETROLEUM, ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND THE WORLD DEMAND FOR ALGERIAN OIL."

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01078 231227Z

6. RE PARA 2. PARIS 9771, OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT TAX OF 55 PERCENT IS BASED ON REFERENCE PRICE LESS EXTRACTION COSTS OF ABOUT DOLS .75 OR THAT ACTUAL TAX WOULD BE ABOUT DOLS 1.16 PER BARREL. ADDING COSTS WOULD RAISE FOB PRICE TO DOLS 1.91 WHILE REAL MARKET PRICE FLUCTUATES BETWEEN DOLS 1.90 AND DOLS 1.95. EAGLETON

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29

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Department of State

62 H
TELEGRAM

SECRET 282

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01047 131903Z

50
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 131825Z JUL 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5077

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1047

EXDIS

REF: ALGIERS 1040

073721

6270 JUL 13 PM 10:32

1. DURING CONVERSATION (REFTEL) IN CONTEXT DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE NATIONALIZATION OF OCCIDENTAL INTERESTS IN LIBYA ZEGHAR SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT A PROMINENT AMERICAN (NOT OFFICIAL) HAD ARRANGED WITH EGYPTIANS FOR LATTER TO INTERVENE WITH LIBYAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW "SHALHI" TO LEAVE COUNTRY SO AS TO PREVENT HIS POSSIBLE TRIAL AND EXECUTION. EGYPTIANS ALSO ARRANGED, ON BEHALF OF AMERICANS, FOR AN "EX-LIBYAN VICE-PRESIDENT" TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO LIBYA. AFTER TELLING ME THIS ZEGHAR COMMENTED THAT FACT THAT HE KNEW ABOUT IT PROVED EGYPTIANS COULD NOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP SECRETS.

2. SINCE ZEGHAR HAS PROBABLY INFORMED HIGH ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES OF ABOVE WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT IT ENHANCES HIS STANDING AS A SOURCE. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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SECRET

46

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 761

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01041 141741Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 131825Z JUL 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5077

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1041

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN VICE 1047)

REF: ALGIERS 1040

1. DURING CONVERSATION (REFTEL) IN CONTEXT DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE NATIONALIZATION OF OCCIDENTAL INTERESTS IN LIBYA ZEGHAR SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT A PROMINENT AMERICAN (NOT OFFICIAL) HAD ARRANGED WITH EGYPTIANS FOR LATTER TO INTERVENE WITH LIBYAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW "SHALHI" TO LEAVE COUNTRY SO AS TO PREVENT HIS POSSIBLE TRIAL AND EXECUTION. EGYPTIANS ALSO ARRANGED, ON BEHALF OF AMERICANS, FOR AN "EX-LIBYAN VICE-PRESIDENT" TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO LIBYA. AFTER TELLING ME THIS ZEGHAR COMMENTED THAT FACT THAT HE KNEW ABOUT IT PROVED EGYPTIANS COULD NOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP SECRETS.

2. SINCE ZEGHAR HAS PROBABLY INFORMED HIGH ALGERIAN AUTHORITIES OF ABOVE WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT IT ENHANCES HIS STANDING AS A SOURCE. GP-3.
EAGLETON

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SECRET

25

3/2
70 JUL 14 PM 5:50

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 709

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01311 231916Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

P 231832Z AUG 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5189

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1311

EXDIS

DEPT PASS BANGKOK, MOSCOW, SAIGON, USDEL FRANCE

REF: STATE 137398 (VIENTIANE 5725)

BORMAN STRONGLY AGREES WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED REFTEL ESPECIALLY
ON KEEPING VISIT TO BANGKOK IN AS LOW KEY AS POSSIBLE. GP-3.
GALANTO

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.

084501

1002AUG 24 AM 8:25
WHITE HOUSE



SECRET 919

51
ACTION SS-45

103315

R 071415Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4699

SECRET ALGIERS 310

EXDIS

REF: (A) STATE 032269, (B) ALGIERS: 303

1. SHORTLY AFTER SENDING REFTEL (B) I RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM HAMDANI IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED I COME TO HIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY (LATE AFTERNOON MARCH 6. TO DELIVER SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO BOUTEFLIKA. I DELIVERED MESSAGE NEARLY VERBATIM AND HE TOOK COMPLETE NOTES. HE DID NOT COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE PORTION OF MESSAGE RELATED TO EL PASO PROJECT, NOTING THAT HE WOULD MAKE FULL REPORT TO BOUTEFLIKA AND WOULD PERHAPS HAVE COMMENTS LATER, BUT HE DID ASK NUMBER OF QUESTIONS REGARDING FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND ASKED WHETHER WE COULD GIVE HIM COPY OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. (WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING DEPARTMENT CAN SEND US IN THIS REGARD.)

2. RE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON BE EXPANDED AT AN EARLY DATE (PARA 3, REF (A), HAMDANI SAID HE HOPED I WOULD MAKE IT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON THAT FAILURE TO MOVE ON INTERESTS SECTION THUS FAR WAS CAUSED BY COMPLICATIONS IN GENERAL DIPLOMATIC RESHUFFLE AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH GOA'S CONTINUING DESIRE ENLARGE INTERESTS SECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HAMDANI GAVE IMPRESSION THAT THOUGH HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN BOUTEFLIKA SEVERAL TIMES RE OTHER MATTERS, HE HAD NOT YET HAD OPPORTUNITY FOCUS DIRECTLY ON PROBLEM ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION. (BOUTEFLIKA HAS RESUMED HIS NORMAL WORK AT MINISTRY AND RECEIVED NUMBER OF AMBASSADORS MARCH 6.)

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head, surrounded by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA".

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 ALGIER 00310 071555Z

4. HAMDANI SAID HE HOPED AFN DIRECTOR BLAKE HAD FOUND HIS VISIT TO ALGIERS USEFUL. I REPLIED THAT BLAKE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY HAMDANI'S CLEAR EXPOSITION OF ALGERIAN POLICIES AND DESIRE MOVE AHEAD ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH US. I NOTED THAT ONLY "SURPRISE" WAS DECISION THAT BLAKE SHOULD NOT BE RECEIVED AT FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ABSENCE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. HAMDANI REPLIED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT. HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN BOUTEFLIKA HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT BLAKE'S CONTACTS SHOULD BE WITH HIM RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. PURPOSE WAS TO ENSURE THAT BLAKE WOULD HAVE BRIEFING ON ALGERIAN POLICIES FROM A SINGLE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE (HAMDANI). THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSIDERATION OF PROTOCOL ASPECTS SINCE IN ABSENCE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IT WAS CERTAINLY AS "OFFICIAL" FOR BLAKE TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN GOVERNMENT PALACE IN IN OFFICE JUST ACROSS HALL FROM PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WERE HE RECEIVED IN FOREIGN MINISTRY. HAMDANI SUGGESTED THAT CHIEF PROTOCOL BOUSSELHAM HAD PERHAPS RECEIVED BOUTEFLIKA'S INSTRUCTIONS SECONDHAND AND HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD ITS PURPOSE. HE ASKED THAT I CONVEY ABOVE TO BLAKE AND DEPARTMENT. (WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT HIS EXPLANATION.) GP-1
EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 466

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00303 061830Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 061735Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4696

S E C R E T ALGIERS 303

EXDIS

REF: STATE 32269 AND ALGIERS 391

1. HAMDANI HAS BEEN SO OCCUPIED WITH MEETINGS THAT I HAVE AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO SET UP APPOINTMENT WITH HIM TO CONVEY SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO BOUTEFLIKA (STATE REFTEL). APPOINTMENT WILL PROBABLY BE SET FOR EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. MEANWHILE, DURING AFN DIRECTOR BLAKE'S VISIT MARCH 3-5 HE WAS ABLE TO GIVE CHIEF OF EUROPE-NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU FONOFF, MEDJAD, A REALISTIC DESCRIPTION OF LIMITATIONS OF DEPARTMENT'S INFLUENCE WITH EXIMBANK AND FPC. HE EXPLAINED THAT BOTH AGENCIES WERE BASED ON SEPARATE STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT TURN TO DEPARTMENT FOR ADVICE RE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSACTION. DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS, IF SOLICITED, WOULD ONLY BE ONE ASPECT OF TOTAL CONSIDERATION OF PACKAGE AND NOT NECESSARILY CONTROLLING. INSOFAR AS DEPARTMENT WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, IT VIEWED EL PASO PROJECT WITH SYMPATHETIC INTEREST. MEDJAD SEEMED DIS-CONCERTED TO LEARN OF KEY POSITION OTHER AGENCIES IN CON-SIDERATION OF EL PASO DEAL.

3. DURING BLAKE'S VISIT WE OBTAINED CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT BOUTEFLIKA HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SUGGESTED ESTABLISHING SPECIAL LIAISON IN ALGIERS AND WASHINGTON TO PROVIDE DIRECT COMMUNI-CATION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SECRETARY. WE HAD TOLD CHIEF PROTOCOL (AND CHARGE-DESIGNATE OF ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION WASHINGTON) BOUSSELHAM THAT BLAKE WOULD LIKE TO PAY COURTESY CALL ON HIMSELF, MEDJAD, AND ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICER IN FOREIGN MINISTRY. MEANWHILE APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN ARRANGED

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 00303 061830Z

WITH HAMDANI (REF ALGIERS TEL). WHEN HAMDANI, MEDJAD, AND BOUSSELHAM ARRIVED FOR DINNER AT RESIDENCE MARCH 4, IT WAS REVEALED THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN PASSED DOWN, PRESUMABLY FROM BOUTEFLIKA, THAT IN VIEW ABSENCE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IT WAS CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE THAT A HIGH OFFICIAL USG (BLAKE) SHOULD BE RECEIVED AT FOREIGN MINISTRY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SPECIAL LIAISON CHANNEL (HAMDANI) HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. IN ASIDE WITH BOUSSELHAM I EXPRESSED MY SURPRISE AT THIS DECISION. HE DEFENDED IT IN TERMS UNUSUAL STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, BUT WAS DEFENSIVE AND GAVE IMPRESSION HE DID NOT AGREE WITH ARBITRARY DECISION HANDED DOWN FROM ABOVE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN ANY RETREAT FROM ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE PUSH AHEAD WITH RELATIONS PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC FIELD.

4. WE ARE INCLINED NOT TO ATTACH UNDUE IMPORTANCE TO FAILURE TO RECEIVE BLAKE AT FONMIN WHICH PROBABLY REFLECTS BOUTEFLIKA'S CONFUSED IDEAS RE OUR PREVIOUS CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS AND HIS DESIRE TO CONCENTRATE CONTACTS IN HAMDANI CHANNEL. NEVERTHELESS, IN VIEW OF HAMDANI'S DETAILED EXPLANATION OF REASONS WHY ALGERIA COULD NOT MOVE ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT THIS TIME (REF ALGIERS TEL) AND ALGERIAN SENSITIVITY RE QUESTION OF RECEIVING BLAKE AT FONMIN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS IS TIME TO RAISE WITH HAMDANI POSSIBILITY RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS AT CHARGE LEVEL (PARA 4 STATE REFTEL). BLAKE CONCURS IN THIS ASSESSMENT.

5. WE DO NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT FIND APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE QUESTION OF RESUMPTION AT CHARGE LEVEL AT TIME WHEN THERE SEEMS TO BE BEGINNING OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT ON ONE OF TWO ISSUES THAT ALGERIANS ARE LOOKING TOWARD TO FIND PRETEXT FOR RESUMPTION (VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST). WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT IS WISE TO REFER TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM'S CONVERSATION WITH RACHID ZEGHAR LAST FALL. SINCE MY ARRIVAL HERE IN NOVEMBER OUR INTERMEDIARY WITH ZEGHAR, AMERICAN SONATRACH EMPLOYEE DON SARBER, HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS TOLD ME THAT HIS NEIGHBOR (AND OUR NEIGHBOR) ZEGHAR IS PLANNING TO INVITE ME OVER FOR DINNER TO REESTABLISH CONTACTS HE HAD WITH MY PREDECESSOR. THIS DINNER HAS BEEN POSTPONED ON ONE PRETEXT OR ANOTHER AND WE ARE BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER ZEGHAR'S INFLUENCE WITH BOUMEDIENE IS SLIPPING OR HIS CONNECTION WITH AMERICANS IS PLACING HIM IN SENSITIVE POSITION. ZEGHAR IS RATHER MYSTER-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ALGIER 00303 061830Z

IOUS FIGURE WHOSE NAME IS NEVER MENTIONED BY ANY OF OUR
NORMAL CONTACTS AND WHOSE NAME WE IN TURN NEVER MENTION.

GP-1

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 544

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02277 271227Z

21
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

102752

R 271115Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4570

S E I C R E T ALGIERS 2277

EXDIS


REF: STATE 207826; ALGIERS 2276

SUBJECT: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPERS OF OCTOBER 28

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED BOTH ENGLISH AND ARABIC VERSIONS OF UAR/ISRAEL PORTION OF US-USSR WORKING PAPERS. WE WILL BE PASSING THIS ON TO FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA AND PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE VIA PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR HAMDANI.

2. DURING OUR CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI (ALGIERS REFTEL) DECEMBER 26 IT WAS APPARENT THAT ALGERIANS ARE INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN OUR PROPOSALS ON JORDAN/ISRAEL ASPECTS SINCE IT IS THEREIN THAT PALESTINIAN ISSUES, WHICH ALGERIANS CONSIDER VITAL, ARE TREATED. ALGERIAN OFFICIALS ARE APPARENTLY USING AS THEIR SOURCE OF INFO RE OUR JORDAN/ISRAEL PROPOSALS WHAT THEY PICKED UP ORALLY FROM OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE AT RABAT SUMMIT AS WELL AS 10 POINTS AS CARRIED BY LE MONDE.

3. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD PASS OUR JORDAN/ISRAEL PROPOSALS TO BOUTEFLIKA AND BOUMEDIENE ON SAME BASIS AS UAR/ISRAEL PROPOSALS. HAMDANI HAS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXTS RATHER THAN ARABIC, THOUGH FIRST CHOICE HERE IS ALWAYS FRENCH. IF DEPT. AGREES TO ABOVE SUGGEST TEXT BE SENT US BY TELEGRAM IN VIEW OF SLOW POUCH SCHEDULE.
EAGLETON



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 544

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02277 271227Z

21
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

102752

R 271115Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4570

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2277

EXDIS

REF: STATE 207826; ALGIERS 2276

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3. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD PASS OUR JORDAN/ISRAEL PROPOSALS TO BOUTEFLIKA AND BOUMEDIENE ON SAME BASIS AS UAR/ISRAEL PROPOSALS. HAMDANI HAS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXTS RATHER THAN ARABIC, THOUGH FIRST CHOICE HERE IS ALWAYS FRENCH. IF DEPT. AGREES TO ABOVE SUGGEST TEXT BE SENT US BY TELEGRAM IN VIEW OF SLOW POUCH SCHEDULE.
EAGLETON

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 527

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02220 181820Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

061812

P 181730Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

SECRET ALGIERS 2220

EXDIS

REF: (A) STATE 209184, (B) 189511

ACCORDING REF (B), FULL TEXT OF DRAFT JOINT US-USSR DOCUMENT
WAS SENT SEPTEL. OUR NEED IS FOR THIS JOINT DOCUMENT.
GP-3
EAGLETON

69 DEC 18 PM 10:37

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 396

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02198 161132Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 161040Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4546
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T ALGIERS 2198

EXDIS

REF: STATE 207826

SUBJ: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPERS OF OCTOBER 28

IN ALGIERS WE PROPOSE TO TRANSMIT COPY OF US-USSR
WORKING PAPER TO FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA THROUGH
CHIEF OF WEST EUROPE-NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION IN FONMIN
MEDJAD. IF THIS TEXT IS TO REACH BOUTEFLIKA BEFORE ARAB
SUMMIT IN RABAT, WE MUST HAVE COPY BEFORE OUR NEXT
WEEKLY CLASSIFIED POUCH WHICH WOULD NOT ARRIVE HERE UNTIL
DECEMBER 24. IF TEXT IS NOT TOO LONG WE SUGGEST THAT
DEPARTMENT OR PARIS CABLE US A FRENCH TRANSLATION. IF THIS
IS NOT FEASIBLE, WE WOULD IN ANY CASE APPRECIATE RECEIVING
THROUGH POUCH ENGLISH AND FRENCH AS WELL AS ARAB VERSION
OF PAPERS.
EAGLETON

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69 DEC 16 AM 9:32

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SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 172

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01893 191148Z

52

ACTION SS: 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

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R 191105Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4450

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1893

EXDIS

REF: STATE 176130.

1. FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA HAS RETURNED TO ALGIERS BUT APPARENTLY HAS NOT AS YET BRIEFED HIS SUBORDINATES ON MEETING WITH SECRETARY. BOUSSELHAM, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL AND ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION CHIEF DESIGNATE, AND BOUKJADUI, HEAD OF FONOFF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, SAID LAST EVENING THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE OF DETAILS OF CONVERSATION. I INFORMED BOUSSELHAM HOWEVER THAT AT BOUTEFLIKA'S SUGGESTION CHARLES BRAY HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY DEPARTMENT AS INDIVIDUAL WHOM ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION MIGHT LOOK TO FOR DIRECT AND SYSTEMATIC CONTACT. I INQUIRED WHETHER ANYBODY HAD BEEN SO DESIGNATED IN FONOFF. BOUSSELHAM SAID THAT SUCH DESIGNATION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO AWAIT REORGANIZATION OF FONOFF WHICH EXPECTED TO RESULT FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE NEXT WEEK. COMM: PROBLEM OF EFFECTIVE CONTACT WITH FONOFF HAS BEEN NO MORE DIFFICULT THAN FOR MOST OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. THERE HAS BEEN SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL IN FONOFF LATELY AND AMERICAN AFFAIRS OFFICER HAS JUST BEEN ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE (HIS SUCCESSOR HAS NOT AS YET BEEN REVEALED). WITHIN PAST WEEK HOWEVER WE HAVE ESTABLISHED WHAT SEEMS TO BE EFFECTIVE CONTACT WITH FONOFF ECONOMIC BUREAU. BOUSSELHAM, AS MY POTENTIAL COUNTERPART IN WASHINGTON, IS TAKING INCREASED INTEREST IN US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS AND IS USEFUL CHANNEL FOR BUSINESS NORMALLY HANDLED ON POLITICAL SIDE OF FONOFF. ABERKANE IN BOUTEFLIKA'S OFFICE CONTINUES TO BE HELPFUL ON VARIETY OF MATTERS. NEVERTHELESS, IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO HAVE INDIVIDUAL DESIGNATED AS COUNTERPART OF BRAY AND WE SHALL FOLLOW UP AS SOON AS NEW DESIGNATIONS ARE

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PAGE 02 ALGER 01893 191148Z

KNOWN IN FONOFF.

2. BOUSSELHAM HOSTED FAREWELL DINNER FOR ME OCT. 18, TO WHICH HE INVITED EAGLETON, LOWRIE, EMBOFFS, ABERKANE, BOUKUADJI, AND WIVES. IT WAS HELPFUL TO HAVE LOWRIE PRESENT TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE ALGERIANS THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO CONSIDER RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US, AT LEAST AT CHARGE LEVEL. BOUSSELHAM SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITHIN FONOFF BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT MATTER WOULD BE RESOLVED POSITIVELY WITHIN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. I WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED WHEN HE SPOKE OF RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN US-MARITANIAN RELATIONS. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS SO AND INQUIRED IF THIS MIGHT NOT FACILITATE US-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RAPPROCHEMENT. BOUSSELHAM LISTENED POLITELY.

3. BOUKUADJI TOLD US, AS HAD BOUSSELHAM BEFORE, THAT ALGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE UP FOR SEARCHING REVIEW DURING CONFERENCE OF OCT 20-25. PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAD ALREADY LET IT BE KNOWN, HOWEVER,

THAT HE WANTED ALGERIA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND CONSIDERATIONS TO BE GIVEN HIGHEST PRIORITY IN SETTING POLICY LINES. BOUKUADJI ADDED THIS SHOULD BRING ABOUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH U.S. WE POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE NOT TAKING ANY INITIATIVES TOWARDS RESUMPTION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE WOULD SOON BE CONFRONTED WITH NEED TO MAKE SEVERAL KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS IN ECONOMIC FIELD. LACK OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED DEPARTMENT'S LEVERAGE TO PRESS FOR KIND OF DECISIONS WHICH GOA WOULD LIKE TO SEE. BOUKUADJI REPLIED GOA COULD NOT IGNORE MIDDLE EAST AND VERY STRONG FEELINGS WHICH ALGERIANS AS ARABS HAD ON THIS ISSUE. THEN, WITHOUT SAYING PRECISELY HOW, HE INSISTED FUTURE WOULD SEE FURTHER IMPROVEMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND ALGERIA.

4. BOUSSELHAM HAS NOT AS YET FIXED DATE FOR ETA WASHINGTON, SAYING MATTER WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH HIS MINISTER. HE GIVES NO INDICATION HOWEVER OF EARLY DEPARTURE. THERE STILL PERSISTS RUMOR THAT GOA WAS STARTLED BY ARTICLE IN AMERICAN PETROLEUM JOURNAL EXPRESSING EXPECTATION OF EARLY

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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01893 191148Z

RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS (WE HAVE NOT SEEN ARTICLE). GOA IS THEREFORE DELAYING BOUSSELHAM'S DEPARTURE, RUMOR CONTINUES, SO AS NOT TO APPEAR OVERLY ZEALOUS.

5. IF BOUSSELHAM'S MISSION IS DELAYED, WE ARE NOT OVERLY CONCERNED. HE GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF GOING AND HE HAS BECOME MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN HIS PRIMARY CONCERNS, WHICH HE APPRECIATES ARE IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BRIEF HIM AND HIS STAFF, WHOM HE HAS NOT AS YET REVEALED. IN HIS PRESENTLY FRIENDLY FRAME OF MIND, SUCH BRIEFING IS EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH. THIS CONFERENCE OF NEXT WEEK, ALONG WITH MANY PERSONNEL SHIFTS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IT, PREOCCUPIES MANY GOA OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. ONCE DUST SETTLES AFTER CONFERENCE, WE MAY HAVE BETTER IDEA OF LOGICAL NEXT STEPS TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS, WHICH WERE GIVEN BIG SHOT IN ARM BY SECRETARY-BOUDEFLIKA. TALK. WE TOO ARE GRATIFIED BY IMPROVED TONE IN THOSE RELATIONS. GP-3.
HOFFACKER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 609

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01878 161800Z

54
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 W

084951

R 161705Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4442

SI EL CIR EIT ALGIERS 1878

EXDIS

REF: STATE 162542

1. COMMANDANT SLIMANE HOFFMANN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA, VOLUNTEERED TO ME THIS MORNING AN EXPRESSION OF BOUMEDIENE'S PLEASURE OVER RECEPTION GIVEN ZEGHAR IN STATES. HOFFMANN WENT ON TO SAY THAT BOUMEDIENE IS NOW BETTER INFORMED REGARDING BASIC FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN TWO PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENT, A SECTOR WHERE HE HAS SOMETIMES RECEIVED INCOMPLETE OR INACCURATE INFORMATION. HOFFMANN AS MUCH AS SAID THAT FOMMIN BOUTEFLIKA IS TO BLAME FOR SUCH MIXED COUNSEL. (JUDGING FROM BOUTEFLIKA'S RELATIVE RESTRAINT IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY, BOUMEDIENE MAY WELL HAVE INSTRUCTED HIS FOMMIN TO ACT IN MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH U.S. AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, BOUTEFLIKA CAN BE QUITE IRASCIBLE. FRENCH ARE STILL SMARTING OVER UNCALLED-FOR TONGUE-LASHING BOUTEFLIKA GAVE FRENCH FOMMIN SCHUMANN EARLY THIS MONTH.)

2. HOFFMANN, LIKE ZEGHAR, PURSUES PERSONAL PROJECTS, ALONG WITH GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVES. WHILE THERE MAY BE A MINGLING OF THE TWO, WE STILL REGARD HOFFMANN AND ZEGHAR AS BASICALLY INCLINED TOWARD CLOSER COLLABORATION WITH US IN AT LEAST ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS. THEIR INTIMACY WITH BOUMEDIENE REMAINS AN ASSET FROM WHICH THIS MISSION BENEFITS, AND ALTHOUGH THE CHANNEL IS UNORTHODOX, IT REMAINS VALUABLE ONE WHICH MERITS CONTINUED BUT SELECTIVE CULTIVATION. WE CONTINUE NATURALLY TO AVOID "COMPETING" WITH TRADITIONAL CHANNEL WITH FONOFF. MORE OVER, BOUMEDIENE HIMSELF OBVIOUSLY WELCOMES MAINTENANCE OF MORE THAN ONE CHANNEL FOR HIS PURPOSES AND IS CLEARLY THE INITIATOR IN THIS SITUATION.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01878 161800Z

3. I TOOK OCCASION TO INDICATE TO HOFFMANN THAT WHILE WE DID NOT HAVE DETAILS OF CONVERSATION WHICH BOUTEFLIKA HAD WITH SECRETARY LAST WEEK, WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT AMBIANCE OF THAT CONVERSATION PARALLELED THOSE WHICH ZEGHAR HAD EXPERIENCED-I.E. FRANK AND FRIENDLY EXPLORATION OF MATTERS TOUCHING ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND REAFFIRMATION ON BOTH SIDES OF NEED TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THOSE RELATIONS. GP-3.
HOFFACKER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 514

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01815 081227Z

45
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 W

032489

R 081025Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4405

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1815

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

REFS: ALGIERS 1711 AND STATE 162542

1. DINED LAST EVENING WITH ZEGHAR AT HIS INVITATION. SARBERS WERE ALSO PRESENT. ZEGHAR HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TEXAS-OKLAHOMA TOUR WHICH LEFT HIM EVEN MORE PRO-AMERICAN THAN USUAL. HIS MEETING WITH FORMER GOVERNOR CONNALLY, WHO IS EXPECTED VISIT ALGERIA SOON, AND WITH NASA PERSONALITIES WERE HIGHLIGHTS OF TOUR. AS WERE CONVERSATIONS WITH FRANK BORMAN AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES WHO PRESENTED HIM KEYS TO EL PASO AND OTHER CITIES IN SOUTHWEST. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO VISIT HERE OF BORMAN AND ROBERT ANDERSON. APPARENTLY HE WAS PRESENTED AT NASA AND ELSEWHERE AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. ZEGHAR WAS GRATEFULLY IMPRESSED WITH TIME AND ATTENTION GIVEN HIM BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM AND WAS PLEASED WITH FRANK GIVE-AND-TAKE DURING THAT SESSION. ZEGHAR SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH BOUMEDIENE ABOUT SUGGESTION THAT RELATIONS BE RAISED TO CHARGE LEVEL. SINCE ZEGHAR SEEMED FUZZY ON SOME OF THE SUBTLETIES OF SUCH CHANGE, I TOLD HIM WHAT IT WOULD REQUIRE ON GOA SIDE AND I HOPE THEREFORE THAT HE NOW UNDERSTANDS BETTER THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCH A MODIFICATION AND MERELY SENDING BOUSSELHAM AS HEAD OF BEEFED UP ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION. IN ANY EVENT, HE APPRECIATES THAT ELEVATION TO CHARGE WILL REQUIRE CHANGE OF FLAG. HE SAYS HE WILL SEE BOUMEDIENE SOON TO PURSUE MATTER AGAIN.

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01815 081227Z

3. ZEGHAR TAKES CREDIT FOR DELAYING BOUSSELHAM'S DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON UNTIL HE COULD REPORT HIS FINDINGS TO BOUMEDIENE. I TOOK OCCASION TO SUGGEST THAT NO MATTER UNDER WHAT FLAG OR WITH WHAT RANK BOUSSELHAM PROCEEDS TO WASHINGTON, HE SHOULD GO WITH AT LEAST ONE GOOD ECONOMIST WHO COULD TALK WITH BANKERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS WHO ARE QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS THOSE ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN WHICH THERE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION. I ALSO ACQUAINTED ZEGHAR WITH POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING BOUSSELHAM'S RANK TO MINISTER, BUT OBSERVED THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR SOME POTENTIAL U.S. INVESTORS OR FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS WHO MAY REMAIN UNCOMFORTABLE WITHOUT STARS AND STRIPES.

4. ZEGHAR ALSO CLAIMS CREDIT FOR INFLUENCING SIGNATURE NOW OF EL PASO AGREEMENT (ALGIERS 1802), SAYING THAT MINISTER OF ENERGY ABDESSELAM HAD HESITATED UNTIL BOUMEDIENE INSISTED THAT THE DEAL BE ACCELERATED.

5. SOME OF ABOVE MAY BE PARTLY ZEGHAR BRAVADO AND WHEELING DEALING, BUT SARBER, WITH WHOM I SPOKE SEPARATELY LATER, IS SATISFIED, AS AM I, THAT BOUMEDIENE PROBABLY LISTENS TO ZEGHAR INTENTLY IN SUCH MATTERS BEFORE COMING TO DECISIONS. IN ANY EVENT, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT NEWSOM SUGGESTION OF CHARGE LEVEL REPRESENTATION HAS BEEN PLANTED AT HIGHEST LEVEL. WE MUST NOW GIVE IT REASONABLE TIME TO GERMINATE. I EXPECT TO SEE ZEGHAR BEFORE MY DEPARTURE ON OCTOBER 21, HOPEFULLY WITH EAGLETON, WHO DUE HERE OCTOBER 18-20.

6. ANOTHER FACTOR OF POSSIBLE PERTINENCE IS CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE HERE BEGINNING OCTOBER 20, WHEN RESHUFFLE OF FONOFF AND FOREIGN SERVICE ARE EXPECTED. (SARBER SAYS THAT SONATRACH AND MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY MAY ALSO BE AFFECTED SOON BY HIGH GOVERNMENT SHIFTS.) THERE IS RENEWED SPECULATION THAT FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA MAY BE MOVED, BUT SUCH PREDICTIONS HAVE IN PAST PROVEN TO BE WISHFUL THINKING. LAST NIGHT I GOT EARFUL OF ANTI-BOUTEFLIKA CRITICISM FROM ZEGHAR, BUT THIS IS STANDARD LINE FROM HIM. I GATHER THAT ZEGHAR HAS NOT DISCLOSED HIS MISSION TO BOUTEFLIKA. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF BOUMEDIENE HAS BRIEFED HIS FONMIN ON THIS ZEGHAR EXCURSION INTO DIPLOMACY.

7. ZEGHAR MADE NO MENTION OF PALESTINE EXCEPT THAT HE HAD HAD GOOD EXCHANGE ON SUBJECT WITH NEWSOM. GP-1

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 086

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01711 251730Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

R 251610Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4359

S E C R E T ALGIERS 1711

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

REF: STATE 162542

1. ALTHOUGH WE, LIKE ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM, HAVE SOMETIMES HAD EXPERIENCE OF NOT KNOWING PRECISELY WHAT ZEGHAR IS LEADING UP TO, WE ARE SATISFIED REGARDING ZEGHAR'S CLOSE TIES WITH BOUMEDIENE AND HIS SYMPATHY FOR THE U.S. AND AMERICANS. HE IS, AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, A SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSMAN WITH LITTLE PATIENCE FOR SOCIALIST METHODS. HE HAS SHOWN A PERSISTENT DESIRE TO SERVE AS CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL BETWEEN GOA AND USG. PERHAPS AS A HANGOVER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD, BOUMEDIENE AND OTHER ALGERIAN LEADERS ARE PRONE TO FAVOR UNORTHODOX CHANNELS, PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE ENGAGING IN TRAIL BALLOON EXERCISE, WHICH MAY BE PRESENT CASE.

2. DESPITE THESE QUALIFICATIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS ZEGHAR INITIATIVE IS WORTH PURSUING AND CONCUR WITH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT WE FOLLOW UP IF APPROACHED AFTER ZEGHAR'S REPORT TO BOUMEDIENE.

3. WE HAVE NO DOUBT REGARDING BOUMEDIENE'S STRONG FEELINGS ON PALESTINE, BUT WE WERE UNAWARE UNTIL RECEIPT OF REFTEL THAT THERE WAS ANY THOUGHT OF GOA'S SERVING AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND OURSELVES. (IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT GOA OFFERED TO BRING US TOGETHER WITH "OTHER SIDE" IN VIET NAM.) WHEN SUBJECT OF PALESTINE ARISES HERE, WE REPLY, AS DID NEWSOM, THAT THIS FACTOR SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION OF RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE PRESENT EFFORT TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ALGIER 01711 251730Z

OBTAIN AMERICAN CONCESSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS ILLUSTRATES ONCE AGAIN NOT ONLY THE DEEP ALGERIAN COMMITMENT TO THE FATAH CAUSE, BUT ALSO THE EARNEST ALGERIAN DESIRE FOR A FACE SAVER IN THE PROCESS OF RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. WE HAVE SEEN OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE GOA'S WISHING TO CLIMB BACK OFF THE LIMB AS FAR AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED. SOME ALGERIANS ARE NOW OBVIOUSLY SEARCHING FOR A POLITICAL DEAL OR QUID PRO QUO.

4. WE ARE NOT SURPRISED AT ZEGHAR'S LESS THAN POSITIVE REACTION TO THE SUGGESTION THAT WITH MY DEPARTURE AND WITH BOUSSELHAM'S ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MIGHT BE REPRESENTED BY CHARGES, AND THAT THE PRESENT PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SWISS AND GUINEANS BE DISPENSED WITH. OUR FEELING IS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIET NAM SITUATIONS MUST PROBABLY EVOLVE SOMEWHAT FURTHER BEFORE THE ALGERIANS CAN MUSTER SUFFICIENT COURAGE TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (EVEN AT THE SUGGESTED MODEST LEVEL) WITH THE NUMBER ONE "IMPERIALISTS". ECONOMIC NECESSITY AND PRESSURES SUCH AS NEWSOM REFERRED TO IN PARA 5 MAY HOWEVER ACCELERATE THE ALGERIANS' MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THE ALGERIANS APPARENTLY HAVE NOT YET FELT SUFFICIENT ECONOMIC PRESSURE, IN CONNECTION WITH EL PASO FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES, TO OVERCOME THEIR REVOLUTIONARY INSTINCTS IN THIS RESPECT. WE DO NOT LOSE ANY OPPORTUNITIES LOCALLY TO REMIND THEM OF THE INEVITABLE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS AND OF THE NECESSITY TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE IN U.S. FOR FINANCIAL AND OTHER PURPOSES.

5. SHOULD THE ALGERIANS NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF AN EXCHANGE OF CHARGES, THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT CONSIDER A COUNTER PROPOSAL THAT BOUSSELHAM ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON (HE SPEAKS NOW OF AN ETA OF LATE OCTOBER) AS MINISTER, CHIEF OF ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION, GUINEA EMBASSY, AND THAT MY SUCCESSOR HAVE COMPARABLE RANK HERE. THIS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE EXCHANGE OF MINISTERS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND CAIRO, WOULD NOT REQUIRE RENEGOTIATION OF PROTECTION AGREEMENTS, AND WOULD GIVE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF GRADUAL PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. IT MIGHT ALSO INCREASE SOMEWHAT BOUSSELHAM'S AND MY SUCCESSOR'S ACCESSIBILITY TO APPROPRIATE HIGH OFFICIALS IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS.



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PAGE 03 ALGIER 01711 251730Z

6. WE HAVE BEEN AWARE FOR A LONG TIME OF ZEGHAR'S ANTIPATHY TOWARD BOUTEFLIKA. WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE FEELING IS MUTUAL AND THAT BOUTEFLIKA RESENTS ZEGHAR'S INTERFERING IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS. WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PROTECTING OURSELVES AND ENSURING THAT THE FONOFF IS NOT BYPASSED EXCEPT ON THE APPARENT AUTHORITY OF BOUMEDIENE. SINCE THE ALGERIANS HAVE COME TO US IN THIS INSTANCE AND SINCE ANOTHER INITIATIVE IS AWAITED FROM THEIR SIDE (THAT IS, ZEGHAR IS EXPECTED TO TRANSMIT REPLY TO ME), WE CAN CONSIDER LATER HOW WE MAY APPROPRIATELY INVOLVE THE FONOFF. SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES COME TO MIND: FAREWELL DISCUSSIONS WITH BOUSSELHAN, A TOUR D'HORIZON WITH HAMDANI IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, OR A JOINT SESSION WITH HAMDANI AND CHITOUR OF THE FONOFF.

7. ALTHOUGH WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT ACCOMMODATE THE ALGERIANS REGARDING A CHANGE OF U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE PALESTINIANS, WE ARE HEARTENED BY FRIENDLY, FRANK, AND POSITIVE MANNER IN WHICH THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY RECEIVED AND RESPONDED TO ZEGHAR. OUR WILLINGNESS TO TALK OVER ALGERIAN CONCERNS, EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE NO PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, HELPS REDUCE UNFOUNDED ALGERIAN SUSPICIONS OF OUR WANTING TO ISOLATE THEM. SUCH AN APPROACH SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE BUILDING OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WHICH HAS REGRETTABLY BEEN LACKING PREVIOUSLY AND WHICH SHOULD LAY THE BASIS FOR SOUNDER FUTURE RELATIONS. THE FACT OF RECEPTION OF AN UNOFFICIAL FRIEND OF BOUMEDIENE BY A HIGH USG OFFICIAL SHOULD IN ITSELF HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT LOCALLY.

8. DEPARTMENT IS AWARE OF PRESENCE OF MOHAMMED YAZID IN NEW YORK AT UNGA (ALGIERS 1698). HE IS BELIEVED TO BE ONE OF CHIEF GOA CONTACTS WITH FATAH AND POSSIBLY OTHER PALESTINIAN GROUPS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT YAZID'S PRESENCE IN U.S. AND ZEGHAR'S MISSION ARE CONNECTED, BUT THE TWO MEN OBVIOUSLY ARE IN TOUCH, INDIRECTLY AT LEAST, WITH THE SAME FATAH ELEMENTS. ZEGHAR INCIDENTALLY WAS PROMINENT IN ARMS PURCHASING FOR FLN IN MOROCCO AND ELSEWHERE DURING THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION. HE GREW UP IN SAME REGION WITH BOUMEDIENE (EASTERN ALGERIA), WORKED INTIMATELY WITH HIM DURING THE REVOLUTION, AND HAS REMAINED CLOSE TO HIM SINCE.
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Department of State

SUMMARY
TELEGRAM

SECRET 909

PAGE 01 ALGIER 00101 221255Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO NSA 02, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INR 07,

P 04, USIA 12, RSR 01, EUR 15, /096 W

121203

R 221155Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3749
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT

SECRET ALGIERS 101

SUBJECT: US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

REF: RABAT 320

1. DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY RABAT MAY WISH TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION FOLLOWING VIEWS OF THIS MISSION WHEN DETERMINING HOW TO DEAL WITH FRIENDLY MOROCCAN INITIATIVE REPORTED IN REFTEL.

2. WE ARE SOMEWHAT SURPRISED OVER BOUMEDIENE'S REPORTED COMMENT THAT US WAS ONLY COUNTRY HE BASICALLY WOULD TRUST SINCE HE HAS OFTEN HARBORED FOOLISH SUSPICION OF US MOTIVES IN THIS PART OF WORLD. LIKEWISE, BOUMEDIENE AND HIS SUBORDINATES KNOW THAT US WOULD RECEIVE SYMPATHETICALLY ALGERIAN PROPOSITION FOR RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITHOUT CONDITIONS. GOA HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY ADVISED OF US POSITION IN THIS REGARD AND NEED ONLY APPROACH US DIRECTLY IN THIS SENSE.

3. OVER THE PAST YEAR ALGERIANS HAVE PERMITTED INCREASINGLY DIRECT DIALOGUE ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING SUBJECT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. SOME OF LATEST EXAMPLES WERE QUIMBY VISIT (A-630) AND DIRECT POLITICAL DEMARCHE FOLLOWING BEIRUT AIRPORT INCIDENT (ALGIERS 2779 AND 2788). WE AND ALGERIANS THEREFORE RARELY OPERATE THROUGH SWISS, OUR FORMAL PROTECTORS.

4. LAST SPRING ITALIAN FORMIN FANFANI TOOK INITIATIVE WITH BOUTEFILKA WITH VIEW TO FACILITATING RESUMPTION OF US-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THIS EFFORT WAS HELPFUL, BUT BECAME SOMEWHAT LESS SO AS ITALIANS TENDED TO INSERT ASPECTS INTO INTER-

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MEDIATION WHICH TENDED TO CONFUSE ISSUE. WE HAVE BEEN PLEASED THEREFORE TO BE GRADUALLY MOVING TOWARD SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WHICH GERMANS, WHO ARE ALSO PROTECTED BY SWISS, HAVE ENJOYED FOR SOME TIME: A DE FACTO POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS VIRTUALLY NORMAL AND WHICH LACKS ONLY AN AMBASSADOR AND THE FORMAL ASPECTS OF DIPLOMATIC RECGNITION.

5. WHILE THE KING'S INITIATIVE WITH BOUMEDIENE WAS PROBABLY HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WAS MADE IN WHAT APPEARS FROM HERE TO HAVE BEEN A WARM AND FRIENDLY ALLIANCE, WE QUESTION THE UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING ANOTHER CHANNEL WHEN THE DIRECT ALGIERS-WASHINGTON CHANNEL SEEMS TO SERVE PRESENT PURPOSES. GP-3 HOFFACKER

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET - 1536

PAGE 01 STATE 087745

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

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APPROVED BY IO:WBBUFFUM
EB:TOENDERS (SUBS)
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS FLASH

SECRET STATE 087745

EXDIS, TOSEC 42

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EGEN, UNGA

SUBJECT: GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION: SPECIAL MEASURES

REF: SECTO 18
FOR SECRETARY FROM BUFFUM AND ENDERS

1. WE ARE UNABLE TO PROCEED WITH OUR INITIATIVE IN THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY BECAUSE OF CONTINUED OPPOSITION FROM
SECRETARY SHULTZ WHO IS WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR IDA REPLENISHMENT.

2. IN MEANTIME NEGOTIATING EFFORTS CONTINUING IN NEW YORK
AND PAKISTANIS HAVE MODIFIED THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH
INCLUDES NOT ONLY BROADLY GAUGED REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO
MOST DISADVANTAGED LDCS BUT ALSO ESTABLISHMENT OF A
SPECIAL FUND.

3. USUN IS SENDING YOU DIRECTLY FULL TEXT OF LATEST PAK
PROPOSAL TOGETHER WITH AMBASSADOR SCALI'S RECOMMENDATION
ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN LIGHT OF OUR INABILITY TO
PRESENT INITIATIVE OF OUR OWN.

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4. IT APPEARS GA WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST TWO MORE DAYS. WE
WILL FOCUS ATTENTION OF INTERESTED OFFICES AND AGENCIES ON
USUN'S RECOMMENDATION EARLY TOMORROW AND SEND YOU
CONSIDERED REACTION DURING THE DAY. RUSH

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. A small olive branch is held in the eagle's right talon, and a bundle of arrows is in its left.

SECRET 403

10
ORIGIN SS-30

DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE:MHD
APPROVED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
S/S - SRGAMMON
AF: MR. EASUM

R 130000Z FEB 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS

010203

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH ALGERIAN MINISTER
ABDESSELAM

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY HOSTED LUNCHEON FOR ALGERIAN MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND ENERGY, BELAID ABDESSELAM, FEBRUARY 8 AT WHICH BOUSSELHAM, GHOZALI, ZAGHAR AND GUELLAL ALSO PRESENT ON ALGERIAN SIDE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE EASUM ALSO ATTENDED LUNCHEON AS DID VICE PRESIDENT CHARLES E. HOUSTON OF EXIM BANK, KATZ OF EB, AND BLAKE (AF/N).
2. DURING PRIVATE MEETING BEFORE LUNCHEON DEPUTY SECRETARY RECALLED DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST SINCE MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER, DESCRIBING THEM AS ENCOURAGING. ABDESSELAM AGREED, EXPRESSING PARTICULAR GRATIFICATION FOR SECRETARY'S SUCCESS IN EFFECTING AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT. ABDESSELAM EXPRESSED CONCERN, HOWEVER, OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN BRINGING PALESTINIANS INTO WIDER MIDDLE EAST PICTURE EITHER AT GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE AND SIMILAR LACK OF PROGRESS ON ISSUE OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT. MINISTER THEN ALLUDED TO FEBRUARY 14 OPEC MEETING IN TRIPOLI AT WHICH HE SAID EMBARGO AGAINST U.S.

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WOULD BE DISCUSSED. ACCORDING TO ABDESSELAM BOTH LIBYA AND KUWAIT OPPOSED LIFTING OF EMBARGO.

3. DEPUTY SECRETARY DESCRIBED CONTINUATION OF EMBARGO AS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND SITUATION AS ONE THAT COULD DELAY PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS OF SECRETARY. ARABS HAD TO BEAR IN MIND, DEPUTY SECRETARY WENT ON, NEED TO TACKLE EACH PROBLEM IN ORDERLY FASHION: CEASE FIRE, DISENGAGEMENT OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, DISENGAGEMENT ON SYRIAN FRONT, JERUSALEM AND PALESTINIANS. ABDESSELAM REPLIED THAT AT DECEMBER MEETING ALGERIA HAD TRIED TO OBTAIN SOME RELAXATION OF EMBARGO BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE JUST AT THAT MOMENT THE MASSIVE U.S. ARMS AID PROGRAM FOR ISRAEL BECAME KNOWN AND ALGERIA HAD TO FOLLOW THE ARAB CONSENSUS. DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IT IS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THOSE WHO SAY "NO" USUALLY CARRY MORE WEIGHT IN COLLECTIVE DISCUSSIONS THAN THOSE WHO SAY "YES."

4. ABDESSELAM AGREED AND THEN WENT ON TO STATE THAT BOUMEDIENE IS NOT OPPOSED TO LIFTING THE EMBARGO BUT REMAINS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER PALESTINIANS AND SYRIA. BOUMEDIENE HAS IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT IS GETTING GREATER ATTENTION FROM U.S. THAN EITHER SYRIA OR PALESTINIANS. ALGERIA DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF DROPPING SMALLER STATES FOR THE LARGER. ABDESSELAM THEN SAID ALGERIA HAS BEEN THINKING OF PROPOSING A TEMPORARY LIFTING OF EMBARGO BUT IT DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THIS POSSIBILITY PUBLICLY AND WOULD PREFER TO BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY SUCH PROPOSAL IN TERMS OF EVOLVING EVENTS IN MIDDLE EAST.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE FOUND THE IDEA OF TEMPORARY LIFTING OF EMBARGO "INTERESTING." HE UNDERSTOOD ALGERIAN CONCERNS OVER RELATIVE DEGREE OF ATTENTION EGYPT WAS RECEIVING BUT NOTED EGYPT IS NOT ONLY THE LARGEST AND STRONGEST OF THE ARAB STATES BUT ALSO, GIVEN STABILITY OF SADAT, HAS A GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION. MOST NATURAL THING IN NEGOTIATION IS TO TAKE ON THE EASIER PROBLEMS FIRST SO THAT WHEN THE TOUGH ONES ARE REACHED IT WILL BE HARDER FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT ON SO MUCH TO BACK AWAY FROM WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE. DEPUTY SECRETARY CITED HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH RUSSIANS ON BERLIN QUESTION AS EXAMPLE OF WHAT HE MEANT.

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
PAGE 03 STATE 029047

ABDESSELAM COMMENTED THAT SYRIANS REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER LACK OF PROGRESS IN THEIR AREA. RECENT HIGH LEVEL ISRAELI STATEMENTS INDICATING TOTAL UNWILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM GOLAN HEIGHTS HAVE DISTURBED SYRIANS EVEN MORE. SYRIANS WANT TO KNOW WHAT EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE. POINT USG MUST BEAR IN MIND IS THAT NO SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO SURVIVE ANY AGREEMENT SACRIFICING SLIGHTEST PIECE OF TERRITORY.

6. DURING LUNCHEON, CONVERSATION WAS GENERAL. ABDESSELAM EXPRESSED HIMSELF WITH SOME FEELING ON PRESENT STATUS OF ALGERIAN LABORERS IN FRANCE AND RAISED POSSIBILITY OF

THEIR REPATRIATION BECAUSE OF FRENCH MISTREATMENT. MINISTER ALSO SPOKE BITTERLY ON FRENCH POLICY AFFECTING ADVERSELY EXPORT OF ALGERIAN WINES TO FRANCE. IN CONNECTION WITH LATTER HE WAS ADAMANT ABOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO LOWER THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL WHICH HE SAID WOULD MEET WITH STRONG ALGERIAN OPPOSITION. FORMERLY ALGERIA COULD DEPEND ON EXPORT OF WINES AND REMITTANCES FROM ITS WORKERS FOR NEEDED FOREIGN EXCHANGE. NOW THAT BOTH OF THESE ARE THREATENED, PETROLEUM IS THE ONLY MONEY EARNER ALGERIA HAS LEFT AND IT MEANS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF IT. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 216996

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ORIGIN SS-30

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DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE:BJR
APPROVED BY AF:CGROSS
S/S - MR. MILLER

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TO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 216996

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (DAVID D. NEWSOM)
SUBJ: TRAVEL OF ASST SECRETARY NEWSOM
REF: ALGIERS 2327
FOR EAGLETON

REGRET TIGHT SCHEDULE PRECLUDES POSSIBLE MEETING BY YOU
WITH SECRETARY OR NEWSOM IN RABAT. LATTER LOOKS FORWARD
TO MEETING YOU IN ALGIERS NOVEMBER 13. KISSINGER

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Department of State

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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4/3/72 FXT. 2045R
APPROVED BY P:AMBRASSADOR PORTER
S/S - MR. MILLER
AF:DDNEWSOM
NEA (SUBSTANCE) MR. SISCO
INR (SUBSTANCE) MR. KLINE

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TO USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY TUNIS
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SECRET STATE 062910

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LY

SUBJECT: LIBYA AIR SPACE PROBLEM

1. IN CONSIDERING STEPS USG MIGHT APPROPRIATELY TAKE FOLLOWING ATTEMPTED DOWNING OF UNARMED US MILITARY AIRCRAFT BY LARG ON MARCH 21, WE HAVE CONCLUDED RENEWED APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE TO LIBYAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PURPOSE OF APPROACH WOULD BE TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT LARG FULLY UNDERSTANDS DISTINCTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN "RESTRICTED AREA", WHICH THEY HAVE DEFINED AS 100 NAUTICAL MILES FROM TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND "DANGER AREA". DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE CONCEPTS IS SET FORTH STATE 210803 WHICH IS BEING REL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PEATED TO YOU. NEW APPROACH BY EMBASSY TRIPOLI WOULD BE IN FORM OF NOTE REITERATING POINTS ALREADY MADE ORALLY BY EMBASSY BUT PERHAPS NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD.

2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THERE COULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IF YOUR RESPECTIVE HOST GOVERNMENTS WERE ALSO ACQUAINTED WITH LEGAL BASIS FOR US PROTEST AGAINST LARG ACTION OF MARCH 21. ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OVERRIDING OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD BRIEF APPROPRIATE ELEMENT OF HOST GOVERNMENT OF US POSITION, DRAWING ON STATE 210803. IF QUERIED RE PURPOSE AND TIMING OF YOUR BRIEFING, WHICH WE ASSUME WOULD BE AT MIDDLE LEVEL, YOU SHOULD INDICATE IT BASED ON OUR DESIRE ACQUAINT GOVERNMENTS IN AREA OF INCIDENT WITH US POSITION WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS SOUND BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE. ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01

DRAFTED BY AF: DDNEWSOM:CHG

3/31/73: EXT 22530

APPROVED BY AF: MR NEWSOM

S/S -O:KAKURZE

73 APR 1 AM 10:48
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TO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USDEL SAN CLEMENTE IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 060001

EXDIS TOSEC 35

E.O. 11652: N.A.

TAGS: PFOR, AG

SUBJECT: NEWSOM VISIT ALGIERS

REF: ALGIERS 766, 779 (NOTAL)

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE PLANS FOR ALGIERS VISIT FOR
EAGLETON BACKGROUND IN DISCUSSIONS WITH BOUSSALEM:

2. PUBLICITY: DOUBT VISIT CAN BE MADE WITHOUT ATTENTION
OR THAT WE SHOULD TRY. IF ALGERIANS AGREE, THEREFORE
WE WOULD NOT PLAN FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT -- BUT WOULD
PLAN MERELY STATE, ON BASIS INQUIRIES, NEWSOM MAKING
ROUTINE VISIT OUR POSTS IN MAGHREB (RABAT AND TUNIS
WILL RECEIVE SEPTTEL REGARDING POSSIBLE VISITS THESE
POSTS.) VISIT OTHER MAGHREB POSTS HOPEFULLY WILL DIFFUSE
ATTENTION TO ALGIERS VISIT AND SPECULATION ON PURPOSE
THEREOF. WE WOULD PLAN ANSWER ANY QUESTION REGARDING
RESUMPTION RELATIONS BY STATING WE WOULD ALWAYS WELCOME
THIS BUT THIS NOT PURPOSE OF TRIP. (IF SUDAN PARALLEL)

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REFERRED TO AGAIN, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE DID NOT
LEAK REFERENCE TO RELATIONS OR PRESS POINT THAT VISIT.)

3. RESUMPTION RELATIONS: BELIEVE ZEGHAR'S LAST WORD
(ALGIERS 779) SUFFICIENT INDICATION ALGERIAN INTENTIONS
AND WE SHOULD NOT PRESS MATTER FURTHER. WE DO NOT WISH
RISK ALGERIAN REACTION TO WHAT THEY MAY BELIEVE TO
BE UNDUE PRESSURES.

4. INVITATION: GHOZALI AND BOUSSALEM REPEATED INVITATION
TO NEWSOM AT MEETING MARCH 30. NEWSOM INDICATED HE WOULD
ACCEPT.

5. PROGRAM: WILL LEAVE PROGRAM TO USINT AND ALGERIANS
BUT NEWSOM WOULD LIKE INDICATION GENERAL OUTLINE BEFORE
FINAL SCHEDULE FIXED.

6. NEWSOM WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. NEWSOM AND PROBABLY
ONE OFFICER FROM AF. ITINERARY FOLLOWING BY SEPTFL.

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

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22670 3-9-73
APPROVED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER
AF - MR. NEWSOM
AF/N - MR. BLAKE
NEA - MR. SISCO
INR/RNA - MR. JONES
S/CCT - AMB. MEYER
L - MR. FELDMAN
WHITE HOUSE - COL. KENNEDY
S/SO - MR. M. EALUM

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TO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T STATE 044811

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: ADS, DECLAS. DEC. 31, 1981

TAGS: PINS, XF

SUBJECT: ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUPPORT FOR BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION

REF: STATE 42486

1. AS FOLLOW-UP TO APPROACH INSTRUCTION REFTEL, YOU SHOULD STATE USG SPECIFICALLY BELIEVES ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO STOP ANY TRANSFER OF FUNDS, EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, NOW GOING TO BLACK SEPTEMBER AND OTHER RADICAL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS OR TO ENTITIES THAT SERVE AS CONDUITS TO SUCH ORGANIZATIONS. WE ALSO THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS DENY USE OF THEIR PASSPORTS TO TERRORISTS. OBVIOUSLY, ABILITY OF TERRORISTS TO TRAVEL ON REGULAR OR OFFICIAL ARAB GOVERNMENT PASSPORTS MAKES THEIR JOB MUCH EASIER; WHEN PASSPORTS ARE GIVEN TO KNOWN TERRORISTS, GOVERNMENTS BECOME ACCOMPLICE TO THEIR DEEDS. MORE SERIOUS YET IS PRACTICE OF ALLOWING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO USE DIPLOMATIC POUCHES. YOU SHOULD SAY USG WILL VIEW ARAB GOVERNMENT ACTIONS IN THESE REGARDS AS GAUGE OF THEIR SERIOUSNESS IN PREVENTING TERRORISM AND MEASURE OF THEIR WILLINGNESS ABIDE BY ESTABLISHED AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE AND BEHAVIOR - FACTORS WHICH WILL INEVITABLY INFLUENCE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

2. WHERE PUBLIC STATEMENT CONDEMNING MURDER OF US OFFICIALS IN KHARTOUM HAS NOT YET BEEN ISSUED, YOU SHOULD PRESS FOR ONE. AT MINIMUM WE WOULD EXPECT THAT EVEN RADICAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING OR SAYING ANYTHING WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO CONDONE BLACK SEPTEMBER ACTION IN KHARTOUM.

3. WE ALSO URGE FULL COOPERATION RE DIALOGUE BETWEEN
USG AND ARAB GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES IN ICAO AND ALL
RELEVANT UN FORUMS.

4. FYI FOR ALGIERS AND TRIOLI: WE APPRECIATE FOREGOING

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DEMARCHÉ WILL BE RECEIVED COLDLY BY GOA AND LARG WHOSE SUPPORT OF PLO IS WELL ESTABLISHED. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THOSE GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FULLY AWARE OF SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONS. END FYI.

5. FYI. USG PREPARED TO CONSIDER EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON TERRORIST PLANS AND ACTIVITIES BOTH BI-LATERALLY AND THROUGH INTERPOL WITH SELECTED ARAB GOVERNMENTS ON AN AD HOC BASIS. WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSIES' RECOMMENDATIONS THIS REGARD. END FYI. ROGERS

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CONFIDENTIAL 132

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APPROVED BY: AF/WWITMAN II
AF/W - MR HORAN
AF/N - MR BLAKE
AF/C - MR COHEN
S/S - MR CURRAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BANGUI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 110681

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REF: STATE 108939

FRENCH TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ORAL DELIVERY WILL

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12 JUN 21 AM 8:26

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 STATE 110681

BE SENT ASAP.

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 103578

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF:AF/N:JJBLAKE:DEH
6/10/72
APPROVED BY AF:DDNEWSOM
S/S - MR. MILLER
J:UAJOHNSON (DRAFT)
E/TT:BREIN

O 101815Z JUN 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS NIACT IMMEDIATE

078348

S E C R E T STATE 103578

EXDIS

REFERENCE: ALGIERS 1035

SUBJECT: WESTERN HIGHJACKING

1. UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON CALLED IN BOUSSELHAM THIS MORNING. MEETING WHICH LASTED ABOUT ONE HOUR WAS A STAND-OFF. UNDER SECRETARY DISCUSSED INCREASED PUBLIC AND HIGHEST LEVEL USG CONCERN OVER HIGHJACKINGS OF WHICH WESTERN AIRLINES CASE ONLY MOST RECENT EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT HAS LOW KEYED BILATERAL ASPECTS OF CASE IN INTEREST OF U.S. ALGERIAN RELATIONS AND HAD NOT INSPIRED EITHER PRESS CAMPAIGN OR PILOTS' THREAT OF BOYCOTT. HOWEVER, IT HAD BEGUN AND WOULD NOW ACCELERATE CONSULTATIONS IN ICAD AND UN FORUMS WITH OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS (INCLUDING GOA) ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT HIGHJACKINGS IN FUTURE. USG FELT ANSWER TO PROBLEM WAS ADHERENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION BY GOVERNMENTS TO TOKYO AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS. IT WAS FAILURE OF GOA PROMPTLY TO ACT ON BASIS OF PRINCIPLES IN THESE CONVENTIONS THAT GAVE RISE TO PRESENT SITUATION. (SUBSEQUENTLY IN CONSULTATION BOUSSELHAM GAVE PERSONAL OPINION GOA WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ADHERE TO THOSE CONVENTIONS.) UNDER SECRETARY ALSO UNDERSTOOD CONCERN OF PILOTS. THIS

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ALSO INCREASINGLY CONCERN OF PASSENGERS.

2. UNDER SECRETARY ASKED GOA RETURN WESTERN AIRLINES MONEY AND PROSECUTE HIGHJACKERS OR RETURN THEM TO U.S. FOR PROSECUTION.

3. HE POINTED OUT FAILURE OF GOA TO ACT PROMPTLY AND DECISIVELY WAS CONTRIBUTING TO ALREADY EXISTING ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WOULD BE HIGHJACKERS FELT THEY WOULD BE TREATED LENIENTLY IN ALGERIA. THIS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO WESTERN AIRLINES CASE AND CONTINUATION OF PRESENT SITUATION COULD ONLY ENCOURAGE FURTHER HIGHJACKINGS TO ALGERIA WHICH NOT IN ANYONES INTEREST.

4. PROPOSAL OF GOA THAT USG ASK IT NOT RECEIVE HIGHJACKED AIRCRAFT IN FUTURE WAS NOT PRACTICAL SINCE IT ABSOLVED GOA OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLUTION TO PROBLEM. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO REPEAT NO WAY HIGHJACKER COULD BE PREVENTED FROM FORCING PLANE TO LAND.

5. BOUSSELHAM IN REPLY STATED GOA HAD NOT SOUGHT THE PROBLEM. IT HAD TREATED CREW OF PLANE COURTEOUSLY AND HAD RELEASED PLANE. HIGHJACKERS WERE PLACED IN CUSTODY AND SO WERE FUNDS. GOA HAS BEEN LOOKING TOWARD SOLUTION. PRESS CAMPAIGN AND PILOTS' THREATS HAD CHANGED ATMOSPHERE. HE STATED FRANKLY HE NOW SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF EARLY SOLUTION PROBLEM AND ASKED THAT USG NOT ASK FOR TOO MUCH ALL AT ONCE OR QTE THE IMPOSSIBLE. UNQTE ROGERS

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INFO OCT-01 SSD=00 NSCE=00 /026 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T STATE 103560

EXDIS

REFERENCE: ALGIERS 1035

SUBJECT: WESTERN HIJACKING

FOR EAGLETON FROM NEWSOM

1. REFTEL WAS MOST HELPFUL IN CONVEYING SENSE ALGERIAN
VIEW HIJACKING PROBLEM. WE REALIZE YOU HAVE CONVEYED
WIDELY AND EFFECTIVELY U.S. VIEW. HEART OF PROBLEM,
HOWEVER, STEMS FROM DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSING U.S. AND
ALGERIAN VIEWS OF PRIORITIES IN CURRENT PROBLEM. THIS
MESSAGE BASED ON THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE OF FURTHER USE FOR YOU
TO CONVEY TO ZEGHAR AND HAMDANI AS COMING PERSONALLY FROM
ME PICTURE AS SEEN FROM WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING POINTS MAY
BE USED IN YOUR DISCRETION.

2. OVERRIDING CONCERN IN WASHINGTON IS WITH GROWING PROBLEM OF HOW TO STOP HIJACKING. ALL OTHER ISSUES - INCLUDING U.S.-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS - TAKE SECOND PLACE. WHILE THERE IS SOME UNDERSTANDING OF DELAY IN ACTION CAUSED BY ALGERIAN SENSITIVITIES AND CONFLICT BETWEEN REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE AND OTHER ALGERIAN INTERESTS, MOST IN WASHINGTON FIND IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT RESPONSIBLE NATION WOULD NOT

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IMMEDIATELY RETURN STOLEN MONEY AND IN OWN INTERESTS TAKE PROMPT ACTION EITHER PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE HIJACKER. GOA SHOULD NOTE 28 INNOCENT TRAVELERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN INTERNATIONAL HIJACKINGS THIS YEAR.

• NO DESIRE EXISTS SINGLE OUT ALGERIA. WESTERN HIJACKING HOWEVER CAME AT TIME WHEN CONCERN AT EXTREMELY HIGH POINTS RESULT 16 INCIDENTS SO FAR THIS YEAR (AS AGAINST TOTAL OF 19 FOR ALL OF LAST YEAR) AND GROWING THREAT AND COST CAUSED BY EXTORTION/HIJACKINGS. ATTITUDE NOT HELPED BY FACT ALGERIA HAS REFUSED SIGN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON HIJACKING. FURTHER ALGERIA, BY DELAY, APPEARS BE FIRST NATION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN IMMEDIATELY COOPERATIVE IN RETURNING STOLEN MONEY.

• FAR FROM GENERATING PRESSURES AGAINST ALGERIA, WE IN DEPARTMENT HAVE SOUGHT ALLAY THEM IN INTEREST PROVIDING TIME FOR ALGERIA WORK OUT APPROPRIATE AND SATISFACTORY RESPONSE. INDICATIONS FROM ZEGHAR AND HAMDANI THAT MONEY WOULD BE RETURNED AND APPROPRIATE ACTION TAKEN HAVE BEEN USED PUBLICLY AND HAVE BEEN HELPFUL, BUT OUR CREDIBILITY AND THAT OF ALGERIA BEING INCREASINGLY CHALLENGED BY THOSE WHO SEE NO ACTION. WE ARE CONCERNED OVER GOA IMPRESSION OF ONE UNPRECEDENTED PRESS CAMPAIGN UNQTE AGAINST ALGERIA IN U.S. THIS IS NOT REPEAT NOT CASE. PRESS HAS REPORTED DEVELOPMENTS THIS INCIDENT IN STRAIGHT FORWARD MANNER. IT HAS REPORTED GOA'S WILLINGNESS TO RETURN MONEY AND TO TAKE STEPS PREVENT RECURRENCE OF INCIDENT. ONLY EDITORIAL COMMENT OF WHICH WE AWARE APPEARS TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES WHICH INDICATED QTE ALGERIA'S NEWLY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO END ITS HAVEN FOR HIJACKERS IS A WELCOME - IF BELATED - STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQTE. NONE OF MEDIA HAS NOTED GAP BETWEEN GOA'S PROMISES AND DEEDS. AS GAP PERSISTS, WE EXPECT THIS TO COME. GOA MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT AND THAT HIJACKINGS ARE NEWS IN U.S. PRESS INTEREST THEREFORE NATURAL ESPECIALLY WHEN HIGHEST LEVEL USG BECOMES INVOLVED. WOULD ALGERIAN PRESS REMAIN SILENT IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES?

• WE FULLY APPRECIATE WIDER ISSUES INVOLVED IN CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL FABRIC OF U.S.-ALGERIAN

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RELATIONS. NO ONE SHOULD BE UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS THAT NECESSARY CONFIDENCE CAN WITHSTAND PROLONGED APPARENT LACK ALGERIAN COOPERATION IN THIS ISSUE OF OVERRIDING HIGH LEVEL IMPORTANCE TO U.S.

6. ALGERIAN PROPOSAL RELAYED BY BOUSSALEM UNDERSTOOD AS REPRESENTING EFFORT BE COOPERATIVE, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR U.S. TO AGREE TO PROPOSAL WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, PLACES PLANES AND PASSENGERS IN JEOPARDY BY FORECLOSING POSSIBILITY LANDING AT ANOTHER AIRPORT, NOR DOES U.S. FEEL ANOTHER RESPONSIBLE NATION, ITSELF DEPENDENT ON AIR TRAFFIC, CAN ABSOLVE ITSELF OF RESPONSIBILITY IN MATTERS OF THIS KIND. AS AMBASSADOR JOHNSON WILL TELL BOUSSALEM

THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, WE ARE WILLING DISCUSS FURTHER WITH ALGERIA HOW WE MIGHT WORK TO PREVENT FURTHER SUCH INCIDENTS.

7. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF SINGLE INCIDENT THIS KIND, DESIRED NEITHER BY U.S. OR ALGERIA SHOULD DISTURB GROWING RAPPORT AND SUBSTANTIAL BASIS COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN TWO NATIONS. I FEEL DEEPLY THIS IS POSSIBILITY IF WE CANNOT FIND PROMPT WAY OF SATISFYING WIDESPREAD AND UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN WITH THREAT TO EVERY NATION POSED BY GROWING RASH INTERNATIONAL EXTORTIONS AND HIJACKINGS. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: AF:MR. NEWSOM
DOD/ISA:MR. BADER (INFO)
PM:MR. SIPES (SUBS)
NEA:MR. SISCO
S/S:MR. MILLER

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TO USINT ALGIERS
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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SUBJECT: RAYTHEON: AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

REFERENCE: ALGIERS 009

1. APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN OBTAINED FOR RAYTHEON TO BID FOR CONTRACT TO INSTALL AIR DEFENSE TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM IN ALGERIA. DEPT WILL SO INFORM COMPANY, EMPHASIZING THAT SPECIFIC RAYTHEON PROPOSAL WILL HAVE TO RECEIVE FORMAL OFFICE OF MUNITIONS CONTROL (OMC) APPROVAL, AND THAT EXPORT OF ITEMS ON U.S. MUNITIONS LIST MUST BE LICENSED BY OMC.

2. FOR TEL AVIV: BACKGROUND THIS SUBJECT IS AS FOLLOWS: GOA MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ASKED RAYTHEON TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOLS 60 MILLION-DOLS 80 MILLION AIR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. SYSTEM WILL NOT INCLUDE WEAPONS. TO BE COMPETITIVE WITH BRITISH FRENCH AND ITALIAN FIRMS RAYTHEON MUST OFFER ITEMS ON MUNITIONS CONTROL LIST, BUT BECAUSE OF ABSENCE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ALGERIA HAS HERETOFORE FOR POLICY REASONS BEEN INELIGIBLE RECEIVE SUCH ITEMS. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO RELAX THIS POLICY IN HOPE THAT SUCCESSFUL BID WOULD GIVE US FOR FIRST

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TIME DIRECT CONTACT WITH ALGERIAN MILITARY, TO UNDERCUT SOVIETS, WHO ARE MAJOR SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ALGERIA, AND TO PROFIT U.S. FIRM. PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT BECAUSE OF ITS DEFENSIVE NATURE AND DISTANCE FROM ISRAEL. RECOGNIZING THAT ISRAELIS MAY NEVERTHELESS BE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT OUR ENTERING THIS LIMITED MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH ALGERIA, WE PLAN TO EXPLAIN ALL THIS TO ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON IN ORDER PUT MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE.

3. FOR ALGIERS: IN YOUR DISCRETION YOU MAY INFORM PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR. GP-3. ROGERS

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EUR-MR HILLENBRAND
NEA-MR SISCO
S/S-MR FLATIN

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AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. A small star is on either side of the eagle's head.

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AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE.
AMEMBASSY DAKAR

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YAOUNDE/FOR SANTA ISABEL ON NEXT SCHEDULED VISIT

DAKAR POUCH TO BATHURST

FOR AMBASSADOR:

1. PLEASE PROVIDE GENERAL BRIEFING TO HEAD OF GOVERNMENT SUMMARIZING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH ALLIED LEADERS PRIOR TO HIS PEKING AND MOSCOW TRIPS, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE UPON FOLLOWING GUIDELINES. AVOID, REPEAT, AVOID CONVEYING INFORMATION IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT.

2. MOSCOW VISIT

IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED LEADERS, WE REVIEWED THE GENERAL STATE OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, AND OFFERED ASSURANCES THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF "DEALING OVER THE HEADS" OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ANY MATTER WHERE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS MIGHT BE AFFECTED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO, AND THERE WILL BE NO, BILATERAL US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EUROPE. DURING THE CONSULTATIONS WE INDICATED THAT SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE EITHER BEFORE OR DURING THE MOSCOW VISIT, IN SUCH BILATERAL AREAS AS ARMS CONTROL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

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PEKING VISIT

WE INDICATED THAT THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO PEKING IS TO PROMOTE BETWEEN THE PRC AND OURSELVES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHERS POSITIONS, AND TO ESTABLISH A CONTINUING MEANS OF REMAINING INFORMED ABOUT THESE POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO AGREE ON AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF EXCHANGES IN NON-POLITICAL FIELDS SO THAT OUR TWO PEOPLES WILL BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER. WE EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER SIDE IS UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT SEPARATE US. HAVING BEEN TWO DECADES IN DEVELOPING, THESE DIFFERENCES WILL NOT BE EASILY RESOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE TO MAKE A BEGINNING TOWARD CLARIFYING OUR POSITIONS AND TOWARD WORKING OUT THE REAL DIFFERENCES THAT STAND BETWEEN US. TO THE EXTENT WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE HELPED REDUCE TENSIONS IN ASIA AND THE WORLD. THIS SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO ALL NATIONS.

THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH IN MIND DURING THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IN FACT THE TALKS IN PEKING WILL FOCUS ON US-PRC BILATERAL ISSUES. GIVEN OUR DIFFERENCES, THE QUESTION OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL NOT ARISE. NOR WILL US TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES BE AFFECTED.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

WE NOTED OUR PLEASURE THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE REALIGNMENT OF EXCHANGE RATES. THIS AGREEMENT WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR A RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IS A MANIFESTATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE MAJOR TRADING NATIONS TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL. IT IS, FURTHER, EVIDENCE THAT ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WHICH WE MAY HAVE WITH OUR TRADING PARTNERS CAN AND WILL BE SOLVED AMICABLY IN A SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

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3. USG DOES NOT INTEND TO PUBLICIZE THE FACT THAT THESE BRIEFINGS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. TO AVOID COMPARISONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES THAT HAVE RECEIVED ORAL OR WRITTEN PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES WOULD APPRECIATE HOST GOVERNMENT ALSO MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH FACT AND CONTENT OF BRIEFINGS. ROGERS

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (OMISSION OF DRAFTING, APPROVAL
AND CLEARANCE INFORMATION)

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING FOR KUWAITI AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY: SISCO INFORMED KUWAITI AMBASSADOR U S, AFTER BRIEF
HIATUS, RESUMING ACTIVE DIPLOMACY TO FACILITATE INTERIM SUEZ
SETTLEMENT, STRESSING THAT WE SEE ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY
AND HOPE SINCE BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO WANT INTERIM SETTLEMENT.
SISCO REAFFIRMED HIS BELIEF THAT INTERIM AGREEMENT REMAINS DOABLE
BY END OF THIS YEAR IF GOOD WILL PERSISTS ON BOTH SIDES. SISCO
ALSO EXPLAINED U S CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH JORDAN ON TACTICS
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM WITH QUESTION OF
TIMING SUBJECT TO FURTHER CONSULTATION.

1. KUWAITI AMBASSADOR, SHAYKH SALIM, CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY
SISCO JULY 7 PRIOR TO SALIM'S DEPARTURE TO VENEZUELA TO PRESENT
CREDENTIALS. SALIM SOUGHT UPDATING ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT
EFFORTS, AND OPENED DISCUSSIONS BY REFERRING TO RUMOR THAT SISCO
SOON WILL GO TO ISRAEL.

2. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT IN PERIOD SINCE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO
MIDDLE EAST HIATUS HAD DEVELOPED IN MOVEMENT TOWARD INTERIM SETTLEMENT

THIS RESULTED PRIMARILY FROM UAR/ USSR TREATY WHICH, OF COURSE,
HAD RAISED QUESTIONS IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN USG. CAIRO
HAS BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH THE TREATY AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS.
WE HAVE FELT ALL PARTIES NEEDED A LITTLE RPT A LITTLE TIME TO
FATHOM, PROBE AND EVALUATE IMPLICATIONS OF TREATY WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO INTERIM SETTLEMENT ON SUEZ AS WELL AS OVERALL
MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT.

3. SISCO CONTINUED USG HAS DRAWN CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS AND FEELS
IN FIRST INSTANCE WE SHOULD SHARE OUR EVALUATION WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT. THUS. BERGUS AND STERNER WENT TO CAIRO. THEY HAVE
TALKED WITH ISMAIL AND HAYKEL AND JULY 6 MET FOR NINETY MINUTES
WITH SADAT. IN SISCO'S VIEW THEIR IN DEPTH DISCUSSION WITH SADAT
WAS SATISFACTORY, PROVIDING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS RE EGYPT'S
DESIRES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERIM SETTLEMENT AND HOW EGYPT

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CONCEIVES U S ROLE IN LIGHT OF TREATY WITH USSR. U S DOES NOT PLAN TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON THESE TALKS BUT SISCO COULD TELL SALIM THAT SADAT HAS CONFIRMED HIS DESIRE TO HAVE U S CONTINUE ITS ROLE IN EFFORT ACHIEVE INTERIM SETTLEMENT. IN REPLY TO SHAYKH SALIM'S QUESTION ABOUT APPARENTLY NEGATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD RE INTERIM SETTLEMENT, SISCO SAID U S WILL BE TAKING ITS CUE FROM PRESIDENT OF EGYPT. DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAT HAVE BEEN THOROUGH, FRANK AND SATISFACTORY.

4. SISCO CONTINUED THAT SADAT COULD NOW EXPECT AN ACTIVE STAGE OF U S DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO HELP ACHIEVE INTERIM SETTLEMENT ON SUEZ. USG HAS NOT DECIDED EXACTLY HOW TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL BUT RUMORS SISCO TRIP TO ISRAEL SHOULD NOT

BE RULED OUT.

5. AMBASSADOR SALIM ASKED HOW SADAT SEES RELATIONSHIP OF INTERIM SETTLEMENT TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. SISCO REPLIED SADAT OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL BORDER. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A BIG QUESTION MARK WHETHER THIS IS ACHIEVABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE TWO OR THREE OTHER DIFFICULT QUESTIONS BUT BOTH SIDES WANT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF FLEXIBILITY IN POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. U S EFFORT WILL BE TO TRY TO RECONCILE THESE POSITIONS ACTING AS QUIET, CONSTRUCTIVE CATALYST.

6. SALIM QUESTIONED WHETHER ISRAEL WANTS INTERIM SETTLEMENT ON SUEZ. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED HE FEEL ISRAELI HAS NOT MATCHED SADAT'S CONSTRUCTIVE REPLY TO AMBASSADOR JARRING IN FEBRUARY RE OVERALL SETTLEMENT. AS FAR AS INTERIM SETTLEMENT IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, EACH SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD POSITIVE IDEAS. EACH SIDE HAS DIFFICULTY WITH CERTAIN OF THE IDEAS OF THE OTHER. RECONCILIATION OF POSITIONS IS REQUIRED AND EACH SIDE MUST ADJUST. SISCO STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT AN EQUAL ADJUSTMENT IS NEEDED ON EACH SIDE. ADMITTEDLY BOTH SIDES HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN MOVING TOWARD INTERIM SETTLEMENT BUT THERE ARE LARGE AREAS OF COMMONALTY AND PARALLELISM. SADAT REALIZES THAT PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN SHORT TERM MUST COME VIA INTERIM SETTLEMENT. NEITHER SIDE IS OBSTRUCTING SETTLEMENT EFFORT OR TRYING TO PREVENT INTERIM SETTLEMENT AND TO PUT BLAME ON OTHER PARTY. SISCO REITERATED THAT BOTH SIDES WANT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY AT THE CHEAPEST POSSIBLE PRICE.

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UM SISCO REFERRED TO RECURRENT REPORTS THAT OTHERS VIEW HIS ATTITUDE ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT AS OPTIMISTIC. HE SAID IF U S "EVER LOSES OPTIMISM " GOD HELP THE UNITED STATES, THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS." SISCO CONTINUED THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS RAY OF HOPE U S MUST PERSIST IN EFFORTS. SISCO CONTINUED HE BELIEVES

8. SALIM NOTED ARAB IRRITATION AT CONTINUED ISRAELI FUND RAISING IN U S AND WITH USG TAX POLICY TOWARDS ISRAELI BONDS. SISCO REPLIED THAT IT UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT PRIVATE FUND RAISING WILL BE STOPPED.

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CONSIDERATION OF JERUSALEM IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND USG. SISCO ADDED WE HAVE INFORMED ISRAELIS OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH JORDAN. HE CLARIFIED FOR AMBASSADOR SALIM THAT WHAT JORDAN WISHES TO BRING TO SECURITY COUNCIL IS QUESTION OF UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTION IN JERUSALEM, NOT QUESTION OF ULTIMATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM WHICH JORDAN REALIZES IS NOT SECURITY COUNCIL QUESTION BUT ONE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND ISRAEL.

19. SISCO AND SALIM ALSO DISCUSSED QUESTION OF KUWAIT'S SUBSIDY TO JORDAN. (SEPTTEL). GP-3. IRWIN

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

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SUBJ: REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FOR YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY: SISCO STATED SEARCH FOR INTERIM CANAL SETTLEMENT WILL LEAD IN NEXT FEW WEEKS TO INTENSIVE US EFFORTS TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN TWO SIDES IN HOPE THAT SEPTEMBER OPENING OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH ALL FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL ATTEND, WILL SET STAGE FOR DECISIVE AND CONCLUSIVE EFFORT. SISCO ALSO DISCUSSED UAR/USSR TREATY, VICTOR LOUIS VISIT TO ISRAEL, MIDDLE EAST ARMS SUPPLIES AND SOVIET PLANS IN MIDDLE EAST.

1. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BOGDAN CRNOBRNJA, CALLED AT HIS OWN REQUEST ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO ON 30 JUNE 1971 IN DEPARTMENT. SISCO OPENED CONVERSATION WITH JOCOSE EXCHANGE, ACCUSING AMBASSADOR IN MOCK SERIOUS WAY OF REPORTING TO EVERYONE IN TOWN THAT JOE SISCO WAS STILL OPTIMISTIC. AMBASSADOR REPLIED ACCUSATION TRUE BUT HE NOT THE ONLY ONE SPREADING THIS STORY. SISCO SAID, "I KNOW."

2. TURNING TO SUBSTANCE AMBASSADOR REPORTED TO SISCO UAR FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD VISITING BELGRADE 8 JULY. CRNOBRNJA REQUESTED REVIEW OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION PRIOR THIS VISIT.

3. SISCO REPLIED USG HAS NOW COMPLETED OVERALL REVIEW OF EVENTS SINCE SECRETARY ROGERS VISITED CAIRO. HE ACKNOWLEDGED A CERTAIN SLOW-DOWN, ATTRIBUTING IT TO INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN UAR, CHANGES IN SOVIET/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL. HOWEVER, SISCO SAID, DESPITE SLOW-DOWN US HAS CONCLUDED THAT ALL SIDES (UAR, ISRAEL, USSR, US) CONTINUE TO WANT SETTLEMENT. IT IS NOW CLEAR MOREOVER WHAT ARE AREAS OF COMMONALITY AND WHERE AREAS OF DIFFERENCE REMAIN. BOTH SIDES HAVE OFFERED INTERESTING IDEAS ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT. ADJUSTMENTS IN POSITION ON BOTH SIDES ARE NEEDED TO REACH AGREEMENT. NATURE OF CONCESSIONS TO BE MADE BY BOTH SIDES IS NOT NECESSARILY EQUAL OR BALANCED ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES MUST, SAID SISCO, MAKE SOME ADJUSTMENTS. SISCO CONCLUDED BY SAYING USG HAS DECIDED IT MUST MAKE FURTHER CONCRETE AND POSITIVE EFFORTS NEEDED TO FOCUS ON REMAINING DIFFERENCES AND NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN NOW AND



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SEPTEMBER WHEN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ALL COUNTRIES WILL ARRIVE IN NEW YORK FOR THE OPENING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SISCO SAID US CLEARLY DOES HAVE A STRATEGY AND IT HOPES DECISIVE AND CONCLUSIVE EFFORTS DURING FIRST TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL MAKE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE CANAL POSSIBLE.

4. PRESSED FOR DETAILS, SISCO GAVE AS FIRST STEP OF FUTURE CONCRETE US EFFORTS THE RETURN OF BERGUS TO CAIRO IN NEXT FEW DAYS. SISCO DECLINED TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON US STRATEGY. CRNOBRNJA SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE HAPPY IF US MADE MORE INTENSIVE EFFORTS REACH AGREEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED IF SISCO'S STATEMENT DID NOT IMPLY THAT ISRAEL MUST ABANDON MORE OF ITS POSITIONS THAN EGYPT IN ORDER REACH AGREEMENT. SISCO REPLIED ONLY THAT BOTH SIDES MUST MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THEIR POSITIONS AND HE WOULD LET YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT JUDGE FOR ITSELF HOW INTENSIVE US EFFORTS IN NEXT THREE MONTHS WOULD BE. SISCO WENT ON TO SAY YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE UAR OFFICIALS UNDERSTAND THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN "VERY BUSY" IN LAST SIX WEEKS, NOTABLY WITH INTERNAL CHANGES AND UNPRECEDENTED TREATY WITH USSR. SISCO SAID US HAS WAITED TO SEE WHAT HAS HAPPENED. YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT AS HONEST STATEMENT FROM US THAT EFFORTS HAVE NOT STOOD STILL AS RESULT ITS OWN DESIRES AND USG CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTED IN REACHING AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT IS IDEAL AGENCY SAID SISCO TO DISPELL CONCERN IN UAR THAT U.S. IS DELAYING ACTION OR HAS NO STRATEGY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON TREATY SISCO SAID THAT IT LESS THAN "DISASTER" (ISRAELI TERM) AND MORE THAN "CODIFICATION OF EXISTING PRACTICE" (EGYPTIAN DESCRIPTION). SAID DESPITE TREATY, U.S. FEELS INTERIM AGREEMENT POSSIBLE BY END OF YEAR AND WE WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO GET AGREEMENT.

6. CRNOBRNJA RELATED THAT DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAY THERE IS MUCH UNCERTAINTY IN UAR INTERNALLY AND "OTHER NAMES THAN SADAT" HAVE BEEN MENTIONED. SISCO REPLIED THIS ANOTHER REASON FOR NEED FOR PROGRESS. SADAT'S POLICY, WHICH POPULAR, HAS STIMULATED EXPECTATIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED. US WANTS HELP SADAT MAKE SOME PRACTICAL

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PROGRESS LEADING PERHAPS TO RECONSTRUCTION OF MAJOR CITIES ALONG CANAL WHERE DESTRUCTION WAS WROUGHT BY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT.

7. CRNOBRNJA ASKED IF VICTOR LOUIS ACTUALLY WENT TO ISRAEL FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SISCO SAID, YES, BUT WHILE THERE HE CONTACTED AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO DID NO MORE THAN LISTEN. SISCO SAID ISRAELI POSITION IS THAT USSR BROKE RELATIONS BUT ISRAEL PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO RENEW FULL GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. SISCO NOTED THAT USG WOULD WARMLY WELCOME THIS. IF RUSSIANS WERE TALKING TO ISRAEL, SAID SISCO, US JOB WOULD BE MUCH EASIER. SOVIETS PROBABLY THEMSELVES INTERESTED IN TALKING TO BOTH SIDES, AS US DOES, AND DESPITE DENIAL OF GROMYKO RECENTLY, ISRAEL/SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE HERE IN WASHINGTON. SISCO SAID THAT TAD SZULC'S RECENT ARTICLE SEEMED ACCURATE IN THIS REGARD.

8. CRNOBRNJA SAID THAT WHILE HE COULD NOT CONFIRM IT HE HAD HEARD REPORTS OF NEW SOVIET FIGHTERS BEING SENT TO UAR AND HE FEARED THEREFORE THAT PIPELINE TO BOTH SIDES MIGHT BE OPENED. SISCO SAID THAT SUPPLIES HAD BEEN SENT TO EGYPT IN MARCH BUT SINCE THEN THERE HAD BEEN NO NEW SIGNIFICANT SUPPLIES. RESTRAINT IS BEING MET WITH RESTRAINT, SISCO SAID, AND EGYPT, WHICH HAS ASKED US NOT REPEAT NOT TO MAKE NEW COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL CAN TAKE SATISFACTION IN THE FACT THAT NO NEW COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE. HOWEVER, SISCO SAID, LACK OF RESTRAINT ON ONE SIDE WILL BE MET BY LOOSENING OF RESTRAINT ON OTHER SIDE. SISCO SAID THAT YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT LIKE UAR GOVERNMENT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IF US GETS REPORT MAJOR NEW SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES TO UAR, US CANNOT RPT CANNOT DISREGARD THIS.

9. CRNOBRNJA REQUESTED SISCO COMMENT ON THEORY THAT THERE ALSO BROAD AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND US ON DESIRABLE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN FACT IN THE WORLD GENERALLY. SISCO SAID THIS STATEMENT PROBABLY TRUE AS GENERALITY BUT IN MIDDLE EAST THERE IS MORE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS THAN ON QUESTIONS EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT, SOUTH AMERICA, ETC. HE SAID BASICALLY NEITHER POWER WANTS TO BE DRAWN INTO A WAR OVER MIDDLE EAST. RUSSIA, HOWEVER, IS TEMPTED NOT REPEAT



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NOT TO SETTLE DUE PRESUMED DOUBLE BENEFIT FIRST OF EASY
ENTRY TO UNSETTLED ARAB WORLD AND SECOND OF STRENGTHENED
SOVIET POSITION WITH REGARD TO MEDITERRANEAN, PERSIAN
GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN. ROGERS

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1. DUTCH AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN CALLED ON ASSTSECY SISCO JUNE 18 FOR DISCUSSION MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SECRETARY'S MAY VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST AND SIGNATURE UAR- SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

2. SISCO STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW DOOR TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT REMAINS OPEN. EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS, AND SOVIETS EACH FOR THEIR OWN REASONS WOULD LIKE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT WILL REOPEN SUEZ CANAL. USG TOO SEES NET ADVANTAGE IN HAVING CANAL REOPENED. AT LATER POINT IN CONVERSATION AMBASSADOR RETURNED TO THIS POINT, ASKING SISCO TO DEFINE ADVANTAGES TO PARTIES FROM REOPENING OF CANAL. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT FROM SADAT'S VIEWPOINT WOULD BE PREFERABLE HAVE INCOME FROM CANAL TOLLS THAN CONTINUE RELY ON SAUDI SUBSIDY. ALSO INVOLVES SOME ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. POLICY OF POLITICAL SOLUTION IS POPULAR IN EGYPT, BUT SADAT CONSIDERS THAT HE MUST NOT MAKE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT IN SINAI APPEAR TO BE FINAL AGREEMENT. ISRAELIS FOR THEIR PART RECOGNIZE THAT PATH TO ACHIEVEMENT OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT HIGHLY COMPLICATED. THEY THEREFORE SEE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AS PRACTICAL TEST OF EGYPTIANS' DESIRE FOR PEACE. IN ANSWER AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT VALIDITY OF ARGUMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST KEEP CANAL CLOSED IN ORDER DENY THAT STRATEGIC WATERWAY TO SOVIET FLEET, SISCO NOTED THAT U.S. NAVY WOULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM REOPENED CANAL. HE STRESSED TO AMBASSADOR THAT USG HAS ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IMPORTANCE OF SUEZ CANAL TO COMMERCIAL INTERESTS OF ITS WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES.

3. RE UAR- SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY, SISCO REMARKED IT VERY EASY TO UNDERESTIMATE OR OVERESTIMATE ITS IMPORTANCE. HE NOTED SOVIETS HAVE PLAYED TREATY IN UPKEY FASHION WHILE EGYPTIANS HAVE PLAYED DOWN ITS IMPORTANCE. LATTER HAVE EMPHASIZED ARTICLE 8 OF TREATY WHICH THEY FEEL GIVES THEM ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. AT SAME TIME EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS TO USG FOLLOWING POINTS: THEY WANT DIALOGUE WITH USG TO CONTINUE. THEY CONTINUE TO WANT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ALONG SUEZ CANAL. SADAT'S CAPABILITY TO MAKE BASIC POLICY DECISION REMAINS UNALTERED BY SOVIET TREATY. UAR CONTINUES WISH USG PLAY A ROLE IN HELPING BRING ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, AND NEED FOR PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT BY END OF YEAR, SINCE OTHERWISE NEW WAR COULD ENSUE. UARG HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT IF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CAN BE WORKED OUT, CAIRO WOULD BE PREPARED RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH USG.



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RM SISCO CONTINUED THAT SINCE SECRETARY'S VISIT U.S. MINISTER IN CAIRO BERGUS HAD MET TWICE WITH SADAT S WELL AS WITH SADAT CONFIDANTE HAIKAL AND WITH FONMIN RIAD. ESSENCE OF THESE CONVERSATIONS IS THAT WHAT SADAT TOLD SECRETARY IN EARLY MAY REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT STILL STANDS. MOREOVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INJECTED INTO THE SITUATION A FEW NEW IDEAS WHICH WE CAN DEAL WITH. FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPTIANS, WHILE STILL STRONGLY INSISTING THAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR STATIONING EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF CANAL, HAVE INDICATED THIS FORCE COULD BE MORE SYMBOLIC THAN REAL IN NATURE. USG HAS ALSO SUCCEEDED IN IDENTIFYING CERTAIN AREAS OF COMMONALITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AT SAME TIME THERE HAS BEEN UNFORTUNATE PUBLIC ESCALATION OF RHETORIC ON BOTH SIDES AND THERE IS CLEARLY ORCHESTRATED EGYPTIAN PUBLIC CAMPAIGN TO BRING PRESSURE ON USG TO EXTRACT MAJOR CONCESSIONS.

5. SISCO SAID USG OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE BEFORE NEXT UNGA TO NARROW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTIES. HOPE IS THAT THIS WILL PERMIT SOME SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TO BE MADE DURING UNGA SESSION AND BEFORE END OF YEAR. SISCO REMARKED THAT SECRETARY'S JUNE 15 PRESS CONFERENCE HAD CONTAINED GOOD STATEMENT OF HOW WE SEE SITUATION. UARG HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO SECRETARY'S USE OF TERM "AGREEMENT" WHICH IN EGYPTIAN EYES IMPLIES SOME SORT OF FORMAL UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL. CONSEQUENTLY, USG WILL IN FUTURE SEEK USE SOME OTHER TERM WITH LESS SENSITIVE CONNOTATION TO EGYPTIANS.

6. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIET-UAR FRIENDSHIP TREATY HAS COMPLICATED MATTERS BUT NO DOORS HAVE BEEN CLOSED. IN OUR JUDGMENT PROGRESS OR LACK OF IT TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN EITHER PRE-OR POST-TREATY PERIOD IS MORE SIGNIFICANT ISSUE. THERE IS NO QUESTION, HOWEVER, BUT THAT ISRAELI WARINESS HAS BEEN INCREASED AS CONSEQUENCE OF THIS TREATY AND THAT LATTER HAS SOME POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SISCO STATED USG HAS NO IMMEDIATE PLANS FOR TALKS WITH SOVIETS. HE BELIEVES FOCUS MUST BE ON PARTIES.

8. SISCO DESCRIBED INTERNAL EVENTS IN EGYPT SINCE APRIL AS ELIMINATION OF ALI SABRI AND HIS PRO-SOVIET COHORTS FOLLOWED BY LATER ELIMINATION OF OTHER SADAT RIVALS WITH POWER CENTERS OF THEIR OWN. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION

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THAT SOVIETS PROBABLY WANT TREATY PARTLY TO COUNTER- BALANCE
ELIMINATION OF PRO- SOVIET ELEMENTS IN EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT AS
WELL AS TO OFFSET SEEMING WARMING UP OF U S- UAR RELATIONS.
ASKED WHETHER PRIN. FAWZI VISIT TO U S IS STILL ON, SISCO
SAID IT HAD BEEN DEFERRED BUT NOT CANCELLED. GP3. ROGERS

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SUBJ: SISCO BRIEFING OF ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY: ROMANIAN AMBASSADOR BOGDAN REVIEWED RECENT MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE OF HIS GOVERNMENT. SISCO DISCUSSED RECENT EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI REPLIES TO JARRING, CURRENT SOVIET AND US ROLES IN MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, CONTINUING URGENT NEED FOR SETTLEMENT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS OF DE FACTO CEASEFIRE AND PLACE OF TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS IN FOREFRONT PRESENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. IN CONCLUSION, SISCO ANSWERED BOGDAN INQUIRY ABOUT PRESENT STATE OF FEDAYEEN. END SUMMARY.

1. AMB. CORNELIU BOGDAN (ROMANIA) CALLED AT HIS OWN REQUEST ON ASST. SEC. SISCO IN DEPARTMENT AFTERNOON OF 9 MARCH, 1971. BOGDAN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD CALLED IN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR BUCHAREST TO SAY MORE MOVEMENT AND FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN ISRAELI POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, BOGDAN NOTED, ROMANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WAS TOURING ARAB COUNTRIES. BOGDAN CHARACTERIZED PRESENT STATE DIPLOMACY IN MIDDLE EAST AS "GREAT AND GOOD OPPORTUNITY" AND SAID EGYPT HAD MADE IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE STEP FORWARD WHICH CREATED FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT.

2. SISCO AGREED. SISCO SAID SADAT HAD GIVEN IMPRESSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF SUCCESSION. HE CHARACTERIZED LAST EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL AS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD. SISCO SAID THAT ISRAELI REPLY NOT ONLY WAS NOT RESPONSIVE TO JARRING INQUIRY BUT ALSO DID NOT MATCH THE POSITIVE CHARACTER OF THE UAR REPLY. SISCO SAID US LAST WEEK WAS READY ENTER INTO FOUR POWER COMMUNIQUE WHICH ENDORSED THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN ALL RESPECTS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DID NOT AGREE TO INCLUDING IN THE COMMUNIQUE ANY MENTION SUPPORT FOR THANT'S APPEAL FOR CONTINUED FORMAL CEASEFIRE AND THEREFORE NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON COMMUNIQUE. SISCO NOTED THAT CEASEFIRE QUESTION AND ONLY CEASEFIRE QUESTION CAUSED THE BREAKDOWN IN EFFORTS TO REACH A FOUR POWER AGREEMENT. ON OTHER POINTS, HE NOTED, ALL FOUR POWERS WERE CLOSE TOGETHER.

3. SISCO SAID US IN CLOSEST POSSIBLE COMMUNICATION WITH UAR AS WELL AS WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND USG HAD HEARD AS RECENTLY AS THIS WEEKEND FROM SADAT WHO, IN EFFECT, SAID "UAR HAS TAKEN STEPS, NOW DO WHAT YOU CAN WITH ISRAEL." SISCO NOTED FAVORABLE IMPACT UAR REPLY ON WORLD AND SAID USG HAD URGED EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT



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TAKE NO PROVOCATIVE STEPS TO REDUCE THIS IMPACT. USG SPECIFICALLY URGED EGYPT HEED SECRETARY GENERAL APPEAL. USG ALSO TOLD UAR SITUATION STILL REQUIRES NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING. USG REITERATED ITS INTENTION PLAY CONTINUING ROLE GETTING PEACE AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES. SISCO REFERRED AMB. BOGDAN TO FULL EXPLANATION US POSITION IN PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE WORLD MESSAGE AND ACCOMPANYING SPEECH.

4. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY, SISCO AGREED MIDDLE EAST WAS IN EVOLUTION AND PRESENT SCENE MARKED BY IMPORTANT CHANGES. FIRST, THIS IS EIGHTH MONTH OF NO SHOOTING. SECOND, USG BEING CREDITED WITH PURSUING MORE BALANCED APPROACH. THIRD, USG HAS UNIQUE ROLE TO PLAY REGARDLESS OF SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET PRESENCE IN AREA. FOURTH, SOVIETS, LIKE US, HAVE ADOPTED POSTURE RESTRAINT TOWARD ACTS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO RENEWAL HOSTILITIES. IF SOVIETS NOT TAKING ANY POSITIVE STEPS HELP SETTLEMENT, AT LEAST THEY NOT OBSTRUCTING SUCH STEPS. FIFTH, CAIRO HAS GIVEN, AS NOTED ABOVE, POSITIVE AND CONCRETE EVIDENCE ITS DESIRE FLEXIBILITY AND FORWARD MOVEMENT. SISCO NOTE THAT RECENTLY CONCLUDED TALKS WITH PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN CONVINCED HIM SAME REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE FRAME OF MIND, SAME INTEREST IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, PREVAILED IN JORDAN. FINALLY, SISCO NOTED THAT IN ISRAEL IT WILL TAKE TIME FULLY COMPREHEND MEANING EGYPTIAN MOVES LAST FEW WEEKS. SISCO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT A POLITICAL PROCESS OR "FERMENT" IS GOING ON IN ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO HARD DECISIONS NOT SQUARELY CONFRONTED UNTIL NOW. MOST IMPORTANT, ISRAELIS RECOGNIZE WHAT SADAT HAS DONE REPRESENTS CHANGE FROM NASSER ERA.

5. SUMMING UP ABOVE CHANGES IN MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, SISCO SAID DOOR IS OPEN TO JARRING MISSION AND PROGRESS POSSIBLE. SISCO DID NOT SPECULATE NEXT STEPS JARRING MIGHT TAKE. HE SAID HE HAD NO CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS HOW JARRING MIGHT PROCEED. NOTED NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING LIKE FURTHER MOVES ON SADAT'S SUEZ CANAL PROPOSALS WERE BOTH OPEN QUESTIONS. SISCO AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR BOGDAN, HOWEVER, THAT ALL PARTIES -- EGYPT, JORDAN, AND ISRAEL -- FEEL BALL NOW IN ISRAELI COURT.

6. FURTHER QUESTIONS NEXT STEP JARRING MISSION LED SISCO ELUCIDATE PRESENT STATUS DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL. HE NOTED SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT PRESENTED IN TRUNCATED FASHION THE RECENT JARRING QUERY ON WITHDRAWAL, WHICH IN JARRING TEXT WAS SET IN CONTEXT OF SEVERAL CONDITIONS: (A) ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE

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AGREEMENT; (B) ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARM AL-SHAikh AND DMZ'S;
(C) FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ CANAL. THESE CONDITIONS NOT
MENTIONED IN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. SISCO NOTED THAT JARRING
HAS NOT ASKED FOR PRIOR COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TO
JUNE 5 LINES. SISCO NOTED THAT UAR POSITION WAS THAT FOLLOWING
ITS RECENT OFFERS IT WISHED COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO "WITHDRAW
FROM SINAI AND GAZA." SISCO SAID US HAD MADE IT CLEAR ISRAELI
REPLY TO JARRING QUERY WAS NOT HELPFUL AND ISRAEL SHOULD RESPOND
TO JARRING'S QUESTION WITH SPECIFICS.

7. SISCO SAID THAT NATIONAL INTEREST USG IN MIDDLE EAST BEST
SERVED BY SATISFYING LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES, WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITION TERRITORY. HOWEVER, PEACE SHOULD NOT BE
ONE MERELY WRITTEN ON PAPER. IT HAD TO BE REAL INVOLVING PHYSICAL
SECURITY. SISCO SAID PEACE WAS ACHIEVABLE.

8. BOGDAN ASKED ABOUT USSR-UAR RELATIONS, WHICH SISCO CHARACTERIZED
AS "VERY CLOSE." SISCO SAID SOVIET POLICY DEFERS TO UAR VIEW AND
WHILE SOVIETS WILL MAKE NO RPT NO GREAT EFFORT COUNSEL COMPROMISES.
IT WILL NOT RPT NOT IN OUR JUDGMENT OBSTRUCT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
SISCO AGREED WITH BOGDAN THAT THIS VERY IMPORTANT ASSESSMENT OF
SOVIET VIEW, AND SAID IT UNDERLIES US EFFORTS IN AREA. SISCO
SAID, FOR INSTANCE, THAT COMPLETELY UNHELPFUL SOVIET ATTITUDE
IN FOUR POWER TALKS CONCERNING FORMAL RPT FORMAL EXTENSION OF
CEASEFIRE DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN SOVIETS WANTED SHOOTING WAR
IN MIDDLE EAST. SISCO SAID US KNEW 30 DAYS AGO SOVIETS WANTED
LONGER EXTENSION CEASEFIRE, AS DID US, AND US NOW BELIEVES SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR DE FACTO RPT DE FACTO CEASEFIRE REFLECTS REAL AND
CONTINUING SOVIET AVERSION TO RESUMPTION SHOOTING. BOGDAN EXPLAINED
SOVIET POSITION AS FEAR FORMAL EXTENSION CEASEFIRE WOULD PERPETUATE
CEASEFIRE LINES, BUT SISCO NOTED OCCUPATION OF SINAI WOULD GO ON
AS LONG AS THERE NO PEACE AGREEMENT.

9. SISCO NOTED UAR HAS RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO OFFER THREATS.
HE SAID US NEVER CONSIDERED CEASEFIRE DEADLINE CREDIBLE THREAT
IN ANY CASE AND THE OFFER TO START SHOOTING IF PROGRESS NOT MADE
IN TALKS DOES NOT CARRY MUCH WEIGHT. THE CEASEFIRE, SAID SISCO,
WAS IN INTEREST BOTH SIDES AND STILL IS. SISCO NOTED PRESENT DE
FACTO CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ARTIFICALLY CREATED 30-DAY DEADLINE
DOES NOT CHANGE UNDERLYING URGENCY OF NEED FOR SOLUTION. SISCO
SAW "INHERENT DEADLINE" IN AREA AS TOUCHY AND DANGEROUS FOR MIDDLE
EAST, NOTING, "THE LONGER THE IMPASSE, THE GREATER THE DANGER."



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10. BOGDAN ASKED ABOUT RELATION PRESENT DISCUSSIONS UAR BORDERS WITH JORDAN SITUATION, AND SISCO SAID UAR AND JORDAN PLANNING TO MOVE TOGETHER. SISCO AGREED SADAT'S CANAL PROPOSAL PROVOKED CONCERN IN JORDAN ABOUT POSSIBLE SEPARATE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN UAR AND ISRAEL AND SAID FURTHER SADAT'S SECRET TRIP TO MOSCOW "WON'T GO DOWN WELL IN OR OUT OF AREA."

11. BOGDAN ASKED WHAT PROMPTED TRIP. SISCO CITED SPEECH IN WHICH SADAT SAID HE WENT AT SOVIET BEHEST. SISCO NOTED ALSO TRIP OCCURRED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MARCH 7 EXPIRATION DATE.

12. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUERIES BY BOGDAN RE US/UAR DIALOGUE, SISCO SAID IT VERY GOOD AND US IN DAILY CONTACT WITH UAR OFFICIALS. ANSWERING QUESTION ABOUT FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SISCO SAID US CLOSER TO FORMAL RELATIONS WITH UAR THAN 6 MONTHS OR YEAR AGO, BUT SOME PROGRESS MUST BE MADE ON SUEZ CANAL PROPOSAL OR JARRING TALKS BEFORE RELATIONS CAN BE RENEWED. SISCO AGAIN STATED QUESTIONS OF JARRING TALKS AND SUEZ CANAL PROPOSAL BOTH OPEN AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROGRESS.

13. WHEN BOGDAN SUGGESTED FEDAYEEN WERE LESS OF PROBLEM NOW THAN IN PAST, SISCO AGREED, CITING DISORGANIZATION AND MONEY PROBLEMS OF FEDAYEEN, BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT POLITICAL CLIMATE IN MIDDLE EAST HAS IMPROVED AND POPULATION THERE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FEDAYEEN APPEAL. ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANISM STILL FORMIDABLE POLITICAL FORCE, IT CAN BE BROUGHT INTO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, SISCO SAID. WITHOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, FORCES OF FRUSTRATION COULD REVIVE. BOGDAN THEN ASKED IF IN SISCO'S VIEW TERRITORIAL PROBLEM WAS IN FOREFRONT OF PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CONCERN AND SISCO SAID YES. GP-1. ROGERS

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with a shield on its chest, holding an olive branch and arrows. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

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SUBJ: CALL BY JAPANESE AMBASSADOR USHIBA ON ASSTSECY SISCO

SUMMARY. JAPANESE AMBASSADOR USHIBA CALLED ON ASSTSECY SISCO AT THE FORMER'S REQUEST ON MARCH 3, 1971 IN THE DEPT. SISCO SUMMARIZED PRESENT STATUS OF JARRING TALKS, ACKNOWLEDGING ISRAELI REPLY TO JARRING'S RECENT QUERY HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING. WE WORKING FOR EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE AS FOLLOW-UP TO SYG REPORT AND FOUR POWER COMMUNIQUE. ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT USG PREPARED CONSIDER APPROPRIATE FOUR POWER COMMUNIQUE IN LIEU OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR USHIBA OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING ASST SECY SISCO ABOUT THE IMMINENT VISIT OF ISRAELI PRESIDENT SHAZAR. SISCO REPLIED THAT THIS VISIT WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL ONE.

2. SISCO THEN INFORMED AMBASSADOR USHIBA THAT ISRAELI REPLY TO AMBASSADOR JARRING'S AIDE MEMOIRE HAD BEEN RECEIVED. IN ALL FRANKNESS HE HAD TO CHARACTERIZE THIS REPLY AS DISAPPOINTING AND AS NOT MATCHING THE POSITIVE CHARACTER OF THE EGYPTIAN REPLY.

3. IN REPLY TO QUERY JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, SISCO SAID IMMEDIATE TACTICAL SITUATION WAS THAT NO GOVERNMENT, NOT EVEN UAR, WAS PRESSING FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. FOCUS AT PRESENT IS FIRST ON REPORT WHICH SECRETARY GENERAL COMMITTED HIMSELF TO ISSUE TO SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF LAST CEASEFIRE EXTENSION. THIS COMMITMENT WAS MADE TO UAR AT TIME OF LAST EXTENSION. SISCO NOTED THAT JAPAN THEREFORE WOULD SOON RECEIVE REPORT AS A RESULT JAPANESE MEMBERSHIP SECURITY COUNCIL. THE REPORT WILL FOCUS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE JARRING MISSION AND QUESTION OF CEASEFIRE. SECOND, SISCO SAID THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE NOW GOING ON RE POSSIBLE FOUR POWER STATEMENT AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. SISCO SAID WE PREPARED CONSIDER STATEMENT IN LIEU OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. THIS FOUR POWER COMMUNIQUE WOULD FOCUS ON QUESTIONS OF PRESENT STATUS OF TALKS AND POSSIBLE FOUR POWER EXHORTATION FOR FLEXIBILITY. WE HOPE COMMUNIQUE WOULD ALSO ADDRESS ITSELF TO EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE.

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5- THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD NOT CATEGORICALLY REFUSED TO WITHDRAW TO 1967 LINES. SISCO SAID THIS WAS NOT REALLY THE CENTRAL PROBLEM; US HAD NEVER INTERPRETED SC RES AS MEANING TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE 5 LINES. WHAT WE FIND DISAPPOINTING IN THE ISRAELI REPLY IS FAILURE TO BE SPECIFIC ON QUESTION OF UARI BORDER. SISCO NOTED THAT JARRING'S QUERY DID NOT SUGGEST TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES; INSTEAD HE ASKED WHETHER GOI WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW TO INTERNATIONAL BORDER PROVIDED SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON SHARM AL-SHAYKH AND DMZ'S.

7. SISCO ANSWERED QUERY OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR BY SAYING SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SEEN DOBRYNIN RECENTLY AND PRESS REPORTS OF MEETING WERE GENERALLY ACCURATE. DOBRYNIN WAS INFORMED THAT PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS WERE NOT USEFUL IN PRESENT SITUATION.

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SUBJ: ASST SECY SISCO MEETING WITH DANISH AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY. DANISH AMBASSADOR TORBEN RORNE CALLED AT OWN REQUEST ON ASST SECY SISCO IN DEPT ON FEB 17 TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. MR. SISCO, SAYING PEACE EFFORTS AT MOST IMPORTANT STAGE SINCE JUNE WAR, DESCRIBED THE THREE TRACKS ALONG WHICH NEGOTIATION ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE IS NOW PROCEEDING, STRESSING THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING ARE THE MOST PROMISING. SECOND, THE UAR AND ISRAEL STATEMENTS RE SUEZ CANAL OFFERED SOME HOPE, WHILE DISCUSSIONS ALONG THIRD TRACK, IN WHICH THE FOUR POWERS WOULD DISCUSS GUARANTEES FOR A SETTLEMENT, MUST BE SUBORDINATE TO SEARCH BY JARRING FOR A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. MENTION ALSO BRIEFLY MADE OF GREECE WHERE MR. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT WE DECIDED ON STATEMENT AS EXPRESSION OF OUR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER FAILURE REGIME HONOR COMMITMENTS TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW, SET DATE FOR ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR RORNE'S REQUEST FOR CLEAR PICTURE OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN EFFORT REACH SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARABS, MR. SISCO SAID MOVEMENT TAKING PLACE ALONG THREE TRACKS. OF THESE THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT IS JARRING MISSION, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH JARRING SENT LAST WEEK TO ISRAEL AND THE UAR. SISCO SAID U.S. AGREES WITH GREATER INITIATIVE

OF JARRING AND SEES IT AS CONSISTENT WITH JARRING'S SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE. HE NOTED ISRAEL DID NOT AGREE WITH THE U.S. ON THIS POINT. ASSTSECY SISCO WENT ON SAY PROPOSAL WAS JARRING'S OWN. SISCO NOTED IT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO BREAKING THE IMPASSE ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE VERSUS WITHDRAWAL. SISCO NOTED UAR HAD RESPONDED LEAST EVENING IN A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE, NON-POLEMIC, AND POSITIVE WAY. IN PARTICULAR THE UAR RESPONSE TO JARRING'S AIDE MEMOIRE RESPONDS TO ISRAEL'S DESIRE TO RECEIVE A UAR COMMITMENT TO A PEACE AGREEMENT AND ALSO GIVES ISRAEL SOME CONCRETE TERMS OF THAT COMMITMENT. SISCO NOTED THAT AS HE TALKED WITH AMBASSADOR RORNE JARRING WAS PROBABLY DELIVERING THE UAR RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELIS. TAKING NOTE OF AMBASSADOR RORNE'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGATIVE ISRAELI REACTION TO JARRING'S INITIATIVE, SISCO SAID THAT EBAN HAD SAID THAT A POSITIVE UAR RESPONSE WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL TO ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE QUESTION OF BORDERS. SISCO SAID HE FELT UAR REPLY SHOULD SATISFY ISRAELI CONDITIONS FOR A POSITIVE

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RESPONSE.

2. SISCO AGREED WITH RONNE THAT THE EARLINESS OF THE UAR RESPONSE WAS HELPFUL AND IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY THE DANISH AMBASSADOR ABOUT BORDERS, SISCO NOTED THAT THE JARRING PROPOSAL ASKED FOR WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN CONTEXT FOR SOME ASSURANCES ABOUT SHARM AL-SHEIKH AND DMZ'S.

3. RONNE INQUIRED ABOUT SIGNIFICANCE OF MARCH 7 DATE FOR THE END OF PRESENT CEASEFIRE AND SISCO REPLIED BOTH SIDES HAD AN INTEREST IN PROLONGING CEASEFIRE BUT FINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DATE WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN ON THE VARIOUS TRACKS WHICH NOW PROVIDE FOR NEGOTIATION OF THE ISSUES.

4. SISCO WENT ON TO SAY THE SECOND TRACK WAS THE SUEZ PLAN WHICH SADAT PROPOSED FIRST IN SPEECH IN UAR AND THEN ELABORATED IN NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NEWSWEEK DISCUSSION HAD BEEN MODIFIED IN VERSION PUBLISHED IN UAR BUT SAID THAT COMMON PRACTICE OF THE EGYPTIAN REGIME AND HE FELT POSITIVE FEATURES IN NEWSWEEK ARTICLE EXPRESSED SADAT'S REAL INTENTIONS. SISCO NOTED THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD SAID NO TO THE OTHER ON THIS PROPOSAL AND THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY, IF NOT PROBABILITY, THAT THE PROPOSAL WILL AFFORD A GOOD CHANCE FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION BY BOTH PARTIES. RONNE ASKED IF NEW TEHRAN AGREEMENT ON OIL CRISIS MIGHT NOT INCREASE AMERICAN HOPES TO OPEN THE CANAL AGAIN AND SISCO REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY BUT WENT ON TO SET OUT THE MORE BASIC U.S. HOPE TO GET UAR AND ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON ANY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS, SEPARATE THE COMBATANTS, AND REPRESENT A STEP TOWARD AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. SISCO SAID THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO IMPEDE SUCH A MOVE.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF THE THIRD TRACK, WHICH CONCERNS GREAT POWER DISCUSSION ON GUARANTEES, SISCO MADE CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE PRELIMINARY AND THAT PACE AND SUBSTANCE WOULD BE SUBORDINATE AND SECONDARY TO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING. HE NOTED THAT THE SECOND OF THESE FOUR POWER MEETINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE TOMORROW AND THAT POWERS SUFFER HANDICAP NOT KNOWING WHAT EXACTLY IS TO BE GUARANTEED. ONCE ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES PROVIDE DETAILS OF SETTLEMENT, FOUR POWER SUPPLEMENTARY GUARANTEES CAN CONTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF SECURITY TO THE SETTLEMENT. THIS ELEMENT WOULD IN ANY CASE BE MARGINAL AND SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

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OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

7. RONNE ASKED ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL SAYING THAT THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY HAVE THE IDEA THE U.S. IS GOING FURTHER THAN IN THE PAST TO PROMOTE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ARABS. SISCO NOTED THAT IN THE LAST 48 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN TWO OPEN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. THE FIRST WAS SISCO'S OWN ENDORSEMENT ON TELEVISION PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION" OF GREATER INITIATIVE JARRING HAD EXERCISED UNDER HIS MANDATE FROM SECURITY COUNCIL. THE SECOND WAS STATEMENT THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL PREJUDICE SETTLEMENT AND CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS UNILATERAL ACTS. SISCO WENT ON TO SAY THAT ISRAEL MUST FACE UP TO U.S.-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES NOT ONLY ON THESE ISSUES BUT ON ROGERS PLAN AS A WHOLE AND SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF SETTLEMENT WAS AT ITS MOST CRITICAL STAGE SINCE THE TIME OF THE JUNE WAR.

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IN CONTEXT OF FOUR POWER TALKS WOULD BE SECONDARY TO JARRING MISSION. INITIAL PROCESS IS NEGOTIATION BETWEEN PARTIES.

10. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM AMBASSADOR RONNE ABOUT JORDAN, SISCO SAID THAT THE ISRAELI-JORDAN EXCHANGE WAS PAPER ONE AT PRESENT AND SERVED MERELY TO KEEP THE HOPE OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AFLOAT. NEITHER PARTY SAID SISCO HAD COME TO GRIPS WITH THE SERIOUS ISSUES YET. THIS EXCHANGE WAS PRESENTLY IN A WAITING PERIOD.

11. AMBASSADOR RONNE ASKED IF MR. SISCO FORESAW A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OR A PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFTER THE MARCH 7 CEASEFIRE DEADLINE AND SISCO SAID THAT ANYTHING WAS POSSIBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE HOPED PROGRESS COULD BE MADE AND SECURITY COUNCIL THEREFORE AVOIDED.

12. SISCO ALSO NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ABOUT GREECE ON "FACE THE NATION" REPRESENTED THE FAIR PUBLIC CRITICISM OF U.S. OFFICIALS OF THE REGIME IN GREECE. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THE GREEK AMBASSADOR HERE AFTERWARDS THAT HE WAS TEMPTED TO SAY ON TELEVISION THAT THE U.S. WAS MORE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAN IT LETS ON THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD NOT KEPT ITS COMMITMENT TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW AND SET A DATE FOR ELECTIONS. HE TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT U.S. HAD DISCUSSED WITH ITS NATO ALLIES THAT U.S. HAD NO INTENTION TO ENTER INTO GREEK DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BUT WISHES GREEK GOVERNMENT TO KNOW THAT ITS DISAPPOINTMENT IN THIS MATTER WAS DEEP. RONNE ASKED IF THE KING MIGHT STILL COME BACK TO GREECE AFTER HIS LONG ABSENCE AND SISCO NOTED THE USG BELIEVED THE KING STILL HAD POSITIVE ROLE TO PLAY. SISCO SAID THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE KING AND WOULD BE INCREASINGLY IN CONTACT WITH HIM IN THE FUTURE. ROGERS.

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1. SWISS AMBASSADOR FELIX SCHNYDER CALLED ON ASST. SECY. SISCO FEBRUARY 11 FOR BRIEFING ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST.
2. SISCO SAID WE SEE EVENTS PROCEEDING ALONG THREE TRACKS. FIRST, JARRING HAS BEEN TAKING MORE INITIATIVE IN PAST WEEK AND IS BEGINNING TO EXPLORE CRITICAL ISSUES WITH PARTIES TO DISPUTE. BOTH TEL AVIV AND CAIRO ARE WRESTLING WITH THESE PROBLEMS NOW.
3. SECOND TRACK RELATES TO SADAT'S PROPOSAL AIMED AT OPENING SUEZ CANAL. SISCO NOTED THAT THIS SEEMS TO BE A STEP SEPARATE FROM A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. MRS. MEIR'S REPLY TO SADAT'S PROPOSAL INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO TALK ABOUT IT WITH UAR AND LEFT DOOR OPEN FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. SISCO VIEWS THESE TWO TRACKS AS COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES. HE SAID THAT USG HAS NEVER TAKEN ANY PARTICULAR INITIATIVE ON QUESTION OF REOPENING CANAL APART FROM AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, BUT OUR ATTITUDE IS THAT IF PARTIES CAN AGREE ON ANY STEP FORWARD, NO MATTER HOW SMALL, THAT WOULD IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND LESSEN PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT, WE ARE FOR IT.
4. THIRD TRACK IS US PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION OF SUPPLEMENTARY GUARANTEES IN FOUR-POWER TALKS. WE WILL BEGIN THESE DISCUSSIONS IN A PRELIMINARY MANNER AT FEB. 12 MEETING OF THE FOUR. WE VIEW THESE DISCUSSIONS AS AN EXERCISE SUBORDINATE AND COMPLEMENTARY TO DIRECT, CENTRAL PROCESS OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. PACE AND SUBSTANCE OF TALKS ON GUARANTEES WILL BE BASED ON PROGRESS OF JARRING TALKS, I.E. IF LATTER CONTINUE IN A SERIOUS VEIN AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT CARRIED ON IN PUBLIC FORUM, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, SISCO NOTED THAT IF THERE IS SERIOUS MOVE TO SUBSTITUTE FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS FOR CENTRAL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, US WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER SUSPENSION OF ITS PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSIONS ON GUARANTEES. SISCO NOTED THAT OUR CONDITIONS FOR BEGINNING THESE TALKS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY SATISFIED. ALTHOUGH UAR DID NOT CALL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AT END OF JANUARY, THERE WAS NOT A REASONABLE EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE. WE DO NOT CONSIDER 30 DAYS A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT SHORT, ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES CREATE DIFFICULTIES. SCHNYDER OBSERVED THAT FOUR-POWER TALKS ON GUARANTEES

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HAVE TO OPERATE IN TANDEM WITH JARRING TALKS. DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN JARRING TALKS WOULD SO AFFECT WHATEVER GUARANTEES FOUR MIGHT AGREE ON THAT IT WOULD BE USELESS FOR FOUR TO CONTINUE TALKING WITHOUT MOVING IN PARALLEL WITH JARRING.

5. SCHNYDER ASKED IF SADAT'S PROPOSAL ON REOPENING SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY UAR AND ISRAEL THROUGH JARRING. SISCO SAID HE DOUBTED JARRING WOULD BE PERSON TO DEAL WITH BUT WAS UNSURE HOW DISCUSSIONS WOULD PROCEED. SCHNYDER OBSERVED THAT MOST IMPORTANT THING AT THIS STAGE OF TALKS IS TO GET PARTIES TO LAY THEIR CARDS ON TABLE AND OBSERVED THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD DONE SO YET. SISCO SAID WE ARE RAPIDLY REACHING THAT STAGE BUT NOTED THAT PAPERS THUS FAR PRESENTED BY BOTH SIDES HAVE DEALT WITH ALL MAJOR POINTS OF SC RESOLUTION 242.

6. SCHNYDER OBSERVED THAT HUSSEIN SEEMS TO BE IN FIRM CONTROL OF JORDAN AND NOTED THAT HUSSEIN'S RELATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN AND REACTIONS OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO EVENTS IN JORDAN ILLUSTRATE FACT THAT EACH ARAB COUNTRY SEEMS TO OPERATE IN ITS OWN INTEREST RATHER THAN ON BASIS OF ARAB UNITY. SISCO AGREED AND POINTED OUT EXAMPLE OF SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO REOPENING OF TAPLINE WHICH WAS WELCOMED BY OIL COMPANIES. WE BELIEVE SARG MADE THIS MOVE PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF CRITICAL NEED OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SISCO SAID HIS JUDGMENT WAS THAT OPEC COUNTRIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUSPEND OIL PRODUCTION AND THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED.

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BEGIN SUMMARY: NETHERLANDS'S AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN SAW DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES (NEA) JANUARY 29 TO PASS ON SUBSTANCE RECENT REMARKS NETHERLAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS TO AMBASSADOR JARRING. LUNS URGED JARRING ADVANCE NEGOTIATIONS BY ADVANCING OWN IDEAS RATHER THAN MERELY TRANSMITTING OPINIONS OF OTHERS. JARRING SAID VAN LYNDEN DECLINED. LUNS URGED JARRING SUGGEST TO ISRAELIS FORMULA EXPLICITLY MENTIONING WITHDRAWAL IN CONNECTION WITH A PERMANENT PEACE. JARRING FELT BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS WOULD REJECT THIS FORMULATION. DAVIES THOUGHT LUNS INITIATIVE USEFUL AND DISCUSSED PROSPECTS OF JARRING MISSION AS SEEN NOW IN DEPARTMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. VAN LYNDEN SAID NETHERLAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS HAD SPOKEN TO JARRING ON MONDAY, JANUARY 18, TO SUGGEST THE UN EMISSARY NOT RESTRICT HIMSELF TO EXPRESSING THE VIEWS OF OTHERS BUT GIVE HIS PERSONAL OPINIONS TO THE PARTIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. LUNS SUGGESTED TO JARRING THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT STATE THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE IF A PEACE TREATY IS SIGNED. AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN REPORTED JARRING VERY RESERVED ABOUT EXPRESSING HIS OWN VIEWS. JARRING SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS APPEAR TO HAVE NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING SHARM AL-SHAYKH IN ANY WITHDRAWAL AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD DENOUNCE ANY FORMULA THAT STOPS SHORT OF COMPLETE EVACUATION. JARRING SAID HE HAD TALKED ON RECENT TRIP TO ISRAEL TO MRS. MEIR ABOUT WITHDRAWAL BUT SHE HAD DECLINED TO ALTER THE ISRAELI POSITION. ACCORDING LUNS, JARRING THEN COMMENTED TO MRS. MEIR THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW BORDERS COULD BE SO IMPORTANT IN THE MODERN AGE WHEN WHOLE CITIES COULD BE KNOCKED OFF THE MAP BY AIR.

2. MR. DAVIES REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE LUNS APPROACH TO JARRING TO INVOLVE HIMSELF MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY. DAVIES NOTED THAT IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS MANDATED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH STATES CONCERNED TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT. JARRING SAID DAVIES INTERPRETS THIS MANDATE NARROWLY, AS RESPONSIBILITY SIMPLY TO FACILITATE CONTACTS AND TRANSMIT OPINIONS. HE HAS RESISTED EFFORTS TO PERSUADE HIM TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEWS, IN PART BECAUSE OF STRONG ISRAELI INSISTENCE HE LIMIT HIMSELF TO THIS ROLE. DAVIES NOTED IN THE

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JUNE U.S. INITIATIVE ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES ACCORDING TO SUCH PROCEDURES AS JARRING HIMSELF DETERMINED. THIS GAVE JARRING WIDER SCOPE IN U.S. EYES AND U.S. HAS ACCORDINGLY SUGGESTED JARRING INVOLVE HIMSELF IN SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO GREATER EXTENT. DAVIES NOTED THAT JARRING HAD EXTRACTED FROM THE RECENT UAR PROPOSAL SOME TENDENTIOUS ELEMENTS BEFORE HE PASSED THE PROPOSAL ON TO THE ISRAELIS.

3. AMBASSADOR VAN LYNDEN SAID HE CONFUSED WHETHER THERE WERE ONE OR TWO UAR DOCUMENTS. MR. DAVIES SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THERE WAS ONLY A SINGLE DOCUMENT WHICH HAD, HOWEVER, BEEN EDITED BY JARRING BEFORE IT WAS HANDED TO THE ISRAELIS. DAVIES NOTED PUBLICITY IN JEUNE AFRIQUE OF ISRAELI NOTE WHICH JARRING HAD BEEN GIVEN TO FORWARD TO THE JORDANIANS AND SAID IT WAS SPECULATED THAT A PALESTINIAN SOURCE ARRANGED FOR RELEASE OF NOTE TO THE TUNISIAN EDITOR OF JEUNE AFRIQUE. IN ANY CASE, WHEN UAR READ NOTE IT BECAME SUSPICIOUS THIS WAS ISRAELI LEAK. UAR, THEREFORE, PUBLISHED ITS OWN ORIGINAL AND UNEDITED NOTE. THIS IS THE BEST EXPLANATION DAVIES KNEW FOR THE SOURCE OF STORY ABOUT TWO, DIFFERING UAR NOTES. DAVIES SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOUNDER BECAUSE OF PUBLICATION OF FIRST ROUND OF EXCHANGES.

4. VAN LYNDEN ASKED WHETHER OR NOT AMBASSADOR JARRING WOULD RELEASE A STATEMENT SAYING THERE HAD BEEN SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN THE TALKS TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING CEASEFIRE BEYOND FEBRUARY 5. DAVIES SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE CEASEFIRE COULD OFFICIALLY EXPIRE WITHOUT SHOOTING ACTUALLY STARTING AND NOTED SADAT'S RECENT SPEECH DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ACTUAL HOSTILITIES. SAID HE UNDERSTOOD UTHANT POSSIBLY WOULD RELEASE A STATEMENT ABOUT THE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS ON MONDAY.

5. DAVIES ALSO NOTED THAT THE RECENT ISRAELI PROPOSALS ON PEACE WERE SO CLOSE TO WHAT SOVIETS AND ARABS HAD ALREADY INDICATED ACCEPTABLE THAT BOTH WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY REJECTING THEM WITHOUT FURTHER CONSIDERATION. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAELI LABOR PARTY POSITIONS ON TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION WERE CLEAR, OFFICIAL ISRAELI POLICY REMAINED THAT NO POSITION ON TERRITORY WOULD BE TAKEN EXCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER SIDE. HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE

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MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL AS NO ARAB COMMITMENT TO PEACE COULD BE TIED TO SURRENDER OF LANDS. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. POSITION REMAINS AS OUTLINED IN FORMULATIONS OF OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1969. IN REPLY TO VAN LYNDEN'S INQUIRY, AGREED THAT LEAVING SHARM AL-SHAYKH AND SINAI CORRIDOR IN ISRAELI HANDS WOULD BE A MORE THAN INSUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. DAVIES NOTED THAT U.S. POSITION WAS THAT SECURITY ASPECTS SHARM AL-SHAYKH, DEMILITARIZATION OF SINAI, AND DISPOSITION OF GAZA WERE POINTS TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN PARTIES IN CONTEXT FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL TO FORMER INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER.

6. IN REPLY SUMMARY STATEMENT BY DAVIES THAT TALKS GAVE REASON FOR GUARDED OPTIMISM, VAN LYNDEN RELATED KING FAISAL HAD TOLD NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS RECENTLY THAT ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S RECENT SPEECH IN ARABIC WAS IN SOME WAYS ENCOURAGING. ROGERS.

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

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REFS: (A) ALGIERS 1459; (B) STATE 157259

1. DEPARTMENT REGRETS PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE CAUSED BY CHANGES IN YOUR TRAVEL PLANS. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, REMAIN AT YOUR POST AS LONG AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR ROME IN ORDER TO BE FULLY CURRENT AREA DEVELOPMENTS.

2. YOU SHOULD ALSO PLAN FOR REASON CITED REF B TO RETURN TO ALGIERS FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK FOLLOWING MEETING IN ITALY.
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APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPH J SISCO
AFN: MR BRAY
USIA: MR CONGLETON (DRAFT)
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S E C R E T STATE 204880

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON MIDDLE EAST

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1. SECRETARY IS MAKING MAJOR POLICY SPEECH ON MIDDLE EAST AT 8:00 PM EST TONIGHT, DEC. 9. FORUM WILL BE GALAXY CONFERENCE ON ADULT EDUCATION IN WASHINGTON. SPEECH WILL BE CARRIED ON WIRELESS FILE AND ON VOA BREAKFAST SHOW DEC. 10. POSTS SHOULD GET FULL TEXT TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT OF FILE.

2. NEITHER ARABS NOR ISRAELIS WILL BE SATISFIED WITH SPEECH, BUT IT IS BALANCED STATEMENT OF WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE FAIR APPROACH TO A JUST SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL CRISIS, OUTLINING POLICY THAT WILL REQUIRE BOTH SIDES TO MAKE COMPROMISES. BY "JUST" WE MEAN SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL PRESERVE ESSENTIAL INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES WITHIN FRAME WORK OF SC RESOLUTION 242 AND WILL PROMOTE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF HUMAN BEINGS INVOLVED. ARABS WILL BE CRITICAL OF EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS, OF FAILURE CALL FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, OF IMPLICIT EXCLUSION OF SYRIA, OF JERUSALEM PRINCIPLES WHICH FORESEE BOTH ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN ROLE IN UNIFIED CITY, AND OF REFUGEE LANGUAGE WHICH BALANCES DESIRES OF REFUGEES WITH LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF GOVERNMENTS OF AREA. ISRAELIS WILL BE CRITICAL OF RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE ON BOUNDARY CHANGES AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON ISRAEL- UAR BOUNDARY, OF REFUGEE AND JERUSALEM LANGUAGE AND, MORE GENERALLY, OF WHOLE CONCEPT OF OUR STATING WHAT WE THINK OUTER LIMITS OF PARTIES' NEGOTIATING POSITIONS SHOULD BE.

3. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS WHICH POSTS IN ARAB WORLD SHOULD EMPHASIZE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS:

(A) SPEECH IS AFFIRMATION OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN NEAR EAST AND OUR DESIRE FIND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN INTEREST ALL PARTIES AND NOT TO HELP JUST ONE SIDE.

(B) IT REAFFIRMS OUR ATTACHMENT TO AND SUPPORT FOR UNSC RESOLUTION OF NOV. 22, 1967.

(C) IT REAFFIRMS OUR VIEW THAT BASIC AND INTERRELATED ISSUES ARE PEACE, SECURITY AND WITHDRAWAL. WE DO NOT THINK IT FAIR TO ASK ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT HAVING AGREEMENT ON PEACE, BUT WE ALSO DO NOT THINK IT FAIR TO EXPECT ARABS TO MAKE PEACE UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDRAWS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RES.

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(D) SPEECH EXPRESSES OUR BELIEF OBLIGATIONS OF PEACE MUST BE SPELLED OUT AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO SAFEGUARD SECURITY OF ARABS AS WELL AS ISRAELIS. IN THIS REGARD, IT REAFFIRMS OUR SUPPORT FOR SC RESOLUTION ENDORSEMENT OF PRINCIPLE OF NON-ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND ITS CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE TO BOUNDARIES WHICH ARE AGREED TO BY PARTIES, MEANING ISRAEL AS WELL AS ARABS, WE THINK THAT ANY DEVIATIONS FROM OLD ARMISTICE LINES SHOULD BE INSUBSTANTIAL AND WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED OUR BELIEF BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE OLD INTERNATIONAL LINE. WE DO NOT SUPPORT ISRAELI TERRITORIAL EXPANSION, BUT WE DO SUPPORT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

(E) ON QUESTION OF REFUGEES, PRINCIPAL EMPHASIS IS ON DESIRES AND ASPIRATIONS OF PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES, THOUGH OF COURSE, LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF GOVERNMENTS IN AREA MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

(F) ON JERUSALEM, WE BELIEVE CITY SHOULD BE UNIFIED, WITH FREEDOM OF ACCESS FOR ALL, WITH ROLE FOR JORDAN AS WELL AS ISRAEL IN ITS CIVIC, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS LIFE. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH POLICY WE HAVE MAINTAINED FOR 20 YEARS. WE HOPE THAT AGREEMENT ON OTHER ISSUES WILL MAKE AGREEMENT ON THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE AS WELL AS ON REFUGEES ATTAINABLE.

(G) SPEECH CATEGORICALLY REJECTS ASSERTION WE TRYING TO DIVIDE ARAB STATES BY URGING ONE OF THEM TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR FROM OUTSET THAT WE ENVISAGE PACKAGE IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS INVOLVING UAR, JORDAN AND OTHERS WHO ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. WE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED OURSELVES TO SYRIAN ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT IN ABSENCE SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE RESOLUTION, BUT WOULD OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO DO SO IN EVENT SYRIA FORMALLY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION AND REQUESTED BE INCLUDED IN SCOPE JARRING'S MISSION.

(H) SPEECH DOES NOT ENDORSE ISRAELI DEMAND FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR HANDS-OFF POLICY BY MAJOR POWERS. RATHER, IT TAKES PRAGMATIC AND REALISTIC APPROACH THAT AGREEMENT CALLED FOR BY RESOLUTION 242 CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION.

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BETWEEN PARTIES AND THAT JARRING PROVIDES INSTRUMENT FOR GETTING SUCH A PROCESS STARTED. IN OUR VIEW, ONCE FRAMEWORK IS ESTABLISHED WHICH RULES OUT ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM, THERE CAN BE NO REASONABLE BAR TO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE TRADITIONAL AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEANS OF SETTLING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. RECOGNIZING ARAB POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES ON THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER, WE HAVE COUNCHED NEGOTIATION LANGUAGE IN TERMS OF EARLIER ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS AT RHODES -- LANGUAGE WHICH WE AND SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO IN OUR BILATERAL TALKS AND WHICH WAS SUGGESTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD'S COMMENTS TO US IN NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER.

4. FOR TEL AVIV: YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE FOLLOWING IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS:

(A) IN SUBSTANCE, SPEECH SETS FORTH IN COMPREHENSIVE FORM US POSITIONS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED TO GOI. IT EMPHASIZES NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND PROTECTS ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE NEGOTIATING POSITION WITHIN FRAME WORK ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 242. IT STRESSES NEED FOR ARABS TO AGREE TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND FOR SECURITY SAFEGUARDS WORKED OUT BY PARTIES THEMSELVES UNDER JARRING.

(B) WE HAVE MADE THIS POLICY STATEMENT AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF NEED TO CORRECT MISINTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POSITION ON EVE OF ARAB SUMMIT AND AS WE RESUME FOUR POWER EFFORTS IN NEW YORK.

(C) WE URGE ISRAELIS TO RETAIN OPEN MIND AND FLEXIBLE PUBLIC POSITION ON SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. WE WILL OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN FULL ANY QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS GOI MAY HAVE, BOTH NOW AND WHEN WE SEE EBAN DECEMBER 16.

5. FOR PARIS AND LONDON: AS REQUESTED BY SCHUMANN IN MEETING WITH SECRETARY, WE HAVE PROVIDED ADVANCE TEXT OF SPEECH TO FRENCH EMBASSY HERE. HAVE ALSO GIVEN TEXT TO UK EMBASSY.

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SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER LARAKI'S VISIT

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON FYI, SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW:

1. SUMMARY CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT WILL BE FORWARDED SEPTEL.

2. PRIME MINISTER LARAKI AND AMBASSADOR OSMAN MET WITH SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES SISCO AND NEWSOM AND AMBASSADOR WITMAN JUNE 5 FOR MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF HOURS, INCLUDING LUNCH. TENOR OF CONVERSATIONS WAS CORDIAL AND FRANK. WE BELIEVE PRIME MINISTER LEFT WASHINGTON IMPRESSED WITH RECEPTION AND AMOUNT OF ATTENTION HE RECEIVED. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF CONVERSATIONS.

3. DURING OPENING CALL ON SECRETARY, LARAKI STATED:

A. NASSER'S APPEAL WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT AND SHOULD BE GIVEN PROPER CONSIDERATION

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B. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

C. ISRAEL ENJOYS CLEAR SUPERIORITY AS RESULT OF US ASSISTANCE; AND

D. SOVIET INTERESTS WERE BEING ADVANCED IN MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN WHILE FREE WORLD INFLUENCE WAS RECEDING.

4. SECRETARY NOTED ARABS HAD NEVER ACCEPTED A NEGOTIATED PEACE WHILE IT OBVIOUS ISRAEL COULD ONLY ACCEPT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT KNOWING RESULTS. IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET BOTH PARTIES WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE DIRECT OR INDIRECT. SECRETARY POINTED OUT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ACCORDING RHODES FORMULA. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER NASSER SHOWED ANY WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS.

5. DURING LUNCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO NOTED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO WHICH WE DID NOT HAVE SATISFACTORY ANSWERS.

A) CAN NASSER ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT ON ANYTHING LESS THAN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL? (LARAKI DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND.)

B) IF ONE ACCEPTS FOUR MAJOR U.S. ACTIONS--OFFERING FAWZI OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW RELATIONS, ENGAGEMENT IN FOUR-POWER TALKS OVER ISRAEL OBJECTIONS, ADOPTION OF ROGERS' PLAN WHICH GOLDA MEIER CALLED "TREASONOUS", DEFERRAL OF JET SALES TO ISRAEL--THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN ON ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE, HOW CAN ARABS CONTINUE TO CLAIM U.S. POLICY IS PRO-ISRAELI? (LARAKI SAID MOROCCO HAD URGED NASSER RENEW RELATIONS AND INDICATED APPRECIATION US EFFORTS GET TALKS GOING.)

C) IF WE WERE TO TALK WITH PALESTINIANS, ARE THERE ANY WE COULD TALK WITH WHO NOT DEDICATED TO DESTRUCTION ISRAEL? (LARAKI THOUGHT FATAH WOULD BE USEFUL TO TALK TO THOUGH HE DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY ON GROUP'S OBJECTIVES.)

6. SISCO ALSO STATED NASSER'S MAY 1 APPEAL BEING GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT FOR AIRCRAFT. WE WILL RESPOND TO NASSER APPEAL DIRECTLY, QUIETLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY,

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FEELING DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH HIM PREFERABLE TO COMMUNICATION THROUGH THIRD PARTIES.

7. SECRETARY ASKED LARAKI WHAT NASSER WANTED. IF PURPOSE IN SENDING EMISSARY TO RABAT WAS SOLELY TO GET KING HASSAN TO USE HIS INFLUENCE PREVENT SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL, THAT WAS NON-STARTER. BUT IF, ON OTHER HAND, NASSER GENUINELY INTERESTED IN SEEKING POLITICAL SOLUTION, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP.

8. LARAKI REPLIED KING HASSAN THOUGHT NASSER WANTED PEACE. HOWEVER, ISRAEL AS STRONGER SHOULD MAKE CONCESSION OF WITHDRAWING FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TALK.

9. SECRETARY OBSERVED THIS WAS UNREALISTIC. IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY FIRST. WHEN LARAKI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO CONVEY TO NASSER ANY SUGGESTIONS US MIGHT HAVE, SECRETARY ASKED WHAT MOROCCANS THOUGHT WOULD HELP. LARAKI SAID HE WAS SURE KING WOULD BE WILLING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH NASSER TO SET UP SECRET MEETINGS ON MOROCCAN SOIL IF THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IF MOROCCANS COULD PERSUADE NASSER TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO MOROCCO OR ELSEWHERE FOR SUCH TALKS, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, US WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE ON ISRAELIS TO SEND THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES.

10. LUNCHEON DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH REITERATED EXPRESSIONS BY PRIME MINISTER OF OUR INENTITY OF VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEM. IN PARTING, LARAKI HINTED IN FACT KING MIGHT LIKE PURSUE THESE QUESTIONS IN WASHINGTON SOMETIME IN NEAR FUTURE BUT IN SETTING NEW DATE TO VISIT TWO DAYS WOULD BE REQUIRED.
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(A) SECRETARY WELCOMES EL PASO-SONATRACH PROJECT

(B) IT IS DEPARTMENT'S UNDERSTANDING FROM EL PASO REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE ARE TWO MAJOR OBSTACLES REMAINING: FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION APPROVAL AND FINANCING.

(C) WITH REGARD TO FPC, FORMIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FPC IS INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY OF USG OVER WHICH NEITHER PRESIDENT NOR SECRETARY OF STATE EXERCISES CONTROL. FPC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATING LAWS PERTAINING INTER ALIA TO NATURAL GAS. ONLY APPEAL TO ITS DECISIONS IS IN FEDERAL COURTS. IT IS DEPARTMENT'S UNDERSTANDING THAT FPC WILL BE REQUIRED TO HOLD FORMAL HEARINGS ON EL PASO-SONATRACH ACCORD IN VIEW OF ITS SIZE AND UNPRECEDENTED NATURE. TO EMPHASIZE LATTER POINT, YOU SHOULD NOTE FPC, BECAUSE IT PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH INTERSTATE MATTERS, HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY HELD FORMAL HEARINGS ON APPLICATION DIRECTLY INVOLVING FOREIGN COUNTRY. BECAUSE THIS WILL BE FIRST SUCH HEARINGS, SECRETARY DOES NOT YET KNOW WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, DEPARTMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY IN FPC HEARINGS.

(D) WITH REGARD TO FINANCING, DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS FROM EL PASO THAT U.S. BANKERS ARE RELUCTANT TO HELP FINANCE SONATRACH PORTION OF PROJECT WITHOUT SOME KIND OF GUARANTEES AND/OR PARTICIPATION BY US GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. AID INVESTMENT GUARANTY AGREEMENT IS NOT ONE OF POSSIBILITIES AT THIS TIME. IT IS SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED BY LAW AS LONG AS THERE ARE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. EVEN WITH RELATIONS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE SUCH AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF OUTSTANDING PRE-1967 UNSETTLED CLAIMS AND 1967 SEIZURES OF AMERICAN FIRMS. IN ADDITION AID IS NOT PRESENTLY ISSUING GUARANTEES FOR THIS TYPE OF PROJECT. EXIMBANK DOES NOT HAVE SAME LEGAL BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION, ALTHOUGH IT IS GUIDED BY MOST OF SAME CONSIDERATIONS. EXIMBANK OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY OF DEPARTMENT AND REPORTS DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS. IT HAS FIVE FULL TIME DIRECTORS, APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT WITH CONSENT OF SENATE, WHO PROVIDE POLICY AND OPERATIONAL DIRECTION. DEPARTMENT IS NOT REPRESENTED ON BOARD AND ITS ROLE IS ONLY ADVISORY THROUGH OBSERVERS AND LIAISON. EXIMBANK'S WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY PROJECT AND EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IS BASED ON COMMERCIAL RISK AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS. IN CASE OF EL PASO-SONATRACH PROJECT IT WOULD, IN SECRETARY'S OPINION, ALSO BE INFLUENCED BY STATUS OF



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OUR GENERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS AT TIME OF APPLICATION AND PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITH AMERICAN FIRMS. AS FOREIGN MINISTER AWARE EXIMBANK HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO HELP FINANCE ALGERIAN PURCHASE OF TWO BOEING 727'S. FORMIN MAY REST ASSURED THAT SECRETARY WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE A PERSONAL AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN EXIMBANK POLICY TOWARD ALGERIA.

3. IN VIEW OF COMPLEXITY THESE QUESTIONS AND UPCOMING FPC HEARINGS, (POSSIBLY WITHIN THREE MONTHS) WHICH WILL BE PUBLIC, SECRETARY ENCOURAGES GOA TO EXPAND ITS INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON AT AN EARLY DATE WITH PERSONNEL COMPETENT IN LEGAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS. (END OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY).

4. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS OCCASION OR NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HAMDANI, ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY, IF HE AWARE OF SUGGESTION THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM HAD MADE TO PROMINENT ALGERIAN (ZEGHAR) LAST FALL THAT, IN VIEW OF ACT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WAS SOONER OR LATER LIKELY TO BE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, ALGERIA MIGHT FIND IT CONVENIENT TO RESUME RELATIONS BY SENDING NEW HEAD OF INTERESTS SECTION AS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND DROP PROTECTION OF EMBASSY OF GUINEA. OUR INTERESTS SECTION ALGIERS WOULD DO LIKEWISE. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST TO HAMDANI THAT, IF HE THINKS THERE IS ALGERIAN INTEREST IN NEWSOM PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME, YOU WILL ASK THAT IT BE REVIVED.

5. FYI: WE DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE PRESSING ALGERIANS FOR RESUMPTION, BUT IT IS INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS THAT SUCCESS OF EL-PASO-SONATRACH PROJECT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED IF RESUMPTION TOOK PLACE. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO ALGERIANS, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO SIMPLE TRADE OFF BETWEEN RESUMPTION AND FPC APPROVAL, AND EXIMBANK PARTICIPATION. RESUMPTION IS ONLY ONE OF MANY FACTORS INVOLVED. END FYI.
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN-ISRAEL PROPOSALS

REF: ALGIERS 2277

1. TEXT OF JORDAN-ISRAEL PROPOSALS BEING SENT TO YOU IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

2. AS REQUESTED IN ALGIERS 2277, YOU MAY PASS TEXT PROPOSALS TO BOUTEFLIKA AND BOUMEDIENE WITH CAVEAT THAT FACT WE HAVE GIVEN TEXT TO THEM BE HELD CLOSELY.

GP-3.
RICHARDSON

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 177074

INFO OCT 01, 1946 R

095134

S E C R E T STATE 177074

REF: STATE 176130

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 327

SUMMARY

PAGE 01 STATE 176130

82

ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 R

66636

DRAFTED BY: AF/N: ALLOWRIE

APPROVED BY: AF/MR NEWSOM

S/S: MR BROWN

AF/N: MR BRAY

087367

R 170002Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

SECRET STATE 176130

EXDIS

SUBJ: RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS.

REF: ALGIERS 1858

1. DEPARTMENT GRATIFIED BY IMPROVED TONE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AS RESULT SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BOUTEFLIKA WHICH COMES AGAINST BACKGROUND EL PASO AGREEMENT AND OTHER BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS. WE ASSUME AND ACCEPT BOUTEFLIKA'S SUGGESTION FOR UPGRADING ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION, WASHINGTON, INTENDED AS POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS EVENTUAL DIPLOMATIC RESUMPTION.

2. YOU MAY INFORM ALGERIANS THAT IN RESPONSE TO FONMIN'S SUGGESTION FOR DESIGNATION OF INDIVIDUALS ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION MAY LOOK TO CHARLES BRAY (ACTING DIRECTOR AF/N) AS OFFICIAL CONTACT MAN IN WASHINGTON. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING YOUR REPORT OF SIMILAR ACTION BY GOA.

3. AT SAME TIME DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT FOREGOING IS ESSENTIALLY EXTENSION OF DE FACTO SITUATION NOW PREVAILING ALGIERS AND WASHINGTON AND STOPS SHORT OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RESUMPTION AT CHARGE LEVEL WHICH WE WOULD CONTINUE HOPE ACHIEVE IN TIME. WE SEE CERTAIN ADVANTAGE THEREFORE IN ALLOWING SPECULATION ON RESUMPTION AS RESULT OF LE MONDE STORY (ALGIERS 1858) TO RUN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ITS COURSE, SINCE SUCH SPECULATION COULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR GOA EVENTUALLY TO RESUME. IN ANY CASE, WE PREFER THAT YOU LET ALGERIANS MAKE THE DENIALS IF THEY WISH TO.

4. IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GOA OFFICIALS OR INTERMEDIARIES SUCH AS ZEGHAR, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO POINT OUT THAT IN ABSENCE OF FORMAL RELATIONS, USG MAY BE UNABLE TO SATISFY ALGERIAN NEEDS. IN INTERESTS OF FRANKNESS AND LONG RANGE U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS WE WISH TO MAKE THIS CLEAR AT THIS TIME AND NOT WAIT UNTIL USG TAKES ACTION WHICH GOA MIGHT VIEW AS PUNITIVE.

ROGERS

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481/10/5620

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TELEGRAM

SEP 25 AM 8:44

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 162542

GOA COULD SERVE USEFUL ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY, SUGGESTING THAT CONTACTS BETWEEN USG AND PALESTINIANS COULD BE ARRANGED IN ALGIERS.

4. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT ZEGHAR WAS LEADING UP TO BUT NEWSOM QUICKLY MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD ALGERIAN FEELINGS, IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO LINK PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WITH OUR BILATERAL CONCERN TO IMPROVE ALGERIAN-US RELATIONS. HE SAID THERE WAS NO VALUE IN TAKING ON INTRACTABLE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN THIS CONTEXT AND EMPHASIZED IMPOSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH PALESTINIANS IN ALGERIA, NOTING THAT PALESTINIAN GROUPS WERE DIVIDED AMONG THEMSELVES AND NOT JURIDICAL ENTITY RECOGNIZED BY UN OR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY. NEWSOM STRESSED THAT USG ABILITY TO MAKE FAVORABLE MOVE TOWARD ARABS IS PARTLY FUNCTION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. MANNER IN WHICH SOME ARAB STATES BROKE RELATIONS AND PROLONGED NONRESUMPTION HAS HAD UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE DEPRIVING THEMSELVES OF IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR EXPRESSING ARAB VIEWPOINT. BY RENEWING RELATIONS COUNTRIES LIKE ALGERIA WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION PRESENT ARAB CAUSE. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE STEP THAN EXPECTING US TO MAKE FAVORABLE MOVE.

5. IT WAS ALSO EMPHASIZED TO ZEGHAR THAT ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MIGHT SOON HAVE ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEVELOPING US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. WE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT AMERICAN INVESTMENT BANKERS, WHOSE CLIENTS HAVE REQUESTED THEM TO RAISE LARGE AMOUNTS OF CAPITAL FOR PROJECTS IN ALGERIA (SOME OF WHICH CONNECTED WITH EL PASO DEAL), HAVE TOLD DEPARTMENT THAT AS SONATRACH AND ALGERIA LITTLE KNOWN US CAPITAL MARKET, AVERAGE INVESTOR LIKELY REQUIRE AS MINIMUM ASSURANCE HIS GOVERNMENT ENJOYS SATISFACTORY RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. BY SAME TOKEN USG WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY HAVE TO TAKE POSITION ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP (WE CITED EXIM CREDIT FOR BOEINGS), AND IT WOULD BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT ADOPT POSITIVE STAND IF WE COULD NOT CITE IMPROVEMENT AT POLITICAL LEVEL.

6. NEWSOM SUGGESTED THAT YOUR DEPARTURE IN ABOUT ONE MONTH AND ASSIGNMENT OF NEW CHIEF OF US INTERESTS SECTION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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IN ALGIERS WOULD PROVIDE GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR REESTABLISHING RELATIONS AT CHARGE LEVEL, WITH MINIMUM PUBLICITY. YOUR SUCCESSOR WOULD ARRIVE AS CHARGE, BOUSSELHAM COULD ARRIVE HERE AS CHARGE, AND OUR RESPECTIVE FOREIGN PROTECTION BE QUIETLY DROPPED. EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS COULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL LATER.

7. ZEGHAR SEEMED SOMEWHAT TAKEN ABACK BUT EXPRESSED INTEREST IN SUGGESTION AND SAID HE WOULD PUT IT TO BOUMEDIENE UPON HIS RETURN TO ALGIERS LATTER PART OF SEPTEMBER. IN ORDER AVOID COMPLICATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY, IT WAS AGREED SUGGESTION WOULD BE PASSED AS PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM NEWSOM. ZEGHAR WILL PROBABLY TRANSMIT REPLY TO YOU.

8. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT, IF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WERE NECESSARY, THEY COULD BE CONDUCTED THROUGH YOU OR DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE COULD VISIT ALGIERS. NEWSOM EXPRESSED HIS FULL CONFIDENCE IN YOU AND MENTIONED THAT IF BOUMEDIENE WERE TO SEE YOU PRIOR TO YOUR DEPARTURE, IT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED HERE.

9. COMMENT: ZEGHAR'S AUTHORITY NOT CLEAR AND HE MAY HAVE BEEN SIMPLY FREE-WHEELING, BUT HE CARRIED DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT AND PRESUMABLY WILL GIVE REASONABLE ACCOUNT OF INTERVIEW TO BOUMEDIENE. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR WE HAD NO DESIRE CIRCUMVENT NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT HE DISPARAGED BOUTEFLIKA'S ROLE AND GAVE IMPRESSION FOREIGN MINISTER MAY BE ON SKIDS. ZEGHAR DID NOT EVEN THINK WE SHOULD DISCUSS RESUMPTION QUESTION IN DETAIL WITH BOUSSELHAM, WHO HE SAID WOULD "REPORT EVERYTHING TO BOUTEFLIKA." (WE TAKE ZEGHAR'S OBVIOUS ANTI-PATHY TO BOUTEFLIKA AS WARNING SIGNAL TO PROCEED CAREFULLY WITH EITHER ONE.)

10. DETERMINATION WITH WHICH ZEGHAR PLEADED PALESTINIAN CAUSE INDICATED THAT IN ADDITION TO PROBING FOR ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS TO TAKE BACK TO BOUMEDIENE HE WAS ANXIOUS TO IMPRESS ON US IMPORTANCE WHICH BOUMEDIENE ATTACHES TO THIS PROBLEM, POSSIBLY AS OBSTACLE TO RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR OWN INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS WAS EQUALLY SINCERE, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE QUITE UNREALISTIC TO MAKE SHIFT IN US POSITION CONDITION FOR RESUMPTION BILATERAL RELATIONS. RESUMPTION WAS END IN

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PAGE 04 STATE 162542

ITSELF, SERVING INTERESTS BOTH COUNTRIES, AND SHOULD BE APPROACHED PRAGMATICALLY. THIS IS WHY WE HAD TRIED TO DEVISE FORMULA WHICH WE THOUGHT ALGERIA MIGHT NOW BE ABLE ACCEPT, NEARLY 2-1/2 YEARS AFTER 1967 RUPTURE. ZEGHAR ASKED AT ONE POINT WHETHER HE COULD SAY THAT ALGERIAN ACCEPTANCE OF FORMULA WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR USG TO SUPPORT EL PASO PROJECT. HE WAS TOLD THAT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPRACTICAL TO MAKE SUCH A PROMISE, AS MANY BRANCHES OF USG WOULD BE INVOLVED, BUT THAT RESUMPTION WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE IT EASIER FOR DEPT OF STATE TO EXPRESS FAVORABLE VIEW TOWARD PROJECT.

11. FOREGOING PROVIDED FOR YOUR GUIDANCE IN ANTICIPATION SOME ALGERIAN REPLY. WE WOULD MEANWHILE WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS. RICHARDSON

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

O 071230Z AUG 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 912
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1724

CONTROL: 1584Q
RECD: 7 AUG 13 12Z

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: RESUMPTION OF US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS AND PROPOSED
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
REF: STATE 168298

1. FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS
MOHAMED ABERKANE INVITED EMBOFF TO CALL ON HIM AUGUST 6.
HE SAID PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR, WHO EXPECTED TO
BE AWAY FROM ALGIERS FOR WEEK OR LONGER, HAD ASKED HIM
TO RECEIVE EMBOFF AND OBTAIN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ZEGHAR HAD
POSED (ALGIERS 1564). EMBOFF HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH
ZEGHAR'S OFFICE LAST WEEK TO FIND OUT WHEN HE WAS
EXPECTED TO RETURN.

2. EMBOFF SUMMARIZED BACKGROUND OF PROPOSED ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND ABERKANE REPLIED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF
PREVIOUS EAGLETON-HAMDANI DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT.
EMBOFF THEN PRESENTED SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF REFTEL,
EMPHASIZING THAT SPECIFIC PROJECTS MENTIONED WERE MEANT
TO ILLUSTRATE DIRECTION OF OUR THINKING AND TO SHOW OUR
WILLINGNESS TO DEVELOP A SPECIAL COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP
WITH ALGERIA IN THOSE AREAS WHERE EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE
OF U.S. PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COULD BE MOST
BENEFICIAL TO ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES. ABERKANE
TOOK EXTENSIVE NOTES BUT MADE NO DIRECT SUBSTANTIVE
COMMENT. HE DID, HOWEVER, QUESTION EMBOFF AT LENGTH
ABOUT WATERGATE AFFAIR AND EFFECT IT MIGHT HAVE ON
CONDUCT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

3. WHEN ZEGHAR RETURNS FROM EUROPE IN NEXT WEEK OR SO
WE INTEND TO GO OVER THESE POINTS AGAIN WITH HIM.

SIMPSON

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27-104
Department of State

TELETYPE

SECRET

0 161805Z JUL 74 5 0 3 9 Q
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0805 18 JULY 2 43 PM
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1564

MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, AG, US
SUBJ: ZEGHAR DISCUSSES RESUMPTION OF US-ALGERIAN
RELATIONS AND PROPOSED ECONOMIC COOPERATION

1. EMBOFF CALLED ON PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT RACHID ZEGHAR JULY 10 AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED. ZEGHAR, WHO SAID HE HAD SEEN BOUTEFLIKA SINCE JULY 16 MEETING WITH EMBOFF, OPENED CONVERSATION BY ASKING WHETHER MINENERGY AND INDUSTRY ABDESSELAM HAD EVER TRANSMITTED TO US THE LIST OF PROJECTS WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED FOR. EMBOFF REPLIED TO HIS KNOWLEDGE NO.


2. ZEGHAR THEN ASKED WHETHER EMBOFF KNEW "SIZE OF PACKAGE ENVISIONED FOR ALGERIA." WHEN EMBOFF ANSWERED NO, HE REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION BE OBTAINED FROM THE DEPARTMENT. EMBOFF SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT REQUEST BUT ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED WHETHER ANY SPECIFIC FIGURE EXISTED. IDEA OF SPECIAL COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, EMBOFF SUGGESTED, WAS SO THAT WE COULD EXAMINE ALGERIAN REQUIREMENTS TOGETHER AND DETERMINE WHERE US COULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

3. ZEGHAR THEN REQUESTED THAT WE PROVIDE HIM WITH INFORMATION ON SIZE AND CONTENT OF US "PACKAGES" FOR EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN AND SYRIA. EMBOFF AGAIN QUESTIONED WHETHER FIGURES COULD BE ATTACHED TO TOTAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THEIR VASTLY DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE, BUT ZEGHAR PERSISTED IN WANTING A FIGURE, AN ESTIMATE OF TOTAL VALUE, IN EACH CASE.

4. ZEGHAR THEN ASKED EMBOFF TO TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY HIS SUGGESTION THAT SECRETARY SEND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE RECALLING WITH PLEASURE HIS LAST VISIT AND ALSO RECALLING THAT PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- ALGIERS 1564.

TO FURNISH HIM WITH LIST OF PROJECTS ON WHICH US MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ALSO, IF SECRETARY KNEW WHEN HE WOULD NEXT BE IN AREA, HE COULD SUGGEST IN MESSAGE THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO VISIT ALGIERS TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS FURTHER. ZEGHAR SAID THAT IF SECRETARY SENT SUCH A MESSAGE, HE WOULD TAKE EMBOFF TO SEC GEN OF PRESIDENCY OR AMIR TO DELIVER IT, THEREBY ESTABLISHING NEW DIRECT CHANNEL TO PRESIDENCY AS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED (ALGIERS 0792). CONTINUING SCENARIO, ZEGHAR SAID HE WOULD THEN SEE BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFLIKA AND OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO ANNOUNCE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT.

5. ZEGHAR, WHO WAS VERY CORDIAL AND SLIGHTLY CONSPIRATORIAL THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION, AS HE TENDS TO BE, SPOKE OF IMPORTANCE OF RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS TAKING PLACE THIS SUMMER, BEFORE OPENING OF ARAB SUMMIT PRELIMINARY MEETINGS AUGUST 27 AND RESUMPTION OF GENEVA TALKS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOWN THROUGH TUESDAY JULY 23 AND EXPRESSED HOPE WE WOULD HAVE REPLY AND BE ABLE TO MOVE MATTER FORWARD BY THEN.

6. EMBOFF MADE ONE FURTHER COMMENT THAT HE HOPED WASHINGTON WOULD NOT THINK FROM ZEGHAR'S REMARKS THAT QUESTION OF RESUMPTION WAS IN ANY WAY CONDITIONED ON "PACKAGE." ZEGHAR REPLIED, "NO, NO. YOU MUST TELL THEM THEY ARE NOT LINKED."

7. COMMENT. LINKED OR NOT, IT SEEMS TO US THAT ALGERIANS, OR ZEGHAR AT LEAST, ARE VERY INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE HOW MUCH SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE WORTH TO THEM BEFORE REACHING FINAL DECISION ON RESUMPTION. WE BELIEVE THAT BOUTEFLIKA DISCUSSED QUESTION OF RESUMPTION WITH BOUMEDIENE EVENING JULY 15, AFTER RECEIPT OF SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE, AND THEN REVIEWED SITUATION WITH ZEGHAR ON JULY 16 OR 17. WE DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, WHETHER ZEGHAR'S SUGGESTIONS COME IN WHOLE OR IN PART FROM BOUTEFLIKA OR BOUMEDIENE, OR REPRESENT HIS OWN INITIATIVE. ALTHOUGH ZEGHAR KNEW OF SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE (STATE 152114), HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO IT DURING THIS CONVERSATION. SIMPSON

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 110930Z JUL 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0758
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 1490

CONTROL 2 8 3 5 Q

Recd 11, July
6:30 A.M.

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: ALGIERS 1455

REQUEST DEPT GUIDANCE REGARDING REPLY TO
HAMDANI'S INQUIRY REFTEL.SIMPSON

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COPY 7 OF 12 COPIES.



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TELEGRAM

W 14

CONTROL: 0958Q

RECD: JULY 3, 1974
6PM

O 032055Z JUL 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0738
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1455

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: MOSCOW 10429

MESSAGE DELIVERED TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI.
AFTER READING IT TWICE, HE REQUESTED EMBOFF SEEK CLARIFICATION
WHETHER REFERENCE TO "BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS" IN THIRD
PARAGRAPH OF MESSAGE (WHICH BEGINS "THE
EARLY") MEANS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL,
EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN RESPECTIVELY, AS
OUTLINED IN THE SECRETARY'S PREVIOUS MESSAGE (STATE 137139),
OR WHETHER USSR WOULD NOW BE INCLUDED IN THESE WASHINGTON
CONSULTATIONS.
SIMPSON

SECRET



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

0 291030Z JUN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0716
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1410

9 2 8 0 Q
29 JUN 74 Z11 43

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

DEPT PLEASE PASS THE SECRETARY

1. SUMMARY: DURING FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE JUNE 28 HE STRESSED GOOD U.S.-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS WHILE MENTIONING SERIOUS PAST DIFFERENCES RE VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST. HE SAW U.S. POLICY EVOLVING AND THOUGHT U.S. WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO BE RELAXED RE THIRO WORLD POLITICAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING CUBA. HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT MOMENTUM MUST NOT BE LOST IN MIDDLE EAST, THAT ISRAELI RAIDS ON LEBANON WERE UNHELPFUL AND THAT U.S. SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH IRAN TO PREVENT TROUBLE ON "EASTERN FRONT" IN KURDISTAN. HE EXPRESSED GENERAL SATISFACTION RE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BUT SOME CONCERN OVER FUTURE GAS CONTRACTS WITH U.S. BOUMEDIENE DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO A DATE FOR RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT SAID MATTER WOULD MOVE FORWARD WHEN FOMIN BOUTEFLIKA RETURNS TO ALGIERS FROM KUALA LUMPUR. MEANSHILE HE SAW NO REASON TO REPLACE CHIEFS OF INTERESTS SECTIONS SINCE AMBASSADORS WOULD SOON BE EXCHANGED. END SUMMARY

2. PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE RECEIVED ME FOR FAREWELL CALL AFTERNOON JUNE 28. AFTER USUAL EXCHANGE FOR SUCH OCCASIONS, HE WENT OVER THEME ALREADY KNOWN TO SECRETARY TO EFFECT THAT U.S.-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE NEVER ENCOUNTERED SERIOUS PROBLEMS THOUGH MAJOR DIFFERENCES HAD DIVIDED TWO COUNTRIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPHERE, PARTICULARLY RE VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST. U.S., HE SAID, WAS POWERFUL ENOUGH TO CONDUCT ITS POLICIES IN THIRD WORLD WITHOUT THREATS OR USE OF FORCE AND WITHOUT RELYING ON PERSON SUCH AS LON NOL. COMMUNIST WORLD WAS DIVIDED AND FACED MANY PROBLEMS.

3. BOUMEDIENE REFERRED TO EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED THAT I PASS TO SECRETARY HIS VIEW THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. MEANWHILE

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2- ALGERS 1410, JUN 29, NODIS

HE WAS DISTURBED BY ISRAEL'S RAIDS ON LEBANON WHICH COULD ENDANGER MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE. HE HOPED USG WOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN MONTHS AHEAD.

4. (WITH VICE PREMIER OF IRAQ SADDAM HUSSEIN IN TOWN) BOUMEDIENE ASKED THAT I EXPRESS TO SECRETARY HIS CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN KURDISTAN AND HIS HOPE THAT U.S. WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH IRAN TO ENSURE THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ WAS NOT THREATENED.

5. RE MIDDLE EAST I REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S RECENT MESSAGES TO HIM. I OBSERVED THAT ABSENCE OF PUBLIC DECLARATIONS DID NOT MEAN THAT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP WAS NEGLECTING MIDDLE EAST, NOR DID IT MEAN THAT WE CONDONED ISRAELI RAIDS ON LEBANON. INTENSIVE EFFORTS WOULD BE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT SUMMER TO PREPARE FOR GENEVA TALKS. WE WERE AWARE OF DANGERS TO THIS EFFORT POSED BY CLASHES BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS.

6. RE KURDISTAN I ASSURED BOUMEDIENE THAT USG SUPPORTED TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES IN AREA INCLUDING IRAQ. IT WOULD BE MISTAKE TO OVERESTIMATE OUR INFLUENCE ON IRANIANS WHO CONSIDERED KURDISH QUESTION TO BE THEIR AFFAIR AND SUBJECT ON WHICH THEY DID NOT APPRECIATE OUTSIDE ADVICE. BOUMEDIENE INTERJECTED THAT IN CONFIDENCE HE COULD TELL US HE HAD ADVISED IRAQIS TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH U.S. THEY WERE CONSIDERING DOING SO INCLUDING RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. I REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL AS MEANS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS AND REMOVE THEIR SUSPICIONS REGARDING OUR POLICIES.

7. BOUMEDIENE ALSO BRIEFLY MENTIONED CUBA AS A COUNTRY WHICH DID NOT HAVE NATURAL TIES WITH SOVIET UNION AND WISHED RATHER TO DEVELOP TIES "WITHIN ITS NATURAL ENVIRONMENT". I REPLIED THAT PROBLEM HAD BEEN CUBA'S DESIRE TO EXPORT REVOLUTION AND INTERFERE IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT THOUGHT THEIR ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED.

8. I ASKED WHETHER BOUMEDIENE SAW ANY PROBLEMS ON ECONOMIC FRONT. HE REPLIED IN NEGATIVE BUT ASKED WHAT WAS DELAYING EL PASO II AND OTHER GAS PROJECTS. I

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

-3- ALGIERS 1410, JUN 29, NODIS

REPLIED THAT FORMULATION OF OUR OWN ENERGY POLICY, INCLUDING THAT RELATED TO GAS PRICES, WAS ONE CAUSE OF DELAY. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ASSURED SOURCE OF ALGERIAN GAS AT COMPETITIVE PRICE. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS DESIRABLE AND NOTED THAT SECURITY OF GAS PROJECTS WOULD BE STRENGTHENED BY RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

9. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD ANY THOUGHTS RE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION THAT U.S. AND ALGERIA GIVE STRUCTURE TO THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP THROUGH CREATION OF A JOINT COMMISSION OR IN ANY OTHER WAY ALGERIANS MIGHT SUGGEST. BOUMEDIENE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BEING STUDIED.

10. DURING DISCUSSION OF U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS BOUMEDIENE SAID IN MEASURED BUT SOMEWHAT VAGUE TERMS THAT RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD OCCUR SOON AND THAT ACTION IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE SET IN MOTION FOLLOWING FOMIN BOUTEFLIKA'S RETURN FROM KUALA LUMPUR (PROBABLY NEXT WEEK). I REITERATED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE THAT THIS WAS FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO DECIDE. AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION BOUMEDIENE AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REASON TO NAME A REPLACEMENT CHIEF OF USINT SINCE AMBASSADORS WOULD SOON BE EXCHANGED. EAGLETON

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO THE SECRETARY BY OC/T.

SECRET



W 12
J 12
7
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 261215Z JUN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSATE WASHDC 697
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 1384

8 1 0 0 Q

26 JUNE 8 44 AM

N ODIS CHEROKEE

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE
REF: STATE 137139

1. WITH HAMDANI BUSY IN COMMITTEE MEETINGS I ARRANGED THIS MORNING THROUGH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR TO DELIVER SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO SEC GEN OF THE PRESIDENCY, DR. AMIR. I TOLD DR. AMIR THAT SINCE IRAQI DELEGATION HEADED BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VICE PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TODAY I THOUGHT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE BEFOREHAND.

2. SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SHOULD BE USEFUL IN PUTTING BOUMEDIENE IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND FOR MY MEETING WITH HIM WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE ARRANGED BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FROM ALGIERS JUNE 29. AT THAT MEETING BOUMEDIENE WILL PROBABLY HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
EAGLETON

SECRET

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27-10X 10
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 041130Z JUN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0607
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 1217

7 2 5 Q
Jun 4, 1974
11:59Z

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE AND US-
ALGERIAN RELATIONS

FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 116127

1. ON MORNING JUNE 4, I GAVE PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI. HE READ IT AND SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO BOUMEDIENE LATER THIS MORNING.

2. I ASKED HAMDANI, NOW THAT THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, HOW HE SAW EVOLUTION OF US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS. HE REPLIED THAT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE IN PRINCIPLE TO RENEW RELATIONS SOMETIME FOLLOWING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. HE HAD NOT, HOWEVER, HAD OCCASION TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH BOUMEDIENE SINCE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN SIGNED.

3. HAMDANI ASKED STATUS US RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES WHO HAD BROKEN, PARTICULARLY SYRIA. I REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH I HAD NO PRECISE INFORMATION RE TIMING OF US-SYRIAN RENEWAL, I HAD IMPRESSION SITUATION THERE WAS SIMILAR TO THAT BETWEEN US AND ALGERIA. (FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCES HERE TELL US THEY UNDERSTAND DATE OF JUNE 20 HAS BEEN SET FOR US-SYRIAN RENEWAL.

4. IT APPEARED FROM TENOR OF HAMDANI'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS THAT HE BELIEVES ALGERIA WILL BE PREPARED RENEW RELATIONS WITHIN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE, I.E. PROBABLY DURING MONTH OF JUNE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE HAD LONG EXPERIENCE WITH BOUMEDIENE'S CAUTION AND TENDENCY TO DELAY DECISIONS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ACTION.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- Algiers 1217, June 4

5. ALGERIAN LEADERS ARE WELL AWARE OF US READINESS TO RENEW AT ANY TIME; HENCE NO INITIATIVE ON OUR PART IS STRICTLY NECESSARY. NEVERTHELESS, IF ALGERIANS DO NOT MOVE MATTER FORWARD BY TIME PRESIDENT NIXON HAS COMPLETED HIS VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST, THERE IS DANGER THEY WILL LET PASS PERIOD OF FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR RENEWAL AND ALLOW IT BECOME TIED TO PALESTINIAN OR OTHER ASPECT OF MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. AT THAT TIME, THEREFORE, IT WOULD PERHAPS BE USEFUL FOR ME TO ASK TO SEE BOUTEFLIKA (OR BOUMEDIENE) UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS US VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS, TO MAKE MY FAREWELL CALL, AND HOPEFULLY, WITHOUT PRESSING MATTER, TO STIMULATE AN ALGERIAN MOVE ON RENEWAL.

6. (CHAMDANI, BECAUSE OF SOME RECENT PERSONAL DIFFICULTIES WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE, IS FOR TIME BEING A LESS USEFUL CHANNEL FOR OUR SOUNDING OF TOP ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP THAN HERETOFORE.)EAGLETON

SECRET



SECRET
Department of State

Sec-WFH 8
TELEGRAM

0 291255Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0577
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 1175

CONTROL: 8 9 1 0 Q
MAY 29, 1974
11:27 AM

NODIS

DEPT PASS SECRETARY

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE
REF: JERUSALEM 1154

1. ELEVEN-THIRTY MAY 29 I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE FOR BOUMEDIENE TO PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR (HAMOANI WAS NOT IN OFFICE THIS MORNING). ZEGHAR WAS AT THE TIME ON TELEPHONE TO BOUTEFLIKA WHO SENT HIS CHAUFFEUR TO PICK UP MESSAGE.

2. WHEN EXIM BANK PRESIDENT CASEY AND I CALLED ON BOUMEDIENE MAY 28, HE ASKED ME TO SEND YOU HIS BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF YOUR MISSION WHICH HE REFERRED TO AS "IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF MAKING PEACE BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS."

3. ZEGHAR HAS SEVERAL TIMES DURING PAST WEEK DISCUSSED WITH BOUTEFLIKA AND MINISTER INTERIOR MEDEGHRI RESUMPTION OF U.S.-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ZEGHAR BELIEVES BOUTEFLIKA WILL USE OCCASION OF DELIVERING YOUR MESSAGE ON CONCLUSION OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT TO RAISE SUBJECT WITH BOUMEDIENE.
EAGLETON

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 201515Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0539
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1097

6 2 2 9 Q
May 20, 1974
16:14Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT PLEASE PASS THE SECRETARY
FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY, A.)
SUBJ: RENEWAL OF US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

1. WITH YOUR EFFORTS LEADING TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT IN SOME FORM LATER THIS WEEK, I WANTED YOU TO HAVE MY CURRENT VIEWS RE PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S REACTION AS IT WILL AFFECT TIMING OF A RENEWAL OF US-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
2. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT BOUMEDIENE HAS INDICATED TO YOU, AND ALSO TO HAL SAUNDERS DURING HIS MISSION TO ALGIERS MAY 6, THAT A RENEWAL OF RELATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THIS SOUNDS STRAIGHT-FORWARD BUT OUR PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT BOUMEDIENE'S LANGUAGE USUALLY FALLS SHORT OF A FULL COMMITMENT. HE ALSO HAS RECORD OF LETTING MOMENTS FOR RENEWAL PASS WHILE AWAITING A "MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE" TIED TO LATER DEVELOPMENTS.
3. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BOUMEDIENE WILL TAKE INITIATIVE FOR RENEWAL UNTIL HE IS PUT BEFORE NEED TO MAKE A DECISION. THE SUREST WAY TO STIMULATE AN EARLY DECISION WOULD BE FOR YOU TO STOP BRIEFLY IN ALGIERS ON YOUR RETURN FROM MIDDLE EAST.
4. KNOWING LIMITATIONS ON YOUR TIME AND JEALOUSY THAT VISITS TO ALGIERS AROUSE ELSEWHERE IN AREA, I HESITATE TO URGE YOU TO MAKE SUCH STOP THIS TIME UNLESS THERE IS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT BOUMEDIENE WILL BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE RENEWAL, OR AT LEAST SET A DATE. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO OBTAIN A SIGNAL FROM

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- Algiers 1097, May 20

BOUMEDIENE THAT HE IS PREPARED TO DO THIS BECAUSE OF HIS DISLIKE FOR TAKING ACTION THAT INVOLVES ANY KIND OF PRECONDITION. I DO HOWEVER HOPE TO HAVE TOMORROW A READING FROM PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR ON BOUMEDIENE'S CURRENT INTENTIONS (IF HE HAS FORMULATED ANY) RE TIMING OF RENEWAL.

5. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE, BASED ON YOUR OWN APPRECIATION OF WHAT BOUMEDIENE HAS IN MIND, RE BEST TACTICS TO BRING ABOUT A TIMELY RENEWAL FOLLOWING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.

EAGLETON

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SECRET

O 191310Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0536
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1093

CONTROL: 6 0 7 3 Q

Recd : 19 May
06:43 A.M.

NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS TO THE SECRETARY

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE
REF: SECTO 511

CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE (REFTEL) TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO
HANDANI MORNING MAY 19. HANDANI WAS VERY ANIMATED OVER NEWS
CONTAINED IN MESSAGE AND SAID HE WOULD PASS IT ON IMMEDIATELY
TO BOUMEDIENE. HE SAID HE WAS NOW OPTIMISTIC AND ASKED ME TO
PASS YOU HIS WISH FOR "COURAGE" (IN FRENCH).
EAGLETON

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SECRET

W/A

CONTROL: 4839Q
RECD: 15 MAY '74 5:45P

O 152548Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0526
BT

SECRET ALGIERS 1073

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REF: JERUSALEM 0872 AND 0873

1. I CONVEYED YOUR TWO MESSAGES FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO HAMDANI AT PRESIDENCY 1900 MAY 15. HAMDANI CAREFULLY WENT OVER ENGLISH TEXT OF FIRST MESSAGE RE CURRENT STATE OF YOUR EFFORTS ON DISENGAGEMENT. HE SHOWED KEEN INTEREST IF DETAILS BUT DID NOT COMMENT OTHER THAN TO SAY HE WOULD CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. IN CONVEYING MESSAGE RE FEDAYEEN OPERATION IN NORTHERN ISRAEL I NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH PART OF YOUR REQUEST HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE USEFUL FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO UNDERSTAND SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT SUCH TERRORIST ACTS, AND WAY THEY ARE PUBLICIZED, COULD CAUSE FOR THOSE WHO WERE SEEKING FAIR SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST.

3. HAMDANI REFERRED TO OUTCOME OF FEDAYEEN OPERATION AS A "TRAGEDY". HE ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING WITH WHICH GROUP THEY WERE ASSOCIATED (I SAID NEWS REPORTS ATTRIBUTED OPERATION TO PDFLP) AND WHETHER IT WAS DESTINED TO INTERFERE WITH YOUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE DISENGAGEMENT.

EAGLETON

BT

#1073

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 2806Q
RECD: MAY 9, 1974
1126Z

0 091022Z MAY 74
FM SEC KISSINGER SECTO 293
TO RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC IMMEDIATE
BT

2 8 0 6 Q
09 MAY 74 211 26

SECRET /NODIS/CHEROKEE
E.O.O 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE
SECTO293

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY
FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS I PROMISED, I WANT TO TELL YOU OF MY TALK
YESTERDAY WITH PRESIDENT ASAD.

I TOOK WITH ME TO DAMASCUS AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL WHICH
MOVED IN THE DIRECTION WHICH MR. SAUNDERS DESCRIBED TO YOU.
I SPENT SOME TIME WITH PRESIDENT ASAD DISCUSSING THE
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS WHICH ARE VERY DIFFERENT
ON THE SYRIAN FRONT FROM THOSE WHICH PREVAILED DURING THE
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IN JANUARY. THESE WILL DEFINE
THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS ATTAINABLE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.
I TOLD PRESIDENT ASAD THAT I DID NOT FEEL YESTERDAY THAT I HAD
ATTAINED THE MAXIMUM THAT IS POSSIBLE FROM ISRAEL BUT THAT I
WOULD AT SOME POINT SOON COME TO HIM WITH THE JUDGEMENT THAT THE
BEST POSSIBLE POSITION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED THAT CAN EMERGE FROM
PRESENT CONDITIONS. AT THAT TIME, HE WOULD WANT TO
WEIGHT THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT
AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAKDOWN IN THESE
NEGOTIATIONS AND A PROLONGED STALEMATE
WITH SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT.

AS YOU KNOW, MR. PRESIDENT, I FEEL THAT WE ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A POSITION THAT COULD BE PRESENTED AS
A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT FOR PRESIDENT ASAD.
TO BEGIN WITH HE WOULD REGAIN ALL THE TERRITORY LOST IN
OCTOBER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ISRAELI FORCES ARE IN A
STRONG MILITARY POSITION THERE. THEN, HE WOULD REGAIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2- SECTO 293, MAY 09, NODIS/CHEROKEE

KUNEITRA AND SOME OTHER TERRITORY LOST IN 1967. ALL OF THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY DIPLOMACY FOLLOWING A WAR IN WHICH SYRIAN FORCES LOST GROUND, EVEN THOUGH THEY FOUGHT WITH BRAVERY AND HONOR. ISRAEL WOULD THUS WITHDRAW AS A RESULT OF US DIPLOMACY FROM TERRITORIES IT HELD BY MILITARY FORCE.

MY IMPRESSION IS THAT PRESIDENT ASAD WANTS A DIS-ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT PROVIDED HE CAN PRESENT IT TO HIS PEOPLE IN A POSITIVE LIGHT. I SHALL RETURN TO ISRAEL TOMORROW FOR A FURTHER EFFORT TO MOVE THE ISRAELI POSITION. EACH STEP THE ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN HAS BEEN TAKEN ONLY AS A RESULT OF SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN PRESSURE. TODAY I AM GIVING THE ISRAELIS TIME TO CONSIDER THE THOUGHTS I BROUGHT TO THEM FROM DAMASCUS LAST NIGHT.

MR. PRESIDENT, THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE APPROACHING THE POINT WHEN, IF YOU FEEL THEIR SUCCESS IS IMPORTANT TO REASONABLE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD, YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER MAKING YOUR VIEWS KNOWN TO PRESIDENT ASAD.

WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER.

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Q 292117Z APR 74 ZFF4
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHDM/USINT DAMSSCUS IMMEDIATE 0001
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0443
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0908

CONTROL: 8201Q
RECD: 29 APR'74 11:09pm

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 40

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT ASAD

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT
2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT;

IS HAVE JUST COMPLETED FOUR HOURS OF DISCUSSION
ON THE MIDDLE EAST WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND
WANT TO GIVE YOU THIS IMMEDIATE BRIEF REPORT.

AS EXPECTED, MR. GROMYKO GAVE PRIMARY EMPHASIS TO
THE SOVIET DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND
PRESSED ME AGAIN TO AGREE TO A MEETING WITH HIM IN
DAMASCUS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT I WROTE YOU EARLIER,
I DID NOT AGREE TO SUCH A MEETING, AND I TOLD MR.
GROMYKO I DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. HE
INFORMED ME, HOWEVER, THAT HE MIGHT TRAVEL TO THE
MIDDLE EAST ON HIS OWN. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A DECISION
FOR HIM TO MAKE. WHILE I TOOK NO POSITION WITH HIM, MY
OWN VIEW IS AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED IT TO YOU THAT
IT IS NOT A GOOD IDEA.

IN MY DISCUSSION OF SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT
WITH MR. GROMYKO, HE PRESSED FOR AN EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS ON THE CONCRETE ELEMENTS OF A DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT ISRAEL HAD TO WITHDRAW
BEYOND THE OCTOBER 6 LINE, BUT I DID NOT TELL HIM WHERE
I THOUGHT THE DISENGAGEMENT LINE SHOULD BE.

SECRET



SECRET
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2- ALGTERS 0908, 29 APR '74

I DID INDICATE THAT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN TOWARD THE
END OF MY TRIP SOMEWHERE OUTSIDE THE ARAB WORLD--
THE DECISION TO BE MADE LATER. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SEEN
THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE END
OF OUR MEETING TO A RESUMPTION OF THE WORK OF THE
GENEVA CONFERENCE AT AN EARLY DATE. WHAT I HAVE IN MIND
IN THIS RESPECT IS THE POSSIBILITY YOU AND I HAVE
PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED OF A SESSION IN GENEVA FOLLOWING
AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DISENGAGEMENT. I
MADE THIS VERY CLEAR TO GROMYKO.

I REJECTED, HOWEVER, MR. GROMYKO'S TRONG EFFORT
TO INCLUDE IN THE COMMUNIQUE AFTER OUR MEETING A COMMITMENT
THAT BOTH POWERS WOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ALL PHASES AND
ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT. THE MATTER WAS LEFT IN THE
COMMUNIQUE THAT WE WOULD STRIVE TO COORDINATE OUR
EFFORTS WITHOUT SPECIFYING OR AGREEING ON
THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH TO DO THIS.

IN BRIEF, MR. PRESIDENT, MY MEETING WITH MR. GROMYKO
LEAVES MATTERS ESSENTIALLY WHERE THEY WERE AND IN NO
WAY AFFECTS THE TALKS WHICH I SHALL BE HAVING WITH YOU
LATER THIS WEEK, WHEN I LOOK FORWARD ONCE AGAIN TO THE
HOSPITALITY AND WARM WELCOME FOR WHICH YOUR
COUNTRY IS RENOWNED.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END MESSAGE.
KISSINGER

SECRET

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

104-WH 7

Z 061115Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0478
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0965

1 4 2 6 0
06 MAY 74 Z11 58

NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY


E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: SAUNDERS MISSION TO ALGIERS

REF: AMMAN 2627

1. THIS MORNING I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S SECOND (MAY 6) LETTER FOR BOUMEDIENE TO HAMDANI AT THE PRESIDENCY. HAMDANI, WHO HAD RETURNED FROM DAMASCUS YESTERDAY, SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY DELIVER MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE AND DISCUSS SAUNDERS' VISIT WITH HIM.
2. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING SAUNDERS ETA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (NOTE THERE IS THREE HOUR TIME DIFFERENCE ALGIERS-CAIRO.) BOUMEDIENE'S SCHEDULE LATE TODAY IS QUITE FULL. HE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO FIT IN SAUNDERS JUST BEFORE OR AFTER STATE DINNER FOR PRESIDENT SONGO. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER BOUMEDIENE INTENDED RECEIVE SAUNDERS AND ASHRAF MARWAN TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY. (PLEASE ADVISE IF ONE WAY OR OTHER IS PREFERRED.)
3. HAMDANI ASKED WHETHER ANYONE WAS ACCOMPANYING SAUNDERS. I REPLIED IT NOT LIKELY, BUT PLEASE ADVISE. IN VIEW CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF VISIT HE THOUGHT IT BEST THAT SAUNDERS USE OUR EMBASSY AS BASE AND STAY WITH US IF HE SPENDS NIGHT HERE.
4. HAVING SEEN BOUMEDIENE, HAMDANI JUST PHONED TO ASK WHETHER THIS WAS A JOINT AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN MISSION OR WHETHER MARWAN AND SAUNDERS WOULD HAVE SEPARATE MATTERS TO DISCUSS WITH BOUMEDIENE. HE ASKED ME TO PASS HIM ANY INFORMATION I RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT.
EAGELTON

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Ly - WH
TELEGRAM

O 041620Z MAY 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0477
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0963

CONTROL: 1244Q
RECVD: 04 MAY 74
12:59PM

NODIS CHEROKEE

ROGER CHANNEL

DEPT PASS SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR AG

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE FROM SECRETARY

REF: CAIRO 6502

1. DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR BOUMEDIENE TO
AMALOU AT PRESIDENCY AFTERNOON MAY 4. (CHAMDANI IS NOT
EXPECTED BACK FROM DAMASCUS UNTIL TOMORROW,
SUNDAY.)

2. BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM SAUNDERS SEEING BOUMEDIENE
MONDAY EVENING OR TUESDAY MORNING. BOUMEDIENE
HAS A STATE DINNER FOR PRESIDENT BONGO OF GABON MONDAY
EVENING, BUT IT SHOULD END BY 2200.

3. LOOK FORWARD HAVING SAUNDERS WITH US AT RESIDENCE.

EAGLETON

BT

#0963

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SECRET

0 292117Z ARR 74 ZFF4
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV IMMEDIATE 0306
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0442
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0907

NODIS/CHEROKEE

CONTROL: 8 2 0 3 Q

RECD: 29 APRIL 74

11 18 PM

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER MEIR

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING TO PRIME MINISTER MEIR:

I AM WRITING THIS BRIEF ADDENDUM TO MY PREVIOUS LETTER TO INFORM YOU OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH LED TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROTION OF THE JOINT US-USSR STATEMENT.

THE SOVIETS PRESSED FOR A COMMITMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE RECENT SYRIAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GENEVA CO-CHAIRMAN SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ALL PHASES AND ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT. I REFUSED, AND GOT THEM TO GO ALONG WITH THE NON-COMMITTAL, AMBIGUOUS PHRASING IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THAT WE WILL REMAIN "IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER SO AS TO STRIVE TO COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA." THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT THAT WE WOULD COORDINATE, NOR ON THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THIS MIGHT BE DONE; THE MATTER WAS LEFT VAGUELY THAT THE PARTIES WOULD "STRIVE" TO DO SO.

SECONDLY, YOU WILL HAVE NOTED ALSO THAT BOTH SIDES "EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE WORK OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AT AN EARLY DATE." THERE ARE NO NEW COMMITMENTS INVOLVED, AND WE DID NOT COME TO ANY UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE DATE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH SUCH A RESUMPTION MIGHT TAKE PLACE. I MADE VERY CLEAR THE US POSITION THAT WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO RESUME THE GENEVA CONFERENCE UNTIL A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED. I WANTED YOU TO HAVE THE ABOVE SO THAT YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND FULLY WHAT LAY BEHIND THE JOINT STATEMENT.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- ALGIERS 0907

AS I PREVIOUSLY INDICATED TO YOU, THE TALKS HERE ON THE MIDDLE EAST LEFT MATTERS BETWEEN US WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN FOR SOME TIME.

FINALLY, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, AS I COME NEARER TO MY ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL, AND I REFLECT ON THE DISQUIETING MOOD WHICH SEEMS PREVALENT IN ISRAEL, I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS COMING WEEK IS A FATEFUL ONE FOR ISRAEL, FOR ALL OF US WHO ARE WORKING FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I PRAY THAT OUR EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE

KISSINGER

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SECRET

O 292117Z APR 74 ZFF4
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0041
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0441
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0906

NODIS/CHEROKEE

CONTROL: 8 2 0 5 Q

SECTO 38

RECD: 29 APRIL 74 -

11 20 PM

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO FAHMY FOR
SADAT:

DEAR PRESIDENT SADAT:

I AM WRITING TO YOU IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION
OF OVER FOUR HOURS OF DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. THE RESULTS LEFT MATTERS
ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED FROM WHERE THEY STOOD BEFORE WE
CAME TO GENEVA.

AS EXPECTED, GROMYKO PRESSED AGAIN FOR MORE
DIRECT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE SYRIAN-ISRAELI
NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MAY WELL
DECIDE TO COME TO THE MIDDLE EAST ON HIS OWN, A
DECISION, OF COURSE, FOR HIM TO MAKE THOUGH I STRONGLY
DISCOURAGED IT. HOWEVER, I REJECTED HIS PROPOSAL
THAT I JOIN HIM IN DAMASCUS, AND THERE WILL BE NO SUCH
MEETING. I ALSO REJECTED HIS STRONG EFFORT TO INCLUDE
IN THE JOINT STATEMENT A COMMITMENT FOR A JOINT US-USSR
ROLE "IN ALL PHASES AND ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT." THE
STATEMENT MERELY SAYS WE "WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH
WITH EACH OTHER SO AS TO STRIVE TO COORDINATE THEIR
EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA."

I DID LEAVE OPEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANOTHER
MEETING WITH HIM AT SOME APPROPRIATE TIME AT THE
END OF MY CURRENT TRIP TO THE AREA BUT NOT IN AN ARAB
COUNTRY. THIS CAN BE DECIDED AFTER OUR DISCUSSIONS
AND MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASAD. IN AGREEING TO
INCLUDE REFERENCE TO OUR JOINT STATEMENT TO THE
CONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AT AN EARLY DATE, WE
HAVE IN MIND, AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED, SUCH A SESSION
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- ALGIERS 0906

IN THE AFTERMATH OF A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF AN ISRAEL-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. I MADE THIS EXPLICITLY CLEAR TO GROMYKO. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND FROM THE ABOVE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU AND I CAN REVIEW OUR STRATEGY TOGETHER, AS AGREED, FREE OF ANY NEW ENCUMBRANCES.

I LOOK FORWARD EAGERLY TO THE RENEWAL OF OUR TALKS.

WITH WARM REGARDS AND FRIENDSHIP,

HENRY A. KISSINGER
UNQUOTE.

KISSINGER

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Department of State TELEGRAM

RECD: 26 APR 4PM

CONTROL: 7537Q

O 261930Z APR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0427
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0883

NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, SY, AF
SUBJ: SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT

1. WHEN I SAW HAMDANI AT PRESIDENCY EVENING APRIL 26 TO DISCUSS YOUR VISIT HE SAID HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM UNANNOUNCED MISSION TO DAMASCUS ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AND IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH BOUMEDIENE IN WASHINGTON. HE HAD GIVEN BOUMEDIENE FULL DETAILS AND THESE WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU DURING YOUR VISIT HERE.

2. AS HIS PERSONAL PRELIMINARY COMMENT, HAMDANI SAID HE FOUND SYRIANS "VERY DETERMINED". THEY FELT THEY HAD MADE NUMBER OF GESTURES INCLUDING PRISONER LIST AND HAD RECEIVED NOTHING IN RETURN. THEREFORE IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO AGREE TO REDUCTION OF TENSION ON GOLAN FRONT. AT SAME TIME HOWEVER THEY PLACED MUCH HOPE IN YOUR EFFORTS. HAMDANI RETURNED WITH IMPRESSION THAT A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT MUST BE ACHIEVED THIS TIME IF U.S. GAINS IN MIDDLE EAST ARE TO BE PRESERVED AND ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES AVERTED.
EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 031505Z APR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0326
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0706

CONTROL: 834Q
RECD: 3 APR 15 47Z

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, AG, CA
SUBJ: CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S INTEREST IN POSSIBLE
BOUMEDIENE VISIT TO OTTAWA

1. EMBOFF CALLED ON CANADIAN AMBASSADOR ELLIOTT AT LATTER'S REQUEST APRIL 3. ELLIOTT SAID HE HAD RECENTLY QUERIED OTTAWA REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF INVITING BOUMEDIENE TO VISIT CANADA IN CONNECTION WITH HIS ATTENDANCE AT UNGA SPECIAL SESSION. OTTAWA HAD REPLIED THAT HE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO STIMULATE VISIT BUT THAT IF ALGERIANS TOOK INITIATIVE AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VISITING CANADA, GOC WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE BOUMEDIENE ANYTIME THROUGH APRIL 10 OR AFTER APRIL 22. FROM GOC POINT OF VIEW, ELLIOTT SAID, A STOPOVER VISIT ON WAY TO NEW YORK OR ON APRIL 10 WOULD BE EASIEST TO HANDLE. HE WAS NOW WONDERING, HOWEVER, HOW TO SOUND OUT GOA WITHOUT GIVING IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS EXTENDING INVITATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WE COULD SHARE WITH HIM ABOUT BOUMEDIENE'S TRAVEL PLANS.

2. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD BOUMEDIENE PLANNED TO BE IN NEW YORK APRIL 9 BUT WE HAD AS YET NO PRECISE INFORMATION WHEN HE WOULD LEAVE ALGERIA OR ARRIVE IN U.S. WE HAD ALSO INFORMED GOA THAT WE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR BOUMEDIENE TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY DURING HIS VISIT, BUT EXACT ARRANGEMENTS HAD STILL TO BE WORKED OUT. AT THIS POINT, APRIL 10 OR 11 SEEMED MOST LIKELY DATES.

3. ELLIOTT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WOULD KEEP US INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

SIMPSON

BT

#0706

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in 74. 2101 (4)
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 271100Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0295
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0654

CONTROL: 7246Q
RECD: MAR 27, 1974
1241Z

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CVIP, AG, US
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO US

1. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR BY PHONE SINCE MARCH 24 RE BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO U.S., AND FINALLY CALLED ON HIM TODAY PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA. HIS MESSAGE HAD BEEN THAT DECISION RE VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE AND THIS WAS STILL SITUATION AS OF TODAY. ZEGHAR EXPLAINED THAT BOUMEDIENE HAS BEEN VERY OCCUPIED WITH TRIP TO TUNIS AND JOBERT'S AND PRESIDENT TOLBERT'S VISITS. BOUMEDIENE HAD ALSO INDICATED HE WISHED CONSULT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RE SCHEDULE IN U.S.

2. I STILL EXPECT TO MEET HAMDANI AND ALLAHOU AT PRESIDENCY TOMORROW MARCH 28 TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF VISIT. BOUSSELHAM, WHO CAME TO ALGERIA FOR MCNAMARA'S VISIT, TOLD ME HE TOO WOULD ATTEND. HOPEFULLY HAMDANI WILL HAVE BOUMEDIENE'S DECISION RE WASHINGTON VISIT BY THEN. (MEANWHILE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY CHIEF WILL BE CALLING ON EMBOFF TONIGHT.)

3. ZEGHAR WILL BE GOING TO UNITED STATES IN ADVANCE OF BOUMEDIENE. BOUMEDIENE'S NEW WIFE WILL ACCOMPANY HIM BUT WILL NOT TAKE PART IN ANY OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES. (THIS IS STILL VERY TIGHTLY HELD HERE.) ZEGHAR ALSO REVEALED INCONFIDENCE THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE VISITING HAVANA, BUT NOT PARIS. HE WILL ALSO BE RECEIVING PRESIDENT TON DUC THANG OF NORTH VIETNAM IN ALGIERS NEXT WEEK.

EAGLETON

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27.20x (4)
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7240Q
RECD: MAR 27, 1974
1221Z

R 271139Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0294
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0653

MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJ: PROSPECTS FOR US-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DURING CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT
ZEGHAR TODAY HE SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY BOTH
BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFLIKA THAT THEY DO NOT CONTEMPLATE
RENEWING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. DURING VISIT TO U.S.
INSTEAD THEY FORESEE RENEWAL "WHEN GOLAN QUESTION
IS SETTLED". I TOLD ZEGHAR THAT THIS STATEMENT
COULD BE CONSIDERED POSITIVE IF IT MEANT RENEWAL
AT TIME OF SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.
HE THOUGHT THAT WAS WHAT WAS MEANT. I URGED HIM TO
CONFIRM THIS AND SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF
COMMITMENT COULD BE MADE WHILE BOUMEDIENE IS IN U.S.
EAGLETON
BT
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TELEGRAM

P 051133Z APR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0330
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0819

CONTROL: 1516Q
RECVD: 5 APR 74
7:57AM

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, AG, US
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ON JOINT SAUDI-US
COOPERATION

MESSAGE DELIVERED TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI
AT 1000ZULU APRIL 5.
SIMPSON

BT
#0719

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TELEGRAM

P 290940Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0305
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0668

CONTROL: 7986Q
RECD: 29 MAR 74 6:06AM

NOBIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, AG
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO US

REF: ALGIERS 0666

1. IN REFTTEL DIRECTOR MILITARY SECURITY, SI MERBAH, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN RANK OF MAJOR THROUGHOUT. HE IS THE RESPECTED AND, FOR MOST ALGERIANS, LEGENDARY CHIEF OF ALGERIA'S MOST EFFICIENT AND FEARED SECURITY APPARATUS. IN COUNTRY WHERE COLONEL IS HIGHEST RANK HE IS A SENIOR OFFICER. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT HE BE CONTACTED BY SOMEONE OF APPROPRIATE RANK OF SECRET SERVICE IN NEW YORK.

2. REFTTEL SHOULD HAVE INDICATED THAT IF VENUE OF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON IN WASHINGTON, BOUMEDIENE WOULD LIKE TO SPEND NIGHT OF APRIL 11 IN WASHINGTON AND DEPART MORNING APRIL 12, PROBABLY DIRECT FOR NEXT DESTINATION OUTSIDE US (WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE CUBA). DURING OUR MEETING AT PRESIDENCY MARCH 28 THERE WAS DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD RETURN TO NEW YORK FROM WASHINGTON, BUT THERE WAS NO CONCLUSION AND IT WAS DECIDED THAT FINAL PLANS WOULD BE MADE WHEN ADVANCE GROUP IS IN WASHINGTON APRIL 3.

3. I WILL HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS RE BOUMEDIENE VISIT ON REACHING WASHINGTON APRIL 2. AS PRELIMINARY COMMENT WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT BOUMEDIENE AND HIS ENTOURAGE WILL BE MOST IMPRESSED BY LENGTH OF TIME THAT IS ACCORDED FOR HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON. DURING OUR MEETING MARCH 28 ALGERIANS REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT AS SOON AS HE REACHES WASHINGTON.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2 ALGIERS 0658, MAR 29

4. ON REFLEXION I BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH BOUMEDIENE
MIGHT APPRECIATE CHANGING VENUE OF MEETING TO CAMP
DAVID OR ELSEWHERE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST THAT HE
NOT CONTACT AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN SEMI-CLANDESTINE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEREAS MEDIA COVERAGE OF HIS VISIT
TO WASHINGTON WOULD ENHANCE OUR POSITION HERE
AND PROBABLY ELSEWHERE IN THIRD WORLD.
EAGLETON

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TELEGRAM

R 281900Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0304
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0666

CONTROL: 7769Q
RECD: 28 MAR'74 3:55pm

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, AG, US
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO UN AND US

1. I MET AT PRESIDENCY THIS AFTERNOON WITH DIRECTOR PRESIDENTIAL PROTOCOL ABDELMAJJID ALAHOUM, CHIEF ALGINT BOUSSELHAM AND DIRECTOR MILITARY SECURITY MAJOR SI MERBAH. HAMDANI JOINED US LATER. THEY SAID THEY HAD JUST MET WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WHO HAD VERY MUCH APPRECIATED INVITATION TO GO TO WASHINGTON TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE SECRETARY. BOUMEDIENE ACCEPTED INVITATION WITH PLEASURE.

2. BOUSSELHAM THEN ADDED THAT, KNOWING ALGERIA AS I DID, I WOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND HIS PASSING ON MESSAGE THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WOULD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE PREFER THAT MEETINGS TAKE PLACE SOMEWHERE OUTSIDE WASHINGTON SUCH AS CAMP DAVID. AFTER THIS SUGGESTION HOWEVER ALL OUR DISCUSSION WAS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD GO TO WASHINGTON. IF PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE SECRETARY WOULD PREFER VENUE OUTSIDE WASHINGTON, BOUMEDIENE WOULD NO DOUBT BE PLEASED, BUT ON OTHER HAND DO NOT BELIEVE HE WILL BE SURPRISED OR UPSET IF WASHINGTON VISIT STANDS. IN EITHER CASE IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE WISHES TO REDUCE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF VISIT AND CONCENTRATE ON SUBSTANTIVE TALKS.

3. CAPTAIN MERBAH AND BOUSSELHAM WILL BE GOING TO NEW YORK AS PART OF ADVANCE PARTY. THEY WILL, ALONG WITH SADDEK DJAMALI AND MOULOUD HAMROUCHE (ALGIERS 0661), WISH TO MEET IMMEDIATELY WITH SECRET SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES TO GO OVER DETAILS OF BOUMEDIENE'S ARRIVAL AND STAY IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. THEY WILL BE AVAILABLE AT ALGERIAN UN MISSION AFTERNOON OF APRIL 1. THEY WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING PHONE NUMBER OR POINT OF CONTACT WITH SECRET SERVICE BEFORE THEY LEAVE ALGERIS MARCH 30.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- ALGIERS 0666, 28 MAR'74

4. EXACT DATE OF BOUMEDIENE'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK IS NOT YET KNOWN NOR IS COMPOSITION HIS OFFICIAL PARTY. HE WILL BE STAYING NEW YORK APRIL 9 AND 10 AND SUGGESTS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY APRIL 11. IF HE FLIES TO WASHINGTON MORNING APRIL 11 HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT MORNING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON, WITH AGENDA TO BE OPEN TO ALL SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO TWO COUNTRIES.

5. BOUSSELHAM AND CAPTAIN MERBAH WILL BE GOING FROM NEW YORK TO WASHINGTON APRIL 2 AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH OFFICIALS IN DEPARTMENT MORNING APRIL 3 TO DISCUSS PROGRAM. BOUSSELHAM RAISED QUESTION WHETHER BLAIR HOUSE WOULD BE AVAILABLE APRIL 11. HE ALSO ASKED WHO WOULD PROVIDE CARS FOR ALGERIAN PARTY AND CONFIRMED THAT ALGERIANS WILL NOT HAVE BLACK TIE WITH THEM. THEY WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW U.S. CUSTOM REGARDING EXCHANGE OF PRESENTS AND SAID THEY WISH LEAVE LEVEL OF CEREMONY UP TO US AS WELL.

6. FOR TIME BEING ALGERIANS WOULD LIKE TO KEEP WASHINGTON PART OF VISIT CONFIDENTIAL. THEY WILL DISCUSS PRESS RELEASE WHEN THEY ARE IN WASHINGTON APRIL 3.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 6571Q
RECD: MAR 25, 1974
1220Z

R 251130Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0280
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0633

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO UNGA AND US

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR RETURNED TO ALGIERS MARCH 22 AFTER THREE WEEK ABSENCE. WHEN I SAW HIM MARCH 23 HE HAD NOT YET TALKED TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE BUT WAS EXPECTING TO HAVE PRIVATE DINNER MARCH 24 WITH BOUMEDIENE AND WIFE.

2. WHEN BOUMEDIENE'S TRIP HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR FALL OF 1973, ZEGHAR HAD BEEN DESIGNATED TO COORDINATE PLANNING IN U.S. BEFOREHAND. AS OF MARCH 23 HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HIS ROLE WOULD BE THIS TIME. HE TOLD ME HOWEVER "IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE" THAT BOUMEDIENE INTENDED TO TAKE HIS NEW WIFE WITH HIM ON TRIP TO U.S. ZEGHAR SAID THAT ONLY HE AND PRESIDENT KNEW OF THIS INTENTION AND THAT HE, ZEGHAR, HAD BROUGHT NEW CLOTHES AND JEWELRY FROM EUROPE FOR MADAME BOUMDIENE. AS FAR AS ZEGHAR KNEW BOUMEDIENE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER HIS WIFE WOULD HAVE ANY OFFICIAL ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT. HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT SHE WOULD BE KEPT ENTIRELY IN BACKGROUND. BOUMEDIENE HAD ASKED ZEGHAR TO ACCOMPANY TO HELP WIFE WITH HER PROGRAM BUT ZEGHAR WAS RELUCTANT TO PLAY THIS ROLE.

3. I URGED ZEGHAR TO OBTAIN FROM BOUMEDIENE AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE RE HIS PLANS FOR U.S. INCLUDING TRIP TO WASHINGTON ZEGHAR ASKED ME TO CONTACT HIM EVENING MARCH 25 OR MORNING MARCH 26 TO DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER. HE ADDED "IN CONFIDENCE" THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD PROBABLY STOP IN PARIS TO SEE POMPIDOU ON WAY TO OR FROM NEW YORK. A STOP IN HMVANA WAS ALSO LIKELY.

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TELEGRAM

-2-ALGIERS 0633, MAR 74

4. ZEGHAR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DISPUTE BETWEEN BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFLIKA SEVERAL WEEKS AGO BUT CLAIMED THAT IT WAS NOW PATCHED UP, PARTLY THROUGH HIS INTERVENTION. BOUTEFLIKA HAD BEEN INCENSED BECAUSE BOUMEDIENE HAD PLACED FINANCES OF FOREIGN MINISTRY IN HANDS OF FINANCE MINISTER MAHROUG AND HAD THREATENED TO RESIGN AND NOT ACCOMPANY BOUMEDIENE ON TRIP TO LAHORE AND FAR EAST BEGINNING FEBRUARY 22. ZEGHAR HAD ARGUED WITH BOUTEFLIKA THAT THIS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS ATTEMPT SABOTAGE ALGERIAN POLICY. FURTHERMORE, BOUMEDIENE WOULD NAME CHERIF BALKACEM FOREIGN MINISTER AND BOUTEFLIKA'S FRIENDS WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSTS. ACCORDING TO ZEGHAR BOUTEFLIKA IS NO LONGER CONSIDERING RESIGNATION.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 212000Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0271
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0610

CONTROL: 5 8 5 4Q
RECD: 21 MAR '74 5:13PM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE)
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT OT US

NODIS/CHEROKEE

REF: STATE 50967

1. DURING MEETING WITH HAMDANI AT PRESIDENCY MARCH 21 HE SAID HE HAD CONVEYED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WHO HAD APPRECIATED SUGGESTION THAT HE MEET SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT NIXON IN WASHINGTON IN CONNECTION WITH HIS APPEARANCE AT UNGA SPECIAL SESSION.
2. HAMDANI DID NOT YET HAVE BOUMEDIENE'S OFFICIAL DECISION TO GO TO WASHINGTON FOR MEETINGS BUT HE WANTED US TO KNOW FOR OUR PLANNING PURPOSES THAT BOUMEDIENE WAS RESERVING PERIOD APRIL 10-11 FOR U.S.-ALGERIAN PORTION OF HIS VISIT. HE DID NOT AT THIS TIME KNOW WHETHER IF BOUMEDIENE WENT TO WASHINGTON HE WOULD WISH TO RETURN TO NEW YORK SAME DAY OR STAY OVERNIGHT. I URGED THAT PRECISE INDICATIONS OF BOUMEDIENE'S DESIRES BE GIVEN US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. HAMDANI CALLED IN CHIEF OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTOCOL, ALLAHOUN, WHO SAID THAT ALGERIAN PERMREP TO UN, RAHAL, WOULD BE LEAVING FOR NEW YORK MARCH 22. AFTER RAHAL'S CONTACTS THERE, ALGERIANS WOULD KNOW WHETHER BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE ADDRESSING UNGA APRIL 9 OR 10, AND THEREAFTER OTHER DATES COULD BE FIXED. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITHSME DURING COMING WEEK AND WOULD SET UP A MEETING WITH ALLAHOUN MARCH 28.
4. ALLAHOUN SAID ALGERIA WOULD BE SENDING ADVANCE TEAM TO DISCUSS ALL DETAILS OF VISIT DURING FIRST WEEK IN APRIL. HE WOULD PROBABLY BE MEMBER OF TEAM WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOUMEDIENE'S SECURITY.

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TELEGRAM

-2- ALGIERS 610 21 MAR '74


5. HANDANI SUGGESTED THAT SINCE ALGERIANS HAVE NO EXPERIENCE WITH VISITS TO U.S., WE PROVIDE THEM WITH A CHECK LIST SO THAT THEY DO NOT OVERLOOK ANY DETAIL IN CONNECTION WITH VISIT.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S FURNISHING US SUCH A CHECK LIST WHICH WILL HELP PIN DOWN ALGERIANS AT AN EARLY DATE. THEIR NORMAL PROCEDURE IS TO WAIT UNTIL LAST MINUTE AND IMPROVISE.

EAGLETON

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TELEGRAM

P 211940Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0270
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0609

CONTROL: 5 8 4 9Q
RECD: 21 MAR '74 4:44PM

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, AG
SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE RE OIL EMBARGO

1. HAMDANI CALLED ME TO PRESIDENCY EVENING MARCH 21. HE APOLOGIZED FOR NOT HAVING TRANSMITTED EARLIER AN ORAL MESSAGE WHICH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAD GIVEN HIM FOR THE SECRETARY TWO DAYS AGO.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE. BOUMEDIENE WISHED TO CONFIRM TO SECRETARY THAT ALGERIA DID AS HE HAD PROMISED AT ARAB OIL MINISTERS' MEETING. ALGERIA HAD WORKED FOR RAISING OF EMBARGO AND AT SAME TIME FOR MAINTENANCE OF ARAB SOLIDARITY. A COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED THOUGH IT WAS NOT EASY. BOUMEDIENE HOPED THAT SECRETARY'S INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE PURSUED. END MESSAGE.

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27-LOX
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 141425Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0241
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0553

3801Q

14 MARCH 11 01 AM

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, AG, MX
SUBJ: ALGERIAN ATTITUDE RE LIFTING OIL EMBARGO

1. DURING MEETING WITH HAMDANI THIS MORNING HE SAID HE DID NOT YET HAVE NEWS FROM TRIPOLI. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR CONFERENCE IN CAIRO MIGHT HAVE UPSET WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SMOOTH DECISION IN TRIPOLI TO LIFT EMBARGO. HE REAFFIRMED THAT ALGERIAN POSITION WAS THAT EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED. BOUMEDIENE'S CONVERSATIONS WITH RULER OF KUWAIT ON WAY BACK FROM PEKING HAD IN PART BEEN FOR THIS PURPOSE. ALGERIA HE SAID WAS TRYING TO OBTAIN "UNANIMOUS DECISION". LIBYAN CONCURRENCE WAS NOT REQUIRED FOR "UNANIMITY" BUT ALGERIA DID WANT TO BRING SYRIA INTO CONSENSUS. HAMDANI EMPHASIZED ALGERIAN BELIEF THAT HAFIZ AL ASAD WAS BEST ELEMENT AVAILABLE IN SYRIA AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY ALGERIA AND U.S. HE THOUGHT EGYPTIAN PUBLICITY RE LIFTING EMBARGO HAD MADE ASAD'S POSITION ON EMBARGO MORE DIFFICULT.
EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

4 141217Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0240
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0552

3 7 7 9 Q

14 MARCH 10 12 AM

N O D I S C H E R O K E E

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, AG, US
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO US

1. DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO HAMDANI AT PRESIDENCY MORNING MARCH 14. HE READ LETTER AND COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A VERY USEFUL INITIATIVE WHICH HE WAS SURE WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY BOUMEDIENE.

2. HAMDANI SAID HE HAD SPOKEN BRIEFLY WITH BOUMEDIENE PREVIOUS EVENING RE PLANS FOR U.S. VISIT. BOUMEDIENE HAD CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND VISIT BEYOND NEW YORK AND MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY. HOWEVER THEY HAVE NOT YET FIXED TIMING FOR HIS UNGA PRESENTATION. HAMDANI BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE ADVANCE PARTY GOING TO U.S. TO PREPARE FOR VISIT AND HE ASSUMED RASHID ZEGHAR, WHO IS DUE BACK IN ALGIERS LATER THIS WEEK, WOULD HAVE COORDINATING ROLE. HE SAID HE WOULD GIVE US PRECISE DATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
EAGLETON

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 131805Z MAR 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0239
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0551

CONTROL: 3 5 3 5Q
RECD: 13 MAR 74 3:45PM

NDDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, AG (PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE)
SUBJ: PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S VISIT TO THE US

1. ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP IS NOTORIOUSLY LATE IN PLANNING TRIPS OUTSIDE ALGERIA. HAVE THEREFORE TRIED TO OBTAIN FROM HAMDANI IN PRESIDENCY AN EARLY INDICATION OF PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO HIS ASSUMED, BUT NOT YET OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED, APPEARANCE AT SPECIAL SESSION OF UNGA BEGINNING APRIL 9.

2. MARCH 13 HAMDANI SAID HE HAD NOT YET FOCUSED ON PLANNING FOR TRIP BUT WAS PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION THAT PLAN REMAINED AS IT HAD BEEN IN FALL 1973 BEFORE OCTOBER WAR. AT THAT TIME BOUMEDIENE INTENDED TO VISIT SOME PART OF U.S. OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK AND SEEK MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE SECRETARY EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR SOME PLACE WHERE THEY MIGHT BE ON A WEEKEND.

3. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD INFORM ME AS SOON AS BOUMEDIENE'S MORE PRECISE DESIRES WERE KNOWN. SINCE I HAVE INDICATED INTEREST IN BOUMEDIENE'S PLANS THIS WOULD NORMALLY BE SUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM ALGERIAN SIDE. IT IS POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT ALGERIANS WILL BE AWAITING A MORE OFFICIAL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE FROM OUR SIDE.

4. SUGGEST THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY THROUGH HAMDANI ORAL INVITATION TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE IN GENERAL TERMS TO VISIT U.S. AND MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY IF SCHEDULES PERMIT. THIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY ALGERIANS AS A FRIENDLY AND POSITIVE

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TELEGRAM

-2- ALGIERS 0551, 13MAR'74

GESTURE AND MIGHT STIMULATE THEIR ATTENTION TO
BOUMEDIENE'S PLANS BEYOND NEW YORK. AT THIS POINT
WE CAN ASSUME HE WILL SPEAK AT UNGA ON APRIL 9 OR
SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND THEN HAVE A FEW DAYS FREE FOR
TRIP OUTSIDE NEW YORK.

5. PLEASE ADVISE APPROPRIATE CAPTION FOR FURTHER MESSAGES
ON THIS SUBJECT.

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TELEGRAM

RECD: 10 MAR, 6:15PM

CONTROL: 2 6 4 0Q

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SECRET ALGIERS 0525

HAK
SCOWCROFT
MC PARLANE
RODMAN

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PFOR, AL, EG, US

SUBJECT: ARAB OIL MEETING: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REFS: ALGIERS0524; STATE 048020

1. HAMDANI CALLED ME TO PRESIDENCY AT 2000 MARCH 10 TO PROVIDE BOUMEDIENE'S CLARIFICATION RE ALGERIA'S POSITION ON ARAB OIL MINISTER CONFERENCE. HE SAID BOUMEDIENE WANTED US TO KNOW THAT WITH ABDESSELAM NOW IN PRESIDENCY OF AOPEC ALGERIA WOULD EXERCISE ITS FULL DUTIES. PROCEDURE WAS FOR PRESIDENT OF GROUP TO CONSULT OTHERS AND SET TIME AND PLACE FOR MEETING. IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN TRIPOLI ON MARCH 13.

2. SECOND PART OF BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE WAS THAT ALGERIA'S OBJECTION TO CAIRO MEETING ON MARCH 12 WAS MATTER OF FORM NOT SUBSTANCE.

3. HAMDANI WENT ON TO GIVE HIS PERSONAL COMMENT TO EFFECT THAT EGYPT HAD OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO IMPRESS USG AND OTHERS BY STAGING HURRIED MEETING IN CAIRO. A NUMBER OF MINISTERS HAD GONE TO CAIRO AS COURTESY TO EGYPT BUT THIS WAS NOT THE WAY CONFERENCE WOULD OR SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. ALTHOUGH SOME PARTICIPANTS WERE PUT OFF BY EGYPTIAN TACTICS HE HOPED DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN IN TRIPOLI TO LIFT BOYCOTT. ABDESSELAN WOULD WORK FOR THAT RESULT. QUESTION WAS DELICATE FOR SYRIA AND ALSO FOR U.S. BOUMEDIENE HAD ASKED HIM TO READ LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (TRANSMITTED THIS MORNING) TWICE. AS A CHIEF OF STATE BOUMEDIENE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT NIXON'S POSITION.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0219
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S E C R E T ALGIERS 0524

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS. PFCR, AL, EG, US
SUBJECT: ARAB OIL MEETING: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

- EAGLETON

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#0524

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TELEGRAM

CN: 1088Q
REC'D: MARCH 5, 1974
6:22 A.M.


HAK
Scowcroft
Rodman
M = Farlane
Saunders

REF: SECTO 0113

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TELEGRAM

Q 221452Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0176
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0429

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.C. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US

SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S TRAVEL PLANS

REF: ALGIERS 0407

CONTROL: 5 8 5 6 Q
RECD: 22 FEB 74Z 1843

*Scowcroft
Rodman
McFarlane
Saunders*

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE RETURNING TO ALGIERS FROM LAHORE BETWEEN MARCH 5 AND 7. BOUDEFLEKA LEAVES FOR LAHORE AND POINTS BEYOND TOMORROW FEBRUARY 23.

2. ZEGHAR REFERRED TO BOUMEDIENE'S ADDITIONAL TRAVEL OUT OF LAHORE BUT DID NOT SAY TO WHERE. PAKISTANE AMBASSADOR TODAY HOWEVER MENTIONED TO ME THAT BOUMEDIENE MIGHT BE GOING TO PEKING. THIS FITS IN WITH SRF REPORT REFERRED TO IN ALGIERS 0331.

3. SINCE ALGERIAN TRAVEL PLANS ARE OFTEN SUBJECT TO CHANGE, THERE REMAINS POSSIBILITY THAT BOUMEDIENE MIGHT BE BACK IN ALGIERS BY TIME OF SECRETARY'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON FROM MIDDLE EAST. THIS COULD BE CHECKED OUT WITH HAMDANI IN LAHORE.

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TELEGRAM

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O 191230Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0154
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0381

Control 4 7 3 7 Q
19 Feb 74
10:59Z

SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENE

REF: STATE 032520

1. AT 1000 FEBRUARY 19 I GAVE HAMDANI THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE. HE SAID HE WOULD GIVE TO BOUMEDIENE IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE BOTH ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR A MEETING OF ALGERIAN MAYORS AT CLUB DES PINS.

2. HAMDANI'S ONLY COMMENT WAS TO COUNT NUMBER OF DAYS UNTIL SUGGESTED FEBRUARY 25-6 VISIT TO ALGIERS. HE NOTED THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE AT LAHORE ISLAMIC SUMMIT JUST BEFORE THAT DATE AND "TIMING MIGHT BE CLOSE". ALGIERS SRF IS SUBMITTING A REPORT TODAY (AAA-2638) THAT PLANNING IS UNDERWAY, PERHAPS NOT FINALIZED, FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO VISIT CHINA AND NORTH KOREA IMMEDIATELY AFTER ISLAMIC SUMMIT.

3. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD HAVE REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. EAGLETON

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O 171120Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0153
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0330

CONTROL: 4 6 1 2 Q
FEBRUARY 17, 1974
8:34 AM

SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652/XGDS
TAGS: PFOR AG, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REFERENCE: STATE 032415

1. I CONVERVED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE VIA HAMDANI MORNING FEBRUARY 17.

2. HAMDANI INQUIRED RE "CONFLICTING PRELIMINARY ACCOUNTS OF THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING". I REPLIED ONLY THAT I ASSUMED ACCOUNTS FROM VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT ALL THE SAME. HAMDANI SAID BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OF FEBRUARY 14 HAD ACCURATELY REPORTED DECISIONS OF FOUR CHIEFS OF STATE. HE WAS SURE THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FROM SECRETARY AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH SAQQAF AND FAHMI SO AS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT DECISIONS OF CHIEFS OF STATE WERE ACCURATELY TRANSMITTED. HE ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY DURING THE DAYS AHEAD.

3. AS I LEFT HAMDANI'S HOUSE HE SAID THAT BOUMEDIENE HAD ON THREE DIFFERENT OCCASIONS EXPRESSED TO HIM IRRITATION OVER PROTRACTED STOPOVER OF SAQQAF AND FAHMI IN PARIS.
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CONTROL: 4435Q
RECD: FEB 16, 1974
1400Z

O 161305Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0152
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0379

SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, SA
SUBJ: OIL BOYCOTT

REF: ALGIERS 0363; JIDDA 0764, 0765, 0766
DEPT PASS JIDDA, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

1. JIDDA REFTELS EXPLAIN SOME OF AMBIGUITY IN MESSAGE HANDANI GAVE ME FOR SECRETARY AFTER ALGIERS CONFERENCE. HANDANI PROBABLY DID NOT HIMSELF HAVE FULL BACKGROUND. HE WAS READING FROM NOTES GIVEN HIM BY BOUMEDIENE AND IN OUR DISCUSSION OF MESSAGE SEEMED TO EXPECT NO DIFFICULTY IN LIFTING BOYCOTT AND GETTING ON WITH SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS.

2M FROM READING JIDDA REFTELS RESULTS OF ALGIERS CONFERENCE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE STEP FORWARD SINCE SAUDIS HAD ALREADY MADE SIMILAR PROPOSALS PREVIOUSLY. FROM ALGERIAN PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, CONFERENCE DECISIONS WERE POSITIVE. BOUMEDIENE PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT ALGIERS CONFERENCE, BY DECIDING IN PRINCIPLE TO LIFT EMBARGO AND GET SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS UNDERWAY, HAD AS HE SAID "DEBLOCKED SITUATION". SINCE FROM BOTH FAISAL AND BOUMEDIENE WE HEAR THAT BOUMEDIENE WANTED TO LIFT EMBARGO, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN HIS SUPPORT FOR SETTING A DATE FOR LIFTING EMBARGO TIED TO SECRETARY'S ACTIVITY ON BEHALF SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT.

3. OF VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES DISCUSSED PARA 11 JIDDA 0766, A MODIFICATION OF SUB-PARA D APPEARS TO ME MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED AND PRESERVE U.S. INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD. SUGGESTION SUB-PARA 3 FOR SECRET VISIT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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-2 -ALGIERS 0379, FEB 16

BY THE SECRETARY TO RIYADH MIGHT LEAD TO LIFTING BOYCOTT BUT, UNLESS BOUMEDIENE'S ACQUIESCENCE WERE OBTAINED BEFOREHAND (AND THEN IT WOULD NOT BE SECRET), HE AND OTHER BYPASSED ARAB LEADERS MIGHT JOIN OBSTRUCTIONISTS AND ISOLATE FAISAL.

4. BOTH FAISAL AND BOUMEDIENE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARY VISIT MIDDLE EAST. IF SUCH AN INITIATIVE WERE TAKEN I BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE GOOD CHANCE OF OBTAINING BOUMEDIENE'S AGREEMENT TO A DEFINITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN WHICH LIFTING BOYCOTT WOULD OCCUR AT AN EARLY STAGE, PERHAPS WITHIN TIME FRAME OF STEPS ALREADY AGREED ON BY SYRIA FOR ENTERING INTO DIS-ENGAGEMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS. FACT THAT SECRETARY FOLLOWED BOUMEDIENE'S ADVICE RE TRIP WOULD PUT BOUMEDIENE IN PROPER FRAME OF MIND TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

5. SINCE BOUMEDIENE HAS SHOWN DESIRE INCREASE CONTACTS WITH U.S. AND BE HELPFUL IN PEACE EFFORT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD AT LEAST TRY TO BRING HIM ALONG ON ANY PLAN WE WORK OUT WITH KUDIS RE BOYCOTT.


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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Scowcroft
McFarlane
Rothman
Saunders

O 151645Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0150
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0374

CONTROL: 4 2 1 8 Q
RECD: 15 FEB 74 3:16P

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, SA, EG, US
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTERS TRIP
TO WASHINGTON

REF: STATE 031098; PARIS 4068

1. RE PARAS 2 AND 3 PARIS REFTEL SAQQAF'S SENSITIVITY ABOUT MEETING PRESIDENT NIXON DOES NOT FIT IN WITH MESSAGE HE PASSED TO ME VIA SAUDI AMBASSADOR ALGIERS FEBRUARY 14. AT THAT TIME SAUDI AMBASSADOR, WHO READ FROM ARABIC NOTES, SPOKE ONLY OF SAQQAF'S DESIRE TO MEET WITH SECRETARY.
2. FAHMI, IN HIS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ME FEBRUARY 14, HAD ASKED FIRST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY. HE ADDED LATER THAT TWO MINISTERS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE PRESIDENT IF POSSIBLE.
EAGLETON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SCROFT
MC ARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

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To sec 5

SECRET

R 151400Z FEB. 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0148
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0372

4 1 8 0 Q
Feb 15, 1974
17:24Z

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652/ XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD US

FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: ALGIERS 0363

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI FEBRUARY 14 IN WHICH HE PASSED LATEST MESSAGE TO YOU FROM PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE, I WAS STRUCK BY DEGREE TO WHICH BOUMEDIENE HAS MOVED TOWARD REAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. THOUGH FAISAL AND SADAT CAN DESERVEDLY CALIM MORE CREDIT THAN BOUMEDIENE FOR LIFTING EMBARGO IT IS NOTABLE FACT THAT USUALLY RETICENT BOUMEDIENE CLEARLY WANTS YOU TO KNOW THAT HE IS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL.

2. WHEN HAMDANI CONVERVED BOUMEDIENE'S SUGGESTION THAT YOU MAKE ANOTHER TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST HE ADDED THAT IT WAS INCREDIBLE THAT SO SOON AFTER MIDDLE EAST WAR ARABS WERE LOOKING TO U.S., WHO HAD SUPPLIED MASSIVE ARMS TO ISRAEL, AND HAD FORGOTTEN SOVIETS WHO HAD SUPPLIED ARABS. HE ARGUED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS PHENOMENON BY MAINTAINING DYNAMISM, SPECIFICALLY THROUGH ANOTHER VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST. HE DID NOT MENTION YOUR STOPPING IN ALGIERS, BUT FROM WHAT WAS SDAID LATER IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU AGAIN.

3. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHETHER SADAT CONCERTED WITH BOUMEDIENE ON EGYPTIAN INTENTION TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. LATER THIS MONTH. ON FEBRUARY 14 HAMDANI WAS UNINFORMED BUT NOTED THAT WHILE THER WAS LITTLE IMPACT LEFT IN A U.S. - EGYPTIAN RENEWAL (SONCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2- Algiers 372, Feb 15

MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVED IT HAD ALREADY OCCURRED), THERE WAS STILL SOME WEIGHT LEFT IN RENEWAL BETWEEN ALGERIA AND U.S.

4. IF OIL EMBARGO IS LEFTED WITHOUT SERIOUS NEGATIVE REACTION IN ARAB WORLD AND IF PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT I BELIEVE THERE IS GOOD CHANCE THAT BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE READY TO DECIDE OR ANNOUNCE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT TIME OF YOUR NEXT VISIT HERE. MEANWHILE YOUR MESSAGES ARE VERY USEFUL IN ENLARGING BOUMEDIENE'S CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.

5. BOUITEFLIKA HAS BEEN MYSTERIOUSLY ABSENT FROM ALGIERS SINCE ABOUT FEBRUARY 1. MOST RUMORS SUGGEST HE HAS A HEALTH PROBLEM.

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TELEGRAM

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Z 142005Z FEB 74
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BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0363

CONTROL: 3 8 5 1 Q
RECD: 14 FEB 74 4:57P

NAK
SCROFT
ROTHMAN
McFARLANE
SALLUNDERS

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, EG, SA
SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY

SUGGEST DEPT PASS JIDDA, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

1. HAMDANI CALLED ME TO PRESIDENCY AT 1800. SAID BOUMEDIENE HAD ASKED HIM WHETHER OUR TELEGRAPHIC CHANNEL TO WASHINGTON WENT STRAIGHT TO SECRETARY. HE WAS CONCERNED RE POSSIBLE LEAK TO PRESS. I ASSURED HIM HIS MESSAGES TO SECRETARY WENT BY MOST SECURE AND RESTRICTED CHANNEL.

2. HAMDANI SAID MIN SUMMIT HAD DESIGNATED EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTERS TO UNDERTAKE SPECIAL MISSION TO WASHINGTON. THESE MINISTERS WILL GIVE SECRETARY FULL DETAILS OF ALGIERS MEETING.

3. BOUMEDIENE WANTED SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT HE HAD "SUCCEEDED RE OIL EMBARGO AND ISRAELI PRISONERS". IT WAS NOW UP TO THE SECRETARY TO FOLLOW UP SINCE ARABS WOULD BE AWAITING HIS INITIATIVES. HE HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. SYRIANS WILL CONTACT SECRETARY DIRECT.

5. SITUATION HAD BEEN VERY BLOCKED. ALL EFFORTS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO DEBLOCK IT AND IT WAS HOPED THERE WOULD BE CONTINUED GESTURES ON SECRETARY'S PART. BOUMEDIENE PERSONALLY REPEAT PERSONALLY BELIEVES ANOTHER TRIP BY SECRETARY TO MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WOULD BE POSITIVE ACT AND WOULD HELP ACCELERATE PROGRESS AND FURTHER IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND ARAB STATES.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

ALGIERS 0363, 14 FEB'74

6. ON QUESTION OF OIL PRICES ALGERIAN AND U.S. INTERESTS ARE DIVERGENT. ALGERIAN POSITION IS FIRM BECAUSE OF FUTURE NEEDS OF COUNTRY.

7. BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE ENDED WITH ABOVE BUT I ASKED HAMDANI HOW EMBARGO WOULD BE LIFTED AND WHAT WOULD BE REVEALED IN COMMUNIQUE. HE REPLIED THAT DECISION TO LIFT EMBARGO WOULD BE KEPT SECRET FOR TIME BEING. OIL MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO MEET BUT NEW DATE FOR TRIPOLI MEETING HAD NOT BEEN FIXED. COMMUNIQUE WILL BE VERY GENERAL.

8. IN DISCUSSING SAQQAF AND FAHMI MISSION TO WASHINGTON I MENTIONED THAT BBC HAD SPOKEN OF MISSION TO BOTH FRANCE AND U.S. AND NOTED THAT SAQQAF HAD REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY FOR SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY NIGHT IF SATURDAY MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE. HAMDANI SEEMED SURPRISED AND SAID FROM WHAT HE HAD HEARD MISSION WAS ONLY TO WASHINGTON AND WAS TO BE UNDERTAKEN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

9. WHILE I WAS DRAFTING ABOVE HAMDANI PHONED TO SAY HE HAD JUST SPOKEN WITH BOUMEDIENE RE TIMING OF SAQQAF-FAHMI VISIT TO WASHINGTON. BOUMEDIENE ASKED HIM TO TELL ME THAT FOUR CHIEFS OF STATE HAD CLEARLY INSTRUCTED TWO MINISTERS TO GET TO WASHINGTON BY QUECKEST POSSIBLE MEANS SO THAT AMBIGUITIES RE EMBARGO COULD BE REMOVED SOONEST. BOUMEDIENE WANTED NO MISUNDERSTANDING RE A POSSIBLE MISSION TO PARIS (BBC HAD SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF JOBERT'S SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE IN WASHINGTON). I NOTED THAT MESSAGE FROM SAQQAF REFERRED TO DAY OF WEEK, SATURDAY, BUT NOT DATE. SINCE HE WAS CONFUSED RE DAY OF WEEK WHEN I HAD SEEN HIM YESTERDAY IT WAS POSSIBLE HE INTENDED TO MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR FRIDAY NIGHT FEBRUARY 16. HAMDANI SAID HE HOPED SECRETARY COULD RECEIVE TWO MINISTERS FRIDAY EVENING AND INFORM THEM IN PARIS SO THEY COULD LEAVE PARIS FRIDAY MORNING. I PROMISED TO PASS ON SUGGESTION. HE ASKED THAT THIS BE KEPT "BETWEEN US" AND NOT RELAYED TO SAQQAF AND FAHMI.

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TELEGRAM

-3- ALGIERS 0363, 14 FEB '74

10. OPERATIVE PART OF COMMUNIQUE JUST ISSUED IS
QUOTE THE FOUR ARAB LEADERS REAFFIRMED DECISION OF
ALGIERS SUMMIT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO:

A) THE TOTAL EVACUATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES
OCCUPIED BY ZIONIST ENEMY IN 1967;

B) GUARANTEE OF RIGHTS OF ARAB PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE IN THEIR TERRITORIES AND THEIR NATION.
QUOTE DISCUSSION OF FOUR LEADERS TOOK PLACE IN
ATMOSPHERE OF TRUE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION,
HAVING AS ITS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE SUPREME INTEREST
OF ARAB NATION. TOTAL UNANIMITY RESULTED ON ALL
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED. END QUOTE

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TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0127
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13 Feb 74
11:53Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XOD'S
TAGS: PFOR, AL, EG, SA, EG
SUBJ: ALGIERS MINI-SUMMIT: MESSAGE FOR SAQQAF
REF: STATE 229103

1. 0900 FEBRUARY 13 I PHONED HAMDANI AND ASKED THAT HE ARRANGE FOR ME TO SEE SAQQAF AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES ALGIERS. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD DO SO, FAISAL'S PARTY BEING EXPECTED HERE THIS AFTERNOON.

2. I CONVEYED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (PARA 3 REFTEL) ASSURING BOUMEDIENE THAT U.S. WOULD DO NOTHING TO COMPLICATE HIS CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS. I THEN REFERRED TO FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S MOUDJAHID (ALGIERS 0324) WHICH SEEMED CONTRARY TO BOUMEDIENE'S DESIRE CREATE PROPER ATMOSPHERE. HAMDANI SAID HE HAD NOT YET READ EDITORIAL.

EAGLETON

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TELEGRAM

O 121920Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0125
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 0323

CONTROL: 3 1 7 4 Q
RECD: 12 FEB 74 4:08P

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR,

G, US, EG, SA

SUBJECT: BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY

SUGGEST DEPT PASS TO CAIRO, JIDDA

REFS: STATE 026982, 027122

1. HAMDANI CALLED ME TO PRESIDENCY EVENING FEBRUARY 12 TO CONVEY ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER IN REPLY TO RECENT MESSAGES FRO LATTER. BOUMEDIENE WISHED TO INFORM SECRETARY THAT TRIPOLI OIL MEETING HAD BEEN DELAYED SEVERAL DAYS, EXACT DATE TO BE FIXED LATER. THIS DELAY, AT SAUDI REQUEST, WAS NOT TO PROLONG EMBARGO BUT TO GIVE TIME TO FIND SOLUTION.

2. A MINI SUMMIT WILL BE HELD IN ALGIERS TOMORROW, FEBRUARY 13, BRINGING TOGETHER FAISAL, SADAT, ASAD AND BOUMEDIENE (RULER OF KUWAIT IS BUSY WITH MOBUTU) FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST AND FINDING SOLUTION TO EMBARGO.

3. BOUMEDIENE REQUESTS OF SECRETARY THAT USG MAKE NO STATEMENTS OR TAKE INITIATIVE THAT COULD CREATE PROBLEM FOR SUMMIT DELIBERATIONS. BOUMEDIENE WANTS "RIGHT ATMOSPHERE" FOR REACHING DECISIONS.

4. BOUMEDIENE WILL TRY TO WORK FOR LIFTING OF EMBARGO. IT WILL NOT BE EASY. HE DOES NOT PROMISE RESULTS BUT WILL DO HIS BEST. END MESSAGE.

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ALGIERS 0323, 12 FEB '74

5. IN DISCUSSION WITH HANDANI HE COUNTED FAISAL AND SADAT ON SIDE OF LIFTING EMBARGO, GIVING IMPRESSION THAT BOUMEDIENE WILL BE TRYING TO FIND FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO SYRIA, BUT WILL STICK BY SYRIA IF LATTER IMPOSES VETO.

6. FACT THAT MEETING IS BEING HELD IN ALGIERS ENSURES THAT BOUMEDIENE WILL INDEED DO ALL POSSIBLE TO FIND A "SOLUTION" WHICH WILL MAKE SUMMIT A SUCCESS.

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CONTROL: 3091Q
DATED: 12 FEB 74
1730Z

P 121350Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0122
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0319

NODIS CHEROKEE

SUGGEST DEPT PASS CAIRO AND JIDDA.

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJECT: RE-ESTABLISHMENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
REF: CAIRO 674; STATE 027151

1. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR EL SADR TOLD ME EVENING FEBRUARY 11 THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ASHRAF MARWAN DISCUSSED RENEWAL U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS DURING HIS LATEST VISIT TO ALGIERS FEBRUARY 9. HOWEVER EL SADR WAS NOT PRESENT DURING MARWAN'S TETE-A-TETE WITH BOUMEDIENE AND MIGHT NOT BE FULLY INFORMED.

2. EL SADR ADDED THAT QUESTION OF MINI SUMMIT WAS STILL UP IN AIR BECAUSE OF SYRIAN ATTITUDE. HE THOUGHT ALGERIAN POSITION RE SUMMIT WOULD DEPEND ON THAT OF SYRIA.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING ANY INFO AVAILABLE RE MARWAN'S POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WITH BOUMEDIENE OF RENEWAL U.S.-ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE HAVE NO LOCAL INFO TO SUPPORT REPORTS THAT ALGERIA WILL JOIN EGYPT IN RENEWING FEBRUARY 21.

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SCOWCROFT
MC IRLANE
RODRIAN
SAUNDERS

Department of State

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WH - Scowcroft
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TELEGRAM

SECRET '74 FEB 11 PM 7:57

O 111730Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0118
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0314

Control 2 7 3 7 Q
11 Feb 74
18:35Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PSOR, AG, US, EG, SA
SUBJ: SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 027122

PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE HAS BEEN TIED UP WITH MEETINGS
SO I GAVE ORAL MESSAGE (REFTTEL) ALONG WITH
OUTLINE ON PIECE OF PAPER TO HAMDANI IN THE
PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT IMMEDIATELY
TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AND HOPED TO HAVE BOUMEDIENE'S
REACTION. I ALSO GAVE HAMDANI ADVANCE COPY OF
SECRETARY'S SPEECH AT OPENING OF ENETGY CONFERENCE.

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MCFARLAND

RODMAN
SAUNDERS

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FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0087
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0249

CONTROL: 1 0 6 7 Q
RECD: 05 FEB 74Z 13 13

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: LIFTING OF OIL BOYCOTT

1. I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI 1100 FEBRUARY 5. BEFORE HANDING OVER LETTER WE SPOKE FOR SEVERAL MINUTES ABOUT BOUMEDIENE'S INITIATIVE FOR SPECIAL UNGA SESSION AND ON WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE. HAMDANI TRIED TO PUT ALGERIAN POSITION IN BEST LIGHT STRESSING DESIRE FOR COOPERATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION ON WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HE WAS THUS IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND WHEN HE READ ENGLISH TEXT OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO BOUMEDIENE (WE DID NOT PROVIDE TRANSLATION).

2. HAMDANI HAD NO COMMENT OTHER THAN THAT MESSAGE WAS CLEAR AND HE WOULD DELIVER IT TO BOUMEDIENE.

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TELEGRAM

*Scowcroft
Rodman
Saunders
McFarlane*

O 031045Z FEB 74

FM USINT ALGIERS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0078

BT

SECRET ALGIERS 0236

0612Q

1974 FEB 3 1156Z

NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT PASS JIDDA, KUWAIT, CAIRO, ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, US

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN POSITION ON LIFTING OIL BOYCOTT

REFTELS: JIDDA 0529, STATE 022597

1. ALGERIAN LEADERS HERE HAVE TAKEN NO PUBLIC, OR TO US PRIVATE, POSITION RE LIFTING OIL BOYCOTT. PRESS HOWEVER HAS TILTED AGAINST LIFTING OF BOYCOTT BY PUBLICIZING KUWAITI AND OTHER NEGATIVE STATEMENTS. WE STILL BELIEVE ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP IS LOOKING TO MAJOR ARAB PRODUCERS FOR DECISION WHICH WOULD NOT REQUIRE ALGERIA TO BE COUNTED AMONG THOSE PUSHING FOR LIFTING OF BOYCOTT.

2. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR EL SADR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT AT SOCIAL FUNCTION THAT SADAT'S ENVOY, ASHRAF MERWAN, WHO WAS HERE TWICE EARLIER IN WEEK HAD OBTAINED ALGERIAN AGREEMENT TO LIFT BOYCOTT. I EXPRESSED DOUBTS BUT HE INSISTED THAT MERWAN HAD TOLD HIM OF ALGERIAN AGREEMENT JUST BEFORE LEAVING ALGIERS. (EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR DID NOT ACCOMPANY MERWAN IN TALKS WITH BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFILKA.) I THEN ASKED AMBASSADOR ABOUT NEGATIVE KUWAITI STATEMENTS AND HE REPLIED THAT THEY TOO WERE LINED UP IN FAVOR OF ENDING BOYCOTT. LANGUAGE IN STATE OF UNION MESSAGE (WHICH WE HAD GIVEN EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HERE ON THEIR REQUEST) HAD SATISFIED KUWAITI CONDITIONS.

3. DESPITE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSURANCES, ALGERIA'S POSITION ON BOYCOTT SHOULD PROBABLY BE CONSIDERED UNCERTAIN. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SAUDIS HAVE YET WEIGHED IN WITH ALGERIAN LEADERS. IF NOT, THEY SHOULD DO SO NOW WITH MESSAGE THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN DECISION CONSISTENT WITH ASSURANCES THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN SECRETARY KISSINGER. THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN ALGERIAN ACQUIESCENCE, THOUGH PROBABLY NOT CO-SPONSORSHIP, RE LIFTING BOYCOTT. AGREE THAT IT IMPORTANT HAVE DECISION ON BOYCOTT MADE PRIOR TO TRIPOLI MEETING.

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O 091220Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0114
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0310

2490Q
FEB. 9, 1974
9:16 AM

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EG SA
SUBJ: ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO BOUMEDIENE

SUGGEST DEPT PASS JIDDA, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

REF: STATE 926982

1. ON RECEIPT REFTTEL I PHONED HAMDANI IN PRESIDENCY TO ASK HOW BEST TO TRANSMIT ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO BOUMEDIENE. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN INTEREST OF SPEED I GIVE IT TO HIM SINCE BOUMEDIENE WAS JUST RETURNING FROM EASTERN ALGERIA AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO RECIEVE ME.
2. AT 1100 FEBRUARY-9 I GAVE HAMDANI SECRETARY'S MESSAGE VERTATIM AND LEFT HIM PIECE OF PAPER WITH OUTLINE OF MESSAGE.
3. HAMDANI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO BOUMEDIENE WHO HE THOUGHT WOULD LATER WISH TO COMMENT DIRECT OR THROUGH HIM. HAMDANI SAID MEANWHILE HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE SECRETARY HIS PRELIMINARY COMMENTS.
 - A. WHATEVER OPTIMISTIC MESSAGES WE ARE RECEIVING FROM ARABS RE LIFTING BOYCOTT, ARAB PUBLIC OPINION IS NOW SUCH THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LIFT BOYCOTT WITHOUT MOVEMENT ON SYRIAN FRONT- KING FAISAL, WHO NOW HAS GREAT CAPITAL OF PRESTIGE AND GOOD WILL IN ARAB WORLD, WOULD NOT WISH TO FORFEIT IT BY APPEARING TO LEW DOWN SYRIAN COUSE.
 - B. HE APPRECIATED SECRETARY'S EXPLANATION OF WHY HE HAD SET MARCH 14 AS DEFINITE DATE FOR LIFITING BOYCOTT. THIS WAS VERY HELPFUL CLARIFICATION, NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT DATE SHOULD BE LEFT CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT BROUGHT

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-2- SECRET ALGIERS 310 NODIS/CHEROKEE

OUT INTO PUBLIC IN SUCH A WAY AS TO APPEAR TO
CONSTITUTE AN ULTIMATUM.

C. HE HOPED PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON SYRIAN DIS-
ENGAGEMENT AND IN THIS RESPECT "ALGERIA WOULD NOT BE MORE
ROYALIST THAN KING".

4. I TOLD HAMDANI WE APPRECIATED ARAB DILEMMA, BUT HAVING
HAD ASSURANCES RE LIFTING OF BOYCOTT WE TOO FACE DILEMMA
AND UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMED THAT ARAB
GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED SHOULD FIND WAY OUT.

5. HAMDANI SAID HE DID NOT YET HAVE ANY OFFICIAL INFORMATION
RE CAIRO AKBAR REPORT THAT A RESTRICTED ARAB SUMMIT WOULD SOON
BE HELD TO DISCUSS SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT.

EAGLETON

NOTE: NOT PASSED JIDDA, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS BY C/T.

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*Received
L. S. Smith
WLD*



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TELEGRAM

Control: 1 9 3 1 Q

Received: February 7, 1974 527PM

O 072023Z FEB 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0102
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0285

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PSOR, AG
SUBJ: BOUMEDIENE'S MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

REF: STATE 023523

1. I WAS CALLED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ALONE AT 1800 TODAY. HE SAID HE WISHED TO GIVE ME HIS REPLY TO THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 5 AND TO COMMENT ON THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE (SEPTEL).

2. SPEAKING SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY BOUMEDIENE SAID HE HAD APPRECIATED MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY SINCE THEIR MEETING IN DECEMBER. HE HAD NOT REPLIED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OF BUSINESS BUT WISHED TO DO SO RE MOST RECENT MESSAGE. ALGERIA, HE SAID, HAD FOLLOWED A POSITIVE POLICY TOWARD EFFORTS TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST AND HAD DONE NOTHING TO STAND IN WAY OF DR. KISSINGER'S EFFORT. "WE WILL MAINTAIN THE SAME ATTITUDE."

3. WITH REGARD TO OIL EMBARGO, H SAID, DISENGAGEMENT ON THE CANAL FRONT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. "SOMETHING WAS NEEDED ON THE SYRIAN SIDE." OTHERWISE LIFTING OF EMBARGO WOULD "CREATE DIFFICULT SITUATION FOR EGYPT AND SOME OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES."

4. BOUMEDIENE SAID HE HOPED "SOMETHING WOULD DEVELOP RE SYRIA WHICH WOULD ARRANGE THINGS." HE HAD NO COMPLAINT RE SUBSTANCE OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE BUT IN FRANKNESS HE SHOULD SAY THAT SETTING A DEFINITE

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TELEGRAM

-2- Algiers 0285 February 7, 1974

DATE FOR LIFTING THE BOYCOTT HAD CREATED DELICATE PROBLEM FOR ARAB COUNTRIES WHO WERE THEREBY TO SOME EXTENT "UNDER GUN" (BRAQUES).

5. BOUMEDIENE SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY NOT AGAINST LIFTING BOYCOTT BUT REPEATED THAT THERE WAS PROBLEM RE SYRIA. HE ASKED THAT SECRETARY BE INFORMED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET SYRIANS TO BUDGE AND "THINGS SEEM TO BE HEADING TOWARDS SOLUTION". HE THEN STATED THAT "IF OTHERS AT TRIPOLI ARE FOR LIFTING EMBARGO I WILL NOT OPPOSE; BUT THERE IS PROBLEM OF SYRIA".

6. BOUMEDIENE SAID THAT "IN CONCLUSION HE WANTED SECRETARY TO KNOW HE STOOD BY HIS ANALYSIS GIVEN DURING THEIR DECEMBER MEETING, INCLUDING NEED TO FIND SOLUTION ON THREE FRONTS; EGYPT, SYRIA AND PALESTINE". AS FINAL POINT HE SAID HE COULD TELL SECRETARY IN CONFIDENCE THAT WHEN ASSAD'S REPRESENTATIVE WAS IN ALGIERS HE (BOUMEDIENE) HAD SUGGESTED THAT SYRIA "ARRANGE PROBLEM OF LIST OF PRISONERS". SOMEONE ELSE HAD SUGGESTED LIST BE GIVEN TO THIRD PARTY BUT HE HAD SAID LIST SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DR. KISSINGER TO BE USED IN NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAELIS.

7. DURING CONVERSATION BOUMEDIENE REVERTED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE SECRETARY'S DEADLINE FOR LIFTING OF EMBARGO BUT HE DID NOT COMMENT ON WHAT MIGHT RESULT FROM DEADLINE NOT BEING MET. I NOTED THAT IF TIMING WAS PROBLEM FOR ARABS THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC WHO HAD EXPECTED LIFTING OF EMBARGO TO FOLLOW WITHIN REASONABLE TIME AFTER ACHIEVEMENT OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION BOUMEDIENE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW LATEST SAUDI POSITION RE LIFTING OF BOYCOTT. TWICE HE REFERRED DISPARAGINGLY TO LIBYANS, FIRST FOR OPPOSING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THEN FOR SELLING OIL WHILE PREACHING EXTREMISM.

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TELEGRAM

-3- Algiers 0285 February 7, 1974

8. COMMENT: VAGUE LANGUAGE OF MESSAGE (FROM MY NOTES) WAS BOUMEDIENE'S. HE SEEMED TO WANT TO MAKE HIS POSITION AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE RE LIFTING OF EMBARGO WITHOUT GIVING IN ON POINT THAT SOME MOVEMENT ON SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY. AS I LEFT HE SAID HE WOULD ALWAYS WELCOME HEARING FROM THE SECRETARY TO WHOM HE SENT HIS BEST WISHES.

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'74 JAN 10:00

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SCOWCROFT
McFARLANE
TODMAN
SANDERS

CONTRQL: 4 6 9 8Q
RECD: 21 JAN'74, 1219P

R 211521Z JAN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0033
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0123

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, AG
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT

REF: SECTO 125

I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI EVENING JANUARY 20 AND HE PASSED IT ON TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE MORNING JANUARY 21. HAMDANI READ LETTER AND SEEMED PLEASE WITH ITS CONTENT. HE RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AND THE SECRETARY HAD DEVELOPED AN EXCELLENT RAPPORT DURING DECEMBER MEETING AND SAID HE THOUGHT BOUMEDIENE WOULD WANT TO REPLY TO THIS LATEST MESSAGE.

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0 181140Z JAN 74
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0028
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SECRET ALGIERS 0112

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SCOWCROFT
BURKE
MCFAIRLANE
JANKA
APPLEBAUM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFCR, AG
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S DIALOGUE WITH ALGERIAN LEADERS

DEPT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SECRETARY

1. CONCLUSION OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAS ENHANCED POSITIVE ALGERIAN VIEW OF SECRETARY'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST AND CREATED ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH BOUMEDIENE MAY BE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD ON U.S.-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS.
2. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE MAXIMUM DISTANCE BOUMEDIENE IS NOW PREPARED TO GO TOWARD RESTORING RELATIONS, BELIEVE ANOTHER VISIT TO ALGIERS BY THE SECRETARY EN ROUTE FROM MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE USEFUL.
3. SUGGEST THAT IF ANOTHER ALGIERS STOPOVER IS DECIDED UPON, I MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM BOUMEDIENE AND BOUTEFLIKA THAT THE SECRETARY WISHES TO CONSULT THEM REGARDING HIS PEACE EFFORTS AND WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS U.S.-ALGERIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS IN GREATER DETAIL.
4. IN ALGIERS THE SECRETARY MIGHT TRY FOR FULL RESTORATION RELATIONS AND, IF BOUMEDIENE IS NOT YET READY TO GO THAT FAR, THEN PROPOSE THAT CHIEF USINT WHO IS DUE FOR TRANSFER AFTER FOUR YEAR TOUR BE REPLACED BY PERSON HOLDING AMBASSADORIAL RANK, WITH ALGERIANS DOING LIKEWISE IN WASHINGTON. (DO NOT BELIEVE THIS FORMULA WOULD DELAY EVENTUAL FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, SINCE IF BOUMEDIENE IS NOT READY FOR FULL RELATIONS NOW HE WILL PROBABLY IN ANY CASE HOLD OFF UNTIL FINAL TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST

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-2- ALGIERS 0112, JAN 18, NODIS

5. WHILE WE WOULD HOPE FOR, BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE, MOVEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, SECRETARY'S VISIT HERE WOULD IN ANY CASE HOLD ALGERIAN LEADERS TO THEIR ENDORSEMENT OF U.S. ROLE IN SEEKING MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND PERMIT PRESENTATION OF SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON ENERGY AND OTHER MATTERS.

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RODMAN

0 241720Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9963
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2667

CONTROL: 6115Q
RECD: 24 DEC 17 52Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: NGDS
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 23 MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: RUEADWW #0049 0 230315Z DEC 73

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. I DELIVERED TEXT OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE TO DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY, HAMDANI, AFTERNOON DECEMBER 24. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WOULD GIVE IT TO BOUMEDIENE IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID THIS OPENING OF DIALOGUE WAS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BY PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE NOT JUST IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE TO MIDDLE EAST BUT AT LEAST AS MUCH IN BUILDING BASIS OF LONG TERM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. AND ALGERIA. HAMDANI THOUGHT TIME MIGHT SOON COME FOR ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT TO PUT ITS POSITION RE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON PAPER. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE AFTER FIRST SIGN OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOME PART OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MEANWHILE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WAS WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA AND HOPED FOR PROGRESS.

2. BOUTEFLIKA HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO ALGIERS FROM PARIS, BUT HAMDANI SAID BOUMEDIENE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY IN PARIS DECEMBER 20. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT SECRETARY WAS PROCEEDING IN CAREFUL AND REALISTIC WAY. HE SAW REAL TEST OF U.S. CREDIBILITY COMING AFTER ISRAELI ELECTIONS.

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FM HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO USINT ALGIERS
INFO SEC STATE WASH DC

S E C R E T/NODIS/CHEROKEE
SECTO 239

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO
PRESIDENT BOUMFOTENE:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

"AS I RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY
VIEWS ON THE OPENING PHASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFER-
ENCE IN GENEVA IN THE SPIRIT OF CONSULTATION ESTABLISHED DURING
MY VISIT TO ALGIERS. FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA WILL HAVE
REPORTED TO YOU ON OUR CONVERSATION IN PARIS JUST BEFORE MY
DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA.

"IN MY DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE, WE HAD THREE OBJECTIVES. FIRST, WE SOUGHT
A COMMITMENT IN ISRAEL TO THE PRINCIPLE OF AN EARLY
DISENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES. SECOND, IT WAS IMPORTANT

PAGE 02 RUEADWW #0049 S E C R E T
TO ESTABLISH A SOUND BASIS AT THE CONFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATION
OF A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. THIRD, WE WANTED TO ASSURE
THAT THE DISCUSSIONS BEGUN IN THESE OPENING DAYS OF THE
CONFERENCE WOULD CONTINUE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAD TOWARD
EARLY AGREEMENT. WE ACHIEVED ALL OF THESE OBJECTIVES AT
THE CONFERENCE.

"A SOUND BASIS WAS LAID FOR PROMPT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SEPARATION
OF MILITARY FORCES. COMPARABLE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN JORDANIAN



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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 230436Z

AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES ARE ALSO LIKELY AT AN EARLY DATE. AT GENEVA, I URGED EACH OF THE PARTIES TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND EACH SHARED THIS SENSE OF URGENCY. AS I ALREADY TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFILKA, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE SAME EFFORT ON BEHALF OF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT.

"EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE CONFERENCE SHOWED A DETERMINATION TO MAKE IT SUCCEED. THE ISSUES RAISED WERE RESOLVED IN A SPIRIT OF BUSINESS LIKE CONSULTATION, AND A FRAMEWORK HAS NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE MOMENTUM GENERATED SHOULD

PAGE 03 RUEADWW #0049 S E C R E T

NOT BE LOST, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD CONTINUE IN SESSION. IN ADDITION TO THE WORKING GROUPS DISCUSSING DISENGAGEMENT, THE HEADS OF DELEGATION WILL BE IN GENEVA TO HELP MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AT THE FASTEST POSSIBLE PACE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED TO RETURN TO GENEVA WHENEVER THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.

"I LOOK FORWARD, MR. PRESIDENT, TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFILKA AS THE TALKS PROCEED. FOR THE MOMENT, I BELIEVE A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE.

"AGAIN, I WANT TO SAY HOW MUCH I HAVE ENJOYED MY CONTACTS WITH ALGERIAN LEADERS.
BEST REGARDS. HENRY A. KISSINGER"

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0 230320Z DEC 73
FM KISSINGER
TO RUEBRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
BT

CONTROL: 6 0 5 4 Q
RECD: 23 DECEMBER 73 -
12 29 AM

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE
SECTO 240
EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO SAGGAF FROM SECRETARY
NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SAGGAF FROM SECRETARY
KISSINGER:

"DEAR ONAR:

"AS THE OPENING MEETINGS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE
CONFERENCE CONCLUDE, I WANT TO SHARE MY VIEWS WITH YOU
IN THE SPIRIT OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED
OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS.

"AS WE MOVED INTO THE FINAL DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE
CONFERENCE, WE HAD THREE OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST WAS TO GAIN
A COMMITMENT IN ISRAEL TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EARLY DISENGAGEMENT.
THE SECOND WAS TO ASSURE THE BEGINNING OF TALKS ON DISENGAGEMENT
AT THE CONFERENCE. FINALLY, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THAT
THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE BEGUN THESE LAST TWO DAYS IN GENEVA
WOULD CONTINUE ON A SOUND BASIS. ALL THREE OF THESE OBJECTIVES
WERE ACHIEVED.

"I AM GLAD TO REPORT THAT ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE DURING
THIS OPENING PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE FOR PROMPT DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES ON THE
SUBJECT OF THE SEPARATION OF MILITARY FORCES.
SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN JORDANIAN AND ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES
ON DISENGAGEMENT ARE ALSO LIKELY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IN MY
CONVERSATIONS AT GENEVA, I AGAIN URGED THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE EARLY AGREEMENT, AND I WAS
PLEASED THAT EACH SHARED THIS SENSE OF URGENCY.

"THE CONFERENCE ITSELF WAS TESTIMONY TO THE DETERMINA-
TION OF EACH PARTY THAT IT SUCCEED. ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED
WERE RESOLVED IN A SPIRIT OF BUSINESSLIKE CONSULTATION, AND A
FRAMEWORK HAS NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION.
I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION HAS DEVELOPED ALONG
THE LINES I DESCRIBED TO YOU DURING OUR LAST
CONVERSATION.

"THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD REMAIN
IN SESSION. IN ADDITION TO THE WORKING GROUPS, THE HEADS OF

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-2- SECTO 240

DELEGATION WOULD BE IN GENEVA TO HELP MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AT THE FASTEST POSSIBLE PACE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE PREPARED TO RETURN TO GENEVA WHENEVER THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

"I LOOK FORWARD TO STAYING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AS THE TALKS PROCEED. FOR THE MOMENT, A GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE, AND I BELIEVE HISTORY WILL MARK THIS A A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD PEACE.

"WARM REGARDS. HENRY A. KISSINGER"

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Available.**



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TELEGRAM

Z 0 231353Z DEC 73 ZFF-6
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 2903
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9943
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 2642

CN: 5298Q
REC'D: DECEMBER 20, 1973
6:13 A.M.

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH BOUTEFLIKA (U.S.-ALGERIAN
RELATIONS)

REF: STATE 247144

1. MY CURRENT IMPRESSION OF BOUMEDIENE'S POSITION ON
RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (BASED ON
CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI DEC 19 AND SRF FIELD
REPORT TOPIR 314/12122-73) IS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO
MOVE INTO FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS SOON AS
"RIGHT MOMENT" ARRIVES. PROBLEM IS THAT BOUMEDIENE
IS BY NATURE A CAUTIOUS MAN AND SLOW TO MAKE DECISION
ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES PARTICULARLY IF THEY AFFECT
ALGERIA'S IMAGE. HENCE THERE IS DANGER THAT EVEN
WHEN A RIGHT MOMENT ARRIVES BOUMEDIENE MIGHT MISS
IT.

2. TYPE OF SITUATION WHICH COULD PREPARE
BOUMEDIENE FOR FULL RELATIONS BY PLACING U.S. IN
FAVORABLE LIGHT MIGHT BE ONE OF FOLLOWING:
A. SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT GENEVA.
B. EVIDENCE OF U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL.
C. PROMINENT STATEMENT EMPHASIZING U.S.
RECOGNITION LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE.

3. DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER UPGRADING OF INTERESTS
SECTION TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WOULD DELAY ESTABLISH-
MENT FULL RELATIONS. SUCH A FORMULA WOULD PROBABLY
HAVE APPEALED MORE TO ALGERIANS IF IT HAD NOT
ALREADY BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT WITH EGYPT. SUGGESTION,
HOWEVER, MIGHT STIMULATE BOUMEDIENE TOWARD MAKING
DIFFICULT DECISION RE RELATIONS.

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73 DEC 20 AM 8:23

TELEGRAM

Control: 5 0 9 2 Q

Received: Dec 19, 1973 339 PM

O 191920Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2907
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9947
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2640

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REF: LISBON 4613; ALGIERS 2619 AND 2620

1. HAMDANI CALLED ME TO PRESIDENCY AFTERNOON DEC 19 TO DISCUSS ALGERIAN POSITION FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S STOPOVER DEC 13. HE SAID SECRETARY'S LETTER TO BOUMEDIENE WAS APPRECIATED BY LATTER WHO TOOK IT AS PROOF OF SERIOUSNESS IN FOLLOWING UP SUGGESTION RE MEETING WITH BOUTEFLIKA. BOUMEDIENE INSTRUCTED BOUTEFLIKA TO WAIT IN PARIS FOR INDICATION FROM SECRETARY THROUGH ALGERIAN EMBASSY AS TO WHERE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

2. HAMDANI REITERATED BOUMEDIENE'S CONVICTION THAT SECRETARY'S VISIT HAD BEEN IMPORTANT AND POSITIVE FIRST CONTACT. BOUMEDIENE WAS NOW MORE OPTIMISTIC RE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A JUST AND DURABLE SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST THOUGH HE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD.

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2- Algiers 2640 December 19, 1973

3. HAMDANI SEEMED PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN GIVING POSITIVE INTERPRETATION OF WHAT BOUMEDIENE HAD TOLD SECRETARY RE ALGERIAN LNG SUPPLY TO U.S. HE HOPED SECRETARY HAD APPRECIATED HIS FRANKNESS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT LONG TERM U.S.-ALGERIAN RELATIONS WERE BASED ON GAS CONTRACTS AND ALGERIA WISHED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROTECT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP DURING "CURRENT, BUT TEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES".

4. HAMDANI DID NOT BELIEVE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM GENEVA CONFERENCE REPRESENTED TOO SERIOUS A DEVELOPMENT UNLESS EGYPT FAILED TO MAKE PROGRESS AT GENEVA AND BECAME DANGEROUSLY ISOLATED. HE THOUGHT SYRIANS WOULD GO TO CONFERENCE AS SOON AS THEY BELIEVED ISRAELIS WERE READY TO DISCUSS EVACUATION OF GOLAN.

5. HAMDANI MADE IT CLEAR THAT BOUMEDIENE WISHES TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH SECRETARY. HE GAVE IMPRESSION BOUMEDIENE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PLAY HELPFUL ROLE AS LONG AS HE THOUGHT IT CONTRIBUTED TO OBJECTIVES HE UNDERSTANDS SECRETARY IS PURSUING.

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CONTROL: 4638Q
RECD: DEC 18, 1973
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O 181757Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0390
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9940
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2619

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

REF: LISBON 4613

1. FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA IS NOW IN EUROPE (PROBABLY PARIS, OR GENEVA WHERE HE GOES FOR DENTAL WORK) SO I HAVE SENT SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE THROUGH ABERKANE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. I WILL ALSO TRY TO SEE DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAUVNI TO PASS MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE THROUGH HIM SINCE HE IS OUR USUAL CHANNEL AND IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH BOUMEDIENE.

2. ABERKANE SAID SEC GEN OF FOREIGN MINISTRY BESSAIH WILL BE ABLE TO CONTACT BOUTEFLIKA IN EUROPE TO PASS ON SUGGESTION FOR MEETING DECEMBER 20 IN PARIS.

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73 DEC 18 PM 9:12

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O 131128Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9922
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2589

CONTROL: 3 1 9 7 Q

RECD: 13 DECEMBER 73 -

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SECTO 0084

FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT EXPORT CONTROLS ON PETROLEU PRODUCTS

REF: STATE 243568 (TOSEC 116)

1. WE WILL NEED AN IMMEDIATE EXPLANATION OF WHY WE WERE NOT INFORMED SOONER ABOUT OIL EXPORT CONTROLS (REFTEL), ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ; A) DEPT. APPARENTLY AWARE OF PENDING REGULATIONS ON DECEMBER 8; AND B) ENERGY CLEARLY WAS TO BE A PRIME SUBJECT FOR SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH EUROPEANS IN BURSSLS AND LONDON. HAD WE BEEN ALERTED TO MEASURES, SECRETARY MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONDUCT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON SUBJECT ALONG LINES OF PARA 4 REFTEL DURING THOSE TALKS, AND WOULD HAVE WANTED TO TAKE THE CONTROLS INTO ACCOUNT IN HIS PILGRIMS SPEECH.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM REFTEL WHAT THE IMPACT OF THESE CONTROL IS. KATZ HAS TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT HIS IMPRESSION IS THEY WILL AFFECT ONLY 40,000 BARRELS PER DAY AND MOSTLY CANADA. IF THIS IS SO, WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CONTROLS? WAS THERE A REASON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONTROLS COULD NOT AWAIT OUR RETURN?

KISSINGER

BT

#2589

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O 131126Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0019
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9919
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 2586

CONTROL: 3193Q
RECD: 13 DEC 73 7AM

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SECTO 0081

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MX
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO RABASA

1. PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING LETTER TO
FOREIGN SECRETARY RABASA:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

AMBASSADOR DE OLLOQUI HAS DELIVERED YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 4,
1973 ADVISING ME THAT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO BE
HELD IN MEXICO WILL TAKE PLACE ON FEBRUARY 18-23, 1974.
YOU INDICATE THAT YOUR AND YOUR LATION AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
COLLEAGUES WILL HOLD A PREPARATORY SESSION FIRST AND WE WILL ALL
GET TOGETHER FROM FEBRUARY 21-23. THESE DATES ARE SATISFACTORY
TO ME AND I HAVE INCLUDED THEM ON MY CALENDAR. SHOULD ANY
UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENT OCCUR WHICH WOULD PREVENT ME FROM BEING
IN MEXICO ON THE DATES INDICATED, I WILL BE SURE TO LET YOU KNOW
WITH AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE. WITH RESPECT TO THE
SITE FOR THE MEETING, I SHALL AWAIT THE DECISION WHICH YOU REACH
WITH PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA. ANY LOCATION WHICH YOU SELECT WILL BE
SATISFACTORY TO ME.

I SHARE YOUR CONVICTION THAT THE IMPORTANT NEW DIALOGUE WHICH WE
HAVE STARTED OFFERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN A NEW ERA OF STRONGER
AND CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN ALL OUR COUNTRIES. IT IS IN THIS
SPIRIT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO JOINING YOU AND OUR COLLEAGUES
IN MEXICO IN FEBRUARY.

IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER, I WANT TO
REITERATE MY HIGH PERSONAL ESTEEM AND GRATITUDE FOR YOUR EFFORTS
TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND CLOSER COOPERATION AMONG
THE NATIONS OF THIS HEMISPHERE.

SINCERELY,
HENRY A. KISSINGER

KISSINGER

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O 121130Z DEC 73
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0680
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9908
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2574

CONTROL: 2829Q
RECD: 12 DEC 73 7AM

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BOUMEDIENE

FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 242650

1. RE NEWSOM'S COMMENTS (REFTEL) ON SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ALGIERS, IT IS TRUE THAT BOUTEFLIKA IS USUALLY BASICALLY MORE NEGATIVE THAN BOUMEDIENE. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS VISIT HOWEVER AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE BOUTEFLIKA HAS BEEN MORE HELPFUL THAN PRESIDENCY (HAMDANI).

2. RE DEIPLOMATIC POUCH OPENING AT NATIONL AIRPORT NOVEMBER 29, I BELIEVE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS SATISFIED WITH OUR RESPONSE AND DOUBT THAT THEY WILL RAISE MATTER DURING VISIT.

3. RE ALGERIAN GAS EMBARGO, ALGERIAN LEADERS ARE TORN BETWEEN WISH TO MAINTAIN ACCESS TO U.S. MARKET AND THEIR DESIRE FULLY TO SUPPORT ARAB EMBARGO UNTIL POLITICA OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED. HARDEST LINE ON THIS ISSUE PROBABLY COMES FROM BOUMEDIENE WHO HAS STRONG SENSE OF ARAB HONOR AND WHO IS PREPARED, AND AT TIMES ALMOST EAGER, TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO SHOW THAT ALGERIA IS IN VANGUARD OF MILITANT ARAB STATES.

4. BOUMEDIENE WOULD RESENT PRESSURES RE GAS OR ON OTHER QUESTIONS FOR THAT MATTER. AT SAME TIME HE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT USG DOES NOT LIKE PRESSURES EITHER. THUS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT HIM IN DEFENSIVE POSITION RE PRESSURES. THIS MIGHT HELP AVOID HARDENING OF PRESENT AMBIGUOUS GAS "EMBARGO" WHICH IS BASED N PART ON REAL TECHNICAL PROBLEMS.

73 DEC 12 AM 9.43

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RECD: 31 OCT 1973 6PM

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FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9768
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 2315

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, AG, XF
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE: ALGERIAN REACTION TO ME
DEVELOPMENTS

1. I TOOK PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE FOR BOUMEDIENE TO DEPSEC GEN HAMDANI AT 1200 NOON GMT OCTOBER 31. HE READ IT CAREFULLY AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH BOUMEDIENE AND LET US HAVE REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS POSITIVE.
2. SHORT DISCUSSION ENSURED IN WHICH HAMDANI SAID THAT U.S. WAS NOW IN STRONG POSITION TO RECUPERATE FAVORABLE POSITION IN ARAB WORLD. HE SAID IT WAS NO SECRET THAT EGYPT WANTED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND LESS DEPENDENCE ON USSR. OTHER ARABS WERE EQUALLY READY TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. IF PRESENT OPPORTUNITY WERE MISSED THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANOTHER.
3. I OBSERVED THAT WE WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS, PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO SET REALISTIC OBJECTIVES. IN THIS REGARD IT WOULD NOT HELP TO BRING IN UNDEFINED REFERENCES TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS THAT WERE OPEN TO WIDE VARIETY OF INTERPRETATIONS. WE HAD NOTED TODAY'S STATEMENT BY COUNCIL OF REVOLUTION AND MINISTERS WHICH HAD ENDED WITH PHRASE, "ALGERIA WILL REMAIN AT THE SIDE OF EGYPT, SYRIA AND PALESTINE UNTIL THE TOTAL LIBERATION OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY." DID HAMDANI HAVE FURTHER CLARIFICATION OR DEFINITION OF "NATIONAL TERRITORY."

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2 - ALGIERS 2315, 31 OCT '73

4. HAMDANI SAID PRASE MEANT THAT ALGERIA WOULD SUPPORT LIBERATION OF TERRITORY AS DEFINED BY STATES AND PEOPLES DIRECTLY INVOLVED. HENCE, IF EGYPT WISHED TO GIVE UP PART OF SINAI ALGERIA WOULD NOT OBJECT. ALGERIA WOULD ALSO SUPPORT WHATEVER SETTLEMENT HAD AGREEMENT OF PALESTINIANS. HE ADMITTED THAT PALESTINIANS WERE BADLY DIVIDED AND HAD CONTRIBUTED VIRTUALLY NOTHING TO WAR EFFORT. HE HAD HEARD PRESS REPORTS OF PLANS FOR A PALESTINIAN ENTITY OUTSIDE BORDERS OF 1967 ISRAEL BUT HE DID NOT HAVE IMPRESSION THERE WAS YET A PALESTINIAN CONSENSUS, ALGERIAN GOVT DID NOT HAVE A POSITION RE ANY SPECIFIC PLANS.

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O 061114Z JUL 72 ZFF-4
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7582
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 067
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 006
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 1132

CONTROL: 9 7 5 Q
July 6, 1972
7:48 AM
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SECVISIT NEA FOR THE SECRETARY

DEPT FOR NEWSOM

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA

REF: ALGIERS 1174

WHEN I SAW DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI BRIEFLY AT
BOUMEDIENE'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY RECEPTION EVENING
JULY 5, HE SAID PROPOSAL RE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ALGIERS
"WAS BEING DISCUSSED". I SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO
HAVE DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT HE REPLIED HE
HOPED TO HAVE SOMETHING FOR US TODAY, JULY 6. GDS

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TELEGRAM

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5 of 12

0 2 5 7 Q
July 3, 1972
9:16 a.m.

0 031230Z JUL 72 ZFF-4
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7576
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 103
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 001
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 1174

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SECVISIT NEA FOR THE SECRETARY

DEPT FOR NEWSOM

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA

REF: STATE 119670; ALGIERS 1171

1. AS FOLLOWUP TO CALL ON HAMDANI MORNING JULY 2, I CALLED AT PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ZEGHAR'S HOUSE THAT EVENING TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL RE SECRETARY'S VISIT AND RESUMPTION US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS. HAMDANI, WHO WAS TRYING LOCATE PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AFTER OUR MORNING MEETING HAD PHONED ZEGHAR (BOUMEDIENE WAS NOT THERE) AND GIVEN HIM OUTLINE OF OUR CONVERSATION. (HAMDANI HAD AGREED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH ZEGHAR.)

2. ZEGHAR'S FIRST REACTION WAS TO SUGGEST THAT SECRETARY SHOULD COME TO ALGIERS WHETHER OR NOT RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WAS TO BE ANNOUNCED. I EXPLAINED WHY THIS WAS NOT DESIRABLE AND HE DROPPED MATTER. I THEN DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH ADVANTAGES OF MOVING NOW TO FULL RELATIONS. ZEGHAR WOULD NOT PREDICT BOUMEDIENE'S REACTION BUT SAID HE WOULD TRY TO SEE PRESIDENT JULY 3 TO DISCUSS MATTER AND PRESUMABLY TO URGE RESUMPTION RELATIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD CONTACT ME AS SOON AS HE HAS ANY INFO.

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-2- Algiers 1174 Jul 3

3. COMMENT: GUARDED MANNER WITH WHICH BOTH HAMDANI AND ZEGHAR HAVE TREATED SUBJECT LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THEY FEEL IT UNLIKELY PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WILL BE PREPARED TO RESUME RELATIONS IMMEDIATELY. BOUMEDIENE'S USUAL CAUTIOUS AND DELIBERATE STYLE IS A FACTOR, AND SO IS FACT THAT ENTIRE ALGERIAN GOVT IS OCCUPIED FROM NOW UNTIL JULY 6 HOSTING LARGE NUMBERS OF SPECIAL DELEGATIONS HERE FOR TENTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. FONMIN BOUTEFLIKA HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO ALGIERS BUT SHOULD ARRIVE TODAY. EAGLETON

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FOR NEWSOM

REF: STATE 119670

1. I CALLED ON DEPSEC GEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI 1100 JULY 2 AND GAVE HIM PROPOSAL RE SECRETARY'S VISIT AND RESUMPTION US/ALGERIAN RELATIONS (REFTEL).
2. HAMDANI REPLIED THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT MATTER WHICH WOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS STUDY. BOUTEFLIKA WOULD BE RETURNING ALGIERS LATE TODAY OR TOMORROW (IMPLYING THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE REPLY FOR SEVERAL DAYS). HIS ONLY QUESTION WAS FOR CLARIFICATION WHETHER WE WERE CLEARLY LINKING SECRETARY'S PROPOSED VISIT WITH RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
3. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE SINCE WHATEVER OTHER REASONS THERE MIGHT BE FOR SECRETARY TO VISIT ALGIERS, IT WOULD BE ASSUMED, PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING RENEWAL WITH YEMEN, THAT A MAJOR PURPOSE OF VISIT WOULD BE RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THEREFORE, FAILURE TO DO SO COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SETBACK IN RELATIONS.
4. HAMDANI AGREED AND RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD NEWSOM THAT HE DID NOT WANT VISIT SUCH AS THAT OF NEWSOM END OF MARCH TO BE INTERPRETED BY ANYONE AS HAVING FAILED TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES, AS HAD PARTLY BEEN CASE IN CONNECTION WITH NEWSOM'S EARLIER VISIT TO SUDAN.
5. CONVERSATION CONTINUED WITH MY REEMPHASIZING CONFLUENCE OF FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND ADVANTAGES OF SEIZING MOMENT FOR RAPID ACTION. HAMDANI NODDED BUT ADDED THAT WHATEVER DECISION AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME (MEANING POSSIBLE NEGATIVE DECISION) IT WOULD NOT FORECLOSE ACTION IN FUTURE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2- ALGIERS 1171, JUL 02, NODIS

6. COMMENT: BELIEVE ALGERIANS WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO PROPOSAL BUT SUSPECT CURRENT ODDS ARE AGAINST RENEWAL. FAVORABLE FPC DECISION RE EL PASO WAS MAJOR FACTOR WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL LEAD TO RESUMPTION RELATIONS. RENEWAL WITH YEMEN IS ALSO HELPFUL IN LONG RUN THOUGH ALGERIANS WOULD NOT WANT ANY DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN THAT RENEWAL AND THEIR OWN, AND HENCE IT MIGHT WEIGH AGAINST IMMEDIATE ALGERIAN RENEWAL. MAJOR PROBLEM FOR ALGERIANS, WHO ARE EVER MINDFUL OF THEIR REPUTATION IN THIRD WORLD, WILL BE CURRENT HEIGHTENED MILITARY ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA. IDEAL TIMING FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW WOULD PROBABLY BE A FEW MONTHS HENCE WHEN EL PASO PROJECT IS UNDERWAY AND WHEN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN INDOCHINA MIGHT HAVE BEEN REDUCED. I MENTIONED TO HAMDANI THAT ASSTSEC NEWSOM WAS PREPARED TO COME TO ALGERIA. HAMDANI DID NOT GIVE DIRECT REPLY, BUT I BELIEVE FROM WHAT HE SAID PREVIOUSLY THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO RISK "FAILURE" OF SUCH A MISSION AND THEREFORE WOULD WANT IT ONLY IF DECISION TO RENEW RELATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. IN SUCH CASE, I BELIEVE NEWSOM'S VISIT TO ALGERIA JUST BEFORE AND DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PROVIDING LATEST WASHINGTON IMPRESSIONS FOR BILATERAL TALKS.

EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

R 280930Z MAR 72
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7166
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 0534

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM NEWSOM

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ALGERIA

1. DURING MY VISIT HERE I TOLD PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE AND HIS PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATES OF OUR DESIRE RESUME RELATIONS AND OUR FEELING THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S INITIATIVES ON INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND DEVELOPMENT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS APPEARED PROVIDE AMPLE BASIS FOR COUNTRY SUCH AS ALGERIA TAKE THIS STEP. I STRESSED YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST AND MENTIONED YOUR HOPE YOU MIGHT VISIT ALGERIA ONCE RELATIONS RESTORED.

2. APPROACH CORDIALLY RECEIVED. ALGERIANS REPLIED PRINCIPLE RESUMPTION DECIDED; PROBLEM IS TIMING. DELAY IN FPC APPROVAL MAJOR EL PASO NATURAL GAS DEAL UNDOUBTEDLY ONE FACTOR, BUT FEAR REACTION OTHER ARAB STATES OBVIOUSLY ANOTHER. GIVEN STAUNCHLY PRO-PALESTINIAN STANCE ALGERIA, TIMING MY VISIT AT SAME MOMENT KING HUSSEIN IN WASHINGTON OBVIOUSLY NOT MOST PROPITIOUS.

3. THEY WILL FIND MOMENT THEIR CHOOSING, BUT I DOUBT IT WILL BE SOON. MEANWHILE OUR PRESENT STANCE WORKS TO OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS AS POSSIBILITIES U.S. IMPORTS AND INVESTMENT IN ALGERIA MOUNT AND WE ARE, FOR MOMENT, SAVED LIKELY ADDITIONAL PRESSURES FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH COULD WELL FOLLOW RESUMPTION FORMAL RELATIONS. GP-1.

EAGLETON

BT
#7404Q

7 40 4 Q
RECVD: 28 MAR 72
5:40AM

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Department of State

WH 11
TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 251504Z JUN 70
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5004
BT
S E C R E T ALGIERS 948

6 9 0 9 Q
1970 JUNE 25 AM 10 28

MODIS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S ANNOUNCEMENT

1. IN HAMDANI'S ABSENCE I BRIEF FOREIGN MINISTRY CHIEF EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN DIVISION MEDJAD RE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND US PEACE INITIATIVE. WE WENT THROUGH ENGLISH TEXT WHICH I LEFT WITH MEDJAD AND MADE JOINT INFORMAL TRANSLATION THEREOF. HE ALSO TOOK NOTES ON TALKING POINTS AND ASKED QUESTIONS WHICH ELICITED REPLIES ON AIRCRAFT, COMMITMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND PEACE AND PROVISIONS FOR PALESTINIANS. AIRCRAFT QUESTION REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE EXPLANATION SINCE HE, LIKE MANY OTHER ARABS, WAS CONFUSED RE COMMITMENTS UNDER PAST CONTRACTS AND CURRENT ISRAELI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT. IN REPLY TO HIS QUESTION WHETHER WE DID NOT ALREADY HAVE STANDING POLICY OF REPLACING ALL ISRAELI LOSSES PLANE FOR PLANE I REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY TAKING IT FOR GRANTED THAT THERE WAS SUCH A POLICY AND IT WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED.

2. MEDJAD SEEMED TO CONSIDER US INITIATIVE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT. UNFORTUNATELY, HAMDANI'S ABSENCE MAKES IT UNLIKELY OUR TALKING POINTS WILL GET TO HIGHEST LEVELS. MEDJAD SAID THAT FOUKIN BOUTEFLIKA IS NOW OUT OF TOWN. I WILL TRY TO FOLLOW UP CONVERSATION WITH HAMDANI LATER THIS WEEK OR EARLY NEXT WEEK.

GP-1.

EAGLETON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WJH

P 221650Z
FM USINT ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4987
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 927

5 8 4 5 Q

1970 JUNE 22 PM 1 20

NODIS

REF: STATE 097777

RE PARA ONE REFTEL WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE REACTION IN ALGERIA TO U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT ON PEACE INITIATIVE TO BE SUCH AS TO REQUIRE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS BEYOND INTENSIFIED ALERTNESS. WE WELCOME ABILITY FURNISH TEXT TO GOA, THROUGH HAMDANI, PRIOR TO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AS THIS WILL ALLOW US MAKE SOME POINT TO PLACE INITIATIVE IN BEST LIGHT AND PERHAPS ATTENUATE OFFICIAL CRITICISM. I WILL PROBABLY INFORM SELECTED LEADERS OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY AT ABOUT SAME TIME WE ARE AUTHORIZED TO PASS TEXT TO GOA. GP-3.

EAGLETON

70 JUN 22 PM 3:32

SECRET



Department of State

Dr. Hays
W. H. 7
TELEGRAM

SECRET

1300
1970 MAR 6 AM 11 00
MAR 6 PM 2:53
WHITE HOUSE
STATION ROOM

R 061505Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4693
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 299

NODIS

FOR HENRY KISSINGER

REF: STATE 31511 AND ALGIERS 282

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MR. ROBERT MURPHY DATED FEBRUARY 27 TELLING ME OF HIS PLANNED VISIT TO ALGIERS MARCH 14-17 AND SUGGESTING WE GET TOGETHER FOR A CHAT. THIS CLEARS UP PROBLEM RAISED ALGIERS REFTEL.

2. IN HIS LETTER MR. MURPHY SAID HE WAS ENCLOSING COPY OF AN EXPLANATORY LETTER HE HAD WRITTEN TO ALGERIAN CHARGE IN WASHINGTON, BUT ENCLOSURE WAS MISSING. IF POSSIBLE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING BY TELEGRAM SUBSTANCE OF HIS LETTER TO ALGERIAN CHARGE SO AS TO KNOW BEFORE HIS VISIT HOW HE PRESENTED ITS PURPOSE TO ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT.

GP-1

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Department of State

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W H
TELEGRAM

8

R 041450Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4686
BT
SECRET ALGIERS 282

Control: 685Q

Recd : 4 Mar 70
11:15 a.m.

NODIS

REF: STATE 31611

FOR HENRY KISSINGER

1. IN CONNECTION WITH MR. ROBERT MURPHY'S VISIT TO ALGERIA WE WILL OF COURSE RESPECT ITS PRIVATE CHARACTER BUT AT SAME TIME WOULD BE HAPPY TO EXTEND APPROPRIATE COURTESIES AND HOSPITALITY AS WELL AS ANY ASSISTANCE HE MAY WISH. IN VIEW MR. MURPHY'S POSITION AS DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN AND HIS HISTORICAL CONNECTION WITH ALGERIA DURING WWII, ALGERIANS WOULD PROBABLY EXPECT HIM RECEIVE SUCH COURTESIES FROM US. THEY WILL ALSO HAVE NATURAL CURIOSITY RE PURPOSE OF VISIT, AND FACT THAT HE WILL HAVE VISITED LIBYA AND TUNISIA WILL BE NOTED.
2. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD MR. MURPHY'S SCHEDULE AS WELL AS PURPOSES OF HIS VISIT PERMIT, WE WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH HIM. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF ENSURING CONSISTENCY OF OUR COMMENTS, IF ELICITED BY ALGERIANS, WITH HIS OWN RE PURPOSE HIS VISIT HERE. GP-1

EAGLETON

BT

70 MAR 4 PM 12:56
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
07 MAR 70

SECRET

COPY 5 OF 15 COPIES C70X...



Department of State

SECRET

P 020125Z AUG 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS PRIORITY 0020
BT
SECRET STATE 168298

CONTROL: 0 3 2 3 Q

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AG

SUBJECT: RESUMPTION OF US-ALGERIAN RELATIONS AND
PROPOSED ECONOMIC COOPERATION

REF: ALGIERS 1564

1. IN VIEW OF ZEGHAR'S CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH BOUMEDIENE, WE ASSUME THAT HIS CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF REPORTED REFTEL REFLECTS THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING. WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, REPLY CONSTRUCTIVELY GIVING HIM OUR THINKING ON POSSIBLE AREAS FOR FUTURE US-ALGERIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION ALTHOUGH WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT GIVE HIM SPECIFIC DOLLAR VALUES FOR OUR HOPED FOR FUTURE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH ALGERIA.

2. IN YOUR REPLY YOU MAY MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE USG IS READY TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA WHENEVER THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO DO SO.

(B) LIKE COA, THE USG DOES NOT WISH TO LINK ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW CLIMATE ESTABLISHED BY A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WOULD LEAD NATURALLY TO A BROADENING AND STRENGTHENING OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE ALGERIAN AND US ECONOMIES.

(C) IN PARTICULAR, WE BELIEVE THAT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST FOR POTENTIAL AMERICAN INVESTORS IN JOINT ENTERPRISES IN ALGERIA. AMERICAN INVESTMENT COULD HELP ALGERIA IN

DIVERSIFYING ITS INDUSTRIAL BASE WHICH SO FAR HAS CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON HYDROCARBONS. AMONG THE INDUSTRIES WHICH APPEAR TO OFFER EXCELLENT PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IN WHICH US FIRMS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE ARE THE FOLLOWING: A PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, COULD INCLUDE A SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT; A TIRE MANUFACTURING PLANT; AN AUTOMOTIVE AND/OR TRUCK

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Department of State

-2- STATE 168298, 02 AUG '74

ASSEMBLY PLANT; ELECTRONIC MANUFACTURING FACILITIES; EXPANSION AND UPGRADING OF THE ANNABA STEEL PLANT; AND FACILITIES FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, DRILLING AND WELDING EQUIPMENT, AND PLATE GLASS.

(D) PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED TRADE ARE EXCELLENT. THE MAJOR US IMPORTS WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIST OF HYDROCARBONS (OIL, AND EVENTUALLY, MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF LNG). ALGERIAN WINE IS ALSO A GOOD PROSPECT FOR SALE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ALGERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WILL PROVIDE A MAJOR MARKET FOR ALL KINDS OF US CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.

(E) IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES FIRMS HOLD PATENTS ON THE LATEST SUCCESSFUL GAS LIQUEFACTION TECHNIQUES, AND THEY COULD BE USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALGERIAN PLANTS. JOINT US-ALGERIAN WORKING GROUPS COULD EXPLORE NEW USES FOR LNG WITH A VIEW TO HELPING ALGERIA DIVERSIFY ITS POTENTIAL MARKETS.

(F) WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF ECONOMIC TIES, WE WOULD HOPE TO STEP UP EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF ALGERIANS WHO COME TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TECHNICAL TRAINING AND HIGHER EDUCATION.

(G) OTHER AREAS WHERE US TECHNOLOGY EXCELS WHICH MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO ALGERIA'S RECOGNIZED NEEDS ARE: AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS, SEMI-ARID LAND AGRICULTURAL AND LAND RECLAMATION PROJECTS, AND INTEGRATED REGIONAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE USG IS ALSO PREPARED TO EXPAND ITS PROGRAMS TO FURNISH USG PERSONNEL ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS IN SUCH SPECIALIZED FIELDS AS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EARTH RESOURCES TECHNOLOGY SATELLITE DATA (ERTS).

(H) THE USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEVELOP WITH ALGERIA THE KIND OF COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT, INVOLVING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMISSIONS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND WORKING GROUPS IN SPECIFIC FIELDS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT CHARACTERIZED BY SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PACKAGES OF STATED VALUE BUT RATHER BY UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE USG CAN HELP THESE COUNTRIES MEET THEIR PARTICULAR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE WAYS IN WHICH THE USG CAN BE HELPFUL VARY CONSIDERABLY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THEIR ECONOMIES AND ON THEIR ECONOMIC GOALS AND PRIORITIES. THESE RANGE FROM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, FACILITATING FINANCING THROUGH THE EX-IM BANK

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FOR TOP SECRET INFORMATION ONLY

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Department of State

-3- STATE 168298, 02 AUG '74

AND SALE OF SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ON LONG TERM CREDIT TO CAPITAL ASSISTANCE ON A LOAN OR GRANT BASIS, ALTHOUGH CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE LATTER CATEGORY IS LIMITED TO COUNTRIES LACKING THE RESOURCES TO MEET THEIR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN OTHER WAYS. IN THE CASE OF EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE US GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED CONGRESS FOR 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN AID FOR COMMODITY IMPORTS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS LARGELY RELATED TO RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA. THE USG ALSO HOPES TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT CAPITAL TO EGYPT WHICH COULD BE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AID. IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE NO GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL AID AS SUCH IS PROVIDED, USG HOPES TO ASSIST WITH SUCH PROBLEMS AS THE DIVERSIFICATION OF THEIR INDUSTRIAL BASE AND THE UPGRADING OF THE TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR MANAGERIAL AND WORK FORCES. U.S. HAS NO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR IRAN, BUT HERE AGAIN NUMEROUS GOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR LINKS ARE BENEFICIAL TO IRANIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. AS FOR SYRIA, NO SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PACKAGES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED OR OFFERED, BUT WE ENVISAGE MAKING SOME ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE OUT OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FUND IN PROPOSED MIDDLE EAST AID REQUEST NOW BEFORE CONGRESS, IN VIEW OF SYRIA'S NEED FOR HELP IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.

3. IN PRESENTING THE POINTS LISTED IN PARA 2, YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT USG CAN COMMIT PRIVATE AMERICAN INDUSTRY TO ANY SPECIFIC PROJECT OR THAT USG IS PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ANY SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROGRAM. THE EXAMPLES MENTIONED ARE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE OF POSSIBILITIES WE FORSEE FOR FUTURE COOPERATION. THE USG IS PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO APPOINT JOINT COMMISSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS TO EXAMINE THE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH THE USG CAN BE HELPFUL TO THE ALGERIAN ECONOMY.

4. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM ZEGHAR THAT SECRETARY HAS NO PRESENT PLANS FOR ANOTHER VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST, THOUGH HE WOULD AS ALWAYS MAKE EVERY EFFORT VISIT ALGERIA, TO WHICH HE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE, SHOULD HE TRAVEL TO MIDDLE EAST AGAIN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

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-4- STATE 168298, D2AUG '74

5. IF ZEGHAR RAISES MATTER OF SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE
(STATE 152114), YOU MAY SAY THAT WE ARE STILL AWAITING
REPLY BEFORE WE TAKE ACTION ON REPLACEMENT OF USINT
CHIEF. KISSINGER
NEA/AFN:MMWILLY:SM
7/23/74:X20840
THE SECRETARY

NEA - MR. ATHERTON

S/S - MR. EALUM

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0 120139Z JUL 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 7975
BT
SECRET STATE 150579

CONTROL: 3150Q

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJ: CLARIFICATION OF MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: ALGIERS 1455

1. YOU SHOULD CLARIFY TO HANDANI THAT REFERENCE TO
"BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS" IN SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO
BOUMEDIENE FROM MOSCOW (MOSCOW 10429) MEANS CONSULTATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL,
EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN, WHICH WILL BE GOING FORWARD
OVER THE SUMMER BEGINNING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER
ALLON'S VISIT HERE TOWARD THE END OF JULY. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIETS AS AGREED
IN THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE, BUT THE SUBSTANTIVE BILATERAL
CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE IN MIND ARE WITH THE PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT. THE LANGUAGE IN THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
FROM MOSCOW WAS MEANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND
THE PARTIES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR./HLK
29588 7/12/74
THE SECRETARY

S/S - DUMILLER

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TELEGRAM

O 260120Z JUN 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHRS/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 7910
INFO RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8666
BT

CONTROL: 7945Q
RECD: June 25, 1974
10:51 PM

SECRET STATE 137139

NODIS/CHEROKEE TOSEC 0035

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AG, US, PFOR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO
PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

HAVING JUST RETURNED TO WASHINGTON FROM ACCOMPANYING
PRESIDENT NIXON ON HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, I WANT
TO GIVE YOU THIS IMMEDIATE REPORT.

ABOVE ALL, THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT SERVED TO UNDERLINE THE
FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORK FOR
A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT WILL TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL THE STATES
AND PEOPLES OF THE AREA. THE PRESIDENT AFFIRMED THIS
COMMITMENT IN HIS TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF ALL THE STATES
HE VISITED. THE TALKS ALSO PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
ASSESS THE PROGRESS SO FAR ACHIEVED AND TO DISCUSS OUR
CONCEPT OF HOW THE NEXT STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
SHOULD EVOLVE.

FROM OUR MANY EXCHANGES, MR. PRESIDENT, YOU KNOW OUR VIEW
THAT A PRACTICAL, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, IN WHICH EACH
STAGE BUILDS ON THE EXPERIENCE AND CONFIDENCE GAINED IN
THE PRECEDING ONE, OFFERS THE BEST HOPE FOR CONTINUING
PROGRESS. IN THIS SPIRIT, I ENVISAGE THAT THE PERIOD
IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM ACCOMPANYING
PRESIDENT NIXON TO MOSCOW, WILL BE DEVOTED TO CONSULTATION
WITH THE PARTIES ABOUT HOW WE SHOULD NOW PROCEED. TO
BEGIN THIS PROCESS, ISRAELI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND

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Department of State

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State 137139

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON WILL COME TO WASHINGTON IN JULY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH I BEGAN WITH THE NEW ISRAELI LEADERSHIP DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, ABOUT WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO HELP KEEP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOING. WE WILL THEN WELCOME EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN AS WELL AS JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON.

FOR YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION, OUR TENTATIVE THINKING -- WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENTS ASAD AND SADAT -- IS THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE MIGHT RECONVENE IN SEPTEMBER. WE HAVE NO FIXED IDEAS ABOUT THE BEST PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN THE COMING STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT RECOGNIZE THAT ALL OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES MUST EVENTUALLY BE DEALT WITH -- THE QUESTION OF BORDERS; THE QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN SOLUTION, THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF WHICH WE FULLY UNDERSTAND; THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM; AND THE QUESTION OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA AND OF COMMITMENTS AMONG THEM TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT NO ARAB COUNTRY FEELS IT CAN ENTER A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT SEPARATELY FROM THE OTHERS OR WITHOUT THERE BEING A JUST AND AGREED SETTLEMENT FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WE DO BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY ABOUT HOW THAT GOAL IS APPROACHED -- WHETHER IN PARALLEL STEPS ON ALL FRONTS OR THROUGH FURTHER POST-DISENGAGEMENT PHASES ON ONE FRONT OR ONE PROBLEM AT A TIME.

IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING THE ISSUES OF PEACE, PRESIDENT NIXON EXPLORED AT LENGTH AND IN DETAIL WITH ALL THE LEADERS HE MET, WAYS IN WHICH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE AREA CAN BE STRENGTHENED AND DEEPEDED. WE RECOGNIZE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE, AND PROGRESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH COUNTRIES IN THE ARAB WORLD, ARE INTERDEPENDENT AND THAT EACH REINFORCES THE OTHER. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED THE AGREEMENTS REACHED TO GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF VARIOUS JOINT COMMISSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS IN SPECIFIC FIELDS OF ENDEAVOR. WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WITH ALGERIA AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IF YOUR GOVERNMENT SO DESIRES.

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TELEGRAM

-3- State 137139

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S MIDDLE EAST JOURNEY REPRESENTED A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF OUR DETERMINATION TO ASSURE THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT MONTHS TRULY MARK A TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY OF THE AREA -- A TURNING AT LAST TOWARD A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE -- AND TO CONSOLIDATE A NEW, CONSTRUCTIVE ERA IN ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END TEXT. KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR./HLK
6/20/74 EXT 29588
THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

S/S:UHLUERS

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS FLASH 7627
BT

CONTROL: 8170Q

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 087649

NODIS
TOSEC 35

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: COLSON AFFIDAVIT

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER

1. ACCORDING TO UPI, WHICH WILL BE QUOTED BELOW, COLSON HAS FILED AN AFFIDAVIT WITH THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT WHICH SAYS YOU AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT LEAKS MUST BE STOPPED AT ALL COSTS.

2. I HAVE TOLD THE PRESS SPOKESMAN HERE THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS TO HAVE NO REPEAT NO COMMENT ON THESE REPORTS; I HAVE CONFIRMED THIS WITH BRENT.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE WASHINGTON STAR IS SENDING THE TEXT OF THE AFFIDAVIT TO JERRY O'LEARY, SO YOU CAN EXPECT TO BE QUERIED BY THE PRESS SOMETIME TOMORROW. WE OURSELVES HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE AFFIDAVIT BUT THE PRESS OFFICE HAS PROMISED IT TO ME MOMENTARILY. I WILL SEND THE COMPLETE TEXT TO YOU AS SOON AS I RECEIVE IT.

4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UPI TICKER ITEM AS WE NOW HAVE IT:

QUOTE FORMER WHITE HOUSE SPECIAL COUNSEL CHARLES COLSON TESTIFIED TODAY THAT PRIOR TO THE 1971 ELLSBERG BREAK-IN,

PRESIDENT NIXON TOLD HIM TO STOP NATIONAL SECURITY LEAKS AND INNER QUOTE I DON'T GIVE A DAMN HOW IT IS DONE. END INNER QUOTE


COLSON ALSO SAID SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, THEN A WHITE HOUSE AIDE, ALSO BELIEVED INNERQUOTE THAT THE LEAKS MUST BE STOPPED AT ALL COSTS. END INNER QUOTE

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Department of State



-2- STATE 87649, 29 APR '74

COLSON MADE THE STATEMENTS IN A NINE-PAGE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE GERHARD GESELL IN SUPPORT OF HIS REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF INNER QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY END INNER QUOTE EVIDENCE IN HIS CASE.

COLSON WAS INDICTED MARCH 7 BY A WATERGATE GRAND JURY ON ONE COUNT OF CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE CIVIL LIBERTIES OF A CITIZEN IN THE BREAK-IN AT THE OFFICE OF PENTAGON PAPERS DEFENDANT DANIEL ELLSBERG'S PSYCHIATRIST.

THE OFFICE WAS BURGLARIZED DURING LABOR DAY WEEK END IN 1971, ABOUT TWO MONTHS AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

COLSON SAID HE HAD ABOUT 10 MEETINGS WITH NIXON BETWEEN JUNE 15, 1971, AND JULY 2, 1971. HE TOLD OF ONE MEETING AT WHICH THEN-WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF H. R. HALDEMAN WAS PRESENT.

INNER QUOTE ON THAT OCCASION, THE PRESIDENT, SPEAKING TO MR. HALDEMAN AND TO ME, SAID IN EFFECT: QUOTE I DON'T GIVE A DAMN HOW IT IS DONE, DO WHATEVER HAS TO BE DONE TO STOP THESE LEAKS AND PREVENT FURTHER UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES: I DON'T WANT TO BE TOLD WHY IT CAN'T BE DONE. THIS GOVERNMENT CANNOT SURVIVE, IT CANNOT FUNCTION IF ANYONE CAN RUN OUT AND LEAK WHATEVER DOCUMENTS HE WANTS TO. WE WILL BE DESTROYED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE HAVE UNDER WAY WITH THE SOVIET UNION: WE WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO STAND UP AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION; PEOPLE'S LIVES ARE AT STAKE IN VIETNAM. I WANT TO KNOW WHO IS BEHIND THIS AND I WANT THE MOST COMPLETE INVESTIGATION THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED, END QUOTE END INNER QUOTE COLSON QUOTED NIXON AS SAYING. COLSON SAID THAT KISSINGER INNER QUOTE WAS EVEN MORE ALARMED OVER THE LEAKS THAN THE PRESIDENT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE LEAKS MUST BE STOPPED AT ALL COSTS, THAT ELLSBERG MUST BE STOPPED FROM MAKING FURTHER DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, AND THAT THOSE ACTING IN CONCERT WITH HIM MUST BE STOPPED. END INNER QUOTE

COLSON SAID KISSINGER REPORTED ON ELLSBERG'S INNER QUOTE PRIVATE HABITS. END INNER QUOTE

INNER QUOTE I HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT DR. KISSINGER WAS REACTING TO CONVERSATIONS HE HAD HAD AT VARIOUS TIMES WITH THE PRESIDENT, END INNER QUOTE SAID COLSON.

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Department of State

-3- STATE 87649, 29 APR '74

COLSON CONTENDS THAT A CONSPIRACY TO BREAK INTO THE PSYCHIATRISTS' OFFICE COULD BE JUSTIFIED IN SPITE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ON GROUNDS THE SEARCH WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO HIS POWER TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

BECAUSE OF THIS DEFENSE, GESELL ORDERED APRIL 19 THAT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEON JAWORSKI PROVIDE COLSON WITH TAPE RECORDINGS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS. IT HAS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE RELATING TO THE ELLSBERG BREAK-IN. COLSON INSPECTED THE MATERIALS SATURDAY, AND FILED THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION FOR DISCOVERY OF INNER QUOTE NATIONAL SECURITY END INNER QUOTE EVIDENCE. END QUOTE RUSH

S:LSEAGLEBURGER:ML
4/29/74 EXT. 20964
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

S/S:DUMILLER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 050017Z APR 74 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS NIACT IMMEDIATE 7442
INFO RUEHCR/USDEL ACAPULCO IMMEDIATE 0126 CONTROL: 1 3 5 3 Q
BT
S E C R E T STATE 068663 Recd : 04 April
3:30 P.M.

NODIS/CHEROKEE

TOSEC 105

FOR SIMPSON FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, AG, US
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE ON JOINT SAUDI-US
COOPERATION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER
IMMEDIATELY IN WHATEVER WAY YOU DEEM MOST FEASIBLE.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE: I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU IN ADVANCE
THE RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH SAUDI ARABIA
TO INTENSIFY OUR LONG-STANDING AND COMPREHENSIVE COOPERA-
TION WITH THAT COUNTRY. FOR SOME TIME, BEGINNING
BEFORE THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT LAST OCTOBER AND THE OIL
EMBARGO, AND IN RESPONSE TO SAUDI INTEREST IN DEEPENING OUR
RELATIONSHIP, WE AND THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WAYS
TO GIVE MORE SUBSTANCE AND CONCRETE EXPRESSIONS TO OUR
COOPERATION. THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE RESUMED IN A MORE
CONCRETE WAY IN RECENT WEEKS. HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE
FAHD WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON PROBABLY NEXT MONTH TO
DISCUSS WITH US SOME SPECIFIC WAYS TO INTENSIFY OUR
COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY AND IN THE SUPPLY OF THE KINGDOM'S
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. A JOINT US-SAUDI
STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE ISSUED ON APRIL 5.

3. WE ARE STILL EXPLORING WITH THE SAUDIS WHAT PARTICULAR
FORM OUR COOPERATION COULD TAKE. WE MAY BE ESTABLISHING
SOME JOINT COMMISSIONS THAT COULD DEAL WITH ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY MATTERS AND WHICH WOULD BE AT A
FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL. WE VIEW INTENSIFICATION OF OUR TIES
WITH THE SAUDIS AS A SIGNIFICANT PART OF OUR POLICY OF

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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- STATE 68663

STRENGTHENING OUR TIES WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. I AM SURE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE VALUE OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IN THIS REGARD.

4. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH YOU WHEN WE MEET IN THE UNITED STATES NEXT WEEK. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END MESSAGE.

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JOINT U.S.-SAUDI ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH YOU SHOULD MAKE AVAILABLE WITH FOREGOING MESSAGE.

BEGIN TEXT: QUOTE: FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND AND GIVE MORE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY, AND IN THE SUPPLY OF THE KINGDOM'S REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE FAHD BIN ABD AL-AZIZ HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER.

IN MOVING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS, BOTH GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THEIR HOPE THAT A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE WILL BE REALIZED IN THE MIDDLE EAST SO THAT ALL ITS PEOPLES MAY ENJOY STABILITY AND WORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY OF THE REGION. END QUOTE. END TEXT.

RUSH

NEA/ARP:FM/DICKMAN:CEJ
4/4/74 X22471
P:JJSISCO

NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S/2 - MR. GAMMON

NEA - SS08R
AF - MR. LANE



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TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 232021Z MAR 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO UNINT ALGIERS PRIORITY 7406
BT
SECRET STATE 050687

CONTROL: 6 4 5 5 Q

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, AG
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO BOUMEDIENE FROM THE SECRETARY

REF: ALGIERS 600

FOR EAGLETON:

PLEASE INFORM HAMDANI AS FOLLOWS. SECRETARY WISHES THANK
PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE FOR HIS ORAL MESSAGE AND WANTS HIM
TO KNOW HOW MUCH US APPRECIATES ROLE ALGERIA PLAYED IN
OBTAINING LIFTING OF EMBARGO. THE DECISION TAKEN AT VIENNA
IS FULLY CONSONANT WITH THE NEW AND IMPROVING ATMOSPHERE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD-AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE
SEARCH FOR PROGRESS ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AND
FOR A FINAL JUST AND LASTING PEACE CAN GO FORWARD
UNENCUMBERED BY THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PAST. SECRETARY
DOES NOT MINIMIZE THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES THAT MUST BE
OVERCOME IN THIS REGARD BUT WISHES TO ASSURE PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENE THAT HE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT IN THE PURSUIT OF
DISENGAGEMENT AND FINAL PEACE. ALGERIA'S CONTINUED SUPPORT
AND UNDERSTANDING WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN THIS ENDEAVOR.
PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE SECRETARY CONTINUE TO LOOK FORWARD
TO CONVERSATIONS WITH BOUMEDIENE IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL.
KISSINGER

AF:DDCASUN:BJR
03/22/74 EXT 22530
SECRETARY

NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - WILUERS

P - MR. SISCO

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

O 140039Z MAR 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS 7382
BT
SECRET STATE 050967

CONTROL: 3 6 4 1Q
RECD: 14 MAR 74 8:50PM

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, AG, US
SUBJECT: BOUMEDIENE'S PLANNED VISIT TO U.S.

REF: ALGIERS 551

FROM THE SECRETARY

1. REQUEST YOU DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY
TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE SOONEST:

QUOTE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I REGRET VERY MUCH THAT OUR
RESPECTIVE SCHEDULES DID NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO
MEET AGAIN DURING MY MOST RECENT VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
I HAVE GREATLY BENEFITTED FROM OUR EXCHANGES ON MATTERS OF
INTEREST TO ALGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

I AM WRITING NOW TO LET YOU KNOW THAT PRESIDENT NIXON
HOPES THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO MEET WITH HIM
IN WASHINGTON DURING YOUR VISIT TO THE US IN APRIL TO
ATTEND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE AND I WOULD WELCOME
AT THAT TIME AN OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW AND BROADEN THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. UNQUOTE.

2. IN DELIVERING THE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO
ASCERTAIN BOUMEDIENE'S TRAVEL PLANS AND PROGRAM WHILE IN
THE U.S. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND
PRESIDENT NIXON. DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE RECEIVING
ANY SUGGESTIONS BOUMEDIENE MAY HAVE RE SUBJECTS HE
WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT.

KISSINGER

BT

#0967

DRAFTED: AF:DBEASUM
APPROVED: THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCE: S/S - SFRY

DEPUTY SECRETARY

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TELEGRAM

Control: 4 6 7 8 Q
Received: February 18, 1974 408PM

HAK
Scowcroft
Rodman
McFarlane
Saunders

O 102000Z FEB 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT ALGIERS NIACT IMMEDIATE 7303
BT
SECRET STATE 032520
NOD16/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XG03
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE
REF: STATE 32415; ALGIERS 363

1. YOU SHOULD PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO
PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON SATURDAY, I ASKED MR. SAGLETON TO CONVEY TO YOU
MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR HELPFUL EFFORTS AT THE RECENT
SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS AND TO TELL YOU THAT I
WOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO YOUR RECOMMENDATION
THAT I MAKE A FURTHER VISIT TO THE AREA. I WANT YOU TO
KNOW THAT I HAVE NOW DECIDED TO MAKE SUCH A TRIP AS YOU
HAVE SUGGESTED. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD PLAN TO STOP IN
ALGIERS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU BEFORE GOING ON TO THE
MIDDLE EAST, ARRIVING IN ALGIERS THE EVENING OF MONDAY,
FEBRUARY 25 AND LEAVING FROM THERE FOR DAMASCUS ABOUT
NOON THE NEXT DAY. I WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU
ABOUT THE DETAILS OF MY TRIP BUT WANTED TO GIVE YOU THIS
ADVANCE INDICATION IMMEDIATELY.

SECRET



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TELEGRAM

-2- State 32520 February 18, 1974

I WOULD ASK THAT YOU HOLD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE
FOR NOW THE FACT THAT I AM PLANNING THIS TRIP TO THE
MIDDLE EAST.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END MESSAGE. KISSINGER

BT

#2920

Drafted by: NEA:ALThornton, Jr.

Approved by: S- Mr. Eagleburger

Clearances: NEA- Mr. Sisco S/S- Mr. Fry

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RODMAN
SAUNDERS

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TELETYPE

SECRET

0 161914Z FEB 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USIN ALGIERS NIACI IMMEDIATE 7300
BT
SECRET STATE 032415

CONTROL: 4 4 9 8 Q

RECD: 16 FEBRUARY 74

NDIS/CHEROKEE

5 41 PM

E.O. 11652: XDS
TAGS: PDR, AG, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENNE
REF: ALGIERS 363

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENNE FROM THE SECRETARY BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE. SECRETARY KISSINGER THANKS PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENNE FOR HIS MESSAGE WHICH WAS CONVEYED THROUGH
MR. EAGLETON BY MR. HADJANI THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 14.
THE SECRETARY WANTS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENNE TO KNOW THAT WE
HAVE RECEIVED CONFLICTING PRELIMINARY ACCOUNTS OF THE
RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT MEETING HELD IN ALGIERS. HE WILL
BE MEETING THIS EVENING WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS FARKH AND
SAQQAF TO HEAR FROM THEM WHAT THE FOUR CHIEFS OF STATE HAVE
INSTRUCTED THEM TO CONVEY. MEANWHILE, THE SECRETARY APPRE-
CIATES PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENNE'S EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL.
THE SECRETARY ASSURES HIM THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO PRO-
CEED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY IN THE DAYS AHEAD AND THAT HE
WILL CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATION ABOUT
A FURTHER VISIT TO THE AREA. END MESSAGE.

3. FOR EAGLETON. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES DISCUSS WITH ALGERIANS ANY OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT FROM JIDDA OR OTHER
POSTS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATED TO YOU FOR INFORMATION. KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON:RDF
2/26/74 EXT 24464
NEA:JJSISCO

3 - MR. EAGLEBURGER

1 S/S - MR. FRY

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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TELEGRAM

O 112108Z FEB 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 7240
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5995
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3948
BT
SECRET STATE 027122

CONTROL: 258 Q
RECD: 10 FEB 74 9:04 PM

HAK
Scowcroft
McFarlane
Rohman
Saunders

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EG, SA
SUBJ: SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 26982

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY
TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

THE SECRETARY WANTS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO KNOW THAT HE
HAS JUST RECEIVED PRESIDENT ASAD'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE
PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL ON DISENGAGEMENT WHICH HE CONVEYED TO
PRESIDENT ASAD LAST WEEK AND ASKED CHARGE EAGLETON TO
DESCRIBE TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE IN HIS MESSAGE OF
FEBRUARY 8.

THE SECRETARY IS CONFIDENT THAT PRESIDENT ASAD'S ACCEPTANCE
OF THIS PROPOSAL WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO GET
NEGOTIATIONS STARTED LOOKING TOWARD A SYRIAN-ISRAELI
DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, HE IS CONFIDENT
THAT HE CAN ELICIT A CONCRETE PROPOSAL FROM THE
ISRAELIS AND, AS SOON AS RED CROSS VISITS TO THE ISRAELI
PRISONERS BEGIN, THAT HE GET ISRAEL TO SEND A HIGH LEVEL
OFFICIAL TO WASHINGTON FOR INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH US.
HE HAS CONVEYED HIS THANKS TO PRESIDENT ASAD AND HAS TOLD
HIM THAT, AS PROMISED EARLIER, HE WILL INITIATE EFFORT
WITH ISRAEL TO BEGIN THE STEPS OUTLINED IN THE PROPOSAL
PRESIDENT ASAD HAS ACCEPTED AS SOON AS THE OIL EMBARGO
IS LIFTED. THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO REAFFIRMED TO PRESIDENT
ASAD PRESIDENT NIXON'S AND HIS COMMITMENT TO MAKE A
MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE SYRIAN
FRONT.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 27122, FEB II

THE SECRETARY IS SENDING A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO KING FAISAL AND TO PRESIDENT SADAT, AND LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING AT AN EARLY DATE THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH RESPECT TO THE EMBARGO WHICH HE UNDERSTANDS ARE NOW UNDER WAY AMONG KEY ARAB LEADERS. THE SECRETARY REITERATES IN THIS CONNECTION THAT FURTHER STEPS ON OUR PART MUST AWAIT A SOLUTION TO THE EMBARGO QUESTION.
END OF MESSAGE.

RISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALTHEERTON

APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCE: S:S:MR. GAMMON

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

Control: 2 3 2 5 Q
Received: February 8, 1974 554PM

O 062140Z FEB 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 7234
INFO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5974
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3933
BT
SECRET STATE 026982

HAK
Scowcroft
Rodman
McFarlane

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XODS
TAGS: PFOR, AG, US, EG, SA
SUBJECT: ORAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: ALGIERS 285

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

SECRETARY WANTS TO CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE CONVEYED THROUGH YOU ON FEBRUARY 7. SECRETARY IS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE IS NOT AGAINST LIFTING THE OIL EMBARGO. HE HOPES ALGERIAN REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE THIS CLEAR TO OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS, A NUMBER OF WHICH HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT THEY FAVOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO BUT ARE LOOKING FOR OTHERS TO JOIN THEM IN THIS DECISION.

SECRETARY HAS NOTED THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE SAID HE HOPED SOMETHING WOULD DEVELOP WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA. HE WANTS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO KNOW THAT HE SENT A PROPOSAL TO PRESIDENT ASSAD ON FEBRUARY 5, WHICH IN HIS VIEW COULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR GETTING TALKS STARTED LOOKING TOWARD DISENGAGEMENT ON THE SYRIAN FRONT. HE IS AWAITING PRESIDENT ASSAD'S REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL WHICH HE HAS MEANWHILE NOT CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2- State 26982 February 8, 1974

THE PROPOSAL IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. WE WOULD CONVEY TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE NUMBER OF POW'S SYRIA HOLDS.
2. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SEND THE LIST OF POW'S TO ITS INTERESTS SECTION HERE IN WASHINGTON.
3. WE WOULD INSIST WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY COME UP WITH A CONCRETE PROPOSAL ON DISENGAGEMENT WHICH THEY WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO ME, IN EXCHANGE FOR THE LIST OF POW'S.
4. AS SOON AS THE VISIT OF THE RED CROSS TAKES PLACE, I WOULD TRANSMIT ISRAEL'S CONCRETE DISENGAGEMENT PROPOSAL TO ASSAD AND AT THE SAME TIME WOULD INSIST WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY SEND A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL TO WASHINGTON WITH A VIEW TO DISCUSSING FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN WHATEVER PROPOSAL THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE AVAILABLE.
5. A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD THEN BEGIN PERHAPS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN MILITARY WORKING GROUP.

THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO NOTED PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE'S COMMENT THAT WE HAD SET A DEFINITE DATE FOR LIFTING THE BOYCOTT AND THAT THIS HAD CREATED A DELICATE PROBLEM FOR ARAB COUNTRIES. THE SECRETARY WANTS PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE TO KNOW IT WAS NOT THE UNITED STATES WHICH SET A DATE. WE HAD RECEIVED FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THE EMBARGO WOULD BE LIFTED WHEN AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. SUBSEQUENTLY

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-3- State 26982 February 8, 1974

IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE ON JANUARY 30
PRESIDENT NIXON SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT AN
URGENT MEETING WOULD BE CALLED TO DISCUSS LIFTING THE
EMBARGO. THE MEETING REFERRED TO, WE LEARNED, WAS THE
MEETING OF ARAB OIL MINISTERS TO BE HELD IN TRIPOLI
FEBRUARY 14. THE WORDING OF WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON SAID
IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE WAS BASED PRECISELY
ON WHAT WE WERE TOLD BY THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT. THE
FEBRUARY 14 TRIPOLI MEETING WAS THEREFORE THE DATE WHEN
WE WERE INFORMED THIS MATTER WOULD BE DEALT WITH, NOT
THE OTHER WAY AROUND. END MESSAGE.

KISSINGER

BT
#6962

Drafted by: NEA:ALatherton Jr.
Approved by: THE SECRETARY
Clearances: NEA- Mr. Sisco
S/S- Mr. Luers

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

Z O 092042Z MAR 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS FLASH 7369
INFO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 6322
BT
S E C R E T STATE 048020

CONTROL: 2 6 1 3 Q
RECD: 9 MAR '74 4:47

HAAR
SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AL, EG, US
SUBJECT: ARAB OIL MEETING: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENE

FOR EAGLETON FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE BY MOST
EXPEDITIOUS POSSIBLE MEANS FROM ME TO PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENE.

2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WANT TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHERE MATTERS STAND
SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE TO YOU WHILE I WAS STILL IN THE
MIDDLE EAST ON MY RECENT TRIP.

FOREIGN MINISTER EBRAN WILL BE COMING TO WASHINGTON NEXT
WEEK TO CONTINUE MY DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERN-
MENT ABOUT THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE SYRIAN
FRONT. HE WILL BE FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY GENERAL
DAYAN OR ANOTHER SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIAL WITH WHOM I WILL
PURSUE THIS DISCUSSION INTENSIVELY AND IN CONCRETE TERMS.
I HAVE INFORMED PRESIDENT ASSAD OF THIS AND HAVE TOLD HIM
THAT I WILL THEN BE IN A POSITION, IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS
TIME, TO RECEIVE HIS TRUSTED REPRESENTATIVE AS HE AND I
EARLIER AGREED. I HAVE ALSO REITERATED TO PRESIDENT
ASSAD MY COMMITMENT TO OBTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE AGREE-
MENT ON THE SYRIAN FRONT, SO THAT THE DISENGAGEMENT PHASE
MAY BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AND THE GROUND
THUS PREPARED FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF THE GENEVA PROCESS
LOOKING TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND DURABLE PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 48020, 9MAR'74

PRESIDENT NIXON AND I WILL NEED A FREE HAND TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT WITH MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. I HAVE FOR THIS REASON BEEN ENCOURAGED TO LEARN THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS INVITED ARAB OIL MINISTERS TO MEET IN CAIRO TO DECIDE ON LIFTING THE OIL EMBARGO. THIS STEP WILL STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT IT WILL BE SEEN BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS AS REFLECTING UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAJOR EFFORT WE ARE MAKING TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND SOUNDLY BASED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD AND TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THAT WILL BRING PEACE WITH HONOR AND JUSTICE TO THE AREA.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END MESSAGE:

KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR./HLK

3/9/74 EXT 29464

THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

SECRET

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Department of State
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Copy 6 OF 10 COPIES

Scowcroft
McFaulone
TELEGRAM
Rohrer
Saunders

O 050521Z FEB 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS NIACT IMMEDIATE 7222
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JERDA IMMEDIATE 3890
UEHCR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5929
BT
S E C R E T STATE 023523

CONTROL: 982Q
RECD: 5 FEB 74 12:30AM

NODIS/CHEROKEE
E.O. 11552: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, AG
SUBJECT: LIFTING OF OIL BOYCOTT

FOR CHARGE FROM SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY.
2. BEGIN MESSAGE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONCERN OVER THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE OIL EMBARGO, SINCE AS A RESULT OF THOSE DEVELOPMENTS WE ARE APPROACHING A FATEFUL MOMENT FOR THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN THE 4 MONTHS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE OCTOBER WAR, THE US HAS MOVED DECISIVELY AND RESOLUTELY TO GET A NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED THAT WILL LEAD TO A JUST AND DURABLE MIDDLE EAST PEACE. WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE SAID WE WOULD DO, FROM THE OCTOBER 22 CEASEFIRE THROUGH THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11 WHICH RELIEVED PRESSURE ON THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY, THE OPENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN DECEMBER AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOW BRINGING ABOUT THE FIRST ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN SINAI SINCE 1967.

WE HAVE NOW TURNED OUR ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE

DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE SYRIAN FRONT AND ARE DEEPLY ENGAGED IN THAT EFFORT, WHICH WILL REQUIRE THE SAME PATIENT AND DIFFICULT PREPARATIONS BY US WITH ISRAEL AS DID THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. WE HAVE DONE ALL OF THIS DESPITE THE CONTINUING OIL EMBARGO AGAINST US, SINCE WE UNDERSTOOD THE FACTORS WHICH LED TO ITS BEING IMPOSED IN THE HEAT OF THE WAR AND BECAUSE WE RECEIVED MANY ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE ENDED, IN THE NEW SITUATION NOW EXISTING, ONCE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. I BELIEVE YOU WOULD AGREE WITH ME, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE BEGINNING OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE JANUARY 18 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT REPRESENTS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 23523, FEB 5

I HAVE JUST LEARNED, HOWEVER, FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA OF ITS NEW POSITION, FOLLOWING THE RECENT VISIT THERE OF PRESIDENT ASSAD, THAT THE EMBARGO SHOULD NOT BE LIFTED UNTIL A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. WE ARE INFORMING THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA, THAT IF THE EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED BY THE TIME THE FEBRUARY 14 MEETING OF OIL MINISTERS IN TRIPOLI CONCLUDES, PRESIDENT NIXON WILL NOT AUTHORIZE THE CONTINUATION OF OUR EFFORTS WITH RESPECT TO THE NEXT STEP OF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. WE WOULD DISCONTINUE OUR EFFORTS RELUCTANTLY, BUT CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA WILL NOT SUPPORT OUR PURSUING THE DIFFICULT COURSE WE HAVE SET FOR OURSELVES TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WHICH ARAB COUNTRIES SAY IS THEIR OBJECTIVE, IF THOSE COUNTRIES CONTINUE THEIR DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES AGAINST THE US.

MR. PRESIDENT, YOU KNOW MY DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR A JUST SETTLEMENT AND YOU KNOW THAT I KEEP MY COMMITMENTS. I THEREFORE FEEL I OWE IT TO YOU, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE FRANK AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN US, TO INFORM YOU OF THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE COURSE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD IF THE EMBARGO CONTINUES AND I AM THEREBY UNABLE TO CONTINUE THE WORK I SET OUT TO DO.

FINALLY, LET ME CONCLUDE WITH THIS THOUGHT. WHEN WE MET, MR. PRESIDENT, I WAS MUCH IMPRESSED WITH WHAT YOU SAID ABOUT THE DIGNITY OF THE ARAB NATION. I WAS ALSO IMPRESSED WITH YOUR DISCUSSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE RELEVANT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. I TOLD YOU THEN WHAT WE WOULD DO, AND WE HAVE KEPT ALL OUR PROMISES. BUT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES ALSO HAS ITS DIGNITY. WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO ACT UNDER PRESSURE. YOU HAVE MY WORD, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO OUR UTMOST FOR A JUST PEACE, AND WE WILL KEEP OUR WORD.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END
MESSAGE. KISSINGER

BT
DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.:MTB
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
S/S-O: R.ELTZ

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
Department of State

'74 JAN 21 PM 10:00

TELEGRAM

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MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

PAGE 01 STATE 012875

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INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:A ATHERTON
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
S/S - MR. LUERS

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TO USINT ALGIERS FLASH

SECRET STATE 012875

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE)

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE

1. DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT
BOUMEDIENE:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN TO DAMASCUS, I WANT TO GIVE YOU
A BRIEF REPORT ON MY FIVE HOUR MEETING YESTERDAY WITH
PRESIDENT ASAD.

THE PRESIDENT AND I HAD A GOOD TALK. I WAS ABLE TO
EXPLAIN TO HIM IN DETAIL HOW WE ENVISAGE THE PEACEMAKING
PROCESS EVOLVING IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE FRAMEWORK,
ALONG THE LINES I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY TO YOU IN MY LETTER
YESTERDAY. WE DISCUSSED IN PARTICULAR HOW SYRIA MIGHT BE
BROUGHT INTO THAT PROCESS THROUGH THE INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS
LOOKING TOWARD THE DISENGAGEMENT OF SYRIAN AND
ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 012875

PRESIDENT ASAD GAVE ME SOME IDEAS ON A SET OF PRINCIPLES ON DISENGAGEMENT, WHICH MIGHT FORM A PROPER BASIS FOR SUCH

NEGOTIATIONS. HE AUTHORIZED ME TO CONVEY THESE TO THE ISRAELIS, AND I THOUGHT THEM SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO STOP IN ISRAEL BRIEFLY ON MY RETURN TRIP TO WASHINGTON.

I INTEND TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA, AND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO HELP BRING ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE SYRIAN NEGOTIATION, SINCE I KNOW THERE CAN BE NO JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS IT INCLUDES ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED AS THIS MATTER PROGRESSES.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END TEXT.
KISSINGER

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2 1.1 5Q
RECD: 9 SEP '72, 5:07PM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/USINT ALGIERS NIACT IMMEDIATE 5137
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1339
RUESBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2935
RUESTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI NIACT IMMEDIATE 5971
RUESKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2958
RUOSKH/AMEMBASSY KHARJUM NIACT IMMEDIATE 3654
RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2028
RUESRE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 5417
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1962
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0267
INFO RUESKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE 6111
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 4181
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 3169
BT
SECRET STATE 164981

NODIS

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF US NATIONALS AND PROPERTY

1. WHILE WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELIS WILL PURSUE PUNITIVE ACTIONS AGAINST FEDAYEEN IN NEIGHBORING STATES AS RESULT MUNICH INCIDENT, POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL AIR OR OF LAND STRIKES CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT LOCAL ARAB POPULATIONS OR FEDAYEEN MAY TAKE RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST IN-COUNTRY US NATIONALS AND AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS WITH OR WITHOUT APPROVAL OR INCITEMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

2. VIEW FOREGOING, DEPARTMENT SUGGESTS ADDRESSEES SATISFY THEMSELVES RE ADEQUACY OF POST PLANNING WITH RESPECT TO LOCAL EMERGENCIES. AT THEIR DISCRETION, ADDRESSEES MAY ALSO WISH INDICATE TO APPROPRIATE ELEMENT HOST GOVERNMENTS OUR EXPECTATION FULL PROTECTION WILL BE AFFORDED DURING THIS PERIOD OF TENSION TO AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY WITHIN COUNTRY. YOU MAY INDICATE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT US AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATELY TOOK STEPS FOLLOWING MUNICH INCIDENT TO INCREASE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARAB MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK AND THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN IN EFFECT.

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-2 - STATE 164981, SEP 9, 1972

3. DEPARTMENT WILL ENDEAVOR KEEP ADDRESSEES INFORMED RE
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD AFFECT SUBJECT PLANNING.
GDS. ROGERS
BT
#4981

DRAFTED BY: AF/N:JJBlake
NEA-Mr.Davies

APPROVED BY: AF-Amb.Ross
S/S:JMEalum

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Department of State

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NODIS

FOR EAGLETON FROM NEWSOM

REF: STATE 119376 AND WITMAN TELECON 7/1/72

1. TOSEC 156 AND SECTO 115 BEING SEPARATELY REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. ACCORDINGLY, WHEN INFORMING HAYDANI OF RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YEMEN PER REFTTEL, YOU SHOULD REMIND HIM THAT USG AT HIGHEST LEVEL ATTACHES SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. TO THIS END, YOU MAY SAY THAT SECRETARY WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY VISIT TO ALGIERS AT END OF HIS CURRENT TRIP IF RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS COULD BE ANNOUNCED AT THAT TIME.

3. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE CONFLUENCE OF SEVERAL CONDITIONS ALGERIANS HAVE AT VARIOUS TIMES HINTED MIGHT CONSTITUTE APPROPRIATE MOMENT FOR RESUMPTION, E.G., SIMILAR ACTION BY AN EASTERN ARAB STATE AND/OR FAVORABLE ACTION BY FPC ON EL PASO/SONATRACH AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALSO SOLVED PROBLEM OF HIJACK RANSOM MONEY, AND COULD LEND ACTION PRESTIGE OF SECRETARY'S VISIT. FYI: WHILE QUESTIONS STILL REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN EL PASO AND FPC AND WHILE WE STILL HOPE ALGERIA CAN FIND MORE ADEQUATE FORMULA FOR DISCOURAGING HIJACKINGS, WE FEEL SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TO DATE AND AVAILABILITY OF SECRETARY IN OUR VIEW PROVIDE

ADEQUATE AND TIMELY BASIS FOR RESUMPTION. END FYI. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THEM MAKE THIS DECISION NOW.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2- STATE 119670, JUL 01, NODIS

4. IT WOULD NATURALLY BE ESSENTIAL TO HAVE EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY IN ORDER THAT SECRETARY'S ITINERARY CAN BE FINALIZED.

5. PLEASE INDICATE SOONEST WHETHER YOU CONSIDER IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO MAKE QUICK TRIP TO ALGIERS IN THIS CONNECTION, AND IF SO, WHEN. I AM READY IF NECESSARY.

6. DECLASSIFICATION GDS JOHNSON

DRAFTED BY:
AF:WITMAN:CHG

APPROVED BY:
AF/DDNEWSOM

CLEARANCES:
S/S:RTCURRAN

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two stars.

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5526Q
18 AUG 71, 6:38 P.M.

71 AUG 19 AM 8:57
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2. ASST SECY SISCO HAS NOW MADE FULL REPORT TO HIS SUPERIORS ON HIS TALKS IN ISRAEL. WE HAVE NOT SAID ANYTHING PUBLICLY--NOR DO WE INTEND TO--ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE IDEAS WE EXPLORED WITH ISRAELIS BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW THE MORE THE DETAILS ARE AIRED PUBLICLY, THE GRATER BECOME THE ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS. SISCO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2-STATE 151777, AUG 18

HAD THREE LONG MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR, EBAN, ALLON AND DAYAN TOGETHER, PLUS A SEPARATE MEETING WITH EBAN, LARGELY DEVOTED TO BILATERAL MATTERS. SISCO REVIEWED IN DETAIL PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE INTERIM CANAL AGREEMENT, WHICH HAVE EMERGED FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS QUESTION WITH BOTH SIDES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. HE FOCUSED ON THE FOLLOWING: (A) RELATIONS BETWEEN AN INTERIM AND AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT; (B) QUESTION OF THE USE OF THE CANAL BY ISRAEL; (C) NATURE OF THE CEASEFIRE; (D) QUESTION OF AN EGYPTIAN PRESENCE EAST OF THE SUEZ CANAL;

(E) EXTENT OF THE ZONE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; (F) NATURE OF THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM. SISCO EXPLORED ALL OF THE ELEMENTS IN DEPTH AND, WITHOUT MAKING FORMAL PROPOSALS, PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS DESIGNED TO TRY TO MEET WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. WE EXPECT THAT THE IDEAS AIMED AT RECONCILING DIFFERENCES WITH SISCO EXPLORED WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUING DISCUSSION IN THE DAYS AHEAD BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE US, AND WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED STAGE FOR MORE CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS WITH UAR. WE HAVE TOLD EGYPTIANS THIS IN COURSE OF GENERAL REPORT TO THEM ON SISCO TRIP THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE WOULD EXPECT DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES WILL BE INTENSIFIED DURING WEEKS AHEAD. MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS INTENSE INTEREST IN DETAILS OF IDEAS SISCO DISCUSSED WITH ISRAELIS, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO HOLD THESE CLOSELY IN PRESENT DELICATE STAGE OF OUR DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL.

3. SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT REMAIN, BUT WE CONTINUE TO BE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT FEEL WE HAVE HEARD THE LAST WORD FROM EITHER THE ISRAELIS OR THE EGYPTIANS. THEY BOTH SAY THEY FAVOR A CANAL AGREEMENT AND WANT USG TO PLAY DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN SEEKING TO BRING IT ABOUT. IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF PARALLELISM CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE SAID THAT PURPOSE OF PRESENT EFFORTS IS TO REOPEN CANAL AND THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT THROUGH SOME WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM CANAL CEASEFIRE LINE. FOR OUR PART WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT AN INTERIM, PARTIAL AGREEMENT OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL CAN BE A GREAT, PERHAPS A DECISIVE, STIMULUS TO THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING AN OVERALL PEACE.

4. POSTS SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON "NEW" US INITIATIVES; STRESS SHOULD BE ON CONTINUITY OF ONGOING PROCESS. IF QUERIED RE REPORTED UAR "DEADLINES" AND PRESENT UAR ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR EFFORTS, YOU MAY SAY WE ARE AWARE OF IMPORTANCE SADAT ATTACHES

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

-3-STATE 151777, AUG 18

TO TANGIBLE PROGRESS THIS YEAR, AND WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS UNABATED TO THAT END. WE HOPE NEITHER UAR NOR ISRAEL WILL TAKE ACTIONS POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE WHAT WE CONSIDER BEST AVENUE NOW AVAILABLE FOR MAKING POLITICAL PROGRESS, SINCE ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. SPECIFICALLY, WE RECOGNIZE THAT CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN IN CAIRO AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE TO AIRING MIDDLE EAST QUESTION DURING FORTHCOMING UNGA. IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD RISK COMPLICATING SERIOUSLY THE QUIET DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS NOW UNDER WAY TO ACHIEVE AN INTERIM CANAL AGREEMENT.

5. IF QUERIED RE STATUS OF ISRAEL'S ARMS REQUESTS, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT (A) WE HAVE ONGOING ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEXT OF OUR MAINTAINING AREA MILITARY BALANCE, (B) QUESTION OF FUTURE SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT, ON WHICH DELIVERIES UNDER PAST COMMITMENTS NOW COMPLETED, WAS AMONG BILATERAL US-ISRAELI MATTERS DISCUSSED DURING SISCO VISIT, AND (C) SISCO'S REPORT ON ALL ASPECTS OF HIS TALKS IN ISRAEL IS NOW UNDER STUDY WITHIN USG. YOU SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON QUESTION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS SUPPLY AND STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR INTERIM AGREEMENT, SIMPLY NOTING THAT MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY BALANCE REMAINS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY. GP-3. ROGERS
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALatherton, Jr. NEA/IAI:HHStackhouse
APPROVED BY: The Secretary
CLEARANCES: NEA:JJSisco
S/S-Mr. Eliot

SECRET

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~~SECRET/NOTES~~
Classification
Department of State
TELEGRAM

9

70 JUL 11 AM 9:24

ACTION: USINT ALGIERS
 Amembassy ~~AMMAN~~.....
 Amembassy BEIRUT
 USINT CAIRO
 Amembassy JERUSA
 Amembassy KUWAIT
 Amembassy LONDON
 Amembassy MOSCOW
 Amembassy PARIS
 Amembassy RAWALPINDI
 Amembassy RABAT
 Amembassy ROME
 Amembassy TEL AVIV
 Amembassy TRIPOLI
 Amembassy TUNIS

STATE 110907

SUBJECT: Confidential Guidance on Military Assistance for Israel

EXEX

DOMESTIC

APPROVED BY:
NEA: Joseph J. Sisco

NEA/ARN:TSceIye (subs.)
NEA/ARI:BWtrampelmeier (subs.)
NEA/PAF:TCoono (subs.)
NEA:ALatherion, Jr.
S/C - Mr. Brown

EUR:Miss Tibbetts (subs.)
AF/N:FGW:ner (subs.)
NEA/D:GSmith (subs.)
S/PRS:Mr. Barton (info)

~~SECRET/NO DTS~~
~~Classified/100~~



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAMWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

INDICATE

☐ COLLECT☐ CHARGE TO'70 MAR 23 AM 8:43
23 MAR 70 00 00 Zfile 8
7

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

Amembassy AMMAN

BEIRUT

BONN

USINT CAIRO

Amembassy JIDDA

USINT KHARTOUM

Amembassy KUWAIT

LONDON

PARIS

ROME

TEL AVIV

TUNIS

TRIPOLI

RABAT

INFO: Amconsul DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE

Amembassy BUCHAREST

Amconsul JERUSALEM

Amembassy MOSCOW

BELGRADE

USUN NEW YORK

Amembassy ANKARA

TEHRAN

NEW DELHI

RAWALPINDI

STATE - 041924

NODIS

REF: State 41919

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:ALatherton, Jr:mob

DRAFTING DATE

3/22/70

TEL. EXT.

29464

APPROVED BY:


NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

S/S - O: N.C. Ledsky S/PRS - Mr. McCloskey (Info)

SECRET/NODIS

Classification



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 2

DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR/CHIEF OF MISSION AT OPENING OF
BUSINESS MONDAY, MARCH 23

Text contained reftel of Secretary's announcement on Israel's
military and economic requests should be further revised as
follows:

A. In fourth paragraph of text, delete repeat delete second
sentence which reads as follows: "To this point, these
reports do not indicate a significant shift in the balance,"
and delete first word, "But," of following sentence. Revised
fourth paragraph therefore now reads as follows:

~~XXX~~ "In this connection, we have evidence that the
USSR has been taking recent steps to strengthen
the air defense of the UAR by introduction of
SA-3 missiles and additional Soviet personnel.
As the President indicated on Saturday, the
situation bears and will receive close and

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

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Classification



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☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 3

careful scrutiny by us as well as continuous
review and evaluation."

B. In the fifth paragraph of text, delete repeat delete
following phrase in last sentence: "in excess of \$100 million."

Revised fifth paragraph therefore now reads as follows:

~~XXX~~ "On the economic side, the United States will
respond affirmatively to certain of Israel's
short-term financial requests while studying
further its longer-range needs. There will
be an expanded PL-480 program for purchase of
surplus food, principally wheat and feed grains,
under favorable credit arrangements. We will
also extend credits to help cover the balance
due on past military contracts."

GP-3

END

ROGERS:

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL EXT

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Classification



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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM'70 MAR 23 AM 8:43 14z
23 MAR 70

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: USINT AEGIERS IMMEDIATE

Amembassy AMMAN
BEIRUT
BONN
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy JIDDA
USINT KHARTOUM
Amembassy KUWAIT
LONDON
PARIS
ROME
TEL AVIV
TUNIS
TRIPOLI
RABAT

INFO: Amconsul DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE

Amembassy BUCHAREST
Amconsul JERUSALEM
Amembassy MOSCOW
BELGRADE
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy ANKARA
TEHRAN
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI

STATE 041919

NODIS

REF: State 041871

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:ALatherton, Jr:mob

DRAFTING DATE

3/22/70

TEL. EXT.

29464

APPROVED BY:

The Secretary

CLEARANCES:


S/S - O: N.C. Ledsky

NEA - Mr. Sisco

S/PRS - Mr. McCloskey

SECRET/NODIS

Classification



INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 2 7

DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR/CHIEF OF MISSION AT OPENING OF
BUSINESS MONDAY, MARCH 23.

Following is further revision of announcement on Israeli
military and economic requests which Secretary will make at
noon Monday, March 23. Text which follows replaces that
contained reftel and posts should be certain it is only text
used in approaches to host governments and for all other
purposes.

BEGIN TEXT: My statement will deal with the Israeli requests
both for military and economic assistance from the United
States. The decisions I am announcing today are based on our
present appraisal of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Last year, the Government of Israel asked the United
States to sell it 25 additional Phantoms and 100 more
Skyhawks. The Israeli request has been carefully and
sympathetically considered in the light of the military

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DRAFTING DATE


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Classification



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 3 7

situation in the area and of our policy of doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

In our judgment, Israel's air capacity is sufficient to meet its needs for the time being. Consequently, the President has decided to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for additional aircraft. In doing so, he has instructed that close watch be kept on the military balance in the area. The United States will be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it. To this end the United States will remain in close consultation with those concerned.

In this connection, we have evidence that the USSR has been taking recent steps to strengthen the air defense]

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
TEL. EXT.

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CLEARANCES.

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Classification



SECRET/NODIS
Classification
Department of State
TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 47

of the UAR by introduction of SA-3 missiles and additional Soviet personnel. To this point, these reports do not indicate a significant shift in the balance. But as the President indicated on Saturday, the situation bears and will receive close and careful scrutiny by us as well as continuous review and evaluation.

On the economic side, the United States will respond affirmatively to certain of Israel's short-term financial requests while studying further its longer-range needs. There will be an expanded PL-480 program for purchase of surplus food, principally wheat and feed grains, under favorable credit arrangements. We will also extend credits in excess of \$100 million to help cover the balance due on past military contracts.

These decisions are taken with the strong conviction that ultimate security for all concerned lies in peace.]

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT

APPROVED BY:

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Classification



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☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 5 7

They are taken in the belief that the current trend of events must be reversed if the situation is to be stabilized and if progress toward peace is to begin. Restraint will be required on the part of other major suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue a policy of seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is to be achieved.

In making this interim decision on aircraft, we have no intention of jeopardizing the security of Israel. If steps are taken which might upset the current balance or if in our judgment political developments warrant, the President will not hesitate to reconsider this matter.

We believe that our restraint will afford fresh opportunities for all concerned--in and outside the area--to diminish hostilities and enhance the prospects for peace. To this end, the United States will make renewed efforts in diplomatic channels to:

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TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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Classification



INDICATE:
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☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 6 7

- (1) encourage both sides to adhere fully to the UN ceasefire resolutions;
- (2) call upon the parties to the conflict to reappraise positions which have become roadblocks to peace;
- (3) urge all concerned to support proposals which would help Ambassador Jarring launch a process of negotiation among the parties under his auspices; and
- (4) engage the other major suppliers to the Middle East in early arms limitation talks.

These will be serious initiatives. We urge all concerned to respond to them with the sense of urgency which the present situation demands of all responsible governments.

END TEXT

GP-3

END

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

ROGERS

CLEARANCES:

SECRET/NODIS

Classification



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

041715

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT☐ CHARGE TO

21 MAR 70 00 54z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:	USINT ALGIERS	PRIORITY	
	Amembassy AMMAN	"	
	BEIRUT	"	
	BONN	"	
	USINT CAIRO	"	
	Amembassy JIDDA	"	
	USINT KHARTOUM	"	
	Amembassy KUWAIT	"	
	LONDON	"	
	PARIS	"	
	ROME	"	
	TEL AVIV	"	
	TUNIS	"	
	TRIPOLI	"	
	RABAT	"	
INFO:	Amconsul DHAHRAN	"	Amembassy ANKARA
	Amembassy BUCHAREST	"	" TEHRAN
	Amconsul JERUSALEM	"	" E NEW DELHI
	Amembassy MOSCOW	"	" RAWALPINDI
	BELGRADE	"	
	USUN NEW YORK	"	

70 MAR 21 PM 12:31

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

STATE 041715

NODIS - NOFORN UNTIL ANNOUNCED

Following is text of announcement on Israeli aircraft request
which Secretary will make at twelve noon Washington time
Monday, March 23. Instructions by septel.

BEGIN TEXT. Last year, the Government of Israel asked the
United States to sell it additional military aircraft.

DRAFTED BY: <i>NEA:JJS</i>	DRAFTING DATE: 3/18/70	TEL. EXT.: 29464	APPROVED BY: <i>The Secretary</i>
CLEARANCES: S/S - Mr. Eliot <i>AL</i> White House - Mr. Kissinger <i>OR</i>			

SECRET/NODIS



SECRET/NODIS
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

- ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 2 7

The Israeli request has been carefully and sympathetically considered in the light of the military situation in the area and of our policy of doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

In our judgment, Israel's air capacity is sufficient to meet its defensive needs for the time being. Consequently, the President has decided to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for additional aircraft.

In doing so, he has instructed that close watch be kept on the balance and that the United States be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it. To this end, the United States will remain in close consultation with those most concerned. The United States will respond affirmatively to certain of Israel's financial requests.

DRAFTED BY:

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APPROVED BY:

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

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ACTION:

PAGE 3 7

✓ This decision is taken in the strong conviction that ultimate security for all concerned lies in peace. It is taken in the belief that the current trend of events must be reversed if the situation is to be stabilized and if progress toward peace is to begin.

The United States alone cannot achieve that result. This Government, therefore, calls upon the Soviet Union to exercise similar restraint. In making this proposal, it must be understood that we have no intention of jeopardizing the legitimate security interests of our friends in the region. It goes without saying that if any country takes steps which might upset the current balance or if in our judgment political developments warrant, the President will not hesitate to reconsider this matter.

We believe that our restraint will afford fresh opportunities for all concerned--in and outside the area-

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

SECRET/NODIS

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★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-575



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

Page 4 7

to replace the drift towards violence with positive steps towards peace. To this end, the United States will make renewed efforts in diplomatic channels to:

- (a) encourage both sides to adhere scrupulously to the UN ceasefire resolutions;
- (b) call upon the parties to the conflict to reappraise positions which have become roadblocks to peace;
- (c) urge all concerned to support proposals which would help Ambassador Jarring launch a process of negotiation among the parties under his auspices; and
- (d) engage the other major suppliers to the Middle East in early arms limitation talks.

These are serious initiatives addressed to a serious situation in the area. We urge all concerned to examine]

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DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

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SECRET/NODIS

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

PAGE 5

7

them with care and with the sense of urgency which the
present situation demands of all responsible governments.

END TEXT.

GP-1

END

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

SECRET/NODIS



SECRET / NODIS
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

034788

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

10 MAR 70 00 46z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy ALGIERS

STATE: ~~XXXXXX~~ 034766

REF: Algiers 299

N O D I S

1. Murphy's letter to Algerian Interests Section here said that he would be visiting Algiers on business, in his capacity as Chairman of Board, Corning Glass.
2. Since letter was addressed to IntSec here we not at all certain its substance relayed to GOA.

End

70 MAR 10 8:34
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: AF/N:CWBrayIII:pw	DRAFTING DATE 3/9/70	TEL. EXT. 20529	APPROVED BY: AF - C. Robert Moore
----------------------------------	-------------------------	--------------------	--------------------------------------

CLEARANCES:

~~XXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Irons

White House - Mr. Hoskinson (sub)

SECRET / NODIS
Classification

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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Department of State

W H
TELEGRAM
10

SECRET

R 251530Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8239
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T TUNIS 0887

7 5 1 2 Q

1969 FEB 25 PM 12 14

NODIS

SUBJ: CONTACTS WITH MOHAMED FAYYAD

REF: STATE 25720

1. AT FAYYAD'S REQUEST EMBOFF (BLOCK) SAW HIM FEBRUARY 24 AND MADE ALL POINTS REFTEL. EMBOFF EMPHASIZED U.S. WILLINGNESS LISTEN SHOULD IN NO WAY BE CONSTRUED AS INDICATION AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE, TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH ME FEBRUARY 13, FOREIGN MINISTER BOURGUIBA, JR. SAID THEY NOW HAVE SOME DOUBTS CONCERNING FAYYAD'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE AMONG PALESTINIANS.

GP-3 RUSSELL
BT

NNNN

SECRET



Department of State

WH 8
TELEGRAM

RR RUEHC
DE RUEHCR 6150Q 0510833
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 200815Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8187
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET TUNIS 0812

SECRET

6 1 5 0Q
FEBRUARY 20, 1969
3:51 A.M.

NODIS

DEPT PLS PASS TO AMMAN JERUSALEM TEL AVIV AND USUN.

SUBJ: MOHAMED FAYYAD

REF: STATE 025720

AT OUTSET, EMBOFFS SACKSTEDER AND BLOCK MADE IT
CLEAR TO FAYYAD USG SIMPLY LISTENING AND NO ENCOURAGE-
MENT FOR HIS VIEWS IMPLIED. FAYYAD ALSO UNDERSTOOD U.S.
POSITION CONTEMPLATES RETURN OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN.
UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, EMBASSY WILL AWAIT REQUEST
FOR MEETING FROM FAYYAD TO REAFFIRM POINTS REFTEL.

GP-3 RUSSELL
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN JERUSALEM TEL AVIV & USUN BY OC/T.

NNNN

SECRET

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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CODEWORD

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

Cleared Cables

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

Msg. No.

1. Sent by:

2. TO: White House

424

3. Transmitted by: Whitaker

Date & Time: 8/23 1020

4. Received by: DP - C

Date & Time: 23 10 26

5. Description:

Telegram to Tunis re msg to Pres. Bourguiba

6. Classification & Controls:

CONFIDENTIAL

7. No. of Pgs. 4

8. Precedence IMMEDIATE

9. Validated by RLBrown

10. Deliver to:

White House - Mr. Kissinger

For: Clearance XXX

ATTN: Com. Howe

Information

Per Request



DATE:
COLLECT:
CHARGE TO:

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

'69 AUG 23 AM 10 31

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy TUNIS PRIORITY

STATE

1. Embassy requested transmit following message to President Bourguiba:

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message concerning the most unfortunate fire which occurred in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, and deeply regret the damage caused to this site held sacred by Muslims the world over. From my own travels in the area and visits to the holy places, I am keenly aware of their meaning to peoples of all religions. The spiritual loss is compounded by the loss of works of great beauty and historical value.

I fully share your concern for the serious repercussions this incident could have. I am asking Ambassador Calhoun to keep in close touch with you regarding such details as we may receive concerning

ATTENTION:

AF/N:FGWisher:jms:ls

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TEL. EXT. 20498

APPROVED BY:

S/S -

ARRANGES:

AF/N - Mr. Allen (draft)

AF - Mr. Newsom (in draft)

IO - Mr. Green (draft)

NBA - Mr. Davies (draft)

WII -



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this incident and steps which may be taken as a result.

My government will watch this situation closely, and I can assure you of our deep and abiding interest in the question of Jerusalem. I hope this matter can be settled in a manner satisfactory to Muslims everywhere.

During this difficult period I know I can rely on your great qualities of statesmanship in helping to ensure that the present unfortunate situation does not deteriorate further. In the first instance I am sure you agree that calm and order must be maintained. I know your cooperation can be counted on in arriving at a resolution satisfactory to all concerned peoples.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

2. Department has received text of following letter from President Bourguiba to President Nixon:

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The President

The White House

I have the honor to inform you that the government and people of Tunisia have learned with emotion the news of the fire which ravaged Moslem holy places of Jerusalem. This odious act, in addition to proving a characteristic scorn for spiritual values of the highest order, is bound to seriously aggravate the situation in the Middle East and to render even more difficult the search for a just and lasting peace in the region. The Tunisian Government considers that the responsibility of the Zionist occupying power is directly involved and feels that it is necessary (1) that the United Nations take urgent conservatory measures to be imposed in order to safeguard the existence of the Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem and to assure their safety and protection; (2) that an international inquiry be immediately convoked in order to shed light

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on the circumstances surrounding this incident; (3)
that every measure must be taken with a view to
assuring the application of United Nations decisions
relative to the Jerusalem Holy Places.

I request you to please use your influence in
order to insure that a firm attitude is taken by the
community of nations respecting international law with
regard to this incident which has just shocked not
only the Moslem community, but the entire international
community, and which gravely endangers world peace.

Habib Bourguiba
President of the Tunisian Republic

3. Department considers exchange a privileged communication
and does not intend release text. Expect GOT will treat in
similar fashion.

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TCM: EKT.

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PARANCAH